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1 
Het 'triage' concept als allocatie-criterium voor de ontwikkelingshulp, hetwelk 
volgens GREENE wordt voorgestaan door verschillende Amerikaanse politici en 
wetenschapsbeoefenaars, is vanuit geen enkel gezichtspunt te verdedigen. 
GREENE, W., New York Times Magazine, 5 Januari, 1975, p. 9. 
2 
De verdeling over de ontwikkelingslanden van de harde zowel als zachte 
leningen, uit te geven door de internationale instellingen voor ontwikkelings-
hulp, zou gebaseerd moeten zijn op een internationaal overeengekomen 
formule. 
3 
Bij de selectie van concentratielanden voor het Nederlandse bilaterale hulp-
programma worden sedert kort drie criteria aangelegd: 'a) mate van armoede, 
b) specifieke ongedekte behoefte aan hulp, en c) mate waarin de hulp ten goede 
komt aan brede lagen van de bevolking (waarbij tevens wordt gelet op de 
mensenrechten in het land).' Dit betekent dat meer dan tot dusverre het geval 
was het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken zieh specifieke landen-, sector- en 
projectkennis eigen moet maken om het Nederlandse hulpprogramma in over-
eenstemming te brengen met de selectie-criteria. 
Memories van Toelichting bij de Begrotingen 1975 en 1976. 
4 
Het verdient aanbeveling om de thans vertrouwelijke projectbeoordelings-
rapporten van de internationale ontwikkelingshulp instellingen te publiceren. 
5 
Volgens REUTLINGER is het aannemelijk dat financieel en economisch gezien de 
baten van wereld graanreserves kleiner zijn dan de kosten. Indien echter de 
baten ten goede komen aan de graan importerende landen, terwijl de kosten 
gedragen worden door de graan exporterende landen en door de instelling die 
de reserve voorraden beheert, verdient het desalniettemin aanbeveling om 
zulke programma's verder te bestuderen in het kader van de internationale 
hulpverlening. 
REUTLINGER, S., 'A Simulation Model for Evaluating World-
Wide Bufferstocks of Wheat', American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics, Februari 1976. 
6 
F . L . C . H . HELMERS 
Wageningen, 1 juni 1977 
KINDLEBERGER'S definitie van uitbuiting (exploitation) als een situatie waarbij 
de prijs hoger is dan de prijs onder volledige mededinging moet worden ver-
worpen. Uitbuiting kan alleen dan gedefinieerd worden indien tevens normen 
voor een sociaal aanvaardbare inkomensverdeling zijn vastgesteld. 
KINDLEBERGER, C. P., 'International Economies', 5th ed., 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1973, p. 85. 
7 
De onlangs ook door VAN DEN DOEL verdedigde Stelling van GALBRAITH dat ter 
bevordering van de maatschappelijke welvaart de productie van 'goederen 
en diensten die ondeelbaar zijn of externe effecten veroorzaken' bij de Overheid 
zou moeten worden 'gecentraliseerd', is in zijn algemeenheid onjuist. 
VAN DEN DOEL, J., 'Demokratie en Welvaartstheorie', Samsom 
Uitgeverij, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1975, p. 17). 
8 
Jute, een product dat een voorname bron van inkomen is voor 50 tot 60 
miljoen mensen in de ärmste landen ter wereld, heeft in het verleden vele mark-
ten verloren door concurrentie van synthetische vezels. Volgens AVRAMOVIC is 
jute nu weer meer concurrerend geworden door de recente aardolie prijsver-
hogingen. Het is echter niet te verwachten dat het jaarinkomen van de modale 
jute verbouwer in Bangladesh en India een redelijk niveau zal bereiken en het 
verdient daarom aanbeveling dat deze landen maatregelen nemen gericht op 
bedrijfssanering en waar mogelijk diversificatie van gewassen met als. doel ver-
groting van het inkomen van de kleine jute verbouwer. 
AVRAMOVIC, D., 'Stabilization, Adjustment and Diversifica-
tion : A Study of the Weakest Commodities produced by the 
Poorest Regions', World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 245, 
November 1976. 
9 
Ondanks de verhoging van de aardolieprijzen kunnen nucleaire electriciteits-
centrales in de ontwikkelingslanden nog steeds niet concurreren met conven-
tionele centrales. Het is niet te verwachten dat dit op körte termijn zal ver-
anderen. 
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P R E F A C E 
In the past few years several manuals dealing with project planning for the 
developing countries have been published. One may therefore ask why another 
study on this subject has been written. The answer is that the manuals, in my 
opinion, do not deal adequately with the income distribution aspects of 
projects. This study was written to demonstrate how traditional project plan-
ning criteria can be expanded to include income distribution considerations. 
Part I of the study (Chapters 1 through 6) discusses conventional project 
planning criteria. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction by reviewing some of the 
broader principles of the analysis. Chapters 2 and 3 examine in detail the 
valuation of benefits and costs, paying particular attention to the problems 
that arise in making such valuations in developing countries. While Chapter 4 
is concerned with the rules to be followed for maximizing the net benefits of a 
single project, Chapter 5 reviews the techniques for maximizing the net benefits 
of a series of projects. Chapter 6 deals with a number of different topics, ranging 
from the practical problems posed by linkages and externalities to an examin-
ation of the usefulness of international lending agencies and problems related 
to divergencies from situations of internal and external balance. 
Part II is concerned with income distribution, and begins in Chapter 7 with 
a review of the concept of a social welfare function. If one accepts this concept, 
it is clear that traditional project planning theory assumes a special kind of 
welfare function, so that the social welfare function could just as well have been 
discussed in Part I. Because traditional project theory developed without much 
reference to the concept, it was thought preferable to defer the discussion of the 
social welfare function to Part II. Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to the inter-
temporal and interpersonal aspects, respectively, of income distribution. Chap-
ter 10 applies the methodology developed in the previous chapters to several 
case studies in developing countries. Part II closes with some concluding 
remarks, an English and a Dutch summary, and a list of references. 
In writing the study, I have kept in mind that the subject is relatively new 
and that many who are interested in project planning are not professional 
economists. Several topics received, therefore, a broader discussion than 
would have been necessary if the study were solely addressed to economists. 
It is assumed, however, that the reader is familiar with the basic principles 
of economic analysis. I hope that the study may be of some use to the prac-
titioners of project planning - those who have the hard task of applying theo-
retical principles to the actual preparation, appraisal and implementation 
of projects. 

PART I 
THE CONVENTIONAL PROJECT PLANNING CRITERIA 

1. S O M E BASIC ISSUES 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
Since World War II, development planning has evolved tremendously. Most 
countries, the major exception being the USA, publish Central Plans, setting 
targets in terms of national income growth, sometimes also broken down in 
sectors, regions or income groups. Clearly, the individual projects within the 
Plan determine to what extent the targets will be achieved. However, even when 
a country has no development plan, the choice of individual projects is impor-
tant. In general, given the scarce available resources, one should ensure that 
each project generates maximum benefits. With this is defined the subject of this 
study - the theory of project planning or, as it may also be called, the theory of 
project analysis, project evaluation, or benefit-cost analysis. 
Projects are the building blocks of plans and JANSEN1 sees, therefore, a pro-
ject as the smallest unit of activity - from a technical or economical point of 
view - that can be undertaken. We accept this and further define such a unit of 
activity as the coordinated use of scarce resources for the production of goods 
or services that increase national welfare relative to the situation without the 
project. There are several aspects to this definition that need elaboration. First, 
the word coordinated is used to indicate that some kind of organization - a 
private enterprise, a government department, a state corporation, a joint 
venture, or some other body - is necessary to operate the project. Second, we 
speak of a project only if its objective is to produce goods or services that in-
crease national welfare. For instance, building a factory does not in itself 
constitute a project; since the factory should eventually produce goods or 
services, the project, in this case, consists not only of the investment in the fac-
tory but also of the factory's operations, in the most general sense of the word, 
during its economic life. Third, the word investment is intentionally not used 
in the definition so that also such activities as research and extension can be 
considered projects. Finally, the definition implies that, somehow, national 
welfare should be maximized. 
The theory of project planning provides criteria for the design and implemen-
tation of individual projects and for the selection of a series of projects to arrive 
at a country's development program. The theory borrows substantially from 
both micro- and macro-economic analysis in that the project must be considered 
both as an individual entity and also within the broader perspective of the natio-
nal economy. An essential element of the theory is that it focuses explicitly upon 
the objective of increasing national welfare. What then is national welfare? 
Often it is considered identical to national income. There are, however, several 
reasons why this is not correct as illustrated in the paragraphs below. 
First, there is the problem of determining at which prices national income 
should be measured when the market prices of the produced goods or services 
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change. Suppose, for instance, that a crop failure has increased the price of rice. 
Assuming that demand for rice is inelastic, expenditures on rice and national 
income in current terms would increase, yet welfare has decreased. If national 
income were measured at the old prices, it would decline but, clearly, as indi-
cated by the higher rice prices the decline in welfare is greater than the decline 
in national income. Some price between the old and the new therefore seems 
appropriate. Traditionally, welfare changes have been determined by evaluating 
the changes in consumer surplus - the amount of money the consumers are 
willing to pay over and above what they actually pay. 
A second deficiency of the national income concept is that it does not con-
sider leisure time. Of two economies with the same national income, the one 
with a fourty-hour workweek should evidently be preferred to the one with a 
sixty-hour week. Another example is the following. If a laborer voluntarily 
reduces his working hours even though he thereby reduces his income, then 
according to the national income concept there would be a decrease in welfare. 
In reality, of course, the laborer's welfare has increased because otherwise he 
would not have made this adjustment to his working hours. The disutility of 
labor effort should, therefore, be taken into account in measuring welfare chan-
ges. 
Third, there are many economies where the market prices which enter into 
the national accounts do not reflect the real values of the factors of production 
or of the produced goods. The most evident examples concern labor and foreign 
exchange. Under conditions of unemployment, the cost of hiring an unem-
ployed laborer is obviously not measured by the wage cost. Similarly, if a system 
of licensing applies with respect to imports, the price of an imported good 
valued at the official exchange rate is an underestimate of the scarcity value of 
the import. 
A fourth point concerns externalities. Many production increases have side 
effects - pollution, noise - that are never valued in the national income accounts. 
It is important for an investment decision to know whether such side effects 
exist. 
As the fifth point, it may be mentioned that the national income concept does 
not pay attention to the distribution of income between persons or over time. 
A dollar 2 accruing to a rich man is generally believed to be less valuable socially 
than a dollar accruing to a poor man. Hence, an increase in national income 
going to poor income groups would increase welfare more than if the income 
were to accumulate in the hands of the rich. Similar considerations may apply 
as regards the distribution of income between generations. 
Finally, it should be noted that the national income concept does not con-
sider such things as personal freedom and the quality of life. Of two economies 
with the same national income, an economy with personal freedom is, in our 
opinion, much to be preferred over a dictatorial one. This last point will not, 
however, be further reviewed in this study. 
From the discussion above it is clear that there is a fundamental difference 
between a normal profitability analysis which uses the price data entering the 
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national income accounts and a benefit-cost analysis. For instance, while 
profitability analysis as undertaken by a firm uses market prices for inputs and 
outputs, benefit-cost analysis uses imputed values - the real values of benefits 
and costs - to determine whether or not an investment is worth undertaking. 
It is not the intention here to provide a detailed review of how benefit-cost 
analysis developed, but a brief presentation of some of the principal publica-
tions is in order. 
The use of consumer-surplus in investment decisions has a long history and 
dates back to DUPUIT'S famous work 3 of 1844 on the justification of public 
investment. Although the concept was refined by MARSHALL, 4 HOTELLING, 5 
and H ICKS , 6 it was not generally accepted until the middle of the 1950s when 
the foundation of benefit-cost analysis, including all its other elements, was 
laid by a group of economists associated with the Harvard Water Program 7. 
In 1958, three major publications appeared, namely, by ECKSTEIN 8 a participant 
of the study group - and independently of the group by M C K E A N , 9 and by 
KRUTTLLA and ECKSTEIN . 1 0 These were followed in 1960 by a study of HIRSH-
LEEFER, DE HAVEN and MILLIMAN, 1 1 and in 1962 by the seminal official HARVARD 
study. 1 2 Very useful survey articles were produced by PREST and T U R V E Y , 1 3 
M U S G R A V E , 1 4 and L A Y A R D . 1 5 
During the 1960's, benefit-cost analysis became increasingly accepted as a 
tool for project decision making not only in the USA but also in other countries. 
Following a study by T INBERGEN 1 6 in 1958, mainly on the use of accounting 
prices in public investment analysis, the World Bank gradually began to apply 
the new methodology, and applied it in its work throughout the developing 
world. Manuals to deal with the problems in the developing countries were also 
published by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 1968 1 7 , and the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion (UNIDO) in 1972 1 8. A sequel to the OECD manual by its authors was 
also published in 1974. 1 9 
The above list is, of course, far from complete although it presents some 
of the classic works upon which recent developments have been based. Many 
other important works dealing with benefit-cost analysis have recently been 
published 2 0 and we will refer to a number of these in the course of this study. 
Despite the volume of literature that has recently appeared on the subject, the 
core principles of benefit-cost analysis are still not fully established. The ana-
lysis has become more refined but, at the same time, the positions on basic 
issues seem to have widened, especially regarding such fundamental matters as 
consumer surplus, shadow wage rates, market distortions, and the incorpora-
tion of income distribution aspects into the analysis. This study will try to 
reconcile the different viewpoints and, as mentioned in the preface, will develop 
a theory of project planning which includes income distribution considerations. 
Such a theory is, in principle, applicable to all types of projects. There are, how-
ever, projects whose benefits are difficult to quantify, such as those dealing with 
population control, health, and education. As considerable additional work 
would be required to deal with the special issues these projects raise, these issues 
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will not be discussed. The project planning criteria developed in this study should, 
therefore, be seen as especially relevant to projects with tangible benefits, such 
as those concerning agriculture, industry, public utilities, urban development 
and transport. 
It has become the custom to refer to the traditional analysis as the economic 
evaluation of projects and to the equity-including analysis as the social eva-
luation of projects. As both bodies of analysis take as their starting point the 
interest of society as a whole, these terms are somewhat ambiguous. However, 
we do not wish to confuse the issue more by introducing new terms and will, 
therefore, accept the usual tenninology. In this study, especially in Part II, the 
reader will thus encounter such terms as the social evaluation of projects and 
the social rate of return of a project, the word social meaning that income-
distribution aspects have been taken into account. 
1.2. BENEFITS AND COSTS 
The fundamental principle of project planning is basically very simple and 
can be stated as the rule that incremental units of production should have higher 
benefits than costs. But what are benefits and costs ? In Figure 1.1 the curve DD' 
is the demand curve for a certain good, the curve SS' the marginal cost curve. 
The demand curve represents the price consumers are willing to pay for an 
additional unit of the good and may thus be defined as the marginal willingness 
to pay of the consumers. It is the curve which indicates what the value is of a 
marginal unit of the good to the consumer, and in project-evaluation theory the 
sum of the marginal values represents the total value of the good to consumers, 
i.e. the benefit of the good. In Figure 1.1, the benefit of producing the output 
level OQ is thus represented by the area ODTQ. The cost of producing this out-
put level is equal to the area OSTQ. Hence, the difference between benefits and 
costs equals the area SDT. Since consumers pay a total of ORTQ, whereas they 
would have been willing to pay ODTQ, they have a gain of RDT-the so-called 
consumer surplus. Producers receive a revenue ORTQ but their costs are only 
OSTQ and thus they make a profit of SRT. Denoting benefits by B, costs by C, 
revenues by R, the consumer surplus by Fand profits by P, we have the follow-
ing relationship: 
B -C = (B -R) +(R -Q=Y+P 
Since this relationship holds at any level of output, we find by differentiating 
this expression that the first order condition 2 1 for the optimum output level is 
that benefits and costs of the marginal unit should be equal, or, what amounts 
to the same, that the consumer gain on the marginal unit should equal the loss 
in producer's profit on the marginal unit. 
This basically elementary analysis is not accepted by a number of economists 
on the grounds that the consumer surplus cannot be considered to represent the 
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real utility gain of the consumers. When consumers do not pay what they would 
have been willing to pay and thus receive a gain, the effect must be that the utility 
levels of the consumers are larger than with payments according to willingness 
to pay. As the marginal utility of income of the consumers cannot be considered 
a constant, this means that the money gain as represented by the consumer sur-
plus does not represent the utility gain. This criticism will be reviewed in detail 
in Chapter 2. 
In the above discussion of the optimum output level, we lightly assumed that 
marginal production costs are precisely known. However, this concept is not 
without problems either. In a world full of distortions, costs should not be 
measured at market prices but at real scarcity values. This will be extensively 
discussed in Chapter 3. In this section we wish to review some more general 
problems that may arise regarding the concepts of benefits and costs. 
A criticism that is often made against benefit-cost analysis is that it is a partial 
equilibrium analysis, which therefore cannot capture all the gains and losses 
that may occur in an economy due to a change in the production of a certain 
good. Any project will have indirect effects, in the sense that it affects others as 
well as the parties directly involved. Should all these indirect effects be taken 
into account in the evaluation of a project? The answer has been given by 
VINER, who in a classic article 2 2 has drawn the distinction between pecuniary 
and technological externalities. The latter do not concern us here and will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. The concept of pecuniary externalities, however, is of the 
utmost importance in the present context. An example on the demand side is the 
case where the tastes of a group of consumers change and their demand for, say, 
apples increases. The price of apples will rise and the other consumers of apples 
in the community will suffer a loss. The producers of apples, however, gain, and 
the loss of the other consumers is exactly compensated by the gain of the pro-
ducers so that the pecuniary externality - the price effect on the intramarginal 
units - is not relevant at all in this case. 
Pecuniary externalities arise also on the cost side and it was to this problem 
that VINER'S article was in fact directed. The problem raised by PIGOU and 
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discussed extensively in the economic literature during the first two decades of 
this century 2 3 was analogous to the demand example. Is the price increase of the 
intramarginal units of a certain factor of production a real production cost? 
Suppose that a certain enterprise needs 1,000 laborers with a certain skill. 
Suppose also that this type of labor can be withdrawn from other industries and 
that the total employed in the industry to which the enterprise belongs will 
increase from 50,000 to 51,000, and that the hourly wage will increase from $ 1.00 
to $ 1.01. The cost of labor to the enterprise is then $ 1.01 per hour for a total 
of $ 1,010 per hour. However, the total marginal cost is the difference between 
$ 51,510 (51,000 employed at $ 1.01) and $ 50,000 (50,000 at $ 1.00). Hence, 
the employment of the additional 1,000 laborers in the industry has given rise 
to an increase in total costs per hour of $ 1,510, representing $ 1.51 per hour. 
Should the labor cost be calculated at $ 1.51, that is, should the price increases 
on the intramarginal units be taken into account, or is the real opportunity cost 
of labor $ 1.01 only? The answer is not difficult. The extra amount that enter-
prises elsewhere have to pay for a certain factor of production (in our example 
50,000 hours at $ 0.01 = $ 500) is a loss to these enterprises but it represents a 
benefit to the suppliers of that factor. The higher price of the factor of production 
in question will cause all other enterprises to use less of that factor and more of 
other factors until a new equilibrium position is reached. There will be all kinds 
of price effects on factors of production and outputs. These effects are not to be 
taken into account because they cancel out. Similarly, a lower price for a cer-
tain factor represents a benefit to its users and a loss to its suppliers. Hence, the 
benefits and costs of all these indirect pecuniary spillovers compensate each 
other so that the true opportunity cost of labor can be set at $ 1.01 per hour in 
our example. 
Another subject that requires a brief discussion is the distinction between 
short-run and long-run marginal cost, a distinction that also has given rise in the 
past to much controversy. In fact, the problem is straightforward. Marginal 
costs are the costs of additional output, which, if we consider whether an invest-
ment should be undertaken, i.e. when we consider the long run, include the 
costs of all additional equipment. When an investment has already been under-
taken, however, its costs are sunk costs and the relevant cost concept for pricing 
policies is then marginal short-run costs. It would be foolish in such a case to 
insist on recovery of depreciation or amortization charges, since this may pre-
clude the equipment from being utilized. 
Under conditions of perfect competition, resources will have the same value 
in different uses. However, in the real world such conditions are often not ful-
filled and resources will then have different values in their different uses. How 
should marginal costs then be calculated? The correct principle is to work with 
shadow prices which reflect the real values of the resources. If the resources are 
withdrawn from various uses, each with a different value, then the correct 
shadow price of the resources will be the weighted average of foregone values, 
the weights being the quantities withdrawn. This also means that when the 
project's inputs are imported, the relevant value is the import cost valued at the 
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appropriate scarcity value of foreign exchange. Similarly, marginal benefit 
curves should be based on the values the products create, which, in case of 
production for the domestic market, is the gross consumer surplus - the willing-
ness to pay - and in case of exports or import substitutes, the export earnings or 
savings valued at the appropriate scarcity value of foreign exchange. 
.Resources will be withdrawn at different periods in time and demand may 
change over time. To make such time dated values comparable, present values 
must be calculated, a procedure which may be explained as follows. Suppose 
the Government is willing to invest today an amount equal to K provided it 
obtains one year now a return at least equal to K{\ + q). Then q represents the 
marginal rate of return the Government expects to make. Suppose the Govern-
ment expects to make the same rate of return in the second year. Then the return 
which should be received at the end of year two for an investment maturing in 
two years is #(1 + q)2. Thus, in general, the terminal benefit T„ at the rate of 
return q of an investment maturing in n years, may be represented by Tn = 
K{\ + q)n. It follows that the general formula for the present value of a terminal 
sum T„ in year n at the constant rate q is T„/( 1 + q)n. Application of this formula 
to the various time dated costs and benefits will provide the present values of 
costs and benefits. 
Finally, a few words about another subject that has given rise to confusion: 
the with and without approach. Obviously, when an investment project is con-
sidered, its costs and benefits should be determined in relation to the situation 
without the project. This might seem to imply that costs and benefits should be 
determined relative to the mutually exclusive alternative that is being considered 
for implementation if the project is not undertaken. Without a hydroelectric 
power plant, a thermal plant may be built. Should costs and benefits of the con-
templated hydro investment then be calculated as incremental to the alternative 
investment in thermal power? Of course not. The contemplated investment and 
its alternative are mutually exclusive projects; each project should, therefore, 
be considered on its own merits compared to the without situation, and that 
project that has the highest value to the economy should be chosen. Calculating 
the cost of the investment as the incremental cost compared to the alternative 
could justify many unviable projects. What the with and without approach 
means is that costs and benefits should be determined in relation to the situation 
that would exist if neither the project nor its alternatives were to be implemented. 
1.3. SHADOW PRICES AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
As was briefly mentioned, in many cases market prices do not reflect the real 
values of goods and services because of divergences from the perfect competi-
tion situation. In such cases imputed values - also called shadow prices -
should be used. Consider, for instance. Figure 1.2, which depicts the optimum 
situation for a monopolist. At output O B his marginal costs equal his marginal 
revenues, so that he will then make maximum profits. Assume now that a 
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FIGURE 1.2. 
project is being undertaken which will withdraw resources from the monopolist, 
resulting in a curtailment of his production by AB. Then the cost of these re-
sources should not be based on their market prices, as indicated by the shaded 
area in Figure 1.2, but on the value which consumers attach to the products 
these resources produced, which is the area ABCD. In the case of perfect 
competition, prices would everywhere equal marginal production costs and 
since there would be an infinite number of firms and consumers, the withdrawal 
of resources would affect these firms and consumers only infinitesimally so that 
then indeed the cost of the withdrawn resources would be measured by their 
market prices. 
Considerations like those discussed above have prompted K A H N 2 4 to propose 
that the marginal costs of production of enterprises within an industry should 
be valued at a shadow rate exactly equal to the proportion that the value of the 
output in the economy is higher than its cost of production. M C K E N Z I E 2 5 how-
ever, has pointed out that when an industry uses original factors of production 
as well as intermediate products, which is always the case, too much of the ori-
ginal factors will be used and too little of the intermediate products, because the 
first will be underpriced relative to the intermediate products. Similarly, 
L ITTLE 2 6 has pointed out that difficulties will arise when goods are both final 
consumer goods and intermediate productive services. Also, it may be pointed 
out that KAHN'S proposal neglects the consumer surplus; in Figure 1.2 Kahn 
would value the production of AB as ABCE, yet the value which consumers 
attach to AB is ABCD. 
While this short discussion may already have shown that there are several 
problems regarding the determination of shadow prices when only such simple 
distortions as monopolies exist, it is clear that the problems are compounded 
when all the other possible distortions are taken into account. Monopolies, 
decreasing cost industries, institutional constraints, taxes and externalities are 
just a few of the many distortions that exist in the developed economies. In 
addition to these, disequilibria such as foreign exchange and capital scarcities, 
unemployment and underemployment may exist in the developing countries 
10 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
where it is, for instance, common to find government regulation of foreign ex-
change and capital markets and government manipulation of prices and wages. 
Is it at all possible, in view of the many difficulties, to determine all the rele-
vant shadow prices? It has been suggested2 7 that they should be derived from 
general programming models. Such models can generate Lagrangean multipliers 
that represent in economic terms the shadow prices, which, given the con-
straints incorporated in the model, will result in an allocation of resources that 
will satisfy the postulated objective function. Such models should, in principle, 
be able to produce the real scarcity prices of the goods and services. However, 
although the models can provide valuable insights concerning the structural 
relations that exist in an economy, we seriously question on practical grounds 
whether all the shadow prices obtained from the models can be used for opera-
tional work. First, the models are still highly aggregated so that most of the 
duals they generate - the shadow prices - are extremely crude. Second, it must 
seriously be doubted whether the models can really depict the real world 
situation. It is not only that there are many distortions but also, to formulate the 
models, all cost and demand functions should be known. Obviously it is im-
possible to collect all these data. We feel, therefore, that in addition to the mo-
dels approach a more practical approach must be followed. 
In fact, this approach - the opportunity cost doctrine - has existed for a long 
time. 2 8 Consider an economy where only two goods - X and Y are produced. 
Then the calculation of the costs of an output expansion would not pose a 
difficult problem. For instance, if the production of X is to be increased, the 
cost of producing the additional quantity of X is to be found by measuring the 
value of the Y goods that the community will have to give up in order to in-
crease the production of X. Analysis of the production and demand functions 
for goods X and Y should readily provide the required data. The situation is 
more complicated when a multiplicity of goods is being produced, since it will 
obviously be impossible to analyze the production functions and demand curves 
of all the different goods. The opportunity cost doctrine therefore takes as a 
starting point the factors of production which X uses rather than the displaced 
Y goods and defines the costs of these factors as the returns that the factors 
would earn in the next best alternative elsewhere. Or, in other words, the 
relevant concept for the cost measurement is that of the opportunity benefits 
foregone by the factors of production. 
The opportunity cost approach is necessarily a detailed approach. The 
project analyst must investigate from where the resources for a project will be 
withdrawn and what their values are in those uses. As long as resources with 
low valued uses can be transferred to higher valued uses, the change is beneficial. 
This, in a nutshell, is what the theory of project planning is all about. Although 
the principle is simple, many problems arise in applying it to real world condi-
tions, problems that will be discussed in detail in other parts of this study. 
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1.4. OPTIMAL POLICIES AND ACTUAL POLICIES 
During the last three decades, many developing countries have established 
elaborate systems of import controls and tariff protection, as a result of which 
the production of import substitution goods expanded tremendously. In an 
interesting study, 2 9 it has been contended that these policies - at least for the 
countries studied (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, Pakistan, the Philippines 
and Taiwan) - have overencouraged industry in relation to agriculture. On the 
other hand, many developed countries have raised protective barriers around 
their agricultural sectors which may well have over-expanded their production 
of agricultural commodities. The reasons why such policies were followed may 
differ from country to country and may involve such considerations as the in-
fant industry argument, notions of self-sufficiency, and employment and in-
come distribution objectives. It is not the place here to analyze what specific 
reasons may have caused these in a strict economic sense perhaps non-optimal 
policies, or what the detrimental effects of such policies are; what we are in-
terested in is what position the project evaluator should take vis-a-vis the created 
distortions. Tariffs, quotas, licenses, and such are all variables subject to Gov-
ernment control and can be abolished. As SEN has said, 'For a project evaluator, 
therefore, it is important to know which variables are within his control and to 
what extent. . . ' . 3 0 
Let us take a specific example of a distortion in the supply of a manufactured 
good, say, steel. Assume that the Government has decided that the country 
should be self-sufficient in steel and that it has created a prohibitive import 
barrier through a very high duty on the import of steel, as graphically shown in 
Figure 1.3. The c.i.f. price of steel evaluated at the opportunity cost of foreign 
exchange is shown as OP, but the tariff-inclusive market price is OP t . As a 
result, domestic production of steel - the supply curve of which is S S ' - has 
become profitable, and with a demand curve equal to DD', the price of steel 
has become OP d at a production of OA. Obviously the tariff is non-optimal: 
D S' 
FIGURE 1.3. 
D' 
o A B 
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the producers of steel gain SPdE but the users of steel lose PiPdEC so that the net 
loss to the economy is PiSEC. 
Which price should be used by the evaluator of a project which uses steel? 
Optimal industrial development requires that steel be imported, but the Govern-
ment's policies are not optimal and steel is produced in the country. If in this 
situation the project evaluator were to use the real import price of steel Pi, it is 
clear that he would understate the cost of the resources used in the production of 
steel and that he could arrive at completely wrong conclusions. For instance, 
suppose that the project is worth undertaking if steel is imported but not when 
it is domestically produced. Then, if in fact only the high cost domestic steel can 
be used, the implementation of the project will lead to additional economic 
losses. Hence, to show this, the price to be used for the evaluation of the project 
should be the domestic price of steel. The determination of the net benefits of a 
project depends thus on what the costs will be in the actual situation and not on 
what the costs would be if optimal policies were undertaken. 
This principle is not an easy one to follow. In many cases, an import duty may 
be the result of a haphazard historical decision and urgently in need of revision. 
The project evaluator should then use his influence to convince the responsible 
Government agencies to bring the duty in line with the overall level of tariffs. If 
he succeeds, he should use the real price; if he does not, the market price. Which 
price the project evaluator should use in the evaluation of the project under 
scrutiny depends thus in such cases on the outcome of his efforts. In many other 
cases, however, tariffs are the result of a conscientious policy, for instance, to 
make the country self-sufficient in a certain product. Although such policies 
may not be 'optimal' in a strict economic sense, they may well be 'sensible' from 
a national point of view, whereby what is considered sensible may be determined 
from the national plan or an analysis of Government actions. Clearly, if a 
country is determined to follow a certain policy, the price resulting from this 
policy is the relevant price for investment decisions rather than an imaginary 
optimal policy price. 
1.5. NATIONAL PLANNING AND PROJECT PLANNING 
In principle, the theory of project planning considers only those variables that 
are relevant for the project under consideration. It is possible, therefore, that 
one could imagine that all these variables should be determined by the project 
preparation agency. This would be a mistake because several project variables 
can be determined only at the macro level. For instance, the demand for a 
product depends inter aha on population and income growth; the supply situa-
tion of a project's input may depend on the growth path of the economy; the 
shadow price of foreign exchange and the discount rate to be used for project 
planning are clearly national parameters; and so on. If every project evaluator 
were to determine individually the national parameters, there would be quite a 
duplication of effort. Moreover, in all probability, one would end up with 
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divergent estimates and misinvestments because the Government departments 
and public corporations that prepare the various investment projects would not 
have sufficient information to estimate the national parameters meaningfully. 
It is the task of the central authority - the Central Planning Unit or the Treasury 
- to review the projects prepared and proposed by the different departments and 
corporations and to determine after consultation with them what the final set 
of projects will be. But it is this final set that determines how the economy will 
develop, so that only the Center can really determine what the values of the 
national parameters are. Furthermore, it may so happen that the available 
investment funds will not be sufficient to undertake all the proposed projects. 
In such a case, it is the Center's task to set the cut-off rate of return for the in-
dividual projects at such a level that the number of acceptable projects will just 
exhaust the available budget. 3 1 This rate also can be determined only at the 
Center. 
A national plan consists normally of sectoral plans so that the possibilities 
within a sector can be reviewed and misinvestments prevented. Suppose, for 
instance, that every region in a country plans to undertake a sugar project. Some 
sectoral review is then required to prevent the likely overinvestment. Also, 
sectoral plans will be necessary when different types of projects within a sector 
are interconnected. For instance, in the transport sector, a port project may 
necessitate improvement of road and rail connections with the hinterland, or the 
improvement of a certain road may necessitate a feeder road improvement pro-
gram, and so o n . 3 2 Furthermore, it is possible that a shortfall of investments in 
the transportation sector may hold back development elsewhere in the economy. 
Clearly, if the sector is so important, some long-term planning is necessary. 
Another example would be the following. Assume that a large power resource -
hydroelectric, gas or oil - can be developed at low cost. Then it may be in the 
country's interest to set up a long-term plan for the promotion of energy-
intensive industries. In general then, sectoral planning will be necessary where 
overinvestments may occur, where important inter-relations within the sector 
exist, or where the sector will have an important impact on the rest of the eco-
nomy. 
In addition to sectoral planning, plans may be required for regions or income 
groups. As regards regions, important interconnections may exist between 
agriculture, industry, transport, labor, etc., which make such plans mandatory. 
As regards income groups, it is now more and more accepted that for certain 
groups some form of planning is required. Assume, for instance, that the income 
level of a certain income group, say, smallholder farmers, is expected to remain 
depressed. Assume further that the Government has decided to remedy the 
situation by means of an investment program geared towards raising the income 
level of the group. Then also a series of projects spread out over time and inter-
connected, i.e., a plan, will be necessary. 
Since most sectoral plans will have a substantial impact on other sectors and 
plans for regions or income groups will cover several sectors, the drawing up of 
the plans should in most cases be done jointly by the Center and the concerned 
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Government departments. The Center thus plays a crucial role. It is responsible 
for the macro-economic plan, it has to assure itself that the intermediate level 
plans relate properly to the overall plan, and it has to decide which set of indivi-
dual projects will be implemented. In all of this it needs project data for the 
calculation of the national parameters but, at the same time, the lower levels can 
only provide the project data after they have received the national parameters. 
Although such interactions might appear to involve an insolvable circularity, 
the process, if it is appropriately handled, would sharpen the understanding of 
the central authority as regards the desired development path of the economy. 
In a well run administration the interaction might take place as follows. The 
central authority would make, with the help of programming models, tentative 
projections of development objectives and national parameters, which it 
would submit to the various Government departments. These would use the 
data in the preparation of projects within their jurisdiction and submit to the 
Center a list of projects together with feasibility studies. The Center would 
review how the proposals would fit in with the initial development strategy, 
calculate new national parameters, including tentative cut-off rates of return in 
case of a shortage of available funds, and submit them to the departments, 
which would in turn revise their plans and submit them to the Center, and so on. 
As a result of these interactions, it can be expected that a well formulated na-
tional plan, including intermediate level plans, and a set of well prepared pro-
jects would emerge. 
It must be remarked that the above sketch presents the target towards which 
the planning process should strive. In many countries we still find that the 
concerned Government departments have no planning unit or that the inter-
action between the Center and the Departments is still so rudimentary that the 
latter have little notion of the values of the national parameters. It is encouraging 
to see, however, that all this is gradually changing for the better. 
In the past, many governments relied mainly on macro-economic plans for 
their investment strategies. Often these plans were based on estimates of simple 
sectoral capital-output ratios and, as a result, serious misinvestments occurred. 
Programming has taken great strides since then but, even so,the resource 
allocations emerging from the models are still so crude that the possibility of 
serious mistakes cannot be excluded. Project planning, on the other hand, is 
based on detailed investigations of the economic viabilities of individual pro-
jects, so that only projects with high priority will be selected. Also, as regards 
intermediate level plans, project evaluation has a fundamental task to fulfill. If 
a certain sector's initial set of projects includes some with low rates of return, 
then it would be in the national interest to transfer part of the initial budget 
allocation for that sector to a sector where projects have higher rates of return. 
Project planning thus not only increases the likelihood that the investment 
program will be successful, it leads also to an optimal program. Fortunately, 
it is becoming increasingly accepted that the basis on which macro plans as well 
as intermediate level plans rest are well thought out individual project proposals. 
Project planning theory is the tool that provides this basis. 
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2 . T H E V A L U A T I O N O F B E N E F I T S 
2 . 1 . THE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONCEPT 
The measurement of a project's benefits has been extensively discussed in the 
economic literature and concerns the concepts of producer surplus (profits) and 
consumer surplus. Should only the producer surplus be measured or the con-
sumer surplus also ? The concept of consumer surplus was discovered in 1844 by 
DUPUIT , who, in a path-breaking article, tried to measure the public utility of 
such things as roads, bridges and canals.1 He showed that the utility which an 
individual obtains from the consumption of a certain quantity of a good is 
greater than the price he pays because the price represents only the utility of the 
marginal unit and not that of each intra-marginal unit. Thus, according to 
DUPUIT : 'To sum up, political economy has to take as the measure of utility of 
an object the maximum sacrifice which each consumer would be willing to make 
in order to acquire the object.'2 What DUPUIT has identified is willingness to 
pay. What is now generally called consumer surplus is the difference between 
what a consumer is willing to pay and what he actually pays. To give an example: 
if a person would buy one pound of rice a week if the price were $ 0 .20 and two 
pounds if the price were $ 0 .15 , then the individual's consumer surplus when he 
pays $ 0 . 1 5 is $ 0 .05 , since he would have been willing to pay $ 0 . 3 5 for the 
two pounds, whereas he pays only $ 0 .30. The aggregate consumer surplus is the 
sum of the individual surpluses and is measured by the area under the aggregate 
demand curve and above the price line. 
The next writer who used the concept was MARSHALL, who, in his Principles, 
also points out that the satisfaction a person gets from the purchase of a certain 
quantity of a good exceeds that which he gives up in paying away its price. 
MARSHALL continues: 'The excess of the price which he would be willing to pay 
rather than go without the thing, over that which he actually does pay, is the 
economic measure of this surplus satisfaction. It may be called consumer 
surplus.' 3 Although MARSHALL never stated explicitly how his demand curve 
should be drawn up, it is now generally accepted that his assumptions were that 
the money incomes of the consumers and the price of every commodity other 
than the commodity in question would be constant. 4 From this demand curve 
definition, it obviously follows that a consumer's real income will increase when 
output increases and price falls, because the lower the price, the more the con-
sumer can buy of this or any other commodity. Thus, since a consumer's 
willingness to pay for commodities, including the commodity in question, will 
increase the lower the price of the commodity in question, it will be difficult to 
measure the consumer's willingness to pay on the basis of a ceteris paribus 
demand curve. MARSHALL-was well aware of this difficulty and, therefore, 
makes the important qualification that the consumer's surplus can be measured 
only with the help of the demand curve if the marginal utility of income of the 
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consumer is constant, i.e., if the consumer's real income does not change.5 This 
will be the case when the good in question accounts for only a small part of the 
consumer's total expenditure. Real income changes are then negligible and the 
consumer's surplus can safely be measured by the difference between the area 
under the consumer's demand curve and the area under the price line.6 
It appears thus that in all cases where goods have little income effect, the 
collective consumer surplus can be derived from the aggregate demand curve. 
However, in cases where the expenditure on the good accounts for a substantial 
part of the consumers' total expenditures, demand curve analysis is not appro-
priate. Because of this apparent limited application and the inherent difficulties 
of the concept itself, many subsequent writers - including eventually MARSHALL 
himself - came to believe that consumer surplus analysis was a tool of limited 
practical usage. 
The matter had to wait until the late 1930s when HOTELLING and HICKS 
tried to rehabilitate the concept. HOTELLING'S 7 article gives due credit to 
DUPUIT'S work and is in fact a refinement and elaboration of the DUPUIT 
analysis. HICKS'S analysis, on the other hand, was not so much concerned with 
the practical implications of the concept but with the underlying assumptions. 
It opens up entirely new points of view and will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2. THE COMPENSATED DEMAND CURVES 
The Hicksian analysis of consumer surplus advanced the understanding of 
the concept substantially. It appeared at first as a byproduct of the ALLEN and 
HICKS indifference curve analysis of consumer behavior, which was subsequent-
ly elaborated in HICKS'S 1939 book, 'Value and Capital,' 8 but it was soon follow-
ed by a much more extensive series of articles in the Review of Economic 
Studies, which gave rise to a lengthy discussion. Most of the conclusions from 
this discussion are incorporated in HICKS'S 1956 book on the subject.9 Basically, 
what HICKS set out to prove was that the consumer surplus analysis need not be 
restricted to goods without income effects if a demand curve different from the 
Marshallian curve - a compensated curve - is introduced. 
The concept of such a compensated curve may best be explained with the help 
of an example which refers to a demand supply situation of, say, rice in a certain 
country. Let us assume, as is done in Figure 2.1, that the total quantity of rice 
consumed in a certain year is OA at a price of BA. The curve PBC is the normal 
Marshallian demand curve drawn up under the assumption that money incomes 
remain constant and that only the price of rice and not those of other goods will 
change. Let us now assume that the output of rice will be increased to OD. The 
new price will then be CD. The consumers' willingness to pay for the additional 
output is ABCD but they pay only AECD and the consumer surplus on the 
additional output is therefore BEC. On the old output, consumers pay NKBE 
less than before. The total gain in consumer surplus is thus NKBC. 
Thus far our example has not brought out anything that was not already 
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known to MARSHALL. HICKS , however, analyzed in detail how the real incomes 
of the consumers change when they buy the good in question. Specifically, the 
consumers are much better off at output point D than they were at output point 
A, because they would have been willing to pay a higher price than CD for 
each increment in output beyond A. In other words, their real income has im-
proved. HICKS has shown that it is possible to construct a demand curve that 
would leave consumers' real incomes identical to what they had at point A. The 
easiest way to see this is to imagine that a discriminating monopolist charges the 
maximum price that consumers are willing to pay for every increment beyond 
OA. Then, because of the reduction in the consumer's income, the quantity 
bought at any given price will be less than that bought according to the Marshal-
lian demand curve so that the new demand curve will be below the Marshallian 
curve. This new demand curve may be described as a compensated demand curve 
because it is the demand curve drawn up under the assumption that the person 
in question would have paid some maximum amount of money (a compensatory 
payment) to have the change undertaken. Assuming that this new - compen-
sated - curve is BFG, then the monopolist would be able to capture an amount 
of money equal to the area OKBGD. Since the consumers would have been 
willing to pay OKBGD but pay ONCD only, the benefit of the consumers is 
NKBF minus FCG. In the Hicksian terminology, this is called the compensating 
surplus since it is the reduction in income that would be necessary to leave the 
consumer as well off when he buys OD units at the price CD as he was in his 
original position when he bought OA units at the price BA. 1 0 
What this analysis has shown is that one can measure, with the help of the 
compensated demand curve, the minimum benefit - the compensating surplus -
that consumers will receive. At first sight, the consumer surplus analysis thus 
seemed saved. Soon, however, it became clear that the compensated demand 
curve discussed above could understate the benefits of a project substantially. 
This can be shown by constructing a demand curve under the assumption that 
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the real income of the consumer is at the level he would have had after the change 
had taken place (i.e. at point D in figure 2.1). Such a demand curve may be called 
an equilibrated demand curve because the consumer's income is equilibrated 
to what it would have been with the change and could be constructed as follows. 
Assume that the consumer has a real income as at level D and that the price is to 
be increased from CD to BA. Then, instead of mulcting the consumer, he should 
be given, if one wanted to keep the real income of the consumer unchanged from 
that at point D, additional amounts of money for every incremental increase in 
price. IHC is the demand curve under such a procedure. This demand curve can 
also be constructed by a reasoning analogous to the first case. One should ima-
gine here that the consumer's demand curve is to be constructed under the 
assumption that the consumer's real income at level A should be the same as that 
which he would have if the project had already been implemented. The con-
sumer should then be given at point A additional amounts of money equal to 
the difference in real income between levels D and A and the discriminating 
monopolist should again charge the maximum price that the consumer is 
willing to pay for every increment beyond OA. Also in this hypothetical case, 
one would end up with the equilibrated demand curve IHC. On the basis of this 
demand curve the gain in consumer surplus on the additional production is IEC, 
and on the total production NKBHC + BIH. In the Hicksian terminology, it 
is called the equivalent surplus 1 1 since it is the increase in income that would be 
necessary to leave the consumer as well off when he consumes OA units at the 
price BA as he is when he consumes OD units at the price CD. 
As a result of the Hicksian analysis, it appears that there are three demand 
curves, each with a different consumer surplus. Consequently, it seems to have 
brought us back to MARSHALL'S statement that the consumer surplus analysis is 
only valid if the good in question accounts for only a small part of each con-
sumer's expenditure. In such a case there will be no change in the real income of 
the consumer and the compensated and equilibrated demand curves (BG and 
IC, respectively) will coincide with the Marshallian demand curve (BC). Prob-
lems arise when there are income effects, i.e., when the good in question accounts 
for a substantial part of consumers' expenditures because the three curves will 
then be far apart. The question thus arises as to which one, if any, of the three 
demand curves should be used for the measurement of the surplus. 
It may be recalled that the compensating surplus was arrived at by measuring 
what consumers would have to pay in addition to the price if they were to re-
main as well off as they were before the project was started: in other words, what 
bribe the consumers can afford to offer in order to have the project undertaken. 
On the other hand, the equivalent surplus measures what the consumers should 
receive in money if the project were not undertaken so as to leave their relative 
well-being unchanged from the position they would have with the project: in 
other words, what bribe should be given to the consumers if the project were 
not undertaken. HICKS'S two surpluses are thus compensation payments. In 
Chapter 7 where the compensation tests will be discussed, we will show that they 
cannot give the answer if we want to evaluate the distributive aspects of a pro-
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ject. Why is that so here? The answer is clear. The first compensated demand 
curve shows demand when real income is held constant at the original level A. 
whereas the second equilibrated demand curve shows demand when real income 
is held constant at the level reached after the project's implementation, the level 
D. But since real income at D is higher than at A, the marginal uitility of income 
of the consumers is lower at D than at A. In other words, while we have been 
trying to express the total increase in welfare in money terms, the marginal 
utility of income has changed. It thus appears that the consumer surplus concept 
involves measurement of something that is inherently impossible to measure if 
the values of the marginal utility of income are not known, except in the case 
where the goods account for only a small part of consumer expenditure. 
The above short discussion cannot, of course, do full justice to the Hicksian 
analysis. Enough has been said, however, to show that the concept becomes less 
useful in the case of goods with substantial income effects. HICKS , who started 
to analyze the concept with enthusiasm in 1939, is hesitant about the usefulness 
of the concept in his 1956 book. 1 2 
2.3. SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE CONSUMER SURPLUS 
The inherent difficulty of the consumer surplus concept is that welfare changes 
are being expressed in money terms. It seems to us that there is only one way 
out of the dilemma, namely, to express the welfare changes in utility terms. As 
is well-known from the theory of consumer choice, a consumer will maximize 
his utility by buying a quantity of a commodity such that the utility per dollar 
spent on the last unit will be the same as the utility per dollar spent on the unit of 
every other commodity: otherwise he could increase his welfare by switching 
expenditures from commodities where the dollar spent has a low utility to those 
where it has a higher utility. Denoting the utility of the last dollar spent (the 
marginal utility of income) by um, the marginal utility of commodity x by ux, 
and the price of the commodity by px, the equilibrium position of a consumer 
at any price situation is ux/px = um. Hence, the change in welfare due to a price 
change can be found by evaluating the consumer surplus change due to the 
price change at the appropriate marginal utilities of income. The change in the 
surplus can, of course, be measured only with the help of the Marshallian demand 
curve since the compensated demand curves by definition do not indicate what 
the income changes are. 
An example may perhaps be useful. Assume that in figure 2.1 the demand cur-
ve BC represents the demand curve of a single consumer. Then, if the price 
were to be reduced from BA to CD, his additional consumer surplus would be 
equal to the area NKBC, which may be written as AP(Q + V 2 A Q). To arrive 
at his welfare change in utility terms this expression must be valued at the rele-
vant marginal utilities of income (w). A good approximation will often be to 
value it at the average of the marginal utilities of income corresponding to the 
situations where the old and the new price applied, and the welfare change can 
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then be written as AP(Q + l/2AQ) (u + 1/2Au). The area NKBC has thus 
been weighted with an income distribution weight to arrive at the welfare change. 
The process is also reversible. Thus, if the welfare change in utility terms of 
the consumer is known, we can find the change in consumer surplus by dividing 
this welfare change by the factor (u + V2AM). Hence, even when the marginal 
utility of income of the consumer is not constant, the consumer surplus concept, 
at least for the individual consumer, has relevance. 
Another matter concerns whether the individual surpluses may be added. In 
an analysis of consumer surplus in connection with national income accounts, 
HARBERGER 1 3 arrives at the same conclusion as regards the individual surplus 
as above and reviews then the issue whether consumer surpluses of different 
beneficiaries may be added. HARBERGER believes that one might contemplate a 
national income measure incorporating distributional weights but that 'Two 
obstacles stand in the way: first, the impossibility of achieving a consensus with 
regard to the weights, and, second, the fact that most of the data from which the 
national accounts are built are aggregates in the first place and do not dis-
tinguish the individuals or groups whose dollars they represent.' Because of 
these difficulties, HARBERGER believes that when measuring the net benefits 
or costs of a given action (project, program or policy) the costs and benefits 
should normally be added without regard to the incomes of the individuals to 
whom they accrue. 
We beg to differ. The last part of HARBERGER'S argument is self-defeating in 
that if the national income accounts do not distinguish the incomes of the differ-
ent income groups, then it is high time that the need for this is recognized and that 
changes in national accounting procedures are instigated. As regards the im-
possibility of achieving a consensus on weights, this concerns, of course, the 
issue of the construction of the social welfare function, an issue that will be 
extensively discussed in Part II of this study. Here, it may be mentioned that we 
will argue that a social marginal utility of income schedule can indeed be derived 
from individually held social values. 
Has the HARBERGER proposal then no validity at all? In this respect, it is 
important to note that the traditional benefit-cost theory implicitly assumes 
that the marginal utilities of income of the project participants are the same, 
so that - as also proposed by HARBERGER - income distribution weights need 
not be determined. All project beneficiaries can then be treated alike and the 
additional dollars of benefit at different income levels will have the same value. 
We accept that the criteria of the traditional theory may be applied in cases whe-
re income distribution aspects are not important. In particular, we believe 
that the traditional approach may be followed for projects where the benefi-
ciaries belong mainly to the middle income groups so that MARSHALL'S second 
condition - that the different (sub)classes will be affected in about equal pro-
portions - will be approximated. Assuming that figure 2.1 refers to such a case, 
the welfare change of the project beneficiaries will be NKBC, from which must 
be deducted the loss in income of the producers - the area NKBE - to arrive at 
the net welfare change of the community as a whole. The net increase in welfare 
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will then be EBC - the consumer surplus on the additional production. How-
ever, where income distribution aspects do play an overriding role such as in 
projects geared towards poverty eradication, we believe that project bene-
ficiaries should be identified according to their income levels and the social 
value of incremental income should be estimated. To give an example: if the 
demand curve BC in figure 2.1 concerned a homogeneous group of low income 
people, then the area NKBC should be weighted with an income distribution 
weight to determine their welfare change. This welfare change may thus be 
writtenas AP(Q + V a A g ) - v where vis the socially determined income weight. 
Assuming that the weight v has been determined relative to the weight of the 
producers, the welfare change of society as a whole is then found by deducting 
from the above expression the area NKBE, which may be written as AP- Q. 
Methods by which the income distribution weights could be determined will be 
extensively discussed in Part II of this study. 
The relevant concept, when a project has no income distribution consequen-
ces, is thus willingness to pay as measured by the Marshallian demand curve 
rather than the compensated or equilibrated demand curves. A writer who also 
rejects the latter is W I N C H . 1 4 Basically, what WINCH set out to prove is that the 
compensated and equilibrated demand curves cannot be used for the measure-
ment of benefit increases since they do not represent the actual adjustment path. 
W INCH argues that the income effects and substitution effects act simultaneous-
ly and that the only way to measure them is to follow them over the range of the 
price change, which is what the Marshallian demand curve does. In other words, 
as SILBERBERG1 5 phrased it: 'Winch correctly derives the "Marshallian Triang-
le" as the limit of a sum of compensating variations in income that a consumer 
would be willing to pay for the privilege of consuming at a slightly lower price, 
always assuming, however, that he never actually pays those amounts.' How-
ever, SILBERBERG then shows that there may be many adjustment paths so that 
in general one cannot accept the Marshallian area as the consumer's gain. 
SILBERBERG has introduced a dynamic element into the static analysis of the 
Marshallian triangle and there can be no doubt that within the context of a 
dynamic analysis the surplus may be different from the normal Marshallian 
surplus, Nevertheless, as noted by BURNS 1 6 , the upper and lower limiting values 
of the benefit changes are the Hicksian equilibrated and compensated demand 
curves and the adjustment path will, in general, be very close to the Marshallian 
demand curve. We are therefore not concerned about what path will actually be 
followed. Estimates of demand curves are necessarily rough and the theoretical 
refinement of SILBERBERG should be treated as an application of the 'de mini-
mus' principle. 
Several writers 1 7 have remarked in connection with HARBERGER'S analysis 
that the consumer surplus analysis should be rejected since it implies that the 
cross-elasticities of demand among products are zero. In other words, the possi-
bility of goods being substitutes or complements is excluded. If goods X and Y 
are substitutes or complements, the increased production of X will not, of 
course, leave the price and consumer surplus of Y unchanged, but in a thorough 
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benefit-cost analysis this criticism can be discarded. One of the basic principles 
of benefit-cost analysis is that the system under consideration must be expanded 
until the major direct effects can be taken into account. Hence, if the output of 
a good that has a complement or substitute is changed, the analysis should take 
account of the effects the change will have on these goods. The basic principle 
to keep in mind is that the consumer surplus concept is valid provided we analyze 
systems that include the principal direct effects of output contraction or expan-
sion and that can clearly be separated from the rest of the economy where the 
neglectable indirect effects take place. 
There are, however, writers who reject the consumer surplus analysis on the 
grounds that the indirect effects - the effects on prices and surpluses of goods in 
the rest of the economy - are too important to be neglected. By reviewing this 
for a normal commodity, we may be able to clarify this issue. As we have dis-
cussed, the demand curve for a normal commodity is drawn up under the as-
sumption that prices and surpluses elsewhere do not change. Is this true? 
Theoretically, this assumption is not correct because the increase in real income 
of the consumers due to a production change will cause them to change their 
demand for other commodities. Even if the prices of other commodities do not 
change measurably, theoretically the surpluses on the other commodities may 
change. For instance, if the price of the commodity in question falls, then its 
marginal utility to a consumer would be greater than its new price multiplied 
by. the consumer's marginal utility of income. Thus, a consumer will increase 
his consumption of the commodity. Depending on the demand elasticity, his 
expenditures may increase or decrease, but this means that he should adjust his 
expenditures on other commodities. Hence, even if the prices of other commo-
dities do not change, the consumer surplus on other commodities will be affect-
ed. Also, as L ITTLE 1 8 notes, resources need to be withdrawn for the project's 
output. But this means that output elsewhere has to be decreased and that 
producer surpluses elsewhere change. 
If we understand LITTLE correctly, it is because of the above arguments that 
he states; 'Our conclusion is that consumers' surplus is a totally useless theore-
tical toy. ' 1 9 We disagree. In LITTLE'S argumentation, the project evaluator 
measures only the financial costs of production and does not take the lost pro-
ducer surplus elsewhere - which can be substantial - into account. But we will 
show when discussing the measurement of opportunity costs that this is auto-
matically done. As such, the loss in producer surplus has nothing to do with the 
consumer surplus concept. Regarding the consumer surplus, changes will of 
course take place elsewhere if a project's output is expanded. However, such 
changes will be dispersed over many other commodities and will be negligible. 
LITTLE is questioning the operational significance of the partial equilibrium 
approach vis-a-vis general equilibrium analysis, but general equilibrium criteria 
are seldom operationally usable. Partial equilibrium analysis, which necessarily 
implies that changes of the second order of smallness cannot be taken into 
account, is adequate given the roughness of the estimates that are inherent in 
all project evaluation work and the unimportance of the second order changes 
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relative to the direct impact. 
Finally, another matter. There are writers who argue that in the measure-
ment of benefits from public investments, consumer surpluses should not be 
taken into account because consumer surplus analysis is not done by the private 
sector. Thus WOHL and MARTIN argue in connection with highway projects: 
'Because of the incomparability that would result between public and private 
sectors of the economy, the latter of which does not include consumer surplus 
in the assessment of alternative investment, and because of the indeterminate 
nature of consumer surplus measurement, it is our view that consumer surplus 
should not be included in any user trip benefit calculations to be used in assessing 
the economy of public projects.' 2 0 It is our view that the reasoning should be 
reversed. Consumer surplus analysis should be undertaken for private in-
dustrial projects as well as for public projects because it is only then that the 
social or economic priority of a project can be determined. This point is impor-
tant for many developing countries because they do wish to regulate private 
investment. It is also ironical that WOHL and MARTIN make their suggestion in 
connection with road projects. As is well known, roads, bridges and the like 
often operate under conditions of decreasing costs, and revenues will then not 
be sufficient to cover investments and operating costs. As DUPUIT pointed out 
a long time ago, such projects would never be undertaken if the consumer surplus 
were not taken into account. 
In concluding, we can only emphasize again what the above analysis has 
made clear, that there are real benefits to the consumer in all those cases where 
real income increases are not taken away by discriminatory charges, that is, 
when only one price is charged for the project's output. Hence, market prices 
alone cannot measure the economic or social benefits of a project. 
2.4 . INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS 
In the preceding discussion, consumer willingness to pay emerged as an 
important concept for the valuation of consumer goods. In many cases, how-
ever, the project evaluator will find himself in a position where he has to deter-
mine the value of an intermediate product which may be many production sta-
ges away from the final goods that are eventually produced. An example is 
steel. It may be used in the housing industry for the production of residential 
houses or it may be used in the tractor industry to produce tractors that will 
help to produce more agricultural goods, and so on. 
In principle, the valuation of intermediate products is not different from that 
of consumer goods. Take, for instance, the case of tractors. The value of a 
tractor to the farmer depends on what he will obtain for his agricultural pro-
ducts and on what the costs of his other inputs are. Similarly, for the tractor 
manufacturer, the value of the steel he uses depends on what he will receive for 
his tractors and on what the costs of his other inputs are. Ultimately then, the 
value of steel used in tractor production depends on what the final consumer 
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2 .5 . DOMESTIC PRICES AND BORDER PRICES 
Foreign exchange can be 'produced' by a country either by expanding its 
exports or by reducing its imports. What are the benefit-cost evaluation rules 
for export-generating or import-reducing projects? Exports of a good should 
be expanded as long as the export earnings of the marginal unit valued at the 
foreign exchange shadow rate are higher than its real cost of production. 
Similarly, domestic production of a good should be expanded to substitute for 
previously imported units if the savings in foreign exchange valued at the foreign 
exchange opportunity rate are greater than the real domestic production cost. 
Note that in the latter case the consumer surplus should not be taken into ac-
count as the consumers enjoy it already on the previously imported units. 
Hence, in both cases, i.e., in export expansion or import substitution, the bene-
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pays for the agricultural products which the tractor helps produce. It is thus the 
consumer's willingness to pay for the final product that determines the value 
of the intermediate product used in its production. 
Often a shortcut can be used to measure the values of intermediate products. 
For instance, if the markets for the intermediate goods are perfectly competitive, 
the willingness to pay of the users of an intermediate product would represent 
the true value of the product and the analysis can then stop with an estimate of 
the demand curve for the product. Problems arise, however, where markets are 
not competitive, as the actual prices paid may well understate the final consumer 
value. 
In principle, three types of distortion can be distinguished. First, the users 
of the intermediate product may exercise monopsony powers or, in other 
words, they pay less than they would be able to pay. The only way to measure 
the value of the intermediate product then is to determine the true capacity to 
pay of these users, which means that a hypothetical demand curve should be 
constructed, derived from the estimation of the value of the products produced 
by the users of the input in question, given the costs of all their other inputs. 
Second, it is possible that the users of the intermediate product exercise mono-
poly powers in their product markets. As a result of this, the final consumers 
would have to pay a price for the final consumer good which includes the 
amount of monopoly profit that is being made by the users of the intermediate 
product in their production process. The actual price paid for the intermediate 
product would then understate its value by the amount of the hionopoly profit 
made. Finally, markets may be subject to rationing or price controls. Also, in 
such cases the capacity to pay will exceed the amount that is actually being paid. 
The task of the project analyst thus is to investigate what distortions exist and 
to measure in such cases by what amount true willingness to pay differs from 
what is actually being paid. At first sight, this may look like a formidable task. In 
practice, however, many inputs account for only a small portion of total costs 
so that rough estimates will suffice. 
fits are the export earnings or savings valued at the foreign exchange oppor-
tunity cost rate. In all other cases the benefits of a domestically produced good 
consist of the domestic willingness to pay and its costs are to be measured by 
the opportunity costs of the factors of production. Insofar as the project would 
induce additional imports, the relevant cost concept for those imports is the 
foreign exchange opportunity value, i.e., the c.i.f. costs in foreign currency 
valued at the foreign exchange opportunity cost rate. 
The benefit-cost rules described in the previous paragraph are the classical 
rules and are also followed in the UNIDO Guidelines. 2 1 However, they are 
different from the ones LITTLE and MIRRLEES ( L and M ) 2 2 have proposed in 
Volume II of the OECD Manual on Industrial Project Analysis. 2 3 Basically, 
what L and M suggest is that all goods should be valued in border prices. A 
distinction is therefore made between tradeables - imported and exported or 
importable and exportable goods - for which the conversion is easy, and non-
tradeables - such as power, transport, construction and services. The latter are 
to be decomposed into their constituent inputs which, in the case of materials, 
are again valued in border prices and, in the case of labor, at the marginal 
product of labor, which is then converted into consumption so that it can also 
be valued at border prices. As in practice it will be difficult to decompose non-
traded goods each time into their various parts, L and M suggest that conversion 
factors be used. Thus one may use conversion factors for construction, electri-
city, labor, and such, and, in cases where it is difficult to get detailed information 
about the methods of production, a standard conversion factor, although one 
should recognize that the latter is only a crude approximation. The standard 
conversion factor should be representative of a wide range of goods and is in 
practice calculated as the reciprocal of the opportunity cost of foreign exchange. 
Strict adherence to L and M's methodology could lead to wrong results in all 
those cases where goods do not enter international trade. In a symposium on 
their Manual, several critics therefore took issue with L and M, and it may be 
useful to repeat two examples - one for tradeables, the other for nontradeables -
provided by DASGUPTA , one of L and M's leading critics. The first concerns 
machine tools. Suppose, D A S G U P T A 2 4 states that 1,500 units of machine tools 
are currently being produced annually in a country and sold at $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 each. 
Suppose also that the Government is considering increasing output by 300 
units. If the project is accepted, the market clearing price will fall to $ 19,000. 
On the other hand, the import price of the 300 units is $ 15,000 each. If Govern-
ment allows the units to be imported, then the normal analysis tells us that they 
should be produced if their production cost is lower than their import price. 
Suppose, however, that the Government does not allow imports of the units. 
Then, according to the L and M approach, the 3 0 0 units should be valued at 
$ 15,000, whereas, according to the UNIDO approach, they should be valued at 
somewhere between $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 and $ 19,000, say, $ 19,500. Which procedure is 
the correct one? If the Government will not allow import of the additional 
machine tools, then there can be no doubt that they should be valued at the 
domestic willingness to pay. 
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Regarding nontradeables, DASGUPTA again gave a good example, which we 
quote here verbatim: 'Suppose, for example, that electric power figures pro-
minently in the operation of a project that is to produce an import substitute. 
If the use of electricity by the project reduces its supply in the rest of the economy 
by an amount that the project requires, then the UNIDO approach recommends 
the use of the producers' willingness to pay for electricity in order to evaluate 
its shadow price. The OECD approach, however, recommends the use of the 
marginal social cost of producing it as its appropriate shadow price. If the eco-
nomy were producing efficiently, it can be shown that the two shadow prices 
would be equal. But, typically, the willingness to pay for a marginal amount of 
electricity might exceed its social cost. In such an instance it is possible for the 
project to be rejected by the UNIDO approach (because cost of electric power 
is 'high') and accepted by the OECD approach (because the cost is 'low').' 
It is difficult to say whether L and M have accepted changing their appraisal 
methodology because they do not address themselves directly to the examples. 
However, the following quote seems to suggest a concession: 'Formally, we are 
quite prepared to settle for what Dasgupta says is the UNIDO line - that the 
evaluator should decide in the light of what Government policy will be, after 
allowing for bis own influence.'2 5 Also, in their sequel to the Manual, L and M 
appear to agree that the evaluator should evaluate what will probably happen, 
not what he would like to happen. 2 6 
If indeed L and M have accepted the above criticism, then there is not much 
difference any more from a theoretical point of view between the normal 
appraisal and L and M's methodology. Whereas normally domestic prices are 
used as the numeraire, L and M use foreign prices as the numeraire, but theore-
tically either one of the numeraires can be used with the same result. Further 
more, both methods require the same amount of information. Consider, for 
instance, the case where a project induces some additional production of a non-
tradeable input, the cost of which includes foreign exchange. Then, under the 
L and M method, every component of the input would be valued at border 
prices. Under the traditional method, all components of the input, including the 
foreign exchange component, would be valued at domestic prices, but to deter-
mine the foreign exchange component the same information would be required 
as under the L and M method. 2 7 
In practice there are several objections, in our opinion, to the L and M 
method. First, Governments in general will prefer the valuation to take place in 
domestic prices rather than in border prices. Second, the L and M methodology 
is presented in such a way that it is easy to make mistakes. As STEWART and 
STREETEN wrote: 'The L and M methods may themselves be stretched to cover 
some (possibly all) of the exceptions; in practice, as the Manual is written and 
applied, it is unlikely that they will be so interpreted.' 2 8 
Let us demonstrate a few of the difficulties of the L and M method with an 
example. Suppose we are to measure the values of a series of inputs to be used 
for constructing a dam or a factory. We can then set up the following simple 
table (Table 2.1) to show the difference between the normal and the L and M 
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TABLE 2.1. 
Normal Method L and M Method 
Total Foreign Total Conversion Total 
Cost Exchange Cost in Factors Cost in 
Component Rs mil. US$ mil. 
Rs mil. 
I. Equipment I 
(nontradeable) 30 30 0.80 24 
II. Equipment II 
(imported) 30 30 30 1.00 30 
III. Civil Works 40 10 40 0.85 34 
Total 100 40 
Foreign Exchange 
Premium 10 25% 
Total 110 0.80 88 
method. Since we are interested in highlighting the border price issue, we are 
assuming, for simplicity's sake, that there is no shadow price for labor. In this 
example, the official exchange rate is US $ 1 = Rs 1 and the opportunity cost 
of foreign exchange is US $ 1 = Rs 1.25 or, similarly, the Standard Conversion 
Factor (SCF), being the reciprocal of the latter, is 0.8. As should be clear after 
the above discussion, it does not make any difference whether the costs are ex-
pressed in rupees or in US dollars: under the normal method, the costs are 
valued at Rs 110 million and under the L and M method, at US $ 88 million; 
given the foreign exchange opportunity cost rate, both are equal. 
But will this be so in practice? It seems to us that the L and M method will 
lead much easier to mistakes than the normal method. Let us take Category I, 
the nontradeables, first. In the above example, the conversion was easy: we 
used the SCF. But what will happen when we follow the decomposition method 
of the L and M manual to convert domestic values into foreign exchange? One 
may well arrive at very wrong values. Category II should not cause problems: 
imports and exports are valuated at border prices. But what about Category III 
and all the other categories that include a mixture of foreign exchange and local 
costs? L and M see the danger and recommend the use of as many conversion 
factors as possible. But what will happen in practice is that one will group 
categories together, calculate a conversion factor for them, and then always use 
the same conversion factor. For instance, L and M mention specifically that 
when information on construction is not available it will be useful to have avail-
able the construction conversion factor. It seems to us that there are dozens of 
techniques to construct things and that the project analyst should base bis cost 
estimate on the construction method that actually will be followed rather than on 
some average technique. Finally, there are serious difficulties with the L and M 
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method if one takes into account that the opportunity cost of foreign exchange 
may change during the life of the project. If we follow L and M, then one must 
review and recalculate all the conversion factors if one expects that trade policy 
will change. Under the normal method we can easily adjust the foreign exchange 
shadow rate. 
A criticism that may be made about the normal method is that many govern-
ments have objected to the use of a foreign exchange shadow rate. This is quite 
true, but it was caused by the way it was presented. In the past, many econo-
mists have been guilty of inferring that the foreign exchange rate under free 
trade - that is, the rate in the absence of exchange controls and tariffs - is the 
rate at which the official exchange rate should be set. This is, of course, not 
correct. If we make clear to governments that the opportunity cost of foreign 
exchange is essentially an exchange rate adjusted for the difference between 
domestic and international prices, 2 9 probably no government would object to 
such a rate. 
Benefit-cost analysis is just taking off and it is only recently that some of its 
principles are becoming accepted as core principles. The normal appraisal 
methodology is theoretically correct; moreover, it has proven itself workable. 
The L and M method is complicated and easily leads to wrong results. We see no 
reason to change horses in mid-stream. 
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ei = ei 
PQ 
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PQ 
e 8Y 
• <?3 
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3. T H E V A L U A T I O N OF COSTS 
3.1. INPUTS 
The cost concept that is used in this study regarding the resources used in a 
project is that of the maximum benefits foregone. Suppose that a project's input 
of, say, steel reduces the quantity of steel available in the rest of the economy. 
Then the cost of this steel is to be measured by the value it had to its users. 
Suppose, however, that the project's demand for steel results in an increase in 
steel production rather than a reduction in the use of steel in the rest of the com-
munity. Then the steel producer would need to withdraw resources from the 
rest of the economy and the cost of the additional steel production would then 
be represented by the value of these resources. Or, in other words, the value 
of the additional steel produced would, in this case, be its opportunity cost of 
production. 
The above analysis is especially relevant in the case of distortions which 
drive a wedge between prices and costs. HARBERGER1 has done path-breaking 
work in this field and it will be useful to review his analysis of the opportunity 
cost of an input in the presence of an indirect tax. In figure 3.1 the curve DD ' 
represents the normal market demand curve and the curve SS' the normal mar-
ginal cost (supply curve) for steel. An indirect tax on the price of steel would 
result in an equUibrium situation, indicated by the intersection of SS' with the 
net of tax curve KD', so that output would be OA, price received by the pro-
ducers of steel AE, and price paid by the users of steel AJ. 
Let us assume now that the project under consideration will need a quantity 
of steel equal to CB. This will shift the demand as well as the net of tax curve 
by CB to the right, so that the new production will be OB, the supply price of 
FIGURE 3 . 1 . 
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which is BF. But it is clear that this is not the opportunity cost of steel to be used 
in the cost calculation of the new project. The extra demand of CB has displaced 
demand equal to AC, the opportunity cost of which is AJHC, and has increased 
production by AB, the opportunity cost of which is AEFB. Hence, the true 
opportunity cost of the quantity CB is equal to AJHC plus AEFB. 
The above can also be expressed in algebraic terms. If the additional quantity 
demanded is small in relation to the total market, the triangles MHJ and NFE 
can be neglected so that the opportunity cost consists of AJMC + ANFB. 
Using P„ as the general symbol for the opportunity cost of CB, we may write: 
P0 = (AJMC + ANFB)/CB 
(3.1.) = 8P BP 
~dQd ,8QS 
8P dP 
Smce -~- = ed • — and = es — we may write BP P BP P 
(3 2 ) P = e a ®d P d + e" ®s P s 
ea Qd + es Qs 
Or, in words, the opportunity cost of an input is the weighted average of the 
demand and supply prices, the weights being the fractions of demand displaced 
and supply induced to additional demand. 2 This is an extremely valuable 
formula, which, in many cases, will give a good approximation of the cost of an 
input. It should be noted, however, that this result is based on two implicit 
assumptions. On the demand side, it was assumed that the market for steel is 
perfectly competitive. If, as discussed in the previous chapter, the market is 
distorted, it is not the actual demand price which is relevant for the analysis but 
the real willingness to pay of the users of steel. The second assumption was that 
the steel manufacturers' cost of production could be taken as the true value of 
the cost of producing the additional steel. Suppose, however, that the market 
price of the electricity the industry consumed does not reflect the real cost of 
electricity production or that the coal imported for the steel industry is bought 
by the industry at a price not reflecting its foreign exchange value. Then the 
true opportunity cost of the additional steel production should not be based on 
what is actually paid but on the real cost of the resources used. The cost of 
electricity should thus be calculated on the basis of its real opportunity cost of 
production and the cost of coal on the basis of the real opportunity cost of 
foreign exchange. 
The principle that emerges is that one should attempt to measure the real 
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possible willingness to pay in cases of the project displacing demand, and the 
real opportunity cost of production if the production of an input is increased in 
response to the project, and in cases where both occur, the weighted average of 
the two opportunity costs. This analysis may seem a hard task because, for a 
precise estimate, the relevant elasticities must be determined. In practice, how-
ever, the rate of return of the project may not be sensitive to the values of the 
input in question, so that rough estimates will suffice. 
3.2. FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
In many cases projects are planned because they produce products for export 
or for import substitution, or, in other words, for the foreign exchange earnings 
or savings they generate. Also, many projects - even when producing for the 
local market - may cause an increase in imports to be used as project inputs. 
Under conditions of trade equihbrium and in the absence of export duties 
(subsidies) and import duties (subsidies), the domestic value of the foreign 
exchange earnings or expenditures is found by multiplying the amount of 
foreign exchange by the official exchange rate. However, most countries impose 
import and export duties and many also have quantitative restrictions and fo-
reign exchange controls. In such circumstances, the official exchange rate will 
understate the domestic value of the foreign exchange generated or used by a 
project. 
The question thus is: Can we find criteria for measuring the domestic value 
of foreign exchange in cases where we suspect that the official rate does not 
represent the domestic value? To answer the question we should use the oppor-
tunity cost principle: for what purpose is foreign exchange used, and what is its 
value in such uses? A dollar of foreign exchange can either be added to a coun-
try's foreign exchange reserves or used for increasing imports or for reducing 
exports. Under normal circumstances a country's objective is not to earn foreign 
exchange for the sake of increasing its reserves so that the value of a dollar of 
foreign exchange is then immediately derived from the import-increasing or 
export-reducing objectives. But also if the reserves were to be increased, the 
value of a dollar of foreign exchange is determined by the opportunity-cost 
principle - i.e. by the alternative cost of increasing the reserves - and its value is 
therefore also then derived from the import-increasing or export-reducing 
possibilities. Hence, for the determination of the shadow price of foreign ex-
change it suffices to analyze what happens to the dollar when imports are in-
creased or exports are reduced. 
Suppose that a dollar of foreign exchange will be used entirely for increasing 
imports. Then its value is the domestic willingness to pay for such imports. To 
the extent that there are no quantitative restrictions, this domestic willingness to 
pay is the sum of the foreign price valued at the official exchange rate and the 
import duties. Hence, if the official exchange rate is US $ 1.00 = Rs 2.00, and 
the import duties are 30 percent, the domestic value of US $ 1.00 of imports is 
Rs 2.60. 
36 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-S (1977) 
Suppose that the additional dollar of foreign exchange will be used to reduce 
exports. Then, either more exportable goods will become available in the coun-
try or the resources otherwise used to produce export goods will be used to 
produce home goods. Hence, the domestic value of the additional export goods 
or the freed resources that become available in the home market can be found 
by considering the level of export duties and subsidies. In many developing 
countries, export duties are an important source of revenues in addition to 
import duties. 3 Let us assume therefore that, in our hypothetical country, export 
duties average 1 0 percent of f.o.b. value. Then the domestic value of US $ 1.00 of 
exports in f.o.b. prices is Rs 1.80. 
We have thus found two values for the opportunity cost of foreign exchange, 
the first related to imports of Rs 2 .60 and the second related to exports of Rs 
1.80. It should be noted that we have here the same problem we discussed in 
Section 3.1 regarding the opportunity cost of an input, and we may therefore 
apply the same analysis. HARBERGER'S formula (3 .2) can thus be written a s : 4 
R , = tj.M. (1 + T)R + g X{\ - D)R 
y\M + eX 
where R' = Shadow price of foreign exchange and R = official exchange rate, 
both exchange rates expressed in terms of units of local currency 
per unit of foreign currency 
M = ci.f. value of imports in terms of foreign currency 
T — Import duties 
r\ = Elasticity of demand for foreign exchange with respect to changes 
in the exchange rate 
X = f.o.b. value of exports in terms of foreign currency 
D = Export duties 
e = Elasticity of supply of foreign exchange with respect to changes in 
the exchange rate. 
The foreign exchange opportunity cost is thus the weighted average of the 
domestic values of the country's import and export prices, the weights being the 
fractions in which an additional dollar of foreign exchange will be used for 
increasing imports and reducing exports, respectively.5 In case of export sub-
sidies the sign of D has, of course, to be reversed. In case of quantitative restric-
tions, the formula remains valid except that then T should be interpreted as 
representing the tariff equivalent of the restrictions. In such a case, importers 
may make a more than normal profit and this should be considered as if it were 
a tariff. Hence, the tariff equivalent is to be found by comparing the domestic 
prices of the restricted goods with their world prices valued at the official ex-
change rate. The formula thus has quite some generality. Furthermore, it may 
be noted that when the country in question is a price-taker, demand and supply 
of foreign exchange is determined by physical imports and exports, so that the 
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demand and supply elasticities of foreign exchange can be replaced by the im-
port demand and export supply elasticities.6 It should also be noted that the 
formula is based on existing distortions and that it does not represent the shad-
ow price of foreign exchange under free trade conditions.7 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is therefore the correct formula to use if indeed the Government is 
not willing to abolish the duties, which is what one can generally expect. 
A problem that remains with the HARBERGER formula is, of course, that com-
plicated econometric studies will be necessary to find the relevant elasticities. 
It is therefore useful to review whether the formula can be simplified. The 
UNIDO Manual suggests that the opportunity cost of foreign exchange should 
normally be calculated as the average of the ratios of domestic clearing prices 
of consumption goods to ci.f. prices calculated at the official rate of exchange. 
Exports would be left out of the formula as, in the opinion of the authors of the 
UNIDO Manual, it is unlikely that increased earnings of foreign exchange will 
lead to a reduction in exports. Furthermore, capital goods would not be included 
in the imports in the formula because the authors feel that the rate of investment 
is not constrained by a country's balance of payments but by political and insti-
tutional conditions. Hence, foreign exchange has a higher value than that 
indicated by the official exchange rate only to the extent that it increases do-
mestic consumption. 
It is difficult to reject the UNIDO proposal out of hand because it all depends 
on what will happen in practice when additional foreign exchange becomes 
available. Enhanced foreign exchange availability will often lead to increased 
consumption of exports when such exports are suitable for domestic consump-
tion, such as when the exports consist of manufactured consumer goods. Where 
the exports consist of agricultural raw materials or minerals, the additional 
foreign exchange availability will not, in general, lead to home consumption of 
these products, but the pressure to export may well be reduced and the resources 
otherwise used for exports may then be used for the production of home goods. 
Excluding capital goods from the formula may be justified in special cases where 
indeed investments are constrained by political conditions. But if this is not the 
case, the increased availability of foreign exchange may well increase the de-
mand for imported investment goods when such goods are not available in the 
country. To follow UNIDO's suggestion probably implies that the opportunity 
cost of foreign exchange will be overestimated. On the export side, many 
developing countries impose export duties, so that, in general, the exclusion of 
exports from the formula will tend to increase the estimate of the opportunity 
cost of foreign exchange. Excluding investment goods from imports will have 
the same effect, as import duties on capital goods are normally much lower than 
those on consumption goods. 
Because UNIDO's suggestion is not very realistic, we may ask whether there 
exists another shortcut method of estimating the opportunity cost of foreign 
exchange. In this respect it may be noted that if the demand and supply elastici-
ties are the same, the Harberger formula reduces to a simple ratio of the sum of 
domestic values of imports and exports to their world values. Thus, in our 
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example, if exports equal imports, the opportunity cost of foreign exchange 
would be Rs 2.20. If it is likely that the demand elasticity for foreign exchange is 
higher than the supply elasiticty, a reasonable estimate will often be to take the 
average of the foreign exchange opportunity cost of imports (Rs 2.60) and the 
unweighted Harberger formula rate (Rs 2.20). Thus in our example, the base 
estimate of the foreign exchange opportunity cost would be Rs 2.40. On the 
other hand, if the supply elasticity is expected to be higher than the demand 
elasticity, the average of the foreign exchange opportunity cost of exports (Rs 
1.80) and the unweighted Harberger formula rate (Rs 2.20) may be a good ap-
proximation. In all cases, it is recommended that sensitivity tests be undertaken. 
In Chapter 6 of this study, where the subject of macro-economic imbalances is 
discussed, more information is given on the likely values of the elasticities. 
3.3. LABOR 
The production factor labor has the feature, distinct from all other produc-
tion factors, that the laborer's services are tied to the laborer. This feature has 
important implications as regards the supply price of labor and it will be useful, 
therefore, to review briefly how this supply price is determined. 
The reader is first referred to Figure 3.2A, which presents the well-known 
indifference curve analysis. The horizontal axis represents the number of labor 
hours the worker can provide up to the physiologically maximum OA and the 
vertical axis represents his income. It is assumed that the laborer has a non-
labor income of OR and that any addition to OR is labor income. Two of the 
possible indifference curves of the worker are drawn (Ui and U 2 ) , each present-
ing a line of equal utility achieved by substituting additional utility in the form 
of leisure for a reduction in utility in the form of income. The slope of an in-
difference curve at any one point is therefore -dU/dA: BU/dM, where dU/dA 
is the marginal disutility of labor (or marginal utility of leisure when the sign is 
reversed) and dU/dM the marginal utility of income. The slopes are increasing 
along an indifference curve from left to right, indicating that progressively in-
creasing increments of income are needed to compensate the worker for each 
incremental reduction in leisure. When the worker reaches the maximum num-
ber of labor hours, the slopes become infinite. At the extreme left of the figure, 
the slopes are assumed to be horizontal, indicating that no disutility of labor 
exists when only small amounts of labor are applied. 
The laborer's supply position can now be determined as follows. Suppose that 
the wage rate is wi as indicated by the slope of the line RYi. Then the laborer's 
equilibrium position will be at point A, i.e., the point where the wage rate wi 
equals the marginal valuation of labor ( -8U/dA :dU/dM), or, in perhaps more 
familiar terms, where the marginal disutility of labor ( -dU/8A) equals the 
wage rate w multiplied by the marginal utility of income (dU/8M). At a wage 
rate of wi the laborer will thus work a total of OA' hours, earn AA' of income 
and have a welfare position equal to Ui. Increasing the wage rate to W2 - the 
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level indicated by the slope of the line R Y 2 - will result in a new equilibrium 
position C, so that he will then work a total of O C hours, earn C C of income, 
and have a welfare position equal to U2. 
The increase in the welfare position of the worker due to a wage rate increase 
is often defined with the help of either the compensating variation or the equiva-
lent variation of income. The compensating variation8 is the amount of income 
that should be taken away from the worker in order to keep him when he works 
at the wage rate W2 at his original welfare level Ui . This is thus equal to the 
difference between the Y 2 and and Yi lines. The equivalent variation, on the 
other hand, is the amount of income that should be given to the worker to bring 
him to the welfare level U2 if he has to work at wage rate w i . This amount of 
income is thus equal to the difference between the Y{ and Yi lines. 
However, neither the compensating not the equivalent variation is, in our 
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opinion, a correct measure of the increase in welfare. This may perhaps best be 
shown with the help of Figure 3.2B, which presents the same analysis in a 
slightly different form. The line AC is the laborer's supply curve and the curves 
AB and DC the compensated and equilibrated supply curves corresponding to 
the Ui and U 2 curves of Figure 3.2A, respectively. The compensating variation 
in income is thus represented by the area wi A B w? and the equivalent variation 
in income by the area wi D C W2. Neither of the two areas however, as discussed 
in Chapter 2 where the consumer surplus was reviewed, measures the real wel-
fare increase of the worker. In case income distribution does not count, the 
exact measure is the area left of the laborer's supply curve, i.e., the area wi AC 
W2. This area can also be found by considering the disutility of the extra work 
that the laborer undertakes when the wage rate is increased. The supply curve 
shows that if the wage rate increases from wi to W2, the worker's income in-
creases by a total of O W 2 C C minus Owi A A'. An amount equal to A 'ACC is 
necessary to compensate the worker for his additional work and the net welfare 
increase is therefore wi A C W 2 , or, algebraically, A w ( L + l / 2 A L ) . In case in-
come distribution counts, the total increase in income as well as the leisure 
foregone should be evaluated at the marginal utilities of income corresponding 
to each of the different points on the supply curve AC, so that the welfare in-
crease of the worker equals A w(L +1/2 A L) evaluated at the different marginal 
utilities of income. 
We may now formalize the argument as follows. Suppose that we are con-
sidering the hiring of an individual worker for a new project and that 
m = income of the worker in his present occupation 
a — extra disutility of effort if the worker accepts the new job 
w = wage the new project pays 
x = product of the worker in the new project. 
Then we can set up the following table to show the welfare effects of the hiring 
of an employed worker. 
TABLE 3.1. Welfare Effects of Hiring an Employed Worker. 
Economically Socially 
Income gain of project X - w (x - w) v p 
Income gain of worker w - m (w - m)vw 
Compensation for harder work a a v w 
Net gain of worker w - m - a (w - m - a) v w 
Total gain of society x - (m + a) (x ~w)vp + (w -m - a ) v w 
Economically, the benefit is simply the difference between the product of the 
worker in his new occupation and the worker's old income plus the value of the 
extra disutility of effort. For a social evaluation, however, the benefits must be 
valued at the relevant marginal utilities of income, and the benefit expression 
is then as in the right hand column of the table, whereby vp and vw represent the 
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income distribution weights derived from the marginal utility of income 
schedule applicable to the project owners and workers, respectively. 
Let us consider now the case where an unemployed laborer is hired, and let 
us assume that the worker receives from Government unemployment benefits or 
from his family an income equal to y. Then the following table may be estab-
lished. 
TABLE 3.2. Welfare Effects of Hiring an Unemployed Laborer. 
Economically Socially 
Income gain of project 
Income gain of worker 
Compensation for harder work 
Net gain of worker 
Gain rest of society or family 
Total gain of society 
X - W (X - W) Vp 
w - y (w - y)vw 
a M vw 
• - y - a (w - y ~ a)vw 
y y Vf 
x - a (x-w)vp + (w -y -d)vw 
+ yvf 
Economically, the unemployment benefits are thus not to be considered, 
since they are mere transfer payments. The worker loses y when he becomes 
employed, but the rest of society gains y, so that the net effect is nil. From a 
social point of view, however, when income distribution counts, the loss and 
the gain are to be valued at the marginal utilities of income of the different par-
ties, so that the loss and gain do not cancel. As regards the valuation of a, it 
needs to elaboration that the supply price of the worker depends on his initial 
welfare position. For instance, it is a well known phenomenon in the developed 
countries that some workers prefer to remain unemployed for extended periods 
than to accept a job at a wage rate slightly higher than the unemployment bene-
fits, and the value of a may then be quite high. 
We attach considerable importance to the above analysis, since most of the 
development literature does not consider the welfare position of the worker. It 
is often postulated that the foregone marginal product of the worker is the 
opportunity cost of labor or, similarly, that when a worker is unemployed, the 
opportunity cost of labor is zero. This does not acknowledge that the laborer 
may incur an extra disutility of effort when he moves to another position or 
that he may have a certain reservation wage below which he is not willing to 
work. For the determination of the real cost of labor, the relevant concept is not 
that of m - the foregone marginal product, but rather of m + a - the voluntary 
supply price of labor. Only this concept can explain, for instance, that an addi-
tional wage or salary should be offered to induce a rural laborer to move to the 
city or, in general, to a job where he has to work harder or where conditions are 
more unpleasant. 
After this introduction to the subject, we can turn to the question of how in 
practice we should determine the real cost of labor. The number of possible 
cases that can be studied is almost unlimited, depending on the actual circum-
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stances, and we will therefore restrict our analysis to three institutional frame-
works which are generally believed to be relevant for the developing countries. 
The principles which will emerge from our analysis are, however, applicable to 
other situations. 
The first case which we would like to review is that of the over-populated 
developing countries, the so-called labor-surplus countries. LEWIS 9 has offered 
a model of such an economy which has had, and still has, substantial impact on 
the economic development and project evaluation literature, and it, therefore, 
appears well worthwhile to start our analysis with a review of his work. The 
LEWIS model distinguishes a capitalist sector (factories, mines, plantations, and 
such), where labor is paid the marginal product, and a subsistence sector (of 
which agriculture is the most important), where labor receives the average 
product. The reason that the average product is paid in the agricultural sub-
sistence sector is that the land-to-population ratio in these countries is so low 
that the marginal productivity of labor in agriculture is zero or even negative. 
Hence, labor would starve if it were paid the marginal product. However, if 
each member of the farm household shares equally in the total product, i.e., 
if each member is paid the average product, the household can continue to 
operate although, due to population pressures, the average product will soon 
equal the subsistence level. Since the marginal product of labor in the subsistence 
sector is zero, labor can be withdrawn from there without reducing the volume 
of farm output. Farm labor will be willing to move to the capitalist sector, 
provided the wage rate there is sufficiently above the subsistence wage of the 
agriculture sector to compensate the laborer for bis moving. According to 
LEWIS, this minimum wage level is reached when it is about 30 to 50 percent 
above the subsistence level and the labor supply curve for the capitalist sector 
will then be perfectly elastic. The capitalist sector has a high marginal producti-
vity of labor due to its use of capital and can thus easily absorb some of the 
surplus labor of the agricultural sector at the going wage rate. Since the capi-
talist sector will reinvest its profits, the marginal productivity of labor curve will 
shift upwards, resulting in more labor employment, more profits and reinvest-
ments, more labor employment, and so on. Industrialization is thus in the Lewis 
model the key to economic expansion. The process will come to an end only 
when the supply function of labor starts to rise. This can happen for various 
reasons. For instance, the number of people in the subsistence sector may be 
reduced so far that the average product there will rise. Alternatively, labor 
productivity in the subsistence sector may rise because of additional capital and 
new technology, or because of a rise in the relative price of agricultural products 
due to the additional demand of the workers in the capitalist sector. Thus, 
eventually, the whole process will result in an equiUbrium situation, but this is 
so far away in time that for all practical purposes the opportunity cost of labor 
can be assumed to be zero. 
The analysis can readily be presented graphically. In Figure 3.3A, the curve 
PQ represents the marginal productivity of labor schedule in the subsistence 
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sector. Beyond the labor level OQ, it is assumed that the marginal product of 
labor is zero. There are, however, OR laborers who will share equally in the total 
product OPQ. Let OSS'R equal OPQ. Then the subsistence level is OS. Hence, 
out of a total of OR laborers, only OQ do productive work and QR can there-
fore be withdrawn from the agricultural sector without reducing the farm out-
put: in other words, the opportunity cost of QR is zero. 
Figure 3.3B presents the situation in the capitalist sector, whereby it should 
be noted that the labor axis is drawn on a larger scale than in Figure 3.3A. 
Since the supply price of labor withdrawn from the subsistence sector is OW 
(which is about 30 to 50 percent above the subsistence level according to Lewis), 
capitalists will hire laborers up to the point where the supply curve W intersects 
the marginal productivity of labor curve, i.e., they will hire OT Laborers. The 
opportunity cost of this labor is zero (OT is a fraction of QR) and the real value 
of the total product in the capitalist sector is therefore A + B + C, of which A 
accrues to the capitalists in the form of profits and B + C to the laborers in the 
form of wages. Whereas the wages will be consumed, the profits will be rein-
vested, so that the marginal productivity of labor curve will shift to the right. 
More laborers will then be hired, more profits will be made and reinvested, 
which again raises the marginal productivity of labor curve, resulting in the 
hiring of more laborers, and so on until the perfectly elastic labor supply curve 
starts to turn upward. 
A problem with the model is, of course, that the capitalist sector can expand 
only if it has a market for its products. But in a closed economy, the markets for 
the capitalist sector's manufactures will be quite limited unless at the same time 
the productivity of the subsistence sector is raised. In an open economy, import 
substitution and export expansion may allow a somewhat longer expansion of 
the capitalist sector. However, the process may soon come to a halt if agricultu-
ral productivity is not increased since the possibility of import substitution is 
quite limited, and export expansion in countries at a low stage of development 
encounters difficulties in view of the poor quality of the manufactures produced. 
As a side remark, it may be noted that all this underlines once more the necessity 
of the interaction between national planning and project planning. The short-
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comings of a national plan based on the model would be immediately obvious 
if the rates of return of the individual investment projects were calculated. 
While the LEWIS model thus needs amendment, and this has been done by the 
so-called balanced growth theories which emphasize the necessity of raising the 
productivity of the agricultural sector, the question that still needs to be dis-
cussed is whether marginal labor productivity in the agricultural sector can 
indeed be zero. MYTNT 1 0 has made the remark that employment in the capitalist 
sector of the surplus laborers will lead to extra consumption out of the expanded 
wage incomes (the area B in Figure 3.3B) and that this will lead to a social cost 
in case the projects in the capitalist sector do not yield a consumable output 
immediately. We believe that this argumentation is not correct. Infrastructure 
and heavy industry investments have indeed an element of waiting, but this 
should not be considered a social cost when the social rates of return of these 
investments exceed those of light industry investments where no waiting takes 
place. Furthermore, in an open economy, capital goods may be exported or 
used for import substitution, so that foreign exchange resources would be freed 
to satisfy the demand for consumption goods. Again, this would be justified as 
long as the social rates of return of the capital goods projects exceed those of the 
projects geared towards the immediate provision of consumption goods. The 
question which should be asked immediately in reply to this criticism is how 
these social rates of return should be calculated. This matter will be discussed 
in detail in Part II of this study. Meanwhile, it may suffice to mention that the 
element of waiting will indeed enter into the calculation of the social rate of 
return of a project, but only as long as there is a consensus in the economy that 
waiting is justified or, in other words, that the optimal income growth path has 
not yet been reached in the conomy and that investments should be stepped up. 
Part II will discuss the literature which proposes to deal with this matter by 
putting a premium on investments vis-a-vis consumption, and will show that 
this concept is not correct, since it does not recognize that growth in total 
national income is composed of the income growth of different income classes. 
Hence, when the distribution of income between persons and over time is not 
optimal, the proposal of MYINT - that it is the type of project output (heavy 
industry or infrastructure output vis-a-vis output of consumption goods) that 
counts - as well as that of others - that it is the distribution of project benefits 
between consumption and investment that counts - should be rejected and re-
placed by an analysis of the distribution of project benefits between income 
classes. In this part of the study, however, it is assumed that the interpersonal 
as well as the intertemporal distribution of income is optimal, so that the matter 
of waiting does not arise. Hence, if the opportunity cost of labor were zero, the 
benefits of a project in the capitalist sector would be A + B + C (Figure 3.3B) 
and there would be no need to analyze either the type of output or the distri-
bution of the benefits. 
Returning again to the matter of the zero marginal productivity of labor, 
MYINT has also made the remark 1 1 - an observation previously made by SEN 1 2 -
that it is not the marginal product of a laborer which is relevant but the marginal 
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product of labor time. As MYINT sees it, there is nothing wrong with applying 
labor time until its marginal product is zero since, according to him, it is a free 
good within the family. Hence, while labor time per farm household is applied 
until its product falls to zero, the total available labor time of all the workers 
exceeds what is being applied, and none of the workers will do a full day's work. 
As a consequence, if laborers are moved from agriculture to industry, those 
remaining behind will have to work harder, i.e., accept less leisure, if the total 
agricultural output is to remain unchanged. It is likely that this harder work will 
be undertaken only if economic incentives are provided, i.e., if those remaining 
behind receive a reward for their harder work. But if this is so, then, according 
to MYINT, there will be additional claims on the total resources of the country -
either agricultural products or manufactures - and one cannot then speak of 
a zero shadow wage rate of those moving out of agriculture. Thus, even if the 
marginal product of labor time were zero, there would be a positive opportunity 
cost of labor. 
MYTNT'S analysis is interesting but, in our opinion, not correct. First, it may 
be remarked that when the workers have to work harder their additional claim 
on the resources of the country should be considered the reward and not the 
cost of this harder work. The cost of the extra work is the disutility of the extra 
labor effort. Second, one wonders why in principle labor time should be con-
sidered a free good within the family. MYTNT'S assumption is certainly not cor-
rect if labor has a disutility of effort. Finally, the falling to zero of the marginal 
product of labor time should be seriously questioned on the basis of production 
principles. In a frequently quoted passage, VINER writes: 'As far as agriculture is 
concerned, I find it impossible to conceive of a farm of any kind on which, other 
factors of production being held constant in quantity and even in form as well, 
it would not be possible by known methods to obtain some addition to the crop 
by using additional labor in more careful selection and planting of the seed, 
more intensive weeding, cultivation, thinning and mulching, more painstaking 
harvesting, gleaning, and clearing of the crop. ' 1 3 There is much to this criticism, 
and experience seems to bear VINER out. Even in the most overpopulated coun-
tries, one finds that positive wages are paid for rural landless workers and this 
phenomenon can, of course, be explained only if labor time has a positive 
marginal product. 
Accepting then that the marginal product of labor time is in all likelihood 
positive, the opportunity cost of labor would be positive in the MYTNT model. 
S E N , 1 4 however, has argued against such a conclusion and believes that, even if 
labor time has a positive marginal product, peasants will make up for the fore-
gone output of those leaving the farm by working harder without asking for 
additional incentives. The assumptions SEN must make to arrive at this con-
clusion are that the marginal utility of income schedule of the family and its 
marginal disutility of labor schedule are flat in the relevant region. Similar to the 
analysis of the equilibrium position of a laborer at the beginning of this section, 
we may define the equilibrium position of the family-farm as the position where 
the marginal productivity of family labor (P- dX/dA, where P is the market 
46 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
price, and 8X/8A the marginal physical product) equals the marginal valuation 
of family labor ( -8U/8A:8U/8M, where 8U/8A is the disutility of family labor 
and 8U/8M the marginal utility of income) 1 5. Under SEN'S assumption, the 
marginal valuation of family labor curve would be horizontal so that indeed the 
rest of the family would work harder if a member leaves the farm. In the SEN 
model there is thus a positive marginal product of labor time, but there is also 
surplus labor because a number of workers can be withdrawn from the farm 
without reducing total output. 
SEN regards his hypothesis as not implausible. It seems to us, however, that 
SEN'S model is highly unrealistic. SEN'S assumption that the marginal utility of 
income schedule is constant is rather farfetched,1 6 and the assumption that the 
marginal disutility of labor does not increase in case of harder work is also un-
likely. SEN'S model leads to the conclusion that the supply function for labor 
would be flat. This is in contradiction with empirical observation. The facts are 
that during the busy seasons of planting and harvesting, even in countries such 
as India and Egypt - where LEWIS believes surplus labor exists - the labor sup-
ply curve turns upwards, so that in the busy season higher wages must be paid 
for hired labor than in the slack season. But if that is so, then there is clearly no 
surplus of labor. The doctrine of the zero opportunity cost of labor must thus, 
on this ground alone, be rejected. 1 7 
It remains to be analyzed how family and landless labor employment as well 
as the rural wage rate is determined during the various seasons. HANSEN 1 8 has 
analyzed this matter in detail. In Figure 3.4A, the supply curve of landless 
laborers is Si, and of family labor Sf. It should be noted that only the short-run 
is considered so that the supply curve may start at a high positive level. The 
supply curve for family labor starts at a lower level than the one for landless 
labor, in line with the assumption that self-employment is considered more 
respectable and enjoyable than work for others. The total supply curve for labor 
is the horizontal summation of the two curves and is thus the curve S. Let MPi 
be the marginal productivity of labor curve (at given farm product prices) 
during the busy season. Then total labor input will be WiC, of which WiA are 
landless laborers hired at the wage rate OWi and WiB family laborers. Similar-
ly, if M P 2 is the marginal productivity of labor curve during one of the slack 
periods, the total labor input will be W 2 F , of which W 2 D is landless labor and 
W 2 E is family labor, while the labor wage rate will be O W 2 . The analysis is 
presented on a net basis in Figure 3.4B. The supply of landless laborers is Si, 
while the demand curves for these laborers in the different seasons are represent-
ed by the D curves (found by deducting S f from the MP curves). It is interesting 
to note that if the MP curve falls below the point G in Figure 3.4A, as it may 
well do during an extremely slack season, no labor can be hired. For instance, 
with a marginal productivity of labor curve equal to MP 3 , labor input OL 3 will 
consist entirely of family labor. Although there exists then no market wage rate, 
this does not mean that labor has a zero shadow wage rate. The hiring of an un-
employed worker has, as a consequence, the fact that the worker has to forego a 
certain amount of leisure and, as discussed, it should be recognized that this is 
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a social cost. Therefore, during the extremely slack season, the opportunity cost 
of landless laborers is OW3 and of family labor OW4. 
With the above analysis we have come to an end as regards our review of how 
the opportunity cost of labor should be determined in the rural sector of the 
land-scarce developing countries. As we have seen, the problem of labor surplus 
is not a matter of a continuous surplus during the entire year but a matter of 
seasonality, with shortages during the peak periods and surpluses during the 
slack periods. On an aggregate basis, the overall opportunity cost of agricultural 
labor is simply the weighted average of the rural wage rates (OWi and OW2), the 
reservation wage at which landless labor is not willing to work (OW3) and the 
marginal product of family labor to the extent that it falls below the reservation 
wage (OW4), the weights being the quantities of labor supplied. In the case of 
individual projects, however, a more detailed analysis will be necessary, as the 
withdrawing of labor will not necessarily take place in the quantities in which 
the different types of labor are applied on average. Although a precise analysis 
may be difficult, rough indications of the order of magnitude will often be suffi-
cient to arrive at reasonably good estimates of the opportunity cost of labor. 
For instance, in the case of a rural works program to be undertaken mainly 
during the slack season, the average of the subsistence wage and the lower end 
of the rural wage scale will be a good indicator of the opportunity cost of the 
rural labor. Additional use of hired labor for irrigation projects during the 
entire year can be costed at the average of the rural wage rates throughout the 
year. The opportunity cost in the case of resettlement of non-viable farmers can 
often be estimated as equal to the minimum subsistence wage rate. And so on. 
In principle then, the opportunity cost of labor for rural projects can be reason-
ably well approximated and it is definitely not zero, as the LEWIS model would 
lead us to believe. 
Although we thus reject the LEWIS doctrine, we would like to mention, how-
ever, that this does not mean that we believe that rural incomes in the developing 
countries are adequate. On the contrary, in many developing countries rural 
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productivity is low and many people live there at the margin of physical exist-
ence. What the development process is all about is that such poverty should be 
eradicated. This subject will be discussed in detail in Part II of this study. 
As the second case study, we would like to analyze whether the rural oppor-
tunity cost of labor also determines the urban opportunity cost of labor. If we 
were to follow LEWIS, we should increase the former by about 3 0 to 5 0 percent 
to induce rural workers to migrate to the cities. Others believe a differential of 
about 100 percent would be necessary. Whatever the exact figures, the reason 
why this differential is necessary is obvious. A rural worker will migrate to the 
city only if his real income there is at least equal to his real rural earnings, and, 
in making the comparison, he will take into account that the cost of living in the 
city (food, rent, transportation) is more expensive than in the rural areas, that 
he may have to work harder if employed, that he may risk becoming unemploy-
ed, but that he may then have more leisure, etc. 
Denoting the rural opportunity cost adjusted for the city differences and 
hence the worker's voluntary supply price by m, the urban opportunity cost of 
labor would be equal to m if the wage rate in the urban sector were free to find its 
own market-clearing level. In most developing countries, however, the urban 
wage rate is institutionally determined, sometimes even at levels three to four 
times higher than the average rural wage rate. As a result, rural workers are 
willing to migrate to the urban centers, even though large pools of unemployed 
may exist there. If the number of unemployed in the urban sector were constant, 
the opportunity cost of a worker hired in the urban area would be equal to in 
because the hired unemployed worker would be replaced in the unemployment 
pool by a worker from the rural area. There is, however, as HARRIS and TODARO 1 9 
and HARBERGER 2 0 ( H - T - H ) have shown, no reason why the number of unem-
ployed should remain constant. 
The H - T - H - model is basically very simple. Migration from the rural areas 
to the urban areas is a function of the expected earnings in the urban areas, 
while the expected earnings are a function of the urban wage rate as well as the 
probability of getting employed at this wage rate. In the H - T - H model, this 
probability is presented hyp = N/L, where N is the number of laborers employ-
ed at the institutionally determined wage rate and L the total number of laborers 
in the urban area. From this follows that dL/dN = l/p, or, in other words, that 
the creation of one urban job results in an inmigration of l/p rural workers. 
The opportunity cost of taring a worker in the urban area is thus (1 //>)• rh. As a 
rural worker will migrate to the urban areas only if the probability of obtaining 
the urban wage rate multiplied by this rate w equals m, we may also write m = 
peqw. Substituting this in the previous expression, it is immediately seen that in 
the equilibrium situation where p = peq, the opportunity cost of a worker hired 
in the urban area equals the going urban wage rate w.21 
The rate of unemployment is in this model the mechanism that keeps the 
migration rate down. Suppose that the pool of unemployed in the urban area 
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is small, so that the probability of getting a job as well as expected earnings 
(N/L)- w are high. Then there will be an inflow of migrants, which will increase 
the number of unemployed. As a result, the probability of obtaining a job will 
be reduced. This process will go on until the probability of obtaining a job N/L 
just equals in/w. At that equilibrium level, the average unemployment rate 
(L - N)/L is equal to 1 -p. As the hiring of one laborer will result in an in-
crease in the total labor force of l/p persons and an increase in unemployment 
of (l/p) — 1 persons, the marginal rate of unemployment is presented by 
[d(L - N)]/dL = (l/p - l)/(l/p) = 1 - p, and is thus the same as the average 
rate. Hence, in the H-T-H model the rate of unemployment in the equiMbrium 
position is constant. The taring of additional persons will lead to an increase in 
absolute numbers of the unemployed but not to an increase in the rate of un-
employment. 
The opportunity cost of labor must be equal to the urban wage rate in this 
model because the hiring of one worker whose supply price is pw will lead to an 
inflow of l/p workers, so that the total welfare foregone equals exactly w. This 
can also be shown as follows. Suppose that p = 0.5, so that two workers will 
migrate to the city if one worker is hired. As a result, one worker will become un-
employed and his loss in welfare is thus in. This must be added to the opportu-
nity cost of the hired worker, which is also m. Hence, the total opportunity cost 
equals 2m, which, because in = 0.5w, equals exactly the urban wage rate. 
While the H-T-H model makes it very clear that in addition to the supply 
price of the individual worker, the loss in welfare of those workers who become 
unemployed must also be considered, the model is not very realistic in several 
respects. First, as STIGLITZ 2 2 has observed, the definition of the probability of 
obtaining work in-the urban area,/? = N/L, implies'that 'individuals go to the 
hiring hall every day' or, in other words, that all the individuals - employed and 
unemployed - compete constantly with each other for the jobs. Since this is 
unrealistic, STIGLITZ replaces the one-period H-T-H model with a multi-period 
model where the probability of being tared depends on the length of time in the 
unemployment pool. STIGLITZ, however, then arrives at the same result as the 
H-T-H model. He recognizes as a possible objection to this result that the pre-
dicted unemployment rates are much too large. For instance, if the urban wage 
rate is about twice the level of m - which it often is - it follows from in = peqw 
that peq and hence the employment rate N/L is only about 50 percent, clearly an 
unacceptable prediction. The models may thus imply, in STIGLITZ'S opinion, a 
much higher unemployment rate than is actually the case. 
MAZUMDAR 2 3 makes the same criticisms and, following an earlier model of 
TODARO, 2 4 suggests that a more realistic probability function would be p — 
{yN)/{L - N), where as before TV represents the number of urban jobs, L the 
number of urban job seekers, and y the rate of growth of the urban jobs N. The 
probability of finding a job in the urban area is thus a function of job openings 
and the absolute number of unemployed. The function can also be written as 
^ = {(j/p) + 1 }N from which follows that the migration function is presented 
by dL/dN = (y/p) + 1. The opportunity cost of hiring a worker is thus 
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{illp) + Since a rural worker's supply price in the equilibrium situation 
will be m = p w, we may write: 
opp. cost of labor _ (y/p + \)m _|_ 
wage rate (l/p)w ^ ^ 
_ _|_ yN _ yL _ y 
~ 7 L-N ~ L-N ~ (L-N)/L 
Thus if the growth rate of urban jobs is 5 percent and the unemployment rate 
about 9 percent, the opportunity cost of labor would be about 55 percent of the 
urban wage rate. The average rate of unemployment is presented by 
L -N _ yN/p __ y 
L ~ {(y/p) + 1}N ~ T+p 
and the marginal rate by 
d (L -N) = l 1 = y 
dL (y/p)+l y+p 
Since the two are equal, the rate of unemployment will not change in the M A -
ZUMDAR model, just as in the H-T-H model. The MAZUMDAR model gives, how-
ever, much more reasonable predictions as regards the level of the rate of un-
employment. 
Rather than having large pools of unemployed in the urban areas, many 
developing countries appear to have an urban informal sector where the mi-
grants can earn at least some money by working as casual laborers, street ven-
dors, rickshaw drivers, house servants, and the like. HARBERGER has argued that 
in such cases the informal sector wage rate represents the supply price m of the 
migrants and that therefore the opportunity cost of a laborer hired by the formal 
sector is equal to his informal sector earnings. This argumentation, however, 
overlooks the point that the migrants will be willing to work for less than the 
going wage in the informal sector because they expect to obtain a job in the 
formal sector later at the higher urban wage rate. The MAZUMDAR model can 
easily take account of this point. In the presence of an informal sector, the equi-
librium condition for a rural worker who considers migrating to the city is 
presented by in = ptqWf + (1 - p*q)wu where in is the supply price of the 
migrant, p% the probability of obtaining a job in the formal sector, w/ the wage 
rate in the formal sector. (1 -p%) the probability of working in the informal 
sector, and wi the average earnings of the migrant in the informal sector. From 
this, it follows that pta = (in - wi)/(wf - wi). Denoting the number of people 
in the informal sector by L - N, the probability function is as before (yN)/(L ~N). 
Hence, rural workers will migrate to the city as long as yN/(L - N) is larger than 
ptq. The inflow of migrants will, however, increase the number in the informal 
sector and also reduce the earnings wi of the workers in the informal sector. This 
process will go on until the equilibrium position is reached where yN/(L - AO = 
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p*q. At that point the migration function is the same as in the previous model 
and the hiring of one person by the formal sector will thus result in an inflow of 
(y/P*) + 1 persons. It should be noted, however, that in this casep* has a lower 
value than the p in the previous model, so that the opportunity cost of labor for 
the formal sector is higher than in the previous model. This is logical because 
the possibility of earning wi will result in a larger inflow than before. The in-
formal sector will also, therefore, account for a larger percentage of the total 
labor force than the unemployed in the previous model. 
The last model can also be refined by means of a multi-period analysis. 
Furthermore, the analysis has not been entirely correct, in that the value of m 
will of course change during the migration process. It must, however, seriously 
be questioned whether sufficient empirical data will be available to determine 
the required migration function with any precision. Estimating the opportunity 
cost of labor for the formal sector in the urban area is therefore often a rather 
arbitrary undertaking. The upshot of the above discussion is that at least some 
limits can be indicated, in between which the opportunity cost will he. It is 
definitely not zero, as the LEWIS model would lead us to believe, but substantial-
ly larger than the rural earnings. It is also larger than the earnings in the informal 
sector. On the other hand, it will be lower than the institutional wage rate. In the 
presence of an informal sector, a good approximation will often be to calculate 
the value of {(yip*) + 1 }fh. For instance, if y equals 5 percent and the informal 
sector accounts for about 20 percent of the total labor force, it follows from 
p* — yN/(L -N) that p* = 0.25. Hence, the opportunity cost of labor can 
with reasonable accuracy be put at 1.20 times m. If wi = 0.5 w/, then m will be 
0.625 Wf25 and the opportunity cost of labor will thus be 75 percent of w/ and 
150 percent of wu Often, however, no reliable data will be available as regards 
p*. The best one can do in such a case is to estimate the values of wt and wj 
and to consider these the minimum and maximum values, respectively, of 
labor's opportunity cost. The use of both values will show how sensitive the rate 
of return of the project is with respect to this variable and in cases where the 
value of the opportunity cost of labor appears to be important, a range of rates 
of return should be calculated rather than a single-valued rate of return. 
The third case we would like to review is how the opportunity cost of unskilled 
labor should be determined in the so-called primitive affluence countries. Our 
attention so far has focused on the determination of labor's opportunity cost 
in those countries where the land-to-population ratio is low. In general, even 
though the subsistence sector may be quite large in such countries, the modern 
sector-plantations, mines and industry-does not encounter any difficulty in 
hiring the labor it requires. But there are quite a number of countries where the 
modern sector encounters substantial problems in obtaining labor. These coun-
tries also have a large subsistence sector, but the land-to-population ratio is 
high and the subsistence farmer does not seem to work unduly hard to obtain a 
reasonable living. This is all to the good, but what appears to be a perverse 
reaction is that even at relatively high wages, labor does not appear to be willing 
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to work in the modern sector. Such a situation seems to have existed in coun-
tries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Mauritius and some Eastern and Central 
African nations - to the point even that the modern sector opted to import 
immigrant labor from India and China. In the present time this situation exists, 
according to F I S K 2 6 , in the Pacific Region, including Papua New Guinea and 
several other Melanesian and Polynesian islands and, acording to others 2 7 , in 
parts of Africa. The problem of the unresponsive subsistence farmer is impor-
tant because the level of participation in the monetary economy determines to a 
large extent the overall economic development of the country. 
What then are the reasons for the unresponsive conduct of the subsistence 
farmer? According to FISK, the situation of many groups of peasants in the 
countries in the Pacific Region can be characterized as one of 'primitive afflu-
ence'. The peasants 'are able to provide, from their own resources, as much as 
they can consume of the normal staple foods that they are used to, together with 
a reasonable surplus for entertainment, display and emergency, and a standard 
of housing, clothing and entertainment requisites that is traditionally accepta-
ble, with an employment of a relatively small part of the total potential re-
sources of labor and land available to them. This means that within their self-
non-monetary system the productivity of their labor is very high, and it is still 
quite common in these countries to find substantial groups of peasants able to 
sustain this level of consumption from their own resources at the cost of an 
average labor input of about three hours per man-day or less.' 
Illustrative in this respect are the findings of M O U L I K 2 8 , who collected, inter 
aha, data on the daily activity patterns of sixty-seven subsistence farmers in 
three districts in Papua New Guinea. Out of a normal weekly activity time 
(including leisure) of 77 hours ( 1 1 hours per day), the productive activities - as 
MOULIK calls it - appeared to account for only some 1 9 to 25 hours. These 
activities included subsistence production and a very limited amount of cash 
cropping and paid work. Leisure accounted for about 40 to 48 hours per week, 
while social obligations, ceremonial activities, the meeting of Administration 
officials, and such, accounted for the rest of the available weekly activity time. 
It is not clear from MOULIK'S report where he has drawn the distinction be-
tween leisure and the social obligation type of activity. Furthermore, his defi-
nition of productive activities (subsistence production, cash cropping and paid 
work) is unfortunate, since many of the so-called non-productive activities 
definitely have an economic function. Story-telling and singing are a form of 
education of the young; palavers are a means of arriving at consensus and sett-
ling disputes; and the making of ceremonial masks is just as productive an 
action as that of a sculptor in the Western world. The way the family allocates 
its time between these different types of activities can still be based on marginal 
principles so that the utility from an hour's work in subsistence farming will be 
equal to the utility from an hour of leisure or any ceremonial or educational 
activity. What MOULIK'S investigation has confirmed, however, is that the 
peasant fanner in Papua New Guinea appears indeed to live in a situation of 
primitive affluence, a situation where the agricultural work week is short and 
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the marginal utility of additional agricultural staples is low. 
The subjective equilibrium position of the peasant farm in primitive affluence 
has been analyzed in detail by NAKAJIMA 2 9 and the following analysis is based 
on his work. The model we will use has three special features. First, in view of 
the difficulty of measuring the value of ceremonial activities and the like, we 
define income as the value of the agricultural subsistence products, and assume 
that there are some outside markets for agricultural products so that the family 
is able to impute a price to these products. Second, as confirmed by empirical 
data, the equilibrium position of the farm as regards agricultural production 
will be reached when only a very low amount of labor is applied, say 20 to 25 
hours per week. Third, the indifference curves will assume a vertical slope soon 
after the subsistence level of living has been reached. NAKAJTMA calls the level 
of income at which the curves turn upward the achievement standard of income, 
but this is, in our opinion, a rather unfortunate term as it does not acknowledge 
that the peasants may have substantial aspirations outside the subsistence 
farming field. NAKAJIMA'S achievement standard is very similar to what FISK 
has called the demand-ceiling or, in a slightly different context, the full-belly 
situation. Whichever name is used, it is clear that in a primitive affluence type 
of society, the marginal utility of additional staples will become negligible at a 
satisfaction level close to the subsistence level. 
The model is presented in Figures 3.5A and 3.5B. The horizontal axis OA 
represents in both figures the maximum possible labor hours of the family, 
while the vertical axis in Figure 3.5A represents total family income and in 
Figure 3.5B the marginal productivity and the marginal valuation of family 
labor. In Figure 3.5A the subsistence level of income is OMo and the full-belly 
level is O M 2 , the latter being only slightly above the subsistence level. As 
mentioned above, the indifference curves (not drawn between OMo and O M 2 ) 
have a vertical slope above the level O M 2 . Equilibrium will be reached where 
the family income curve OLi touches an indifference curve, which is assumed 
to be at the point Q. This equilibrium position is also shown in detail in Figure 
3. 5B, where the curve L3 is the marginal productivity of labor curve and L 2 is the 
marginal valuation of labor. It should be noted that L2 assumes an infinite value 
for work beyond M 2 C . The equilibrium position is Q' and a quantity of labor 
equal to OAi will be applied, representing about 20 or 25 hours of adult male 
work per week. 
Between the levels OMo and O M 2 (Figure 3.5A), the peasant farm will act 
as a normal economic unit. For instance, let us assume that the possibility of 
outside wage work has been opened. Its marginal valuation curve is then no 
longer determined by the production possibility curve OLi but by the wage 
income curve. In Figure 3.5B there will be a new marginal valuation curve and 
a new subjective equilibrium. Whether this new equilibrium will be to the left 
of OAi or to the right, depends on the slopes of the indifference curves between 
Q and C. Let us assume, however, that there will be a positive response towards 
higher wage rates and let us assume that the family will follow the curve Q'E' 
in supplying its labor. With a wage rate equal to OWi the new equilibrium will 
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be at the point F', so that the family works partly on the farm and partly outside. 
At higher wage rates, the family would even be willing to abandon the farm and 
to spend all its time on outside work. However, the maximum the family would 
be willing to work would be determined by its full-belly income level, OM2. In 
Figure 3.5B this occurs when the wage rate is at the level OW2. An amount of 
labor equal to OA2 will then be supplied and the family's income OW 2 E 'A2 
is then equal to OM2. Above point E' the supply curve will take the form of a 
hyperbole and will be backward sloping. This is readily seen. For instance, at 
the wage level OW 3 (the slope of OD in Figure 3.5A), the labor supply will be 
O A 3 and no more because only an income of OM2 is sought. The labor supply 
curve of the farm over the entire wage range is thus equal to Q'E'D'. 
It should be noted that there is nothing unique about this backward sloping 
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labor supply curve. One will find it even in the developed countries, as the rise in 
income due to higher wage rates will eventually lead an individual to buy more 
leisure, even though the price of leisure - the hourly wage rate - has become more 
expensive. The income effect has then won over the substitution effect. What is 
unique, however, in the context of the primitive affluence society is that the 
backward bending takes place at, by Western standards, a minimum effort 
level. This has important consequences for the determination of labor's op-
portunity cost. Assume that at a plantation wage rate of US $ 300 per annum, 
the peasant farmer is willing to work only 20 hours per week rather than the 40 
hours per week the plantation requires. Then the opportunity cost of labor will 
not be US $ 300 but US $ 600 per annum, because the plantation would need to 
hire two men rather than one to obtain its 40 hours of work per week. 
Thus, labor in primitive affluence societies is not cheap. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that in the past many plantations - with the consent of the colonial 
governments - preferred to import cheap labor from abroad. As a result, the 
subsistence sectors in such countries never became developed while the immi-
grants, however, became used to the modern sector with its longer working hour 
weeks. Eventually, when the numbers of the immigrants increased, they took 
over many of the more lucrative jobs (trade, service, money-lending), thus 
exacerbating the socio-economic problems of these ethnically mixed societies. 
In Malaysia in the present day, for instance, the average income of the Chinese -
representing 34 percent of the population - is about double that of the indige-
nous Malays, accounting for 55 percent of the population. 
In most countries immigrant labor policies are now no longer acceptable. 
Another alternative to obtaining cheap labor for the modern sector - also used 
in the past - is to impose corvées or to use the always available casual labor, 
which, after a spell in the modern sector, reverts to the subsistence farm. But the 
former, very rightly so, is unacceptable nowadays and cheap labor policies will 
never lead to an increase in productivity of the subsistence sector. It should, 
therefore, be recognized that only a policy of relatively high wages will lead to 
the development of the primitive affluence societies. But such policies alone are 
not enough. The objective must be to shift the peasant labor supply curve 
Q'E'D' upwards to such an extent that it will cross the Une of the 40-45 hours 
workweek. The policy prescription for achieving this objective may be summa-
rized as follows : (a) create work opportunities for less than 40 to 45 hours per 
week at relatively high wage rates; (b) increase the labor productivity curve by 
means of integrated rural development projects; and (c) increase farmers' 
demand by introducing consumer goods (kerosene lamps, tin roofs, radios, 
sewing machines, bicycles, and such) and by bringing the farmers into contact 
with the modern world (education). There is much more that can be said about 
the subject. We hope, however, that we have made it clear that cheap labor 
policies are not the answer for the development of the primitive affluence type 
societies and that if one really wishes to make a modern man out of the subsist-
ence farmer, a comprehensive policy package as outlined above is necessary. 
Basic to tb formulation of this package is the labor response of the farmer, 
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showing once more that, in the formulation of a national plan, the micro-
economic data used for project evaluation purposes cannot be neglected. 
3.4. CAPITAL 
Capital theory is a controversial subject 3 0 and this applies also to the concept 
of the opportunity cost of capital. The determination of the opportunity cost 
of capital is, of course, of crucial importance for the evaluation of Government 
projects. If the opportunity cost of capital and therewith the cut-off rate of return 
for Government projects is set too high, a number of projects may need to be 
rejected. If the rate is set too low, inefficient projects may be accepted. 
We will discuss budget constraints in Chapter 5 and assume in this section that 
there is no budget constraint on Government funds so that Government can 
obtain the funds it needs for a particular project from the private sector or, 
alternatively, if it has too many funds in relation to projects, that it can transfer 
the surplus funds to the private sector. Even under these circumstances, the 
economic literature in the past has taken diametrically opposite views as to how 
the opportunity cost of capital is to be found. On the one hand, for instance, 
KRUTILLA and ECKSTEIN 3 1 feel that the opportunity cost of capital is determined 
by consumers' marginal time preference rates. On the other hand, there is the 
view of HIRSHLEIFER, DE HAVEN and M I L L M A N 3 2 that it is the rate of return on 
private investments that counts. BAUMOL 3 3 takes a kind of middle position. He 
first argues that the relevant cut-off rate for Government projects is the marginal 
rate of return on investments in the private sector, but then argues that the 
subjective time preference rate is also relevant. The subject is thus full of con-
troversy and it is well worth our effort to review briefly how these writers arrived 
at their conclusions. 
KRUTILLA and ECKSTEIN argue that the true opportunity cost of capital 
cannot be the rate of return earned on the marginal investment of the most 
successful private firms since a reduction of the Government program by, say, 
US $ 100 million would not result in expansion of investment by such firms of 
an equal amount 3 4 . Their approach is therefore to trace how the capital for a 
Government project would otherwise be used and to determine its value in those 
uses. Two models concerning the United States are analyzed, both models 
assuming that the public investment forestalls cuts in taxes. Model A assumes 
that the tax cuts would be in sales taxes and in the personal income tax, which 
benefits low-income families most so that consumption would be boosted. 
Model B consists of a reduction of the personal income tax with emphasis on 
upper-income brackets and of a reduction of the corporate tax so that invest-
ments would increase. Regarding the cuts in the personal income tax and the 
sales taxes, the tax savings per income class are calculated and the after-income 
tax interest rates facing households in their saving-spending decisions estimated 
so that the weighted average of the after-tax interest rates can be found. Re-
garding the cut in the corporate income tax, it is assumed that 45 percent would 
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be passed on immediately to consumers and wage and salary earners, and about 
37.5 percent over a period of 100 years - the economic life of water resource 
projects - to dividend recipients. The remainder would stay with the firms in the 
form of retained earnings but would mainly be invested in liquid assets at low 
rates of return. Of the entire cut in the corporate tax, only about 3.5 percent is 
valued at the rates of return that firms in the private sector normally make. Since 
the two models calculate the cost of capital mainly on the basis of the low inte-
rest rates at which consumers undertake their savings and borrowing decisions, 
i.e., the consumers' marginal time preference rates, extremely low values were 
found for the opportunity cost of capital. Model A estimates the cost of capital 
at 5.29 percent, Model B at 5.44 percent. 
HIRSHLEIFER, DE HAVEN and MILLTMAN point out that in a perfect competition 
equilibrium situation, the rate of interest measures the marginal time producti-
vity of capital as well as the marginal rate of time preference of lenders 3 5. If 
Government projects are not subject to risk, then the prime - riskless - rate of 
interest can be used for discounting the benefits of Government projects. How-
ever, in their view, Government projects have at least the same risk as private 
projects and perhaps even more because most Government agencies have a 
record of overoptimism in cost-benefit determinations 3 6. On practical grounds, 
they feel, therefore, that the Government's discount rate for water resource pro-
jects should at least be equal to the returns that private utilities pay to their 
bondholders and equity owners. There is the additional complication that a 
corporate tax must be paid on the profits of private utilities. HiRSHLErFER, DE 
HAVEN and MILLIMAN see this tax as a price which equity investors are willing 
to pay to avoid the risk of bearing unlimited UabiUty37. Thus the marginal rate 
of return of private projects includes the various degrees of risk that investors 
face. The marginal private rate of return can be found by analyzing how private 
utilities are financed, which is typically with debt and equity in about equal 
proportions. If bonds yield 4 .7 percent and equity 5.7 percent (1959 averages) 
and if it is assumed that no surpluses remain in the company, the marginal pri-
vate rate of return will be 8.3 percent 3 8. Property and other taxes raise the return 
to over 9 percent, and, taking into account that Government projects are riskier 
projects than private projects, they recommend that 1 0 percent should be used 
as the Government's discount rate. 
BAUMOL starts his analysis by underlining that investment in a Government 
project should be undertaken only if the benefits of the project are greater than 
the loss sustained by removing the investment resources from the private sector. 
If all the goods and services in the economy other than those provided by Gov-
ernment are supplied by corporations, the opportunity cost of the Government 
funds will be equal to the return these corporations make. For instance, if the 
corporations must return 5 percent to their stockholders and the corporation 
tax is 5 0 percent, the opportunity cost of Government funds will be 1 0 percent. 
In the real world there may of course also be risk elements, and corporations 
must then make an additional rate of return sufficient to compensate the 
stockholders for the risks they take. For instance, suppose that the private 
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investors need 8 percent rather than 5 percent to be induced to invest in the 
risky undertaking. Then the rate of return of the corporation must be 16 per-
cent. From the point of view of society as a whole, it is this yield that will be 
foregone if resources are transferred to Government, and the opportunity cost 
of Government funds must thus be set at 16 percent. There is no need to differen-
tiate between the riskiness of Government projects compared to private pro-
jects since, from the point of view of society as a whole, public as well as private 
projects have low risks because of the law of large numbers. The opportunity 
cost of capital to Government consists thus of the rates of return foregone in the 
private sector. 
BAUMOL then goes on, however, to argue that consumers' time preferences -
which are, as discussed, much lower than the opportunity cost of capital be-
cause of the tax factor - also should play a role as otherwise one allocates to the 
future, resources much smaller than the amount consumers would be willing 
to allocate, as indicated by their individual subjective time preference rates. 
BAUMOL does not enter into the issue that the individual time preferences may 
not reflect adequately the social time preference rate of society as a whole. He 
assumes thus implicitly that the individual rates are the relevant ones for deter-
mining the optimal investment program. We will follow BAUMOL for the mo-
ment, but will criticize him later on in this section. According to BAUMOL then, 
there is an unavoidable indeterminancy in the choice of the discount rate to be 
used for Government projects. 'The figure which is optimal from the point of 
view of allocation of resources between the private and public sectors is necessa-
rily higher than that which accords with the public's subjective time preference. 
As a result, neither the higher nor the lower figure that has been proposed can, 
by itself, satisfy the requirements for an optimal allocation of resources, and 
we find outselves forced to hunt for a solution in the dark jungles of the second 
best. ' 3 9 
BAUMOL'S analysis is elucidating. It makes clear that the HIRSHLEIFER, DE 
HAVEN and MILLIMAN construction of treating the corporate tax as a price for 
risk aversion is farfetched. The corporate tax is simply part of the rate of return 
in the private sector. That different parts of that rate of return accrue to different 
parties - Government, lenders, equity investors - is not important; it is the 
total rate of return that is foregone if funds are transferred from the private 
sector to the Government sector. As regards the dichotomy whether the sub-
jective time preference rate or the private rate of return should be used as the 
cut-off rate for Government projects - all the time still assuming that the indi-
vidual rates reflect the social time preference rate - , the matter was analyzed in 
detail by RAMSEY 4 0 and USHER 4 1 in their comments on BAUMOL'S paper and by 
HARBERGER 4 2 in the context of his analysis of the opportunity cost of capital in 
an economy with a reasonably well functioning capital market. 
RAMSEY uses an elegant and simple notation and it will be useful to review his 
analysis briefly. If resources are transferred from the production in the private 
sector of goods X and Y to the production in the Government sector of good Z, 
the value of Z production must at least be equal to the value of the foregone X 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 59 
and Y production. Let MCX, MC, and MC Z be the marginal resource cost of X, 
Y and Z, respectively, excluding cost of capital, and r*Ix, r y I y and r z I z the cost 
of capital of X, Y and Z, respectively, then we must have (in absolute terms): 
(MC, + rjx) • A X + (MC y + r yI y) • AY < (MC, + r z I z ) • A Z 
The two terms on the left-hand side represent the value of the foregone X and 
Y production, respectively, and the term on the right-hand side the value of 
the Z production. Furthermore, we may write: MCX- AX + MCy AY = 
MCZ- A Z and I5- A X + I,- AY = I z- AZ, or in words, the resources other 
than capital and the capital, respectively, which are being transferred from the 
X and Y industry to the Z industry must equal the resources other than capital, 
and the capital, respectively, which will be used by the Z industry. Thus we get: 
r j x - AX + r,I y- AY < r z I z - AZ, which when divided by I z- A Z gives a*rx + 
a y r y < r2,whereax = (L- AX)/(L- AX + I y - AY)anda y = (Iy AY)/(I S- A X + 
ly AY). In words this equation tells us that the opportunity cost of capital to 
Government is the weighted average of the rates of return foregone in the 
private sector, the weights being the capital which would have been necessary to 
produce the foregone private sector products. 
Suppose that, as in our example above, the X good is produced by corpora-
tions and subject to risk so that the rate of return there is 16 percent and that the 
Y goods are produced in the noncorporation sector so that the rate of return 
there is only 5 percent. Suppose further that if the Z goods - the Government 
sector goods - are not produced, 80 percent of the Government funds would be 
used for the production of the X goods and 20 percent for the production of the 
Y goods. Then the opportunity cost of the Government funds would be (0.8 x 
16%) + (0.2 x 5 %) = 13.8 percent. It may be noted that, in this model, the 
subjective time preference rates do not enter into the picture at all. The net of 
risk rate of return of 5 percent which borrowers require is the before-income tax 
rate of return, while the subjective time preference rate is, of course, the corres-
ponding net-of-income tax return. For instance, if the income tax rate is 30 
percent, the subjective time preference rate would be 3.5 percent. In RAMSEY'S 
model, this rate is not relevant at all since the Government funds are all obtained 
by displacing the consumption of, and hence the necessary investments for the • 
production of the private goods X and Y. 
In HARBERGER'S capital markets model, however, additional savings will be 
induced and their value in terms of yield is the subjective time preference rate. 
HARBERGER'S model is basically the same as the one he uses for analyzing the 
opportunity cost of an input (Section 3.1) and is as follows. Suppose that the 
capital market functions reasonably well and that Government borrows the 
funds required for a certain project in this market. Then there will be a reduction 
in private investment, the value of which in terms of yield is the bef ore-tax rate 
of return (i.e., the amount accruing to Government in the form of taxes and to 
the private investors in the form of dividends and retained earnings). This is 
thus exactly the same as in the RAMSEY model. However, the additional borrow-
ing of Government will increase the interest rate and this will induce private 
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savings to come forward, the value of which in yield terms is the net of personal 
income tax return. The opportunity cost of the Government funds thus consists 
in this case of the weighted average of the private sector rate of return and the 
subjective time preference rate, the weights being investments displaced and 
savings induced. 
What has become quite clear from the RAMSEY and HARBERGER analyses is 
that in their models the opportunity cost of Government funds is determined by 
the method of resource transfer which the Government uses. Public funds can 
be raised by taxation or by borrowing. The taxes can be designed to obtain the 
resources from the corporate or high-risk areas or they can be designed to 
obtain the resources from the unincorporated or low-risk areas, and so on. Each 
of the different ways in which the Government can raise its funds will have a 
different impact and there will thus be as many different opportunity costs as 
there are ways of raising money. 
HARBERGER very rightly points out that we will never be able to get the infor-
mation to calculate the multiplicity of possible opportunity costs and proposes 
therefore to use only one opportunity cost, namely, as determined by his capital 
market model, which he denotes by the symbol o. He sees the capital market as 
a sponge which can absorb any tax revenues above anticipated levels or yield 
up the funds required for an increment in Government expenditures if taxes fall 
short. In this sense, incremental tax funds can then be said to have a yield of ro 
and incremental Government expenditures an opportunity cost of co. Those 
who are responsible for project evaluation can thus evaluate whether a project 
is justified in the light of an opportunity cost of (o, so that decentralized decision 
making will be possible. As regards the value of 00, HARBERGER notes that 
savings are in general not very sensitive to interest rate changes. Hence, the 
weighted average of the private sector rates of return and the subjective time 
preference rates 'will be reasonably close, if not precisely equal, to the marginal 
productivity of capital in the private sector.' 4 3 
HARBERGER'S proposal is interesting. Unfortunately, however, most develop-
ing countries do not have a well developed capital market, and the sponge con-
cept of the capital market, therefore, breaks down. It is clear, however, that the 
administrative Government apparatus can only function if projects are evalu-
ated with respect to one single opportunity cost. As the HARBERGER shadow 
rate cannot be used, the question arises whether there is another shadow rate 
that would allow such decentralized decision making. 
In reviewing this matter, it is essential to recollect that all the writers so far 
discussed assume implicitly that the individual subjective time preference rates 
reflect the social time preference rate of society as a whole. However, there is, 
in our opinion, no reason why this should be so as it should be recognized that 
the consensus value of the individuals in the economy as regards the value of the 
social time preference rate - and, hence, as regards the optimum growth path 
of the economy - differs, in all probability, from the values of the time preference 
rates they use in making their personal investment-saving decisions. The dicho-
tomy and the ^determinancy, to quote BAUMOL, of the choice of the discount 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 61 
rate to be used for evaluating projects thus does not exist. The discount rate to 
be used is the social time preference rate, or, as it is also called, the social dis-
count rate. 
In this part of the study, we do not consider income distribution aspects and 
we are analyzing, therefore, situations of optimal growth where the investment 
program of the economy is optimum, so that the right trade-off between current 
and future consumption takes place. In such cases, the social discount rate to be 
used for evaluating Government projects may be defined as the cut-off rate of 
return for Government projects that would keep the economy on the optimal 
growth path. Hence, if capital is to be transferred from the private sector to the 
Government sector, the relevant discount rate will be the weighted average of 
the rates of return foregone by the private sector. In this respect, it is important 
to note that traditional benefit-cost theory does not consider the distributive 
aspects of such transfers because this is considered the domain of the distribution 
branch of Government. The allocative branch of Government - the one that 
makes investment decisions - is assumed to follow economic efficiency prin-
ciples only and it is assumed, therefore, that the capital foregone in the private 
sector is proportional to the capital employed. The opportunity cost of capital 
of the private sector has, therewith, become the relevant discount rate for 
evaluating Government projects. However, the existence of situations where the 
investment program of the economy cannot be considered optimal and, hence, 
where the traditional benefit-cost theory cannot be applied, needs no elabora-
tion. How to evaluate projects under such circumstances will be discussed in 
part II of this study. 
We may now turn our attention to the matter as to how, when income 
distribution aspects are not important, the opportunity cost of capital, which 
as discussed should be the same for the Government as it is for the private 
sector, should be estimated, and we will start our discussion by reviewing the 
so-called production function approach. 
One of the most simple production functions is the one which is generally 
used in macro-planning. Output Y is seen here as a function of capital K only, 
and the function can thus be written as Y = f(K). It is furthermore assumed 
that d Y/dK is constant. As there is one variable only, the marginal product of 
capital which we write as q = dY/dK will therefore equal dY/dK. There are 
several objections to the use of this function. First, it is a static concept that does 
not take into account the time element. For instance, if dY/dK = 1/3, it would 
appear as if the rate of return were 33 percent. In reality, of course, the incre-
ment in income will not be produced immediately and the rate of return will 
then have a much lower value. For instance, if d Y were to materialize after four 
years and then continued to be produced in perpetuity, the rate of return q 
should be calculated from dYj[q{\ + q)4] = dK. If the incremental output-
capital ratio is again 1 /3, the rate of return would appear to be about 19 percent 4 4. 
However, this calculation is not correct either because (a) projects do not 
have mfinite lives and (b) output is not only a function of capital but also of la-
bor. The incremental output-capital formula assumes that the opportunity cost 
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of labor is zero and, as discussed, this is a very unrealistic assumption. 
A slightly more realistic approach is followed in the UNIDO Guidelines by 
DASGUPTA, SEN and MARGLIN. They see output determined by capital as well as 
labor, but do not specify the production function, so that it may be written as Y 
= f(K, L). The function's total differential is dY = (8Y/8K)dK + (8Y/8L)dL, 
for which we may write q = (dYldK) -[(8Y/8L) (dL/dK)] where as above q 
is the marginal product of capital 8Y/8K. In words, the formula suggests 
that the rate of return per unit of investment (i.e., the ceteris paribus rate of 
return q = 8Y/8K) equals the total increase in national income per unit of 
investment (i.e., the mutatis mutandis rate of return dY/dK) minus labor's 
share of that increase. Labor's share is calculated by multiplying the oppor-
tunity cost of labor 8Y/8L by the number of additional laborers that are re-
quired per unit of investment dL/dK. The data regarding investments and labor 
can be taken from national plans. In an example in the Guidelines, 4 5 it is ex-
pected that at the end of a postulated country's five-year plan period, national 
income will be increased by £ 480 million, labor by 1.2 million workers, and 
that the net investment during the plan period is £ 1200 million, d Y/dK is then 
estimated at 480/1200 = 0.40 and dL/dK at 1.2/1200 = 0.001. The opportunity 
cost of labor has to be estimated directly from micro-economic data and is 
assumed to be £ 100. Consequently, the opportunity cost of capital would be 
30 percent (0.40 - 100/1000). 
Another approach commonly found in the economic literature is based on the 
so-called COBB-DOUGLAS production function 4 6. The relationship between 
national income and the production factors is then presented as Y = A K* 
Ll ~*< where A is a constant. This is a so-called linearly homogeneous function 
because multiplication of each independent variable by a factor k will change 
the value of the dependent variable by exactly k-fold. In economic terms, this 
means that output is being produced under conditions of constant returns to 
scale. As is well-known from Euler's theorem, under such conditions, if each 
factor is paid its marginal product, the total product will be exactly exhausted 
by the distributive shares of the factors. Euler's theorem is written in its general 
form as Y = (8Y/8K)K + (8Y]8L)L. As under the Cobb-Douglas function, 
the marginal product of capital 8Y/8K = &Y/K and the marginal product of 
labor 8Y/8L = (\ - a) Y/L, it is readily seen that Euler's theorem applies indeed 
to this function 4 7. Assuming that the COBB-DOUGLAS function represents the 
actual production possibility of the economy, the marginal product of capital 
or of labor can easily be determined. The opportunity cost of capital is a func-
tion of its share of national income and the output-to-capital ratio, and the 
opportunity cost of labor is a function of its share of national income and the 
output-to-labor ratio. Suppose that capital's share in national income is about 
30 percent and that the average output-to-capital ratio is 0.4. Then the opportu-
nity cost of capital is 12 percent. 
Finally, an example which is taken from growth theory 4 8 . Under conditions 
of balanced growth, and assuming that the average output-to-capital ratio is 
constant and that, both profit earners and laborers save a constant proportion 
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of their income, the following relationship holds: 
gK = Sq-qK + SW- wL 
where g = growth rate of national income and of capital 
Sq = savings coefficient of profit earners 
= savings coefficient of laborers 
w = opportunity cost of labor, q = rate of profits 
and K and L, as before, total capital and labor force, respectively. 
In words, the growth of capital equals the sum of the savings of profit earners 
and laborers. If (1 - D) represents the share of the laborers in national income 
we can write Sw- w L = Sw[(wL/Y)/(qK/Y)] q K = Sw[{\ - D)/D]q K and the 
formula becomes g = [Sq + Sw- (1 - D)/D]q. Since Sq D + Sw (1 - D) re-
presents the weighted average of the two savings coefficients, which, of course, 
is the savings coefficient for the economy as a whole (s), the formula may be 
written as: g = sq/D or q = D-g/s. Thus, if capital's share of national income is 
0.30, the growth rate of national income 8 percent, and the average savings rate 
20 percent of national income, then the opportunity cost of capital is 12 percent. 
It is interesting to note that the formulas are very similar, since the growth-
theory formula is q = D- g/s, while the UNIDO formula may be written as 
q = D-d Y/dK and the COBB-DOUGLAS formula as q = D- Y/K. Under balanced 
growth conditions, the formulas are equal, differing only in form, since then 
dY/dK = Y/K = g/s. How useful are the formulas? In our opinion, not very 
useful. The UNIDO formula has the disadvantage that a single value for the op-
portunity cost of labor must be estimated, which, in practice, will be purely a 
guess. The COBB-DOUGLAS formula uses the Y/K ratio and it needs no ela-
boration that it is very difficult to make an estimate of the total capital stock in 
a country, especially in a developing country. The formula has the further dis-
advantage that empirical tests have shown that increases in capital and labor 
lead to a greater increase in national income than the formula implies. The COBB-
DOUGLAS function can, of course, be amended 4 9 by including in the formula a 
trend factor to explain that technical progress, economies of scale, improved 
education and the like also contribute to increases in national income, but such a 
trend factor would be difficult to estimate. The growth theory formula applies 
only under balanced growth conditions. Among other things, it assumes that 
capital's and labor's share of national income remain the same and that the rate 
of savings and investment is constant, assumptions that are clearly unrealistic. 
All in all, it is clear that the above discussed formulas will all arrive at different 
results and that they cannot lead to realistic estimates of the opportunity cost 
of capital. 
There is further the very important point that at present it is being seriously 
questioned whether a production function for the economy as a whole can be 
constructed. It is not the intention to discuss here the recent controversies re-
garding capital theory, but a few words may be useful. The controversy is 
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basically about whether there exists such a thing as the marginal product of 
capital, which is, at the same time, the rate of profit, or whether there is no such 
thing. In the first case, we have dY/dK = q, where q is the rate of profit, as well 
as d Y/dL = w, where w is the wage rate, and the distribution of income between 
persons is thus determined by the marginal productivity relationships. If no 
such thing as an overall production function exists, however, we no longer have 
a marginal productivity theory of distribution and it must then be accepted that 
either the profit rate or the wage rate is determined by outside forces. 
SAMUELSON 5 0 has shown that under certain assumptions the marginal pro-
ductivity relationships do exist in an economy. First, he constructed a produc-
tion function - the so-called surrogate production function - by assuming that 
capital and labor are malleable - like jelly - and that they produce jelly under 
constant returns to scale. Then he showed that the same production function 
can be constructed by assuming that the capital goods in the economy are en-
tirely different from each other but that each needs labor to work with it in a 
fixed proportion. With such a production function the wage and profit rates 
are equal to the marginal product of labor and capital, respectively, and the 
ratio of the relative shares of wages and profits is equal to the elasticity of 
wages with respect to profits, i.e., qK/wL = (-q/w) -(dw/dq). 
That SAMUELSON'S function is rather unrealistic was shown by BHADURI 5 1 in 
probably the simplest and most direct way. The definitional relationship of 
national income is Y = Kq +Lw where Y = national income, K = the value 
of capital, q = the rate of profit or, as we called it, the rate of return, L = the 
number of employed workers, and w = the wage rate per worker. Dividing by L 
we get the per worker measure y = kq + w. Differentiating totally we obtain 
dy = q dk + k dq + dw. SAMUELSON'S condition may be written as (-q/w) • (dw/ 
dq) = (q/w) k because k = K/L. Dividing this by q/w gives - dw/dq = k. Sub-
stituting this in the expression of the total differential, we get dy/dk = q = dy/dk. 
That SAMUELSON'S production function is a very special one is thus clear. It 
implies that the marginal product of capital dy/dk equals dy/dk, and as noted 
before, this is a very unrealistic condition. SAMUELSON had to assume that the 
production processes in the economy take place in rather peculiar circumstances. 
But in the real world, capital, labor and output do not consist of jelly, nor will 
all lines of production have a uniform and constant capital-to-labor ratio. 
If we are then to reject the production function approach of estimating the 
opportunity cost of capital on practical as well as on theoretical grounds, what 
is left? It seems to us that there is only one way to get out of the impasse, 
namely, to estimate the rate of return of the private sector directly. In this respect, 
HARBERGER'S India study 5 2 is an interesting attempt to measure the rate of 
return of the private sector from micro-economic data. The data he used were 
collected by the Reserve Bank of India for the period 1 9 5 5 - 5 9 and covered 
some 1,000 companies, accounting for more than two-thirds of all gross capital 
formation in the corporate sector. Using different methodologies as regards the 
concepts of income and capital, HARBERGER arrives at rates of return varying 
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from 10.4 to 19.3 percent. Leaving out the stock market approach, which cover-
ed only one year, and taking the most refined adjustment of capital and income, 
the rates of return range from 13.0 percent to 14.4 percent. Assuming that the 
opportunity cost of labor is 80 percent of the actual wage bill, the rates of return 
range from 17.2 percent to 21.3 percent. 
It seems to us that HARBERGER'S approach needs amendment. There is, of 
course, the criticism that the returns he has calculated are the profits of the 
joint stock companies only and that the profitability of these companies is 
probably greater than that of the non-incorporated companies, but this is not 
the point we wish to make. As HARBERGER himself points out, this upward bias 
is probably not sufficiently weighty to counterbalance the many downward 
biases he consciously introduced into his estimation procedure. What seems 
to us an oversight is that HARBERGER takes only the opportunity cost of labor 
into account when he corrects the found nominal rates of return. The objective 
of the whole exercise is to find the opportunity cost of capital, and this means of 
course that all the inputs as well as the output should be valued at their appro-
priate opportunity costs, which - especially in a country such as India - may 
differ from the market values. 
In a world full of distortions, the only correct way to estimate the opportunity 
cost of capital is, in our opinion, by detennining the real value of the rate of 
return of the private sector. The nominal rate of return of the private sector may 
be calculated from the formula 
X (Bt - Ri - Li w) 
n 
T.* 
1=1 
but the real opportunity cost of capital will be presented by the formula 
£ (B1 - R* -Lt w*) t K1 
i=l 
where for each investment i: 
Bi = benefits valued at market prices or at the official exchange rate in case of 
exports, 
Ri = all inputs other than labor evaluated at market prices or at the official 
exchange rate in the case of imports, 
w = market wage rate, 
Ki = investment cost at market prices or at the official exchange rate, 
Li = annual quantity of labor used, and 
the asterisked variables are the respective variables valued at their opportunity 
cost rates. 
The above formula can be simplified when consolidated national income 
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accounts are available. The £f i in the above formulas represents the aggregate 
of the domestic and foreign willingness to pay for domestic consumption goods 
as well as for investment goods and intermediate products. Since the withdrawal 
at the margin of investment funds from all te various industries in the economy 
will not affect consumer surpluses, this willingness to pay may be measured by 
the aggregate of the production value of all the various industries. Deducting 
from this the aggregate value of the inputs we obtain the total value added 
in the economy. Hence, we may write q„ = (Y - Lw)/Kand q = (Y* - L w*)j 
K*. 
These two formulas show clearly that, if Y = Y* and K = K*, then indeed 
HARBERGER'S method of calculating the opportunity cost of capital would be 
correct. For instance, if q„ is 13 percent, labor's share of national income 70 
percent and w* about 80 percent of the actual wage bill, the real opportunity 
cost of capital q would be 19 percent 5 3. In general, however, we cannot expect 
that Y = Y* and thatisT = K*. Since r = C + / + X - M , where C, /, Zand 
M represent the domestic value of consumption, investments, exports and im-
ports, respectively, and their values will differ from the nominal values if the 
opportunity cost of foreign exchange differs from the official exchange rate, Y 
will not in general be equal to Y*. As regards capital, part of plant and equip-
ment may have been imported and the real cost of capital may then well differ 
from the nominal cost. Furthermore, plant and equipment may well have been 
produced by means of labor-intensive techniques, so that if the shadow wage 
rate differs from the market wage rate, the real cost of capital goods will differ 
from the nominal cost of capital goods. In India, for instance, many irrigation 
dams are constructed with labor-intensive techniques. All in all, therefore, we 
must conclude that HARBERGER'S method does not go far enough. It is not only 
the wage bill which should be corrected, but also the values of national income 
and capital. 
Another interesting attempt to measure the opportunity cost of capital for 
India was made by L A L 5 4 . The source as regards aggregate census data for 
manufacturing industry in India was the same as HARBERGER had used, but the 
period is more recent, namely, 1958-1964. LAL'S objective is to calculate the 
social opportunity cost of capital - a subject that will be discussed in Part II of 
this study and does not concern us here - but he also calculates the economic 
opportunity cost of capital. By comparing the nominal value of before-tax 
profits (i.e., value added less wages and salaries) with the nominal value of 
capital, LAL finds that the aggregate nominal rate of return of the manufacturing 
industries varies from 12 percent to 19 percent, which is well in line with HAR-
BERGER'S findings. The real opportunity cost of capital is calculated by LAL 
basically in accordance with the formulation we have given to it, namely 
(Y* - L w*)/K*. However, rather than using domestic prices as the numeraire, 
LAL uses border prices and proceeds as follows. To arrive at the value of Y*, 
he calculates the real value of output by dividing the nominal value by one plus 
the All-India average tariff, and deducts from that the real value of the inputs 
other than wages, found by dividing the nominal value by one plus the tariff 
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other than wages, found by dividing the nominal values by one plus the tariff 
that applies to the specific input. Similarly, to arrive at the real cost of capital 
goods, he divides the nominal value of capital goods by one plus the average 
tariff on non-agricultural machinery. As regards the value of w*, LAL assumes 
that the opportunity cost of unskilled labor is 0.4 of the unskilled wage bill. 
After all these corrections have been made, the surprising result is that the rates 
of return are almost the same as the nominal before-tax rates of profits, i.e., 
12 percent to 19 percent. An example of the calculation for the year 1964 is given 
below. 
Rate of Return in Indian Manufacturing, 1964 (Rs million). 
Nominal At Border Prices 
and Shadow Wage 
Rate 
A. Gross Output 56,272 36,305 
Fuel and Electricity 2,892 2,053 
Materials 32,413 21,609 
Other Inputs 5,933 3,490 
41,238 27,152 
B. Value Added 15,035 9,153 
Salaries 2,054 2,054 
Wages 6,241 2,496 
C. Salaries and Wages 8,295 4,550 
D. Before-Tax Profits 6,740 4,603 
E. Capital 52,756 35,725 
Rate of Return D/E 0.128 0.128 
Unfortunately, LAL'S approach is also subject to criticism. LAL sets the op-
portunity cost of unskilled labor at 0.4 of the unskilled labor bill and justifies 
this by arguing that in 1964 the average agricultural wage of Rs 600 was in fact 
only 40 percent of the average industrial wage of Rs 1,500. As discussed in the 
previous section, it may be expected that the opportunity cost of labor in the 
urban area is a multiple of the agricultural wage rate, and HARBERGER'S as-
sumption that the opportunity cost of labor should be set at 0.8 of the wage bill 
appears, therefore, much more realistic to us. A second point is that LAL takes 
border prices as the numeraire. Although we prefer the use of domestic prices, 
there is no theoretical objection to the use of border prices as long as it is done 
consistently, since, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the two methods will theoreti-
cally lead to the same result. Unfortunately, it seems to us that LAL has not been 
consistent in his approach. He should have decomposed the outputs and inputs 
into their tradeable and non-tradeable components and should have valued 
each component at its border price. For instance, a large part of the output must 
certainly consist of non-tradeable goods, but LAL evaluates the total as if it were 
tradeable. Furthermore, if one evaluates outputs and inputs at border prices, 
68 Meded. Landbmiwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
then one should certainly also evaluate the wage and salary bill at border prices, 
and this last element alone would cause the rate of return to be higher than cal-
culated by LAL. 
Neither HARBERGER nor LAL has, in our opinion, calculated the opportunity 
cost of capital for India correctly, but it must be said that it is difficult to obtain 
the data base for such a correct calculation. In practice, one has to work with 
rough estimates, and the HARBERGER and LAL esimates are very helpful in this 
respect. HARBERGER'S cost of labor correction is more realistic than LAL'S and 
this will result in an upward adjustment of the nominal rates of return. How-
ever, when the opportunity cost of foreign exchange is introduced into the cal-
culations, it appears likely that a downward adjustment must also be made. 
In a country such as India, we may expect that the ratio of K* to K will be higher 
than that of Y* to Y because export trade is not that important, while capital 
goods account for a relatively high proportion of the import bill. This would 
tend to reduce the opportunity cost of capital. On the other hand, part of the 
plant and equipment may have been produced with labor-intensive techniques 
and this may tend to mitigate the downward adjustment. Taking all these con-
siderations into account, we would expect, as a rough guesstimate, that the op-
portunity cost of capital in India is probably of the order of 15 percent. 
With this we have come to an end of our discussion of how the opportunity 
cost of capital should be determined when no budget constraint operates on 
Government funds, and when the total investment program in a country is 
considered optimal. In such circumstances, the opportunity cost of capital to 
Government consists of the real rates of return in the private sector. The way 
to find these is to analyze in detail the microeconomic data as found in industrial 
surveys and to correct the nominal rates of return for divergences between the 
market wage rate and the opportunity cost of labor and for divergences between 
the official foreign exchange rate and the opportunity cost of foreign exchange. 
It must be recognized that, although theoretically the approach is clear, the 
lack of empirical data will often result in rather rough estimates. Sensitivity 
tests should therefore be applied in all project evaluation work. 
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4. T H E A N A L Y T I C S O F P R O J E C T P L A N N I N G 
4.1. THE OPTIMAL SCALE OF A PROJECT 
Having reviewed how the benefits and costs of a project should be valued, we 
are now in a position to discuss more fully than we did in Section 1.2 how the 
optimum production scale of a project should be determined. In Section 1.2 
we showed that marginal costs should be equal to marginal benefits. Neverthe-
less, the project evaluation literature has often suggested that other criteria 
should be used and it is, therefore, well worthwhile to review in this section the 
various possible criteria in some detail. We will assume during the first three 
sections of this Chapter that Government is in a position to implement the 
optimum conditions and that it can ensure that they will continue to be imple-
mented. In the fourth section, we will review how projects should be evaluated 
if the optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled. 
The analysis of the optimal scale of a project can be done either in present 
value or in annual terms and is, of course, completely equivalent. For exposition 
purposes, however, it is easier to work with annual values. Long-run marginal 
cost then consists of the addition to annual capital recovery cost (depreciation 
plus interest)1 and to annual short-run operating cost, which are incurred when 
output is increased by one unit. We will start with the assumption that the plant 
is perfectly divisible and that the demand curve does not shift over time. 
Reference is made to Figure 4.1, which shows the relevant long-run average and 
marginal cost curves as well as the demand curve as they would appear in a cer-
tain period. Six positions indicated by Xi through X6, corresponding to the 
various optimization criteria, will be analyzed. 
The first position Xi is based on a rule that was popular for a long time in 
FIGURE 4.1. 
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engineering circles. The rule states that the benefit-cost ratio of a project should 
be maximized. The first order condition for the maximization of B/C is: 
[d(B/Q]/dx = 0. Using .the quotient differentiation rule, we obtain: 
(C- dB/dx - B- dC/dx)/C2 = 0, which implies (d5/djc)/(dC/dx) = B/C. For 
the remainder of this study, it will often be convenient to use a shorthand nota-
tion and to write dB for dB/dx and dC for dC/dx. The above equation can thus 
be written as d5/dC = B/C, or, alternatively, (dB/dQ- C/B = 1. In words, the 
criterion tells us that the elasticity of benefits with respect to costs should equal 
unity. Geometrically, the point X i can be found by extending the B/x curve to 
the X-axis and by drawing from that intersection the tangent line to the C/x 
curve.2 As Figure 4.1 shows, it is clear that this point can never represent an 
optimum position if the objective is to maximize welfare since incremental pro-
duction has larger benefits than costs up to the point X4. 
The second point X2 is the so-called monopoly position. It is the optimum 
scale when the criterion is to maximize profits - the difference between revenues 
R and costs C - and the first order condition is then dR - dC = 0. This criterion 
can be expanded in the following manner. Since R = x- dB, it follows from the 
product differentiation rule that 
dR = x[d (dfi)]/djc + dB 
= x dp/dx + p 
= p[(x/dx)-(dp/p) + l)} 
The elasticity of demand with respect to price is ( -dx/x)-p/dp and we may 
thus write'for the above expression dR — p- (e - \)/e. At the optimum point 
dR — dC and by substitution, we get p = dC- e/{e - 1). From this follows the 
well known theorem that a monopoly can be possible only if the elasticity of 
demand is greater than unity. Otherwise, i.e., if e < 1, p would be negative, 
which is evidently not possible. However, the point X2 is not of interest to us, 
since it is a point of profit maximization rather than welfare maximization. 
The third position X3 is obtained when the criterion is to minimize average 
costs. The first order condition is: [d (C/x)]/dx = (x dC - Q/x1 = 0. Hence, 
this condition is fulfilled when dC = C/x, or, in words, marginal costs should 
equal average costs. It is one of the perfect competition conditions. 
The fourth criterion is to maximize the difference between benefits B and 
costs C. Hence, the criterion is dB = dC. Price should equal marginal costs. 
Since under perfect competition, marginal costs equal average costs as well as 
price, this condition is also fulfilled under perfect competition. 
A fifth possible criterion that is sometimes defended is that the size of the 
project should be maximized subject to the condition that revenues should cover 
costs. This is the case when average costs C/x equal price dB. In Figure 4.1, this 
happens at scale X 5 . 
Finally, one may decide to push the size of the project to the point where total 
costs are just covered by benefits. This takes place in Figure 4.1 at the point 
where C/x = B/x. 
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Only the point X4 fulfills, of course, the condition of welfare maximization, 
given the existing income distribution. It is only at that scale that marginal costs 
equal marginal benefits, so that any divergence from that situation would lead 
to a welfare loss. For instance, at X5 the welfare loss would equal the shaded 
area in Figure 4.1. 
The preceding analysis can be elucidated even more succinctly if the relation-
ship between total benefits and total costs is analyzed. This is shown by means 
of the benefit curve in Figure 4.2. The point X4 - the optimal scale when the 
objective is to maximize the difference between benefits and costs - is now 
found by drawing a tangent line with a slope of 45 0 to the benefit curve. Clearly, 
X4 is the point of welfare maximization. The vertical distance between the 
benefit curve and the 45 0 line from the origin - which represents zero net bene-
fits - is greater at X4 than at any other point along the curve, so that net bene-
fits are at a maximum at X4. 
We are now in a position to review the case where the demand curve shifts 
over time, a phenomenon that is quite common. Suppose, for instance, that the 
income elasticity of demand for a certain product equals 0.5 and that per capita 
incomes grow at 4 percent per annum. Suppose further that population grows 
at the rate of 3 percent. Then the demand curve will shift over time at the rate 
of 5 percent per annum. In Figure 4.3, four demand curves are shown, the first 
one Do corresponding to the initial equilibrium situation. If the demand curve 
shifts to the position Di , production should be increased by Q0Q1. The net 
benefit of this increase is equal to the area ABC, the difference between the 
willingness to pay (Q0CBQ1) and costs (Q0ABQ1). If now, during a subsequent 
period of the project's life, the demand curve shifts to the D2 position, output 
should be increased by Q1Q2. The total willingness to pay during this period is 
Q0EDQ2, total costs Q0ADQ2, and net benefits thus AED. The net benefits of 
the project are thus represented by ABC in period 1, ADE in period 2, AFG in 
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FIGURE 4.3. 
period 3, and so on. Discounting of these net benefits will present the net present 
value of the project. It may be noted that in case the demand curve was constant 
over time, the net benefit during each period would equal ABC only, so that 
the present value of the project would be substantially smaller. In projecting the 
benefits and costs of a project over time, the benefits of additional demand, and 
the costs which must be incurred to satisfy this additional demand, can thus not 
be neglected. 
Finally, let us drop the assumption that the plant is perfectly divisible. The 
economic literature has struggled for a long time with the indivisibility problem, 
but the solution is fairly straightforward. A very elegant analysis regarding the 
case where additional electricity can be generated only in indivisible units is 
presented by WILLIAMSON.3 Consider Figure 4 .4 . The existing capacity is 0 Qi, 
and can only be increased by the indivisible unit Q1Q2. Short-run marginal 
costs are mainly the energy costs of generation and transmission and equal b 
per unit. The short-run marginal cost curve is thus constant up to Qi and 
assumes at Qi a vertical slope because of the capacity constraint. In line with 
the dictum that price should equal short-run marginal cost to clear the market, 
the price at Qi is set at Pi . Long-run marginal costs are also constant and equal 
b + ft per unit, where /? represents the capacity cost per unit. With output of 
OQi at price Pi , the plant thus earns B while consumers receive a surplus 
equal to A. Should the capacity unit Q1Q2 be added to the plant? At the new 
position, the price will be P2 and producers thus incur a loss of C + E + F. 
On the other hand, the consumer surplus is now A + B + C + D + E . Hence, 
the net result of the plant expansion is a benefit of D - F. The plant should 
thus be expanded when D exceeds F, or, in other words, when the willingness 
to pay for the additional output (D + E + G + H) exceeds the costs of its 
production (E + F + G + H). 
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Tabulation of Consumer and Producer Surpluses 
Situation Situation Gain 
atQj a t Q 2 
Consumer Surplus A A + B + C + D + E B + C + D + E 
Producer Surplus B - ( C + E + F ) ~ B - ( C + E + F ) 
Total Economic Surplus A + B (A+B) + ( D - F ) D - F 
The above analysis needs an explanation in that the prices in positions Qi 
and Q2 are higher than the really incurred short-run marginal costs. Or, in 
other words, can one really say that the short-run marginal cost curve assumes 
a vertical slope at the position where the capacity constraint becomes binding? 
If the size of the plant is given, we should maximize benefits (B) minus short-
run marginal costs (b g) , subject to the condition that Q will be smaller than or 
equal to Q - the maximum production at that plant size. The Lagrangean is 
thus: 
max L = B - bQ - X (Q - Q) 
The first order conditions are 
dL/dg = P - b - X = 0, and dLjdX = - ( 2 + 5 = 0 
If Q = Q, then X has a positive value and P = b + X. The economic interpre-
tation of X is straightforward: it is the scarcity premium that must be added to 
short-run marginal costs to clear the market. The value of b + X is what a 
single consumer is willing to pay to have a unit of electricity and it is an op-
portunity cost in the sense that, if he gets that unit, another consumer would 
be deprived of it because production cannot be expanded. In this sense, there-
fore, b + X must be seen as the real marginal cost of providing a unit of a 
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commodity when a capacity constraint exists. On the other hand, if Q < Q, 
then there is no scarcity problem and obviously the value of X is then zero so 
that P = b. 
The question whether tolls should be levied on a bridge, which has also been 
a source of dispute in the economic literature for a long time, can likewise be 
solved readily. We assume now that the horizontal axis of Figure 4.4 is the 
traffic flow over the bridge. Furthermore, since a bridge has negligible short-
run marginal costs, we assume that the b curve does not exist. If the demand cur-
ve is as shown in Figure 4.4 so that D is larger than F, the bridge should be con-
structed to capacity Q2 and a toll equal to P2 should be charged to the users of 
the bridge. 4 However, if the demand curve were to intersect the horizontal 
axis between Q1 and Q2, and the area D were still larger than F, the bridge should 
also be constructed to capacity constraint and, with zero short-run marginal 
costs, any charge would be non-optimal. 
We hope to have shown in this section that the rule for determining the op-
timal scale of a project that still must be constructed is straightforward. Long-
run marginal costs must be covered. On the other hand, once the project has 
been constructed, long-run marginal costs are not relevant at all since they 
include sunk costs, and the relevant cost concept for the pricing of the output 
becomes then short-run marginal costs. In case no capacity constraint exists, 
these are simply the really incurred costs; in case of capacity constraints, how-
ever, the short-run marginal costs are presented by the opportunity cost of not 
satisfying another customer. 
4.2. THE OPTIMAL TIMING OF A PROJECT 
This section is based upon the work of MARGLIN 5 , who was the first to 
distinguish project time from calendar time. Suppose the demand for a project's 
output and the project's operating costs are constant over calendar time so that 
its net benefit rate depends only upon project age, i.e., in this case upon the 
date when the project's construction is finished and it starts to produce. Then, 
there would be no special problem: the project should be constructed if it has 
a positive present value. Neither would a special problem arise if a project has a 
net benefit rate that decreases as calendar time passes. If this project has a 
positive present value, then it should be constructed immediately because any 
postponement would result in a lower present value. Suppose, however, that a 
project's net benefit rate increases over calendar time. Then the project's net 
present value can perhaps be increased by postponing it. In other words, in 
maximizing benefits minus costs, time should also be considered an instrument 
variable. The optimum construction date is the date at which the present value 
of the derivatives with respect to time of benefits and cost are equal, i.e., when 
dB/dt = dC/dt. 
A simple example may illustrate this. Suppose a project with increasing net 
benefits Ni, Nn can be constructed in one year at capital costs K. Post-
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ponement by one year means, on the cost side, that the project's capital costs 
could have been invested in alternative investment, so that there will be a saving 
of qK, where q is the opportunity cost of capital. The present value of this saving 
equals qK/(l + q). On the benefit side, postponement by one year results in the 
loss of the first year's benefits, the present value of which is JVi/(l + q) and the 
gain of the (« + l)th year's benefits, the present value of which is 7Y„+i/(l + 
q)n+l. The overall net gain in present value due to a one-year postponement 
is thus: 
qK Ni Nn + i 
1 +q ~ 1 +q + ( 1 +q)nTl 
By repeating the calculation for postponements of two years, three years, and 
so on, the optimal construction year can be found. The optimal date is when 
the marginal saving in interest costs is absorbed by the marginal loss in net 
benefits.6 
This is the most general formulation. Sometimes, for certain projects, it may 
be possible to simplify the calculation. Suppose that a project has a very long 
life. Then the present value of the (« + l)th year's benefit will be negligible and 
the optimal time for project construction occurs at the date when the first year's 
benefit equals the rate of return q on the project's capital cost. This rule has 
become quite popular for road and mass transit projects in consultant engi-
neering circles, but it should be immediately remarked that a naive application 
of the rule can lead to some disastrous results. If it would take, for instance, two 
or three years after construction before benefits would be produced, the rule 
would lead to the untenable result that the project in question should be post-
poned indefinitely since the first year's benefit would remain zero whatever the 
postponement period. In general, therefore, if we are to consider the optimal 
timing of a project, it is better for the determination of the construction period 
to calculate the present value of the project's net benefits directly rather than 
to use short-cut methods. 
How important is the time phasing of projects? As mentioned, the problem 
arises only with projects whose benefits increase over time. It will be seldom 
indeed that such projects are prematurely submitted because, normally, post-
ponement by one or two years does not affect significantly the net present 
value of a project. Timing is important if at a certain moment in time a sudden 
increase in benefits occurs. But such cases are not frequent and it is not likely 
that errors in timing will then be made. For instance, it is quite obvious that 
there is no sense in building a speedway from city A to city B when city B has 
not yet been constructed. In general, therefore, the optimal timing of a project 
is not that important. Nevertheless, the project analyst should satisfy himself 
that no timing errors are being made. 
8 0 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
4.3. FURTHER EXAMPLES OF CONSUMER SURPLUS ANALYSIS 
We have so far reviewed the benefits of an output expansion but there are 
quite a number of cases more complicated than this one, and it will be useful to 
review briefly how they should be treated. As a first case, we would like to 
review the benefits of a cost reduction due, for instance, to a technological in-
novation. To show the difference from the output expansion case, the cost 
reduction figure (Figure 4.6) has been set beside the output expansion figure 
(Figure 4.5). The figures speak for themselves and, rather than describing the 
gains and losses of the parties involved, it is believed more useful to present the 
analysis in tabular form immediately below the figures. 
As discussed previously, in the case of a social analysis, the benefits of each 
of the two groups - consumers and producers - must be evaluated at the respec-
tive income distribution weights before they can be added up, whereas in the 
case of an economic efficiency analysis, the benefits may be added up directly. 
It should also be pointed out that in the case of an economic efficiency analysis 
it is not necessary to analyze the gain of each of the two groups as the economic 
benefit of the output increase can be found directly by measuring the willingness 
to pay for and the costs of the output. Thus in Figure 4.5, the willingness to pay 
increases by E + F + G, while the cost of production increases by G, resulting 
in a net benefit of E + F. Similarly in Figure 4.6, the willingness to pay increases 
by F + G + H, while the cost of production decreases by C + D and increases 
by H. The net benefit is thus (C + D), which is the cost saving on the old7pro-
duction, plus (F + G), which is the gain on the new production. 
In any analysis like the above, care should be taken that the appropriate 
cost and demand concepts are used. In Figure 4.5, the relevant cost concept 
depends on what we wish to analyze. If a choice is to be made between two 
prospective investment opportunities, the comparison should be between the 
long-run marginal costs of each of the two production possibilities. On the 
other hand, if the choice is whether an existing production proces should be 
continued or replaced by a new production process, the comparison should be 
between the short-run marginal costs of the existing process and the long-run 
marginal costs of the new process. In this case, the long-run marginal costs of 
the existing process are clearly not relevant at all: bygones are bygones, and 
only short-run marginal costs for the existing plant should, therefore, be consi-
dered. 
Often one finds that in analyses like the above, mistakes are made. ECKSTEIN 7 
has given an interesting example as regards the procedure followed in the past 
by the Corps of Engineers in the USA for the estimation of the benefits of 
navigation. All of the benefits of such projects are of the same type - savings in 
transportation costs - and the procedure should be to compare the costs of 
river shipment with the costs of the cheapest alternative. Suppose the long-run 
marginal cost of shipping a commodity by water is $ 1.50 a ton, while the chea-
pest alternative is to ship it by railroad, for which the railroad would charge 
$ 3.60 a ton, although its short-run marginal cost is only $ 2.40 a ton. The Corps 
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FIG. 4.5. Analysis of Benefits due to an Output Expansion. 
Situation Situation Gain 
a tQi a t Q 2 
Consumer Surplus A A + B + E B + E 
Producers Surplus B + C C + F F - B 
Total Economic Surplus A + B + C A + B + C + E + F E + F 
FIG. 4.6. Analysis of Benefits due to a Lowering of Costs. 
Situation Situation Gain 
a tQi a t Q 2 
Consumers Surplus A A + B + C + F B + C + F 
Producers Surplus B D + G D + G - B 
Total Economic Surplus A + B A + B + C + D + F + G C + D + F + G 
of Engineers calculated the benefit of the navigation project at $ 2.10 a ton -
the difference between the price charged by the railroad and the cost of water 
shipment. In reality, of course, the benefit of the project is the cost difference -
$ 0.90 a ton - plus the user's benefit on the induced additional transport volume 
which must also be estimated. This conclusion can be inferred from Figure 4.6 
if we imagine that the two cost curves assume a horizontal slope. 
The second type of complication which we would like to review is that of 
production processes where joint products are produced or where peak load 
demands exist. As will be shown, the analysis is quite similar in both cases. 
Many production processes produce, of course, more than one type of good, 
and sometimes the same equipment is used to produce good A as well as good B. 
So long as the quantities of goods A and B can be varied, the calculation of the 
marginal costs - either short run or long run - does not present a'problem. To 
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find the short-run marginal costs of product A, we should ask what the addition 
to the direct costs will be to increase the output of A when the output of B re-
mains unchanged. Similarly, to determine the long-run marginal cost of A, we 
should ask what additions to capacity plus direct costs are necessary to in-
crease the production of A when the capacity to produce B remains constant. 
The optimization rules remain as before: the intersection of the marginal cost 
curve of any of those goods with its demand curve represents the optimum 
production level of that good. A problem arises, however, when the proportions 
of A and B cannot be varied, i,e., when they can be produced only in fixed pro-
portions, for then, clearly, the marginal costs can be determined only for both 
goods combined. The classic examples of such cases of joint production pro-
cesses are beef and bides, mutton and wool, cotton fiber and cotton seeds, and 
wheat and straw. The technique for determining the optimal production scale 
for such products is as follows. 
Consider Figure 4.7. The demand curves for beef and hides are Db and Dh, 
respectively. For simplicity's sake, it is assumed that the marginal costs are 
constant. Mb+h represents the marginal joint cost of producing the fixed pro-
portion of beef and hides (the cattle), Mb the marginal cost of processing beef, 
and Mh the marginal cost of the separate processing of hides. What is the op-
timum position? The solution is clear if we think of the output as a composite 
unit, determined by a fixed proportion such as X tons of beef plus Y hides. The 
price that will be paid for any quantity of such a composite unit is then found 
by adding vertically the demand curves for beef and hides. In Figure 4.7 this is 
the curve Db + D h up to point U, and from then on, the curve Db. Similarly, 
the marginal cost of producing the composite unit is found by adding vertically 
the three marginal cost curves. The optimum production quantity is then at the 
intersection of the marginal cost curve of the composite unit with the demand 
curve of the composite unit, and is thus equal to OQ. At this output level, the 
producer receives a price of QR for hides, a price of QS for beef, and a price of 
QT ( = QR + QS) for the composite unit. 
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The principle followed in this simple example applies also to the so-called 
peak-load problem, which most public utility companies as well as airlines and 
railroads face. An airline and a railroad, for instance, face peak demands during 
the holiday season, an electric utility company has a slack period during the 
night hours, more phone calls are made during working days than during the 
weekends, and so on. Capacity that is necessary to satisfy demand during the 
peak periods is thus not necessary during the slack periods. The solution to the 
problem is clear if we interpret the overall demand curve as the demand for the 
flow of services that a capacity unit provides during an entire period, including 
slack and peak load periods. Take for instance an electricity undertaking. 
When the plant is perfectly divisible, we may define a unit of capacity as the unit 
which produces 1 kwh during 24 hours. Say that there is a peak period of 16 
hours and a slack period of eight hours. Then we can draw up a demand curve 
representing the amount of money consumers are willing to pay for a marginal 
kwh during 16 hours, and a demand curve representing the amount of money 
consumers are willing to pay for a marginal kwh during eight hours. Let Db and 
Dh in Figure 4.7 represent these demand curves, respectively. Then the overall 
demand curve Db + Dh represents the price consumers are willing to pay to use 
a marginal kwh during the entire period and its intersection with the long-run 
marginal cost curve determines what quantity should be produced. In Figure 
4.7, this quantity is equal to OQ and at the point Q we may then find, for in-
stance, that QS is equal to ^ 160 (16 hours consumption at a price of 0 10 per 
kwh), that QR is equal to $ 40 (representing eight hours consumption at a price 
of C" 5 per kwh) and that QT is equal to $ 200. The price QT will thus be sufficient 
to cover all the marginal costs of production. By carefully defining the demand 
and cost relationships so that they refer to the relevant flow of services during 
the respective periods, the analysis of peak load demand becomes thus the 
same as the analysis of joint products. Introducing indivisibility into the ana-
lysis does not present any further problems. As discussed in Section 1, it is then 
a matter of whether the long-run marginal costs of the indivisible unit will be 
covered by the willingness of the consumer to pay for the flow of services this 
indivisible extra unit provides. 
Decreasing average cost projects present a special problem, in that at the 
equilibrium situation, revenues will not be sufficient to cover costs. 8 In Figure 
4.8 the demand curve intersects the long-run marginal cost curve at the point R. 
The consumer's willingness to pay for output level OQ is ODRQ, the long-run 
marginal costs are OSRQ, and the net benefit of producing OQ is thus DRS, 
which is clearly the maximum that can be obtained. At output level OQ, how-
ever, the price will be RQ 9 so that revenues are OTRQ whereas costs are OSRQ. 
The production of OQ will thus involve a financial loss of STR. The financial 
loss can also be found, of course, by looking at average costs. In Figure 4.8, 
these are OVUQ, while revenues are OTRQ and the loss can thus be defined as 
either STR or TVUR. 
It is generally believed that several public utilities industries - especially posts, 
telegraphs, telephones and railroads - belong to the category of decreasing 
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average cost industries. Large economies of scale cause the average cost curve 
to slope downward over a substantial output range before the increased demand 
for additional factors of production resulting in increased factor prices over-
takes this and causes the curve to slope upward. It should be noted that indivisi-
bilities may be present, but that ^divisibilities as such are not necessary to ex-
plain the phenomenon. It is rather the insufficient demand that is the cause of it. 
How should the deficit be financed? It may first of all be pointed out that if 
one were to wait long enough, the demand curve would eventually intersect the 
long-run marginal cost curve at a point where average costs are increasing, so 
that then no problem of deficit financing would arise. This is, however, not a 
solution because meantime, of course, a substantial flow of services will be 
foregone, the value of which, as determined by the consumer's willingness to 
pay, is much higher than its cost of production. Should we then devise a dis-
criminatory pricing system that will mulct from the consumer their willingness 
to pay? The answer depends on the distributive aspects of the project. If 
consumers are rich, there is no reason why we should not try to do so. If con-
sumers are poor, however, there is no reason why we should do so. As O O R T 1 0 
has stated, if we say that the deficit of a decreasing cost industry should be 
charged to the consumer of its output, then logic demands that the surplus of 
an increasing cost industry should be refunded to its consumers. 
Finally, a few words about foreign exchange earning or saving projects. 
There are, of course, such goods as construction, transport, electricity, sewe-
rage, water supply and so on that cannot be traded because the cost of transport 
would be exorbitantly high. Many other goods, however, such as primary pro-
ducts and manufactures do enter international trade. In Figure 4.9 it is assumed 
that the import price of such a good - the c.i.f. cost valued at the foreign 
exchange opportunity cost rate - equals P m and that the export price - the f.o.b. 
price valued at the foreign exchange opportunity cost rate - equals P e . Let us 
assume that the domestic demand curve is as indicated by the curve QQ' and 
that the good is entirely imported. Import substitution would then be worth-
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while if domestic production can substitute for imports at a cost lower than the 
import cost. If the good can be produced at a cost as indicated by SiSi, it 
would clearly be beneficial to produce quantity P m A of the good, since there 
would be a cost saving equal to P m ASi. It is possible that domestic production 
of the good may lead eventually to a lowering of the cost curve as argued by the 
proponents of the infant industry argument. For instance, if the cost curve 
became S2S2, the additional net benefits would be equal to S1ABCS2. A further 
lowering of the cost curve may even lead to exports of the good. With a cost 
curve equal to S3S3, the additional net benefits would be S2CDES3. Any 
valuation of the benefits of the domestic production of a certain good should in 
principle take all these additional net benefits into account. However, this 
statement must immediately be qualified with the remark that the learning 
process on which the infant industry argument rests takes quite a long time, so 
that in practice the benefit of an import substitution project consists mainly of 
the immediate cost savings - the area P m ASi. Especially in the Latin American 
countries many import substituting industries were established in the 1950s 
which later appeared to be quite uneconomical. Extreme care should therefore 
be taken in projecting any additional benefits from so-called learning processes. 
4.4. NON-OPTIMAL SITUATIONS 
Having reviewed what the optimal production and pricing policies are for a 
project, the question arises as to how Government can ensure that the project 
will indeed be implemented in accordance with these optimal policies. The 
problem is that the optimum conditions are determined by the real benefits 
and costs of a project, while the project manager is faced all the time with 
benefits and costs based on market prices. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
there may be substantial differences between real values and market values. To 
86 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
repeat some examples: the benefits of a project include consumer surplus; 
profits do not. In the case of inputs, the real cost is the weighted average of the 
real supply price and willingness to pay; the cost as it appears to the project 
manager is, however, the market price. The real cost of an imported good is 
determined by the foreign exchange opportunity cost; the market price is based 
on the official rate and includes import duties. Similarly, the real benefit of an 
exported good is its shadow foreign exchange value, while the project will 
receive the export proceeds at the official foreign exchange rate. Differences 
between opportunity costs and market values may also exist as regards labor -
e.g., the urban market wage rate may be higher than the real costs. Furthermore, 
especially as regards capital, one finds often that Governments, in order to 
promote investments, follow policies of providing credit at low interest rates, 
even though the real cost of capital may be high. We have, therefore, situations 
where real values and money values will not be equal so that the project manager 
may use the wrong values. The project manager may also see as his objective the 
maximization of profits rather than the maximization of welfare, and, if he is in 
a monopoly position and starts to act as a monopolist, the optimum may also 
for this reason not be reached. How should the project evaluator handle these 
problems? 
It should first of all be noted that there are many projects that fall entirely 
under Government control, so that the Government can ensure that, for the 
design as well as the implementation of these projects, the real value of the 
resources will be used as a guide. Furthermore, in many cases, there may not 
in fact be much flexibility to change the size of a project. Roads and bridges 
clearly fall into this category. Also, once an irrigation dam has been constructed, 
it will be almost impossible to change the size of the dam. It must be recognized, 
however, that there will also be quite a number of projects, particularly commer-
cial projects, where, indeed, plant size, as well as operations, can be set by the 
operators at a level different from the optimum position. 
One way of letting project operations coincide with the optimum in case of 
divergencies is the granting of subsidies or the levying of taxes. But such 
incentives or disincentives, in general, cannot be applied to individual projects, 
except in very special circumstances that would need constantcontrol. Suppose, 
for instance, that the Government were to grant a special subsidy, a wage 
subsidy, or an exemption from tariffs, to an undertaking that will produce a 
good that is in short supply. Then that particular undertaking would be able to 
undercut existing enterprises and eventually attain a monopoly position. 
Similarly, if the Government were to grant such an incentive to a particular 
industry, other industries would be disadvantaged. If taxes and subsidies are 
to be used, they should thus be applied on a factor basis. But here is a problem 
also, since many Governments, in view of their financial constraints, are quite 
willing to levy taxes but not to grant subsidies. It must therefore be accepted 
that in quite a number of cases it will not be possible to ensure that projects will 
be optimally operated. 
A naive application of project evaluation rules may then lead to completely 
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wrong conclusions 1 1, as was already mentioned briefly in the first chapter. 
Some further examples may be helpful. Let us assume that a certain good can 
be produced with real costs as indicated in Figure 4.10 by SS and real benefits 
as indicated by the demand curve QQ. Then, if there are no distortions, the 
project should be designed to produce an output equal to OQo and the net 
benefit of the project would be estimated as the sum of the areas A + B + C + 
D + E + F. Suppose, however, that the project manager faces nominal costs 
as indicated by the curve S'S' and that the Government cannot exercise control 
over project implementation. The project would then be operated at an output 
level OQi and the benefits of the project would be A + B + C only. A naive 
benefit-cost analysis, in the sense that it does not take into account how the 
project will be operated, would thus lead to a substantial overestimation of the 
benefits. 
The example can easily be extended to include the possibility of import sub-
stitution. Let us assume that the good can be imported at a real cost of OP m . 
The import level would then be OQ2 and the net benefits of importing, A + B + 
D. Should the good be locally produced or should it be imported? The answer 
is clear. The benefits of local production equal A + B + C, while the benefits 
of importing equal A + B + D. Hence, the good should be locally produced 
only if C is larger than D. 
Divergencies between real values and nominal values may also occur on the 
demand side. Consider Figure 4.11, which presents the case of an exportable. 
SS represents the real cost of production, QQ' the domestic demand, and O P e 
the real value per unit of exports. If there are no distortions, production should 
be OQo and the net benefits will be A + B + C + D + E + F. Suppose, how-
ever, that exporters will receive only the price OPe because the official exchange 
rate is overvalued and the Government has no control over the project. Then 
output will be OQi and the net benefit will be equal t o A + B + C + D + E 
only. 
There are many more cases that could be studied if time and space were not 
a constraint. The above examples should have made it clear, however, what the 
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basic principles are. Furthermore, the examples have great empirical signifi-
cance in that commercial enterprises are often faced with input prices which 
differ significantly from the real cost of resources used and with export prices 
which do not represent real export values. As Figures 4,10 and 4.11 have shown, 
the evaluator must consider the actual situation within which production will 
take place and can only then estimate what the real benefits and costs of this 
production are. Of course, the evaluator should point out that the distortions 
cause a loss to the economy. But in all cases where the Government is not 
willing to eliminate the distortions, nominal prices govern the action of indivi-
duals, and the project evaluator clearly should base his analysis on the real 
situation rather than on a hypothetical optimum. 
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1 How the capital recovery cost should be calculated will be discussed in detail in Section 
5.1. 
2 At the tangent point on the Cjx curve, it holds that 
» ! = ^ s o t h a t ^ ^ . 
d(C/x) Cjx dC C 
This can be shown as follows. For the left-hand side of the equation, we write: 
d(B/x) . d(C/x) ^ xdB-B .xdC-C = dB-B/x 
dx ' dx x2 ' x2 ~ dC-Cjx 
This is equal to Hence, — = —. 
Cjx dC C 
3 WILLIAMSON, O. E., 'Peak-Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity under Indivisibility Con-
traints,' The American Economic Review, September, 1966, pp. 810-827. 
4 See, however, Chapter 5, Section 2, regarding the distributive aspects of congestion. 
5 MARGLIN, S. A., 'Approaches to Dynamic Investment Planning', North Holland Publish-
ing Company, Amsterdam, 1963. 
6 This is the optimization rule if no budget constraints exist. For a discussion of optimiza-
tion rules in the presence of budget constraints see Section 5.5. 
7 ECKSTEIN, O., 'Water Resource Development,' p. 175. 
8 A monograph on the subject is provided by OORT, C. J., 'Decreasing Costs as a Problem 
of Welfare Economics,' Drukkerij Holland N.V., Amsterdam, 1958. 
9 It may be noted that the price R Q is equal to short-run marginal costs as well as long-run 
marginal costs. As a moment's reflection should make clear, when the plant is perfectly 
divisible, the short-run marginal costs of an additional unit of production will always equal 
the long-run marginal costs of the unit. This may also be shown as follows. At a point such as 
Q the lowest cost plant size is given by that short-run average cost curve (S R A C) that 
touches the envelope curve, i.e., the long-run average cost curve (L R A C). Since the slopes 
of S R A C and L R A C are equal, short-run marginal costs must also equal long-run 
marginal costs. 
1 0 OORT, 'Decreasing Costs as a Problem of Welfare Economics,' p. 139. 
1 1 A similar position is taken by JANSEN, 'Schaarse Middelen en Structurele Samenhangen,' 
p. 27. 
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5. P R O J E C T R A N K I N G 
5.1. COMPOUND AND DISCOUNT FORMULAS 
A comprehensive discussion of the theory of project ranking requires a full 
understanding of the concepts of compounding and discounting. This section 
is, therefore, devoted to a review of these concepts and the derivation of the 
most frequently used formulas in this aspect of economic analysis. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the general formula for the present value of a 
terminal cash income T„ in year n discounted at the constant annual rate / is 
presented by: 
(5.1) T n 
(1 + 0" 
Where the cash income is not received as a terminal amount but in the form 
of a constant cash income NA per year over n years, this cash flow can be con-
sidered as consisting of a series of n terminal sums NA- Hence, under the 
assumption of a constant discount rate /, the present value of this flow is: 
NA + NA + NA _ A NA 
(l + /) (l + if " ' (i + if £ (l + 0* 
Using the algebraic summation rule, this expression can be reduced as follows: 
(5 2) y NA ^ NA 1 - {1/(1 NA ( 1 ] , f i ( l + 0 » ( 1 + 0 1 - { 1 / ( 1 + 0 } i ( 1 + 0 " 
Combining (5.1) and (5.2), the present value at a discount rate / per year for n 
years of a terminal sum TN and a constant flow NA per year is thus: 
(5.3) v = — 7 " — + | l 1 
(1 + if i | (1 + 0" 
This is an equation with five variables, which can be solved for any of the 
variables if the other four are known. 
Table 5.1 shows the six most common compounding and discounting for-
mulas derived from 5.3 and also their equivalent symbols. These symbols 
stand for the expressions between brackets in Table 5.1 and represent the 
discount and compound formulas when the independent variable assumes the 
value of 1. Table 5.1 also shows how the more complicated of these functions 
are derived. The values of the functions for different values of n and i can be 
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TABLE 5.1. A. Discount and compound functions. 
Description of Formula Given Variables in Formula 
Addition to i and n 
Financial 
Symbol for 
Bracketed 
Expression 
Present value of ST„ 
Terminal Value 
Present value of $N Cash 
flow per year during n years 
NA=0 Tn V = 
Tn = 0 NA . V = 
M"1 [(1 + If l (1 + if 
NA ai\t 
Compound Amount of $A NA = 0 
Single Investment 
Tn= [(1+ifW (1 +/)» 
Compound Amount of SiV 
Invested per year during n 
years 
V = 0 NA Tn 
( 1 + Q ° - 1 
NA Mi 
Investment required per year y _ Q 
during n years to grow to 
Terminal value of %Tn 
(sinking fund factor) 
Tn NA = [ ( i +tr-i Tn 
Cash flow required per year 
during n years to recover an 
Investment of $ V (capital 
recovery factor) 
r„ = o NA 
(1 +ifJ 
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TABLE 5.1. B. Derivation of principal functions 
If NA. = 1 and TN = 0, then present value V is: 
i L _ 
1 a. 1 a. J £ 1 (1 + 0° _ 
(1 + i) (1 +if ' " ' ( 1 + if «^,(1 + / ) ' 
If JVx = 1 and K = 0, then terminal value TN is: 
(1 + 0" + (1 + 0" _ 1 + . . . (1 + 0 = E 0 + 0' = + T ~-
If 7^ . = 1 and I 7 = 0, then JV* is found by solving: 
NA(1 + if + NA(1 + r ) ( B _ 1 ) + . . . JV (^1 + i) = NA- £ U + 0' = 
A r (l + 0" - l , , . = NA-- = NA-smi = 1 i 
Hence, NA = l/snu 
If V = 1 and T n = 0, then is found by solving: 
1 = NA + NA + NA = f = 
(l + / ) (l + 0 2 '•'(! +0° + 0 ' 
i L _ 
= Af^ ^ = NA-amt 
i 
Hence, NA = I/ami 
Furthermore, the following formules are derived from the above: 
1 1 + i and smi = am- (1 + if 
am sm 
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found in any handbook of discount and compound tables. The reader who is 
not familiar with financial calculations may have some difficulty at first sight 
with the symbols. Once their meaning is grasped, however, it will become clear 
that they simplify discussions of financial matters considerably. 
Some examples may be useful. Let us assume, for instance, that we wish to 
calculate the present value at discount rate i of a cash flow NA per year during n 
years. Then by setting TN = 0, and solving 5.3 (or by going back to 5.2), we 
for which we may write V = NA- aa\u where aB\i represents the present value 
at discount rate / of a $1 cash flow per year during n years (see Table 5.1 for 
the direct derivation of a w\ t). 
Let us now look at the opposite case. Suppose that we wish to calculate the 
cash flow NA per year that an investment should generate during n years to 
'earn back' the investment in the sense that a rate of return i should be made as 
well as that the original sum invested should be received back. Then from the 
expression above, it follows immediately that NA = V. l/as\t where the financial 
symbol l/as\i stands for the cash flow per year that a $1 investment should 
generate during n years at rate / (Table 5.1 provides again the direct derivation 
Of 1/fliflj)-
The other equations in Table 5.1 are derived in a similar way. The symbols 
used are ss\i, which represents the terminal value of $1 invested per year 
during n years, and l/sw\t which represents the investments required per year 
during n years to obtain a terminal value of $1 at the end of year n. 
One fundamental point needs, perhaps, further elaboration. For any invest-
ment K in a depreciating asset, net cash income (Nt) in any year consists of a 
return on the value of the investment in the beginning of that year (iKt) and a 
depreciation part (Dt). Hence NT = iKt + Dt. It should, of course, be under-
stood that, in this identity, cash income Nt refers to gross revenues Bt minus 
all operating expenses Ot, to that Nt = Bt- Ot. 
Let us review an example. Suppose an asset worth $100,000 is expected to 
generate a constant cash-flow stream of $16,274.54 per year over its useful 
life of 10 years. What is its rate of return? In any handbook of financial tables 
it may be seen that the cash flow, which is equal to K. l/as\t, represents a 10 
percent rate of return. Hence, the income and depreciation schedule would be 
as in Table 5.2. 
As is readily seen, the rate of return in any one year is equal to 10 percent 
of the value of the asset, while the sum of the depreciation components of the 
cash-flow stream over the life of the project is equal to the original value of the 
asset. 
If the same rate of return is to be earned, the factor \jas\i and the annual 
cash flow must be larger in the case of a short-term investment than in the case 
of a long-term investment. This is so, because - as the fundamental identity 
shows - the investment must be depreciated faster in the case of the short-term 
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TABLE 5.2. Example of Rate of Return Calculation. 
Value of Asset Cash Flow 
Income Total Depreciation 
Yrs l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
100,000.00 
93,725.46 
86,823.47 
79,231.28 
70,879.87 
61,693.32 
51,588.11 
40,472.38 
28,245.08 
14,795.04 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
16,274.54 
10,000.00 
9,372.55 
8,682.35 
7,923.13 
7,087.99 
6,169.33 
5,158.81 
4,047.24 
2,824.50 
1,479.50 
6,274.54 
6,901.99 
7,592.19 
8,351.41 
9,186.55 
10,105.21 
11,115.73 
12,227.30 
13,450.04 
14,795.04 
100,000.00 
investment. On the other hand, consideration of the formula of 1/ajij in 
Table 5.1 shows that l/as\t will tend to i if n assumes large values. This is 
logical. If an investment has an mfinite life, then there is no need to depreciate 
the investment. 
Two other observations are called for. First, in accordance with the formula 
l/a^t = l/s^i + i, the capital recovery factor of an investment may be con-
sidered to consist of the sinking fund factor of an equivalent loan amount and 
the relevant interest rate. To give an example: Suppose that we have borrowed 
$100,000 for 10 years at an annual interest rate of 10 percent. Then the annual 
amount that must be invested at an interest rate of 10 percent to be able to repay 
the original sum of $100,000 at the end of year 10 would be $6,274.54. As the 
annual interest payment is $10,000, the total annual payment is $16,274.54 
which is, as shown in Table 5.2, the capital recovery factor at a rate of return 
of 10 percent of an investment of $100,000. It may further be noted, that if n 
assumes large values so that l/a^i assumes the value of /, the factor l/s^t will 
tend to zero. Again, this is easy to understand. If a loan has an infinite life, 
there is no need to establish a sinking fund. 
Second, the relationship between a capital recovery factor and its terminal 
value is given by l/a^t- s$i=(l + if. For example, if, in Table 5.2 each year's 
cash flow were compounded to the terminal year 10, the terminal value of the 
cash flow would be $259,374.25 ($16,274.54 x 15.9374), which is the same 
value if $100,000 were left to grow at a compound rate of return of 10 percent 
($100,000 x 2.5937425). This result is, of course, not surprising because the 
cash flow is here assumed to be reinvested at the investment's rate of return. 
Problems arise, however, when this assumption cannot be made and the 
difference between the internal rate-of-return method and the present-value 
method - a subject that will be discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.4 - can basically 
be brought back to the assumption at which rate of return the cash flow must 
be valued. 
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5.2. T H E INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN AND THE PRESENT VALUE METHODS 
In the absence of budget constraints1 and uncertainty, two criteria2 are 
generally used to evaluate whether a public investment project is justified: 
the internal rate of return criterion and the present value criterion. 
The internal rate of return criterion consists of calculating the discount 
rate at which a project has a net present value of zero - the project's internal 
rate of return-, and accepting only those projects which have an internal rate 
of return larger than the pre-determined opportunity cost of capital rate q. In 
equation form the criterion may be presented as: 
(5.4) Solve r from £ §L^-°* _ £ K< 
(1 + r)< t f , (1 + rf 
and select only projects with r > q. 
The net present value criterion, on the other hand, states that only those 
projects should be accepted for which the discounted benefits exceed discounted 
costs. Or, in formula form: 
(5.5) Y Bt^Ot £ Kt 
. - i d +<?)' ( = i d +qY 
It may be noted that as regards formulas 5.4 and 5.5 equivalent forms of the 
criteria would be to add operating costs to investment costs rather than deduc-
ing it from gross benefits. 
Two variants of formula 5.5 are possible. For instance, it may be written 
in ratio form as: 
(5.5a) Y B T ~ 0TT IT K T T > 1, or also as 
&(! + qy +qy 
(5.5b) y B t / y K t + 0 t > i. 
These last two formulas are not equivalent as will be discussed below. 
In all these formulas, operating costs do not include financial charges and 
accounting items such as interest and depreciation. Financial charges and the 
problem of how to finance a project are not taken into account in the analysis 
because the analysis is concerned only with whether the project is economically 
justified. Since the criteria all boil down to whether the cash flow stream over 
the life of the project is sufficient to cover the capital investments and the 
opportunity cost of capital, there is no need to take account of depreciation 
charges separately. 
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At least two discount calculations are always necessary to determine the 
internal rate of return. The calculations are shown in the following example: 
TABLE 5.3. 
Cost-Benefit Discounted at Discounted at 
Stream 12% 14% 
- Year 1 -100,000 - 89,286 - 87,719 
. - Year 2 - 47,000 - 37,468 - 36,165 
- Year 3 - 6,000 - 4,271 - 4,050 
- Year 4-32 + 24,000 -137,035 +113,120 
Total + 6,010 - 14,814 
Interpolation between the 12 percent discount rate (net present value 
+6,010) and the 14 percent discount rate (net present value -14,814) gives a 
rate of approximately 12.6 percent at which the present worth of the cost-
benefit stream equals zero. The internal rate of return of the project is therefore 
12.6 percent. 
Is the internal rate of return criterion a theoretically correct criterion? In 
our opinion, it is not. First, it may be pointed out that equation 5.4, from which 
the internal rate of return must be calculated, is a polynomial so that there may 
be several roots that solve the equation. Negative and imaginary numbers can 
be discarded and only positive roots count. However, while a normal cash-
flow stream of signs - , + , has only one positive root, a cash flow stream of 
signs - , + , - , or + , - , + may have two positive roots and the problem 
then arises as to which root should be taken as the internal rate of return of 
that stream. We will return to this problem later on in this Chapter. Second, 
whereas in the absence of capital rationing, a situation which we assume 
throughout this section, the rate of return criterion will lead to the same 
projects being accepted as under the present value criterion3, the ranking of 
projects will be different. Although this is not an important issue when mutually 
independent projects are considered because all projects satisfying the criteria 
can be implemented if sufficient capital is available, it may be extremely 
important where mutually exclusive projects are evaluated. For, in such a case, 
only a subset of the mutually exclusive projects can be undertaken so that then 
indeed only the projects with the highest values to the economy should be 
chosen. In this respect, it is important to be aware of the fact that ranking by 
rates of return may lead to wrong results. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the ranking issue. On its vertical axis are measured the 
present values of the cost-benefit stream of a project; on its horizontal axis 
the discount rates used to calculate these present values. Suppose that we are 
evaluating two mutually exclusive projects and that their present values at 
different discount rates are represented by curves A and B, respectively.4 Then, 
as Figure 5.1 indicates, the net present value of Project A is zero at a discount 
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FIGURE 5.1. p 
Discount rate 
rate of 16 percent, while that of Project B is zero at a discount rate of 22 per-
cent. According to the internal rate of return criterion, Project B, whose internal 
rate of return is 22 percent, should thus be preferred over Project A, whose 
internal rate of return is only 16 percent. However, this cannot be correct. 
The value of a project is given by the sum of money that would be necessary to 
generate the project's net benefit stream at rate q, or, in other words, by the 
present value at rate q of the project's cost-benefit stream. In Figure 5.1, it 
may be seen that if the opportunity cost of capital q is, say, 10 percent, the 
present value of Project A equals OV2 while that of Project B equals OVi. 
Hence, Project A should be preferred over Project B, rather than Project B 
over Project A as the internal rate of return criterion would indicate. The 
internal rate of return criterion can thus lead to erroneous answers. 
A variant of the rate of return method, which might be described as the 
alternate cost-savings method, has become quite popular in recent years for 
the comparison of hydro-electric and thermal power developments.5 According 
to this method, the flows of investment and operating costs of the two alter-
native developments should be compared and the differential cost stream will 
then normally show that the extra investments in the hydro scheme in the earlier 
years will be compensated in the later years by the cost savings of the hydro 
alternative compared to the thermal alternative. If the internal rate of return 
of the extra hydro investments exceeds the opportunity cost of capital, then the 
extra investments are considered to be justified. Is this procedure correct? The 
only conclusion we can draw from the alternate cost savings analysis is that the 
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incremental investment in the hydro project results in cost savings compared to 
the steam program, but it does not tell us whether steam development is 
justified. This means that the normal present value criterion must be used to 
evaluate whether thermal development is justified, and there is then no reason 
why this procedure should not also be used to evaluate the hydro alternative. 
TABLE 5.4. 
Project 
A B 
Present Value Investments (K) 90 50 
Present Value Operating Costs (0) 10 20 
Present Value Benefits (5) 190 140 
(B-0)/K ratio (5.5a) 190/90 = 2.0 120/50 = 2.4 
BI{K+0) ratio (5.5b) 190/100 = 1.9 140/70 = 2.0 
Present value criterion (5.5) : 
B - (K + 0) 90 70 
Let us turn our attention now to the so-called benefit-cost ratios, the variants 
of the net present value method defined by formulas 5.5a and 5.5b. It is easy 
to show that ranking by ratios leads to a result different from that under the 
net present value method. Table 5.4 presents the ranking of two projects under 
the three criteria. Under the present value method, Project A should be prefer-
red because it has the highest net present value. The ratios, however, give 
priority to Project B. This is clearly wrong. A's additional investment and 
operating costs are 30, but this gives an additional benefit of 50, resulting in 
an overall addition to net benefits of 20. A has thus a higher value than B. 
In the absence of capital constraints, ratios are not correct ranking criteria.6 
Apart from the fact that they are wrong, it may also be pointed out that the 
value of 5.5a is always higher than the value of 5.5b, since transferring operating 
costs from the numerator to the denominator must reduce the value of the 
ratio. The B/(K + O) ratio has found in the United States quite a range of 
application, especially for water resources projects. The Flood Control Act 
of 1936 requires that 'the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue (be) in 
excess of the estimated costs.' This formulation is sound in the absence of 
budget constraints, and means simply that projects with ratios less than 1 
should be rejected. In practice, however, the ratio has also been used to rank 
projects and problems of consistency can then easily arise. M C K E A N 7 men-
tions, for example, that in the Green River Watershed project in the USA, 
the increased cost of cattle production was deducted from gross receipts 
instead of being included among the costs of the program, with the result that 
the ratio was higher than it should have been in that case. A further problem 
with the B/(K + O) ratio is that it is extremely sensitive to the level of operating 
costs. Suppose that for a certain project B is 980, O is 800 and AT is 90. Then this 
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project, of which the relative values of the variables are well in line with those 
of a supermarkt or department store, would have a.B/(K + O) ratio of 1.1 and 
a net present value of 90 . Project A in Table 5.4, however, has a B/(K + O) 
ratio of 1.9 even though it is equally valuable since its present value is also 9 0 . 
Thus B/(K + O) ratios have a bias against projects with large operating costs. 
The conclusion that, in the absence of budget constraints, only the net 
present value method provides the correct ranking of projects - whether 
mutually exclusive or not - has often encountered criticism of the sort met 
in the example in Table 5.5., which assumes - as we have assumed all long -
TABLE 5.5. 
Project 
A B 
Present Value Costs: {K + O) 100 1,000,000 
Present Value Benefits: (5) 175 1,000,100 
B/(K + O) ratio 1.75 1 
Net Present Value: B - (K + O) 75 100 
that costs and benefits have been determined with complete certainty. Project 
B has the highest net present value, but its investment costs are so large that 
its B/(K + O) ratio is only marginally above 1. Surely, according to the cri-
ticism. Project A with its much lower investment cost and much higher 
B/(K + O) ratio should be preferred. The apparent contradiction disappears 
if we focus on the fact that the discussed present value criterion applies only to 
situations where the Government has no budget constraint and where condi-
tions of complete certainty exist. Project B must then have a higher ordering 
number than Project A because, even though its investments are larger than 
those of Project A, it provides a higher net present value than Project A. 
The example is useful, however, because it shows that the discussed present 
value method, although theoretically correct, is applicable only in situations 
which are not realistic. Usually, we find that Governments do not have suffi-
cient funds to undertake all projects they would like to undertake and the 
discussed rule then needs amendment. How this should be done in the case 
of a single period budget constraint as well as in the case of a multiple period 
budget constraint will be discussed in the next sections. The last section of this 
Chapter will review how uncertainties - inherent in the estimation of any 
project variable - should be incorporated in the analysis. 
5.3. SINGLE PERIOD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
A constraint may be said to exist with respect to a factor of production or 
commodity if, within a certain time period, the supply of that factor or com-
modity cannot be expanded to satisfy demand. In other words, part of existing 
100 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
demand will go unsatisfied if any additional new demand is to be served. The 
value of such a constrained factor or commodity is higher than its production 
costs by the amount of the scarcity premium it commands. Examples of how 
such premiums had to be calculated in the case of constraints on inputs, foreign 
exchange and production capacity were encountered in the previous chapters. 
However, many other constraints may exist; for instance, with respect to 
project implementation capacity, the Government budget, the number of 
engineers, managers or extension personnel and the like. The calculation of the 
relevant shadow prices is not difficult: the value of the constrained factor or 
commodity is the value that would be generated (or lost) if the available quan-
tity of the factor or commodity were, increased (or reduced) by one unit. 
However, as regards the production factor capital some special issues arise 
related to the problem as to whether in cases of constraints projects should be 
considered discrete units or variable as regards project size, and we will, 
therefore, discuss these matters now in some detail. 
Throughout out discussion we assume that every project variable, except 
capital, has been valued at its appropriate shadow price8 and we will start our 
review by considering the case of the single period budget constraint. How 
should investments be curtailed in such a case so that their sum equals the 
available funds? Traditionally,9 this is done by maximizing the Lagrangean 
expression of the constrained objective function. Hence, if we follow the 
traditional method, the present value of the net benefits of all projects should 
be maximized subject to the constraint that the total investment costs of all 
projects cannot exceed a certain given amount. 
If the present value of the net benefits of the jth project is denoted by Nj and 
its investment costs by Kj, the problem is to maximize for a set of projects the 
objective function : 
n n 
i=i 1 j=i 3 
n 
subject to: ^ K) - K = 0 
where K represents the available investment funds. Hence, the Lagrangean 
expression that should be maximized is: 
L = YJi} - JXj - X(EKj - K) 
The first order conditions are 
IdNj - IAKJ - XLdKj = 0 and K = ~LKj. 
The former may be written as HdNj = ILdKj (1 + X). As we have, moreover, 
the normal condition that in an optimal situation dNj/dKj should be equal for 
all projects, we arrive at the rule that to maximize the net benefits of all projects, 
the marginal benefit of each project should be equal to that of the other pro-
jects and equal to marginal cost plus a premium X. In other words, the marginal 
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dollar invested must be valued in the case of a budget constraint at the shadow 
price of 1 + X. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2, where the total net benefits 
of a project are shown as a function of total investment costs. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, in the absence of budget constraints, the optimal size would be 
at point A where the tangent line has a slope of 1. With the budget constraint, 
the optimal scale would be at D, where the tangent line has the slope 1 + X. 
The purpose of X is to curtail the investment in each individual project in 
such a way that the sum of the investments in all projects just exhausts the 
available funds. Obviously, therefore, the value of X can be found only by 
considering simultaneously all the investment projects. One possible way to 
determine X would be by trial and error. The central planning authority could 
provide the different departments responsible for designing the various pro-
jects with different values of X and then determine at what value of X the total 
budget would be exhausted. Another way would consist of a bottom-up 
procedure. By varying, for each project, the value of X, each department could 
obtain a function relating the optimal investments for the projects under its 
authority to various values of 1 + X. Graphically, this could be done by 
varying the slope of the line dNj = dKj (1 + X) of Figure 5.2. Aggregation of 
the investment relative to (1 + X) functions of the different departments 
would then provide the central planning authority with the function relating 
total optimal investments (E^-opt) to 1 + X. This function is shown in Figure 
5.3 as the curve SisT/opt. 
Without budget constraints, the value of X = 0 and the optimal total invest-
ments would be^ say, K0. With a budget constraint the total available invest-
ment funds are K and the value of 1 + X would be read directly from the figure, 
where it was assumed for illustrative purposes that X has a value of 0.3. By 
feeding back this value to the different departments, the Central Planning 
Authority would ensure that each departments project or projects would be 
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FIGURE 5.3. £Kj 
designed optimally. At the margin of each project's investment scale, each 
dollar invested would generate the same present value of benefits (1 + A). 
There would be no advantage in reducing any one of the projects in order to 
expand another project, and all available funds would be used. 
The above described procedure will lead to the result that different projects 
will have different rates of return. This can be illustrated as follows. As discus-
sed in Section 5.1, the present value of a constant stream of yearly net benefits 
NA during n years may be represented by N = NA- as\q where N is the present 
value, and q the discount rate. Differentiating with respect to output, we may 
write d/Y = dA i^ as\q. But 6NA also represents the periodic constant benefit 
flow of the marginal investment dK. Hence, we can also write dNA = dK- l/as\r, 
where r is the internal rate of return of dK. It follows that, in the case of budget 
constraints and constancy of benefits, dN/dK = a^q\a^\T = 1 + A. This 
expression may be written as l/anq, = (1 + A)- l/ag\t or, in words, the cash 
flow of the marginal dollar invested (l/a»| r) should equal the required cash 
flow in the absence of budget constraints (l/a»|«) weighted with (1 + A). 
Alternative, we may write {1/(1 + A)}- l/a5>- asi« = 1 or, in words, the cash 
flow stream of the marginal invested dollar should be such that its present 
value at discount rate q should be 1 when it is weighted with 1/(1 + A). 
If all the projects under consideration have infinite lifetimes, then dN/dK = 
(ljq)/(l/r) = r/q = 1 + A, and the optimal size of each project may be deter-
mined either by using r or A. For instance, if A = 0.3 and q— 10%, then r = 
13 % and the size of each project should be expanded until the rate of return on 
the marginal dollar invested is 13 percent. At that size level, the present value 
of the benefit stream of the marginal dollar invested would equal 1.3. In the 
case of projects with constant benefits but different lifetimes, the situation is 
different because the weighting with (1 + A) of the required cash flow for the 
marginal investment dollar only increases the rate of return part of the cash 
flow and not the depreciation part. Hence, for short life projects, the rate of 
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return would be substantially higher than the 13 percent calculated for long 
life projects in the example above. For instance, the rate of return on the mar-
ginal dollar invested for a project with a 10-year life would need to be about 
17 percent, if the present value of the marginal benefit stream were to remain 
1.3. Similar problems arise when different projects have the same lifetimes but 
varying benefit streams over time. 
Whereas in the absence of budget constraints, the optimization rule is that 
a project should be expanded until the rate of return on the marginal dollar 
invested equals the opportunity cost of capital, this rule is apparently no 
longer valid in the case of budget constraints if the X rule is followed. Although 
operationally difficult, the X procedure is correct under its assumptions. But 
are these assumptions correct? The implicit assumption of the X procedure is 
that no extra costs will be incurred if we undertake at a later date the invest-
ments eliminated at present under the X rule. As budget constraints vary in 
intensity, it may well be possible that at a later date sufficient funds will be 
available to undertake these investments. However, as is well known, in general 
it will be a costly procedure to expand a project at a later date. For instance, it 
is very difficult to widen a bridge or a road, or to heighten an irrigation dam 
once construction has been completed or sometimes when construction based 
on a reduced design has started. As it is much more efficient to defer a marginal 
project than to defer last increments to projects, we would suggest for this 
reason that project size should be determined by the normal rule that the 
marginal costs of the project should equal its marginal benefits. 
Once it is accepted that project size should not be tampered with, the budget 
constraint rule becomes a simple one. Obviously, the objective is to maximize 
the benefits per dollar of available investment funds. Hence, as HTRSHLEIFER, 
DE HAVEN and M I L L I M A N 1 0 proposed, the procedure should be 'to compare 
projects on the basis of their present value as of time 1 (the value of the time 
stream for periods 1 through n, calculated back to time 1) per dollar of current 
funds.' In terms of the variables used here, the procedure is to rank projects 
by their N/K ratios, giving priority to the project with the highest ratio and so 
proceeding down the line until the budget is exhausted. 
TABLE 5 .6 . 
Project 
A B C 
Present value investments (K) 9 0 5 0 1 4 0 
Present value net benefits (AO 1 8 0 1 2 0 2 5 2 
Present value project 9 0 7 0 1 1 2 
N/K ratio 1 8 0 / 9 0 = 2 . 0 1 2 0 / 5 0 = 2 . 4 2 5 2 / 1 4 0 = 1.8 
An example of the method is given in Table 5.6, which shows the present 
values and N/K ratios of projects A, B and C. Assume that there are only 140 
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units of capital available. Then according to the present value method, project 
C should be implemented because it has the highest present value. As Table 
5.6 shows, however, it would be better to undertake projects B and A as their 
combined present value totals 160. Only by ranking the projects by their N/K 
ratio can we ensure that B and A will indeed be preferred. 
Obviously, it is very important that these ratios be calculated correctly and 
that the K in the formula represents the real economic cost of undertaking the 
project during the budget constraint period. This will not be investment costs as 
defined by accountants or engineers, but rather will comprise all outlays that 
are borne by the Government budget. An example is provided in Table 5.7. 
The capital costs of the project during the first four years, which we assume is 
the budget constraint period, are 7 0 and the operating costs 5. However, if the 
Government budget has to provide only the net outlays for the project, then, 
as Table 5.7 shows, the investments should be taken as 68 . 
TABLE 5.7. 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Capital Costs 50 10 5 5 
Operating Costs - 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Benefits - 3 4 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Investment (K) - 5 0 - 1 0 - 4 - 4 
Net Benefits (JV) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Present Value Investments {q = 1 0 % ) : 65 .39 
Present Value Net Benefits (q = 1 0 % ) : 109.73 
Ratio N/K: 109 .73 /65 .39 = 1.68 
If the ratio is calculated as shown in Table 5.7, the value of AT will represent 
the amount of scarce capital needed for the project and the value of N the 
amount that will be generated. This ratio is thus a measure of the importance 
of the project to the national economy. The disadvantage of this formula is that 
it is a ratio while normal practice is to express the profitability of an investment 
in terms of a rate of return. We will, therefore, discuss in the next section whether 
it is possible to express the N/K ratio as a rate of return. 
5.4. THE MODIFIED INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 
The relationship between the N/K ratio and the internal rate of return can 
best be shown if we assume that the benefit and operating cost streams are 
constant. In such a case N = NA- as]q. Since K = NA- ah~\r, it follows that N/K = 
(l/tf5>)/(l/a5]4). Thus, in cases of constancy of net benefit streams, projects with 
the same lifetimes may be ranked either by their N/K ratios or by their internal 
rates of return. If, however, projects with different lifetimes are compared, 
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TABLE 5.8. Formula: N/K = (l/aEir)/(l/asi«), where q = 10 percent. 
Project Lifetime Internal 
Rate of Return 
Corresponding 
N/K Ratio 
A 
B 
C 
D 
10 yrs. 
25 yrs. 
50 yrs. 
0 0 yrs. 
15% 
15% 
15% 
15% 
1.22 
1.40 
1.50 
1.50 
rankings under the two methods will differ from each other. An example is 
presented in Table 5.8 which shows the N/K ratios of four projects, each with 
a different lifetime, under the assumption that their internal rates of return are 
all 15 percent. While the N/K method would give preference to the projects 
with the longest lives, the internal rate of return method would consider all 
projects to be of equal priority. 1 1 Furthermore, it needs no elaboration that 
the ranking of projects under the two criteria may also differ in cases where 
the net benefits vary over time, even though all projects may have the same 
lifetime. 
The example in Table 5.8 demonstrates that the internal rate of return 
criterion will lead to a different ranking from that obtained when the N/K 
approach is used, while the latter, as discussed in the previous section, provides 
the theoretically correct criterion. Nevertheless, it is possible to arrive at a 
correct ranking if a modified internal rate of return criterion is adopted. Ac-
cording to SOLOMON , 1 2 the internal rate of return criterion can be reconciled 
with the N/K criterion if the reinvestment of the cash flow is taken into account. 
He maintains that the present value criterion assumes benefits to be reinvested 
at the opportunity cost of capital rate, while the internal rate of return criterion 
assumes that reinvestment of the returns will take place at the internal rate of 
return. We believe this explanation to be incorrect. The internal rate of return 
criterion makes no assumption as regards what happens to benefits; they can 
be consumed or they can be reinvested. The decision between consumption 
and reinvestment is, of course, based on the same rate of return and in the 
absence of multiple period budget constraints, this rate is the opportunity cost 
of capital, q. SOLOMON is, however, on the right track and the internal rate of 
return criterion can indeed be reconciled with the N/K criterion if we value the 
cash flow at its appropriate rate. If we assume that the appropriate rate is the 
opportunity cost of capital, q, then the modified internal rate of return is 
found with the help of the formula N(l + qf = K(l + r*)", where r* repre-
sents the modified internal rate of return. Hence, N/K = (1 + r*)"/(l + q)n, 
so that ranking by modified internal rates of return leads to the same result as 
ranking by N/K ratios. 
The principle is illustrated with an example in Table 5.9, which shows the 
investments and benefit streams of projects A and B. According to the present 
value criterion, project B should be chosen because its present value (13.13) is 
higher than that of A (9.89), whereas according to the internal rate of return 
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TABLE 5.9. 
Project A Project B 
Opportunity cost of capital 10 % 
Investments - 1 0 0 - 1 0 0 
Net Benefits yr. 1 + 80 -
Net Benefits yr. 2 + 45 +136.89 
Present Value Net Benefits at 10% +109.89 +113.13 
Internal Rate of Return 18 % 17 % 
Terminal Value of Net Benefits when compounded 
at 10% 132.97 136.89 
Modified Rate of Return 15.3% 17% 
N/K Ratio 1.10 1.37 
criterion A (IRR = 1 8 % ) should be chosen rather than B (IRR = 1 7 % ) . If 
the present values of the net benefits are compounded at the opportunity cost 
of capital rate of 10 percent, then the terminal value of the benefits of project 
A will be $132.97 and of project B, $136.89. With investments of $100 this 
corresponds to a modified rate of return of 15.3 percent and 17 percent, res-
pectively, which gives the same ranking as under the N/K ratios. The two 
approaches are therefore consistent if a common assumption is adopted with 
respect to the rate of return at which the benefits should be valued and both 
criteria - N/K ratio and modified rate of return - will then rank the projects 
identically. 
The problem of multiple solutions to an internal rate of return function can 
now be addressed. This situation arises when the net cash flow changes its 
direction several times, as shown, for instance, in Table 5.10, which reproduces 
an example from GRANT and IRESON . 1 3 The internal rates of return in this case 
are approximately 25 percent and 40 percent. To solve this ambiguity the 
opportunity cost of capital should be used to value the cash flow. In the exam-
ple, if the opportunity cost of capital is 8 percent, the modified rate of return 
is about 10 percent, 1 4 which was found by solving the equation 544.5 (1 + r*)20 
— 782.1 x 1.08 2 0. Such cases are, however, rare outside of the mineral and 
petroleum industries, and GRANT and IRESON 1 5 emphasize that even then 'cases 
of this type arise only in quite specialized circumstances.' 
TABLE 5.10. 
Year Net Cash Flow 
($'000) 
Present Worth 
at 8% at 20% at 25% at 30% at 40% 
1-5 
5 
6-20 
+ 50 per year 
- 8 0 0 
+ 100 per year 
+ 199.6 
-544.5 
+582.5 
+ 149.6 
-321.5 
+ 187.9 
+ 134.4 
-262.5 
+ 126.5 
+ 121.8 
-215 .4 
+ 88.0 
+ 101.8 
-148.7 
+ 46.2 
+237.6 + 16.0 - 1.3 - 5.6 - 0.7 
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The standard internal rate of return criterion, which was rejected earlier in 
Section 5.2 in the case of an absence of capital rationing, must also, as we have 
seen in Section 5.3 and this section, be rejected if budget constraints exist. 
Therefore, one may ask 'Under what conditions can the standard internal rate 
of return criterion be applied?' As LORIE and S A V A G E 1 6 have pointed out, 
there are four such situations: (a) when only one project should be compared 
with the opportunity cost of capital; (b) in the case of several projects when the 
opportunity cost of capital is zero; (c) when the opportunity cost of capital 
is not zero and several projects are to be compared but the time paths of the 
projects do not cross; and (d) when the opportunity cost of capital is not zero, 
several projects are being ranked and the net benefits from each of the projects 
can be valued at their internal rates of return. 
Matters relating to case (a) will be discussed below. Case (b) is of no practical 
relevance since the opportunity cost of capital is always positive. Cases (c) and 
(d) are theoretically identical since the condition of (d) makes the time paths 
of the net benefits of the projects equal except for a proportionality factor. 
Case (d), however, is of less practical value than case (c) because, in general, 
benefits cannot be valued at the internal rate of return. 
What about case (a)? We have discussed in Section 5.1 that in the absence 
of budget constraints a project should be accepted if it has either a present 
value at least equal to zero (B - C>0) or an internal rate of return higher 
than the opportunity cost of capital. As in practical work we often find that the 
estimate of the opportunity cost of capital and, hence of B - C is a rather 
arbitrary undertaking, we feel that the internal rate of return has great opera-
tional value in the absence of budgetary constraints. However, we have also 
stated that in general we would expect that the usual situation is one of capital 
rationing. Has the internal rate of return criterion any validity in such a case? 
Theoretically not. As we have discussed, the NjK approach or the modified 
internal rate of return approach should be followed. However, the problem is 
again that the opportunity cost of capital is difficult to estimate. One may 
attempt to calculate for each project a minimum and maximum value of the 
N/K ratio or of the modified rate of return by using a minimum and maximum 
value of the opportunity cost of capital, but where one can only estimate that 
the opportunity cost of capital lies between some very extreme values, this 
procedure is not very meaningful. In such a case the internal rate of return 
method may be used to establish a tentative ranking order of projects. As 
projects with high internal rates of return will be accepted in any case, one can 
then spend extra time on projects with low rates of return - those at the margin 
of acceptability - in order to sharpen the accept-reject decision. This may be 
done, for instance, by calculating probability distributions of the N/K ratios. 
We feel, therefore, that the internal rate of return is an important tool in 
practical work despite its theoretical limitations. 
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5.5. MULTIPLE PERIOD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
It may be recalled that the optiinization rule in the case of the single period 
budget constraint requires that the cash flow of the marginal dollar invested 
must be weighted with 1/(1 + A) before discounting, where A is the Lagrangean 
shadow premium on investment undertaken during the constraint period. 
As the discount factor at the margin is also relevant for intra-marginal units, 
the result of the budget constraint is that not only the cash flow of the marginal 
investment dollar but any cash flow starting in the period of constraint should 
be weighted with 1/(1 + A). To distinguish the constraint in period 1 from 
constraints in other periods, we denote this weighting factor by 1/(1 + Ai). 
Suppose now that there is a two-period budget constraint. Then any cash 
flow starting in period two should be weighted with 1/(1 + A2). It follows that, 
of a cash flow resulting from a marginal dollar invested in the first period, the 
elements that become available in years 2 through n should be valued at 1/(1 + 
A2). Let us assume that the periods of the constraints are years. Then the follow-
ing tabulation (Table 5 .11) may be made of how the present value of a two-
year cash flow from a dollar invested in period 1 should be calculated if there 
were one or two period budget constraints. 
TABLE 5.11. 
Budget Constraint Present Value Benefits 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 
Ni N2 
(1 + <?) (1 + qf 
Ni N2 
(1 + h) (1 + q) (1 + Ai) (1 + qf 
Ni N2 
(1 + h) (1 +q) (1 + h) (1 + h) (1 + qf 
None 
Single Period 
Two Period 
From Table 5 .11 it is clear that if the impact of the budget constraints is 
about equal in the different periods, i.e., Ai = A2 = ... = A„, the present value 
of a benefit in any year t, if there were a multiple period constraint, would be-
Nt/[(l + A ) ' ( 1 +q)'] 
which can be replaced by 
AV[(1 + b)<] 
where b = (1 + A) (1 + q). In case of continuous compounding, of course, 
b — A + q. 
The result derived here is intuitively simple: the discount rate to be used for 
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discounting a project's benefit and cost stream in the case of a multiple period 
budget constraint should be the budget constraint discount rate. This rate is 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital and acts as a clearing mechanism 
equilibrating total investments with available funds. 
The optimal size of a project can now easily be determined. The project 
should be expanded until the rate of return on the marginal dollar invested 
equals b. Ranking of projects also presents no problem. If, for one reason or 
another, notwithstanding the use of b as a clearing rate, there would be a need to 
defer some projects - e.g., when there would be a temporary shortage of capital 
- projects should be ranked by their N/K ratios, found by discounting at rate b. 
and those with the lowest ratios should be the first to be deferred. Alternatively, 
the ranking could take place by calculating the projects' modified rates of 
return, whereby the rate b should be used for the evaluation of the cash flow 
streams. Projects that have the lowest modified rate of return should then be 
deferred. 
MARGLIN has criticized the use of the N/K criterion because, 'It concentrates 
on the absolute advantage among projects within each period instead of 
looking at the comparative advantage among projects between periods. ' 1 7 
Suppose that in each of two budget periods only one project can be implemented 
out of a group of two, each project having the same investment costs. Suppose, 
MARGLIN continues, that construction timing is optimal for the present period, 
and that if the projects were undertaken in the second period, net present 
values will decrease, as illustrated in Table 5.12. Application of the N/K criterion 
would then lead us to undertake project A first. However, a glance at the table 
shows that the construction sequence B, A has a higher net present value than 
the sequence A, B so that the N/K criterion would apparently lead to the wrong 
result. While project A has the absolute advantage (highest present value) for 
1975 construction, it has the comparative advantage (it loses the least due to 
postponement) for 1980 construction and should therefore be undertaken in 
1980 if we are to maximize net present values simultaneously rather than serial-
ly. The problem of investment planning in a dynamic context becomes rather 
complicated if more than two projects are involved. However, MARGLIN has 
shown that it can be solved with the help of planning algorithms, following the 
solution method of the linear progranrming problem known as the Assignment 
Problem. The assignment of projects to the different budget periods is then 
essentially the same as the assignment of factories to locations or personnel 
to jobs. 
TABLE 5.12. 
Net Present Value Today as a Function of the 
Construction Date 
1975 1980 
Project A 150 140 
Project B 135 115 
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Should we follow MARGLIN'S approach? The comparative advantage criter-
ion would be entirely correct if indeed we could know which projects would 
come up for evaluation in the next plan period. There may indeed be such 
cases, for instance, when large river basins are being studied. Often, however, 
we find that Central Planning Authorities do not possess this knowledge. It is 
easy to see that, under such circumstances, the comparative advantage crite-
ion may lead to worse results than the N/K criterion. For instance, postpone-
ment of a project from the present plan period to the next plan period could 
lead to its replacement in the present period by a lower ranking project, while 
in the next plan period it would compete with projects not yet identified so that 
perhaps it might not be accepted then at all. As a result, total net present value 
could be lower under the comparative advantage rule than under the N/K 
criterion. It is often not possible to consider projects of different plan periods 
simultaneously, and MARGLIN'S approach is then not feasible. It seems to us 
that the best one can do in such cases is to concentrate on the projects that 
are known. If there is a need to postpone a project because of budget constraints, 
then ranking by N/K ratios would ensure the maximization of the net present 
values of the projects under scrutiny. 
5.6. UNCERTAINTY 
So far it has been implicitly assumed that inputs, outputs, costs and prices 
of the projects under scrutiny are precisely known. In many cases, however, 
these variables can only be estimated within a wide range of values. For in-
stance, investment costs are notoriously difficult to estimate; projections of 
quantities produced are often subject to a wide margin of error, and prices 
also, in most cases, can only be forecast in the form of a range of prices. 
In such circumstances, consultants and engineers often use the most likely 
values of the variables to calculate whether a project is acceptable. This pro-
cedure is not correct, as a simple example will show. Suppose that an agricul-
tural engineer has estimated the probability of a project producing 10,000 tons 
and 15,000 tons of padi per year at 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively. 
Suppose, further, that the rice marketing expert has estimated the price of padi 
at $100, with a probability of 60 percent, and at $150, with a probability of 40 
percent, the price not being affected by the project. Then the value of the gross 
benefits would be $1,000,000 if the calculation were based on the most likely 
values of quantity and price. In fact, as the table below shows, this estimate 
would be too conservative. The probability of the project producing a gross 
benefit of $1,000,000 is only 24 percent, while the probability of a gross benefit 
of $1,500,000 or higher is 76 percent. 
In the above example, the analysis was kept simple. Only two variables and 
only two values for each variable were considered. In reality there will be many 
more variables that affect a project's rate of return and several values which 
each of these variables could assume. Clearly, therefore, the acceptance 
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TABLE 5.13. 
Quantity Price Gross Benefits 
Tons Prob. $ Prob. $ Prob. 
10,000 0.6 100 0.4 1,000,000 0.24 
10,000 0.6 150 0.6 1,500,000 0.36 
15,000 0.4 100 0.4 1,500,000 0.16 
15,000 0.4 150 0.6 2,250,000 0.24 
decision of a project should include probability analysis. 1 8 
How should we determine which variables and values should be considered? 
To begin, a sensitivity analysis should be undertaken. Start the rate of return 
or net present value calculation on the basis of the most likely values of the 
variables, and then change the value of each variable one at a time by, say, 20 
percent to determine whether the project's rate of return or net present value 
is sensitive to such variations. The next step is to choose the probability 
distribution of the values of each of the significant variables. In most cases these 
probabilities will be subjective estimates based on the consulted expert's 
experience and expertise. The simplest way to proceed is to have the expert 
indicate the probability of different interval-values of the variable rather than 
the probability of each single point estimate of the variable, or, in other words, 
to have him draw up a step rectangular distribution rather than the much more 
difficult smooth curve distribution of probabilities. 1 9 The final step then is to 
calculate the probability distribution of the rate of return or net present value 
of the project. This seems at first sight a formidable task. For instance, assum-
ing that there are seven significant variables and that each of these has been 
assigned four values, the number of computations would be 4 7 = 16,384. The 
procedure can, however, be simplified by using a simulation technique, known 
as the Monte-Carlo Method. The computer is instructed to assign random 
values to each of the variables which should be varied and to repeat the com-
putations until the probability distribution of the rate of return or net present 
value emerges. The number of computations is a simple problem of statistics, 
known as the Sample Problem, and in most cases a few fundred calculations 
suffice to arrive at an accurate description of the probability distribution. 
In the absence of a computer the calculations can be done by hand, using, 
for example, a table of random numbers to assign random values to the varia-
bles. Rather than a few computer minutes, the calculations may then take 
a few man-weeks. For many projects this is well justified, especially when the 
projects appear at first sight marginal, or when unusual uncertainties are 
present. A probability analysis may also be extremely important for optimizing 
the project's design. POULIQUEN , 2 0 for instance, mentions that a probability 
analysis showed that the productivity of the cargo gangs at the Port of Moga-
discio was a key factor affecting the rate of return of the planned expansion of 
port facilities. If the productivity could be raised to 9 or 10 tons per gang-hour. 
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the major risk in the project would be ehminated. It was therefore recom-
mended that a consultant be engaged to help organize cargo handling opera-
tions. 
A problem for which one has to watch carefully in any probability analysis 
is that of correlation between the variables which are varied. For instance, in 
our example above, it may well be that the uncertainty in the quantity of padi 
production is not independent of the uncertainty in the price of padi because 
the price may depend on the quantity produced. The way to proceed then is to 
estimate the probability of the price being $150 when production is 10,000 tons, 
the probability of the price being $100 when production is 15,000 tons, and so 
on. Or, in other words, the estimates of the price probabilities should then be 
contingent upon the estimated quantities. In our example, the correlation 
between the two variables is negative, i.e., an increase in quantity leads to a 
lower price. Often, however, the correlation is positive. For instance, a 
smoother road surface (increase in costs) may lead to reduced vehicle operating 
costs (increase in benefits), or an increase in the productivity of the cargo 
gang would increase the capacity of the port. The correlation may also be 
caused by a third variable such as the state of the economy. In the case of a 
combined hydroelectric-irrigation project, an increase in the level of economic 
activity may well raise the demand for electricity as well as for agricultural 
products. In all such cases of correlation, benefits could be substantially 
over- or under-estimated if the correlations between the variables were neglec-
ted. 
Suppose now that probability analysis has been applied to all the projects 
under scrutiny. How should we determine their priority? Figure 5.4 presents 
the cumulative probability distributions of two projects. The probability that 
project A will have a rate of return of 10 percent is 90 percent, whereas project 
B's probability of a rate of return of 10 percent is only 60 percent. On the other 
hand, B's chance of achieving a rate of return higher than 10 percent is much 
greater than A's chance, but, at the same time, B has a much greater chance 
FIGURE 5.4. 1 0 0 % - | — ^ — 
1 0 % 1 5 % 2 0 % 
EROR 
-5% 0 5% 
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than A to end up with rates of return lower than 10 percent. In other words, 
the variance of the rate of return is much larger in the case of B than of A. 
Preference among these projects should be determined in the following 
manner. Denote the probability that the utility of a project will be ui, ui, etc., 
by pi,p2, etc., then the expected utility value of the project will be T,pmk where 
k is the kth possible outcome. This raises immediately the question of which 
utility should be attached to the various possible returns. In our discussion in 
Chapter 9 we will show that this utility depends on the project beneficiaries -
whether they are the poor, the middle income group, or the rich. A dollar 
accruing to a poor man is generally considered to have a higher marginal 
utility than a dollar accruing to an average income earner or a rich man. 
Consequently, a project of which the beneficiaries are the poor will have a 
higher social rate of return than one generating benefits for the middle or 
high income population groups. 
Let us assume for the present, however, as has been done so far, that income 
distribution considerations are not important, as is true for a wide range of 
projects. Then the marginal utility of a dollar will be the same irrespective of 
the individual to whom it accrues and the expected utility value of a project will 
be its expected economic value, i.e., the difference between the present values 
of the expected economic benefits and the expected economic costs. The 
expected (modified) economic rate of return of a project is found similarly 
by weighting each possible economic rate of return by its probability. Follow-
ing this procedure, project A would have an expected economic rate of return 
of 10 percent, project B of 1 2 percent, and project B would thus be assigned 
a higher priority than project A. 
An objection may be raised to this procedure on the grounds that it does not 
take into account the fact that project B is much 'riskier' than project A. Two 
approaches are commonly used to deal with risk. The first - often applied in 
private business - is to adjust conservatively the estimates of such variables as 
the discount rate, costs, benefits and project life. Theoretically, this approach 
leaves much to be desired. In general, risks do not increase with time, as the use 
of a higher than normal discount rate would imply, because steps can be taken 
to remedy the situation. Furthermore, over-estimation of costs or under-
estimation of benefits and project life is a rather arbitrary method which can 
only negate the systematic evaluation of the project's net present value or rate 
of return. The second approach would be to use the decision maker's subjective 
probabilities which express his attitude toward risk rather than the subjective 
probabilities estimated by the project experts which do not take account of 
risk. A decision-maker not willing to accept risk might then well prefer project 
A to project B. In general, we believe that it is not necessary to follow this 
approach, because normally it may be assumed that there will be a large num-
ber of independent Government projects so that their risks will be pooled in 
accordance with the law of large numbers. There are, however, cases where the 
risk element should definitely be taken into account, for instance, where the 
variation in the net benefits of a project amounts to a substantial percentage of 
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TABLE 5.14. 
Flood No Flood 
Project A 200 70 
Project B 140 80 
a country's national income, or where the risk of a project will be borne mainly 
by certain income groups (e.g. the poor), or where detrimental effects may be 
imposed on the rest of the economy (e.g. in cases of underestimation of power 
needs). It would be folly then not to take account of the risk element. However, 
such cases do not occur often and it is then no longer a problem for the project 
appraiser but for the highest decision-making authority of government. 
Finally, we may mention briefly that there is a substantial volume of theor-
etical literature about the decision rules to be followed in the case of complete 
uncertainty. 2 1 One of the more well-known of these rules is the so-called 
Maximin Return principle under which that alternative should be chosen 
which guarantees the highest minimum return. For instance, suppose that there 
are two states of nature about which we are completely uncertain - flood and 
no flood - and that two types of flood control projects are possible with net 
present values as presented in Table 5.14. Then the Maximin Return principle 
would recommend project B because the highest minimum return would be 80. 
The extremely conservative nature of this rule needs no elaboration. To obtain 
an additional minimum return of 10 in the case of no-flood, we are willing to 
forego a possible additional return of 60 in the case of flood. Objections of 
this nature can be raised to any of the various decision rules. In fact, a logically 
consistent system of decision rules can only be based upon judgments of the 
various possible states of nature, i.e., the subjective probability approach. 
KNIGHT'S distinction between risk and uncertainty is famous. 2 2 In KNIGHT'S 
view, risk is an uncertainty which can by any method be reduced to an objec-
tive, quantitatively determinate probability. Risk is, therefore, not an uncer-
tainty but a complete certainty. True uncertainty, on the other hand, is, in his 
opinion, not susceptible to any measurement at all. If we follow his approach, 
then it is logical that we should arrive at a theory of objective probabilities 
under conditions of risk and a theory of decision rules under conditions of 
uncertainty. But it is difficult to imagine, as KNIGHT and the decision theory do, 
that no opinion can be formed about the possibility of a certain state of nature. 
If we accept that there are no sharp boundaries between risk and uncertainty, 
and that decisions in real life must be based on judgments, then we must settle 
on a theory of subjective probability as followed here. 
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N O T E S C H A P T E R 5 
1 It should be noted that we assume that the values of the project variables reflect other 
possible constraints. More about this will be said in Section 5.3. 
2 There are, of course, many other criteria, but they are all without theoretical foundation. 
An interesting rule of thumb is the so-called payback criterion, which states that a firm should 
recover its capital normally within a fiveyear period. If benefits are constant, the criterion is 
5.1/an/r = 1. Hence, as can be found in the compound and discount tables, if the lifetime of 
the investment is about 25 to 30 years, the firm's target rate of return is about 20 percent. 
3 If for a certain project r > q, then its net present value at discount rate q will be positive. 
Hence, the criteria will accept the same projects. 
4 A few words may be in order as regards the treatment of the lifetimes of projects in 
project evaluation. For mutually independent projects this presents no special problem, 
because we may assume that the cashflows of the projects under consideration may be valued 
at the opportunity cost of capital rate q, i.e. the cash flows may be valued at face value, and 
the differences in the lifetimes of the projects are then fully taken into account in the calculation 
of the net present values of the projects. For mutually exclusive projects, where the cash-flow 
streams may need to be reinvested for a specific purpose the situation is different. For in-
stance, suppose that Project A has a life of 10 years, and Project B of 30 years. Then, to make 
a choice between A and B, GRANT and IRESON (GRANT, E. L. and IRESON, W. G. Principles of 
Engineering Economy, 4th ed., The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1960, p. 87) have 
suggested that we should consider what renewal investments will be necessary for Project A 
during the life of Project B. In case the life of Project B is not a multiple of the life of Project 
A, they believe that the most appropriate time period would be the least common multiple 
of the lives of the projects being analyzed. Thus, for instance, if two mutually exclusive pro-
jects are to be compared with lives of three and 31 years, respectively, investment costs, 
benefits and operating costs of each of the projects should be worked out as they appear in 
a 93-year period. However, as GRANT and IRESON point out, the arithmetic of discount 
calculations makes it possible to consider a much shorter period. For instance, at a discount 
rate of 10 percent, one dollar 25 years hence is worth only about $ 0.10; the same present 
value is found at a discount rate of 5 percent for one dollar 50 years hence. 
The GRANT and IRESON procedure is complicated and we prefer, therefore, a more direct 
method of taking account of the differences in lifetimes, namely to attach a terminal benefit 
to the last year of each project's life. This terminal benefit should be found by deducting from 
the present value in the last year of all subsequent net benefits the present value in the same 
year of all subsequent reinvestments. For each project sensitivity tests should be applied with 
respect to lifetime and terminal benefit and we may consider the calculation to be correct if 
changes in lifetime and terminal benefit do not affect the present value of the project under 
scrutiny. 
5 See ECKSTEIN, 'Water Resource Development,' p. 239, and for a monograph on the 
subject, VAN DER TAK, H. G., 'The Economic Choice Between Hydroelectric and Thermal 
Power Developments,' World Bank Staff Occasional Papers, No. 1, distributed by the Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1966. 
6 See, however, Section 5.3 for a discussion of ratios in the case of budget constraints. 
7 MCKEAN, 'Efficiency in Government through Systems Analysis,' p. 197. 
8 For a more detailed discussion about shadow prices in cases of constraints than in the 
paragraph above, the reader is referred to Jansen, 'Schaarse Middelen en Structurele Samen-
hangen.' 
9 See, for instance, MARGLIN, S. A., 'Objectives of Water Resource Development: A 
General Statement,' in Maass et al., 'Design of Water Resource Systems,' p. 34; and DAS-
GUPTA, A. K . and PEARCE, D. W., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis: Theory and Practice, MacMillan 
Student Editions, London and Basingstoke, 1972. 
1 0 HIRSHLEIFER, DE HAVEN and MILLIMAN, 'Water Supply,' p. 161. 
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1 1 This result may be explained as follows. Long-life projects have smaller depreciation 
elements in their cash flows than short-life projects, and they will thus have smaller cash flows, 
if both types of projects are to have the same internal rate of return. As it is the ratio of the 
cash flows that counts and the adding of additional depreciation to numerator and denomina-
tor in the case of short-life projects reduces the value of the ratio, long-life projects will have 
higher N/K ratios. 
1 2 SOLOMON, E., "The Arithmetic of Capital Budgeting Decisions,' the Journal of Business, 
University of Chicago, April 1956, p. 124. 
1 3 GRANT and IRESON, 'Principles of Engineering Economy,' 4th ed., p. 509. 
1 4 It should be noted that GRANT and IRESON arrive at a different conclusion. They use 
8 percent as the auxiliary interest rate to convert the positive cash flow of years 1-5 ( + 5 0 per 
year) to compound amount at date 5, which is 293.4. The series becomes then yr 5: -506 .6 
( = +293.4-800.0) yrs 6-20: +100 a year. At 18 percent the present worth of this series is 
zero and GRANT and IRESON conclude that the prospective rate of return is 18 percent. We 
believe that, to be consistent, the auxiliary interest rate should also be used to valuate the cash 
flow streams during yrs. 6-20, in which case the result would be a prospective rate of return of 
10 percent. 
1 5 GRANT and IRESON, 'Principles of Engineering Economics,' 4th ed., p. 513. 
1 6 LORTE, J. H. and SAVAGE, L. J., 'Three Problems in Capital Rationing,' The Journal of 
Business, University of Chicago, October 1955. 
1 7 MARGLIN, 'Approaches to Dynamic Investment Planning,' p. 38. 
1 8 A more detailed discussion of the reasons why will be found in REUTLINGER, S., 'Techni-
ques for Project Appraisal under Uncertainty,' World Bank Staff Occasional Papers, No. 10, 
distributed by the Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1970. 
1 9 See POULIQUEN, L.,'Risk Analysis in Project Appraisal.'World Bank Staff Occasional 
Papers, No. 11, distributed by The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1970. 
2 0 Ibid., p. 20. 
2 1 A discussion of some of these decision rules is in DORFMAN, R., 'Basic Economic and 
Technologic Concepts - A General Statement,' in Maass et al., 'Design of Water Resource 
Systems,' pp. 129-158. 
2 2 KNIGHT, F. H., 'Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,' Sixth Impression, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Boston and New York, 1946, pp. 231-232. 
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6. M I S C E L L A N E O U S P R O B L E M S 
6.1. LINKAGE EFFECTS 
Much has been written about the contribution, that the so-called forward 
and backward linkages can make to the industrialization of developing coun-
tries. It is not our intention to review this literature; rather, we would like to 
review how the linkages are to be analyzed in the context of benefit-cost analysis 
Backward linkages may be said to exist where the production of an industry 
(or a project) stimulates the activity of another industry that produces inputs 
for the first industry. Forward linkages may be said to exist where the produc-
tion of an industry stimulates the activity of another industry that uses the 
outputs of the first industry. Often the two go together, and the classic exam-
ples are the cement plant, where bags for packing purposes represent backward 
linkage and cement block manufacturing forward linkage, and the steel plant, 
where coal production represents backward linkage and metal fabrication 
forward linkage. 
The development literature has devoted its attention mainly to these back-
ward and forward linkages, but there may, of course, be other types of connec-
tion between two industries. The classical price theory types are the cases where 
two industries produce goods that are substitutes or complements. Examples 
of substitutes are gas and electricity, rice and wheat, beef and lamb, butter and 
margarine. Examples of complements are housing and furniture, automobile 
plants and repair shops, hybrids and fertilizer. Also, it may be possible theo-
retically - although examples of such cases are hard to find - that the incomes 
that are raised by the expansion of a certain industry will be spent mainly on the 
products of another industry. 
SCITOVSKY 1 considers all these cases of interconnection examples of pecuni-
ary externalities and has challenged the concept that these are not to be taken 
into account in the evaluation of projects as the traditional benefit-cost evalua-
tion rules tell us. SCITOVSKY draws his conclusion from the analysis of a for-
ward linkage between industries A and B, and reasons as follows. Assume that 
it is advantageous for industry A to invest in a technological innovation which 
will lower its supply curve. A's product has then become cheaper in price and 
B's profits will thus rise. The increase in B's profits calls for investment and 
expansion in B, as a result of which B's demand for A's products increases. 
Hence, there will be a further increase in A's profits, leading to further expan-
sion of A, as a result of which B's profits may increase further, and so on. 
Equilibrium will be reached when additional investments in each of the in-
dustries do not lead to increases in profits. The point of all this, according to 
SCITOVSKY, is that the amount of investment in industry A at the first stage is 
clearly smaller than what it will be after B has made adjustment. He concludes, 
therefore, that when an investment gives rise to a pecuniary external economy, 
118 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
FIGURE 6.1. 
0 Q 0 Q, Q 2 
that its first stage profitability understates the real profitability of the invest-
ment. 
Clearly, however, this has nothing to do with the concept of pecuniary 
externalities. At the first stage, the lower price of A's products leads to higher 
profits for B, but this is exactly compensated by the loss in income on these 
units of A. It is therefore not the pecuniary externality that is relevant, but the 
linkage. What SCITOVSKY has done is to describe how the adjustment process 
takes place. This is important because, for a correct investment decision, the 
project analyst should, of course, estimate what the cost and demand curves 
for the projects under scrutiny will be after the adjustment has taken place. 
What SCITOVSKY'S argumentation boils down to is that an error will be made in 
estimating the benefit of a project if the analyst makes an error. Pecuniary 
externalities as traditionally defined are, however, not to be counted as bene-
fits. This may also be shown with the help of a graphical presentation of his 
example. 
In Figure 6.1 the demand curve for A's product is presented by D i , and the 
cost curve of A's product by Si. Suppose, as SCITOVSKY does, that A's cost 
curve is lowered to S2. Then, if there were no linkage effects, the new produc-
tion would be 0 Qi and the benefit of the cost reduction - the savings in re-
sources - would be equal to the area C + E. A pecuniary externality arises 
in this case because the amount A loses on the intra-marginal units represents 
a gain to the users of A's product. However, the two compensate each other; the 
pecuniary externality is not to be taken into account, and the area C + E thus 
represents the exact measure of the benefits. An underestimation of the 
benefits will occur when B increases its production to profit from the lower 
costs of the A product which it uses in its production process. However, this 
additional benefit is due to the interlinking of the two industries rather than 
the pecuniary externality, and it is therefore preferable to reserve the term 
linkage for such effects than to see it as a new type of externality as SCITOVSKY 
does. 
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The additional benefit which is realized because B expands its production 
can also be measured by considering the shift in the demand curve that A faces. 
Let D2 represent the demand curve in the final equilibrium situation. Then the 
total benefit after the adjustment has taken place will equal C + E + F. The 
area F is traced out by imagining that the cost and demand curves shift simul-
taneously. At any one moment the value of any of the successive units produced 
by A is indicated by the RT line - the quantity price locus - so that the value of 
the additional units is equal to the area Qo R T Q2. With costs of this additional 
production equal to the area traced out by the S2 curve, the net benefit of the 
additional production is E + F . While in the absence of linkages the benefits 
are represented by C + E, in case of linkages the benefits are larger and equal 
to C + E + F, where F represents the benefit due to B's output expansion.2 
All the other cases of linkages discussed above can be analyzed in the same 
way. The approach is clear. The benefits can be found either by analyzing each 
of the interconnected industries separately, or by analyzing the quantity price 
locus which the principal industry faces because of the linkages. Which linkages 
should be and which should not be considered is, of course, a matter of judg-
ment. In principle, the system under analysis should be expanded until all the 
principal linkage effects are captured. There is, however, no universal rule to 
be given and it is the task of the project analyst to ensure that significant linkage 
benefits are included in the estimates of the benefit of a project. 
Can we normally expect that linkage effects will be substantial? In our 
opinion many linkage effects are so small that the estimation errors of the 
normal unadjusted cost and demand values may be larger than the value of the 
linkage benefits. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that in many cases the 
adjustment process will take a long time, especially in cases of forward or 
backward linkages so that the present value of the linkage benefits may be 
negligible. Also, it may be possible that the linkage benefits will materialize 
in any case, due to the general development of the economy, and it would then 
be wrong to attribute all of these benefits to the specific project being consider-
ed. 
In concluding this section it may be useful to discuss briefly a slightly changed 
example from the OECD Manual which underlines this note of caution. Sup-
pose that a project's investment cost in a certain year is Rs 50 million, and that 
its sales and current costs every year thereafter are Rs 15 million and Rs 10 
million, respectively, so that its rate of return is 10 percent. Suppose, further, 
that a certain input accounts for 10 percent of total operating costs and that 
because of the increased demand of the project its cost will fall - and let us be 
optimistic - by some 20 percent. Then there will be a saving of Rs 200,000. 
But this clearly cannot be attributed to the project because in any case the 
general development of the economy would have caused the realization of these 
savings. The project has only advanced the realization of the savings and a 
generous estimate would therefore be that the savings attributable to the 
project amount to the equivalent of some Rs 100,000 per annum over the life 
of the project. This makes a total benefit of Rs 5.1 million per annum and the 
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rate of return of the project becomes 10.1 percent. Hence, the OECD Manual 
states: 'Thus even with such a crude hypothetical example as this does one 
wonder whether it is worth spending a lot of time on trying to estimate exter-
nal economies. It may be far more important to spend the time improving the 
ordinary estimates of sales and costs.' 3 Although we do not agree entirely 
with this and feel that the project analyst should try to estimate the linkage 
benefits to the fullest extent possible, the example may have made it clear that 
many linkage benefits will be extremely small. Because, moreover, assumed 
linkage benefits do not always exist in reality, we believe that one should be 
extremely skeptical if the justification of a project depends on the inclusion of 
linkage benefits. 
6.2. EXTERNALITES 
Any project will have indirect effects in the sense that parties other than those 
directly involved are affected. Examples of linkage effects were discussed in the 
previous section and they presented no special problems because the same 
analysis appeared to apply that applied in the case of a single integrated pro-
duction process. Examples of pecuniary externalities were also discussed in 
several places in this study and they appeared not to be real externalities in the 
sense that they lead to an additional or a reduced use of resources. The situa-
tion is entirely different, however, with regard to technological externalities. 
Suppose that a new factory emits so much soot that the vegetable crops of a 
neighboring farmer need to be rinsed before they can be marketed. Then we 
would have a situation where a real cost in the sense of additional resources is 
incurred by the farmer as a result of the soot emission. While in the case of 
pecuniary externalities no shifting of production functions takes place, the 
externality in this example shifts the production function of the farmer. Tech-
nological externalities may also arise in the case of consumers. For instance, 
a new airport may produce so much noise that the utility level of neighboring 
households is reduced. Technological externalities may thus arise whenever 
a certain action affects the production or utility functions of other parties. 
Technological externalities are almost unlimited. In the case of producers, 
we see that factories pollute the atmosphere and the waters with consequent 
detrimental effects on health, that farmers use chemicals and insecticides which 
may have the same detrimental effect, that highways cause congestion, that 
airports produce noise, and so on. With respect to consumers, we find that 
cigarette smoking irritates non-smokers, that garbage dumped on the street 
irritates other households, that the noise produced by mowing a lawn or turning 
on a radio may upset neighbors, and so on. Many of these externalities are 
negligible; some, however, may be substantial. 
How should the technological externalities that a project generates be taken 
into account when evaluating the project? In many cases it may be possible that 
the project itself will pay its victims. For instance, in the case of the soot example 
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the farmer will, without doubt, ask the factory for reimbursement of his ex-
penses. Such payments are to be considered costs of the project and the optimal 
scale of the project will then be reduced, so that the externality is fully taken 
into account. In many other cases, however, compensation payments may not 
be feasible, either because individuals of a large group of people are affected 
to a relatively small extent, or because the externality may have, as will be 
discussed further below, the character of a public good. 
Since PIGOU'S magistral work appeared, 4 it has been generally accepted that 
a tax on the generator of the externality equal to the damage he imposes at the 
margin on others will ensure an optimal allocation of resources. This is depic-
ted graphically in Figure 6.2. The curve QQ' is the demand curve for the pro-
ject's output, and the curve M C is the marginal cost curve (drawn horizontally 
for simplicity's sake). If the project produces in addition an externality, say, 
smoke, which will impose a cost on others equal to E per unit, a tax of E should 
be levied on the project so that the new equilibrium output will be O Q i . The 
loss in consumer surplus is equal to the area A B C F, but A B C D becomes 
available in the form of tax revenue and the net loss is thus C D F . On the other 
hand, there will be a savings equal to C E F D, since this externality cost is no 
longer incurred. The gain of imposing the tax is thus equal to C E F. 
As BUCHANAN has shown,5 however, a conditio sine qua non for obtaining, 
in the case of a technological externality, an optimal resource allocation by 
means of a tax, is that production is organized in accordance with the optimality 
condition of welfare maximization. In all other cases, a single tax may lead to a 
loss in welfare. Suppose, for instance, that the project manager were to maxim-
ize profits rather than welfare or, in other words, that he acted as a monopolist. 
Then the monopoly output would be O Q2, i.e., the output level where marginal 
costs equal marginal revenues. Imposition of the tax E would reduce output 
by Q3 Q2. Instead of a welfare gain, there would now be a welfare loss equal to 
the shaded area because consumer's value of the eliminated quantity is higher 
than the value of the freed resources plus the cost of the eliminated externality. 
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One should thus be extremely cautious in recommending a tax for the elimina-
tion of a technological externality. Nevertheless, the principle is correct. The 
reason that, in the case of the monopolist, the tax will lead to a loss in welfare is 
because the normal optimality condition is not fulfilled. For the elimination of 
such an additional distortion, an additional instrument will be needed, and, in 
the case of the monopolist, this will be a subsidy. By granting to the monopolist 
a subsidy equal to C G per unit, one would ensure again production taking 
place at the optimal level 0 Qi . The tax is thus necessary to eliminate the ex-
ternality distortion, and the subsidy to eliminate the monopoly distortion. 
Although it is true that the simultaneous levying of a tax (CD per unit in our 
example) and granting of a subsidy (CG per unit) can be replaced by the grant-
ing of a smaller subsidy (DG per unit), it is clear that the latter can be found 
only after the externality and the monopoly distortion have been determined. 
PIGOU'S principle is thus valid even when other distortions exist, but it should 
be borne in mind that additional instruments will be required to eliminate 
additional distortions. 
What should Government do with the taxes it has collected from the genera-
tor of the technological externality? It is here that the distinction made for the 
first time by BATOR 6 between public and private good externalities becomes 
important in that the way the victim should be treated depends on the type of 
externality. First, let us consider the public good type of externality. A public 
good has the peculiar feature that consumption by one person does not reduce 
other persons' consumption (for example, TV programs, police protection, 
and such) and the demand curve is therefore constructed by adding vertically 
the individual demand curves. In principle, therefore, a series of prices rather 
than one single price should be charged, each one determined by each consu-
mer's marginal willingness to pay. In practice, however, it will not be possible 
to determine these prices, because each consumer when interviewed may well 
understate his willingness to pay in the hope that then the burden will be borne 
by the other consumers. Since efficiency prices cannot be determined, the 
financing of a public good is therefore a matter of spreading the burden over 
consumers and then, of course, equity considerations play a primary role. 
Many technological externalities may have the character of a public good 
in the sense that the consumption of one person does not reduce the quantity 
available for consumption by others. Examples of such externalities which 
present negative effects are smoke or water pollution generated by a factory, 
or the noise and fumes generated by a new highway. An example of a positive 
externality would be an irrigation dam or hydroelectric development which 
would open the possibility of gratis recreation on the created water basin. 
Suppose that the externality is smoke. Government should then impose on 
the factory a tax equal to the marginal harm done by the smoke. Should the 
tax revenues be used to compensate the victims? This may well lead to fur-
ther harmful effects because an incentive is then offered to people to seek the 
externality. COASE 7 has therefore suggested that the victims should be taxed 
so that they will try to escape the externality. However, in general, this is not 
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correct either, as BAUMOL and OATES 8 have shown. Since the externality has the 
character of a public good, the person who inhales the smoke affects only 
himself, and he will thus absorb the full consequences of his decision to escape 
or not to escape the externality. Therefore, according to BAUMOL and OATES, 
in cases of public good type externalities, the tax revenues collected from the 
generator of the externality should not be used by the Government to compen-
sate the victims; any other use of the revenues is allowed.9 Similarly, neither is 
it necessary to charge a price to the beneficiaries of a public good type external-
ity. 
In our example, we have lightly passed over the problem of how the marginal 
damage of the smoke can be measured. This is an extremely complicated pro-
blem because, just as with public goods, no price mechanism exists to measure 
the marginal valuation of the consumers, and it must therefore be accepted that 
the level of the taxes will be, to a large extent, determined arbitrarily. The 
problem is further complicated because in many cases - our smoke example is a 
case in point - the externality will have harmful effects on health or will even 
reduce life expectancy. How these matters should conceptually be dealt with 
will be discussed briefly at the end of this section. A further problem is that the 
distributive aspects of an externality may play a role. For instance, a new road 
may generate noise and fumes which may play a preponderant role in planning 
a road layout. However, it would be ridiculous to plan the road through a poor 
income area of a city on the grounds that the willingess to pay of the citizens in 
that area to escape the externality is lower than anywhere else. After our dis-
cussion in Chapter 2, it should be clear that willingness to pay should be weight-
ed with the relevant income distribution weights, a matter which will be more 
fully discussed in Part II of this study. 
Let us turn now to the private type of externality. In our soot example, we 
saw already that the factory may enter into negotiation with the farmer with 
regard to the compensation payment the latter should receive, and these pay-
ments will then enter into the cost function of the factory. In the case of a large 
number of victims, this obviously would not be possible and the Government 
should then impose a tax on the factory. As we have here a private good type 
of externality, the tax revenues should be used to compensate the victims. The 
principle is clear: a private externality can be regarded as a private good and, 
to achieve an optimal allocation of resources, the same pricing rules that apply 
for a private good should apply to the externality. In the case of our soot exam-
ple, this means because the externality carries a disbenefit, that a negative price 
(the tax) should be imposed on the producers, while the victims should receive 
this fine. In the case of a private externality that presents a benefit, the producer 
should receive a positive price (a subsidy) while the beneficiary should pay this 
price. 
A very interesting example of a private externality is the hides-meat case 
mentioned by M I S H A N 1 0 . In Argentina at the end of the last century, cattle were 
slaughtered on the ranches for their hides, and the meat was left for whomever 
wanted it. Clearly, this was a beneficial externality and a private one since an 
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individual's consumption of meat would leave less behind for others. In prin-
ciple, to achieve an optimal level of cattle production a price should have been 
charged for this meat. This was not done because it was too costly for the 
ranchers either to collect the price or to transport the meat to a central marke-
ting point. It should be noted that it would also be too costly for the Govern-
ment to impose and collect these prices. When demand increased, however, 
the industry found it worthwhile to sell the meat and the externality therewith 
became captured. This example is interesting because, when demand was 
insufficient, neither private industry nor the Government found it worthwhile 
to price the meat. Thus if a dollar is counted for a dollar, there did not exist 
any externality at all. However, if we accept that the persons who gathered the 
meat had a much higher marginal utility of income than the ranchers, it becom-
es clear that the willingness to pay of these persons, weighted with the appropri-
ate marginal utilities of income, represents the real value of their increase in 
meat consumption. Thus, when the distributive aspects count, the meat is 
clearly an important beneficial externality. 
In all the cases so far discussed, the pricing principles when income distri-
bution does not count are exactly the same as those that apply to the pricing 
of public and private goods. We will now, however, turn our attention to a 
group of technological externalities where these principles break down. These 
are the cases where the generators of the externality are at the same time the 
victims. Although theoretically this group should include generators that are 
at the same time beneficiaries, it is hard to find a concrete example. Therefore, 
we will limit our discussion to the frequent cases where the generators are also 
the victims, a phenomenon that is known as the congestion externality. Since 
it is such an important type of externality, we will discuss in detail the case of 
road congestion. 
Reference is made to Figure 6.3. The Q Q' curve is the demand for trips on a 
highway and thus represents the marginal willingness to pay of a motorist for 
the privilege of making the trip. What are the costs? There are the capacity costs 
of the highway, the operating and maintenance costs of the highway, the oper-
ating costs of the motorists and the time costs of the motorists. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that all these costs are equal to OA per trip when no con-
gestion occurs on the highway. When congestion occurs, however, fuel and time 
costs of the motorists will increase and the cost of a trip will increase, as indicat-
ed by the curve A B C D. Thus, for instance, when the number of trips equals 
OT 2 , the cost of each trip will be CT2. It may be noted that the curve bends 
backward at point D since congestion has then become so severe that any 
additional vehicle reduces the number of trips that can be undertaken within a 
certain time period. The curve marginal to the average cost curve - the curve 
A F E - indicates what the true cost of an additional trip will be in the sense that 
it includes the extra cost of congestion imposed on others. For instance, if 
the cost of a trip is $1.00 when the number of trips is 50,000 per annum and 
$1.01 when the number of trips is 51,000, the marginal cost of the extra 1,000 
trips is $1.51 per trip. To the motorists making the additional 1,000 trips, 
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FIGURE 6.3. 
Tabulation of Benefits 
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however, the cost of $1.01 per trip will appear as their marginal cost. The curve 
A B C D is thus a marginal cost curve to the individual motorist and an 
average cost curve for the motorists as a whole. The curve A F E, on the other 
hand, includes the increase in cost of every motorist and is thus the real mar-
ginal cost curve. It shows that the real cost of the additional 1,000 trips is 
$1.51 per trip. 
It is easy to see that the trip number corresponding to the intersection of the 
marginal cost curve with the demand curve represents the optimum volume of 
traffic. When volume of traffic is OTi the total cost of the trips will be O G B Ti 
(which is equal to O A F Ti) while the willingness to pay is O Q F Ti . Hence, 
the net benefit equals G Q F B which is equivalent to A Q F. Any other position 
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will lead to a lower net benefit. For instance, at trip level OT2, costs exceed 
willingness to pay by the area F E C. 
How can the Government ensure that the volume of traffic will stabilize at 
the optimumlevel OTi ?Following the above discussed rules, the Government 
should levy a tax equal to the marginal cost which the externality imposes on 
others, and make a payment to the victims equal to the tax collected. Hence, the 
first step to be taken is to collect a toll equal to BF per trip. Motorists then pay 
a total of G H F B in the form of tolls, and, according to the second part of the 
policy prescription, the Government should use this amount to compensate the 
victims of the externality. But in this case the victims are the ones that produce 
the externality, and if the Government were to pay them back the toll, the net 
result would be as if no toll were levied, so that immediately the traffic volume 
would return to the level OT2. Let us assume that the Government will keep the 
toll; then motorists would be worse off by the area J H F C (the difference 
between the consumer surplus at level OT 2 which equals J Q C and the consu-
mer surplus at level OTi which equals H Q F). Rather than benefiting the road 
users, the toll thus results in a harmful effect.11 
It remains true that society as a whole is still better off when the toll is levied 
than when it is not levied. Although the road users lose J H F C, the Govern-
ment gains the toll amount G H F B, and the net result is thus a gain of G H F B 
- J H F C, which, as the tabulation under Figure 6.3 shows, is equal to F E C. 
It is, however, clear that the distributive aspects of the toll financing will now 
play an important role. For instance, a Government might want to levy a toll 
on a road going to an expensive holiday resort. On the other hand, when the 
users of a road do not belong to the higher income groups, the effects of a 
toll may result in a socially unacceptable loss of welfare. 
Because many roads where congestion occurs are often used by average 
and poor income classes, it is not surprising that many Governments have 
not been willing to impose tolls but have preferred to let the road become 
congested. As we discussed in the previous Chapter, benefits and costs must 
then be determined with respect to the non-optimal situation rather than with 
respect to the optimal level. 
Congestion externalities are an extremely important type of externality. In 
general, they occur wherever common property is being exploited. Our road is 
an example. Other examples would be the exploitation of fish or oil resources. 
In all these cases the analysis should follow the same principle as that of the 
road analysis. This may be shown briefly for the fisheries ease. Suppose that 
the demand curve in Figure 6.3 represents the demand for fish and the curve 
A B C D the marginal cost curve of the fishermen. Assuming that there is 
perfect competition, the equilibrium catch rate would be at level O T2. The 
correct optimal catch volume would, however, be at O Ti, the level comparable 
to the point where the A F E curve - the curve that includes the cost which 
an individual fisherman inposes' on the other fishermen - intersects the demand 
curve. A tax equal to B F would ensure this volume but, again, fishermen would 
be worse off by the area J H F C and, the Government may therefore decide to 
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leave well enough alone and to let the fishermen continue to fish at the non-
optimal activity level. 
A similar analysis applies to the congestion which occurs in the cities. As we 
discussed in Chapter 3, the distorted high wage rates in the cities cause an 
immigration of rural workers, many of whom will become jobless. To the 
extent that this immigration leads to congested living conditions and a deterior-
ation of the city environment, the opportunity cost of labor must be increased 
by the cost that immigration imposes on others. The same should be done 
where an influx of industries would lead to such congestion or deterioration. 
Many cities seem to have reached a stage where any further growth will have 
significant harmful effects on their residents. In principle, benefit-cost analysis 
should try to capture these technological externalities, but, as we have seen, 
this is extremely difficult. That such externalities exist, however, cannot be 
doubted since in many cases Governments are diverting industries away from 
cities solely because of them. 
Finally, we would like to say a few words about the evaluation of human 
health and lives, a subject that is important because humans may be substan-
tially affected by environmental externalities. Although we do not wish to 
discuss these extremely important problems in any detail in this study, it is 
appropriate as the last subject of this section to comment briefly on some evalua-
tion rules that have recently been proposed. WEISBROD 1 2 has suggested that the 
value of a human life can be measured by calculating the present value of either 
a person's future lifetime earnings or of a person's excess of earnings over con-
sumption. Both methods are, however, not correct. Both methods have all the 
deficiencies of the national income concept. Moreover, a logical extension of 
the first concept would be that all those who are not able to earn a living should 
be killed. Similarly, under the second method all those who consume more than 
they earn, for instance, retired persons, should be killed. 
There is also the method proposed by some to measure the value of a per-
son's life on the basis of what he has insured himself for. But, clearly, this is of 
more concern to those who survive him than to himself. M I S H A N 1 3 , therefore, 
has rightly pointed out that the value of a human life is the value that the per-
son whose life is at stake attaches to it. MISHAN argues that conceptually this 
value is determined by the compensating variation measure, i.e., the minimum 
sum a person is prepared to accept in exchange for the surrender of his life, 
but points out that in ordinary circumstances no sum of money will be large 
enough to compensate a man for the loss of his life. It is never the case, how-
ever, that a specific person can be designated in advance as one who will be 
killed if a particular project is undertaken. According to MISHAN , this fact of 
complete ignorance, therefore, transfers the calculation from one of calculating 
the compensating variation of surrending one's life to one of calculating the 
compensating variation for accepting additional risk. 
MISHAN is on the right track. Nevertheless, there are, in our opinion, two 
objections to his proposal. First, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the compensat-
ing variations are irrelevant for the valuation of a good. It is the normal demand 
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curve for a good that indicates how a person valuates that good and also, as 
regards health and life, the relevant concept should be the willingness to pay of 
a person for a reduction in the probability of incurring a disease or losing his 
life. Second, just as with a normal good, it is not the money costs, but the 
utility value that counts, especially when such important things as health and 
life are at stake. For instance, the probability calculations may show that a 
poor man's life is worth $5,000 and a rich man's life $500,000, but, clearly, 
none of these figures is an appropriate measure of the utility loss. The correct 
calculation should be to weight both sums with the respective marginal utilities 
of income so that the poor man's life as well as the rich man's life will be ex-
pressed in the denominator of an 'average' man's life. 
This short discussion on the value of health and life cannot do justice to the 
extremely difficult and intricate problems that are inherent in any attempt to 
measure these values. Further discussion would fall outside the scope of this 
study but it should be clear that any estimate will be rough. We, therefore, agree 
wholeheartedly with MISHAN who, at the end of his extremely useful survey, 
writes: 'In view of the existing quantomania, one may be forgiven for asserting 
that there is more to be said for rough estimates of the precise concept than for 
precise estimates of economically irrelevant concepts.' 
As a last remark, it may be mentioned that there is, of course, always the 
possibility to apply a cost-effectiveness analysis. In such a case one would 
stipulate targets in terms of savings of lives or improvement of health and then 
weigh the costs of the alternative ways of achieving the objective in order to 
determine the least-cost solution. As this technique presents no special pro-
blems, it need not be further discussed. The difficulty of this technique is, of 
course, that some body politic needs to set the objective - truly, not a desirable 
task. 
6.3. FOREIGN LABOR AND CAPITAL 
In many cases, foreigners provide part of the labor and capital inputs of a 
project. The question which may be asked is whether the costs of the inputs 
provided by foreigners and the benefits accruing to foreigners should be treated 
in the same way as domestic costs and benefits. Or, in other words, should the 
nationality of the participants in a project be ignored? 
In answering the question, we will not consider international aspects but 
analyze the issue from a purely national point of view. Moreover, we will not 
deal with the special problems that are created by huge influxes of foreign labor 
or capital, 1 4 but limit our analysis to marginal changes. 
Let us start with the production factor labor. Two cases will be reviewed. 
The first is that the project authority will hire a foreigner specifically for the 
project. Employing the foreigner then does not have an opportunity cost in the 
sense that domestic output will be foregone in the host country. On the other 
hand, the salary received by the foreigner represents a transfer of resources 
from the host country to the foreigner. We may conclude, therefore, that the 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 129 
TABLE 6.1. Example of the benefit of hiring a foreigner. 
Foreigner 
Hired From 
Abroad 
Foreigner With-
drawn From 
Alternative Employ-
ment In Host Country 
y 
m 
w 
x value of foreigner's product in project 
foreigner's net-of-tax salary in project 
foreigner's product in next best alternative 
foreigner's earnings in next best alternative 
5,000 
4,000 
5,000 
3,000 
4,000 
2,500 
Total cost of hiring foreigner (w+m-y) 
Net benefit of employing foreigner in 
project 
4,000 
1,000 
4,500 
500 
salary of the foreigner represents the costs to the host country. This salary is, of 
course, net of tax since the taxes the foreigner pays on his salary represent bene-
fits to the host country. 
Now consider the case where the foreigner will be withdrawn from alter-
native employment in the host country. It then remains valid that the net-of-tax 
salary the foreigner will receive from the project is a cost to the host country. 
On the other hand, there is now an opportunity cost in the sense that the pro-
duct which he would have produced in the next best alternative employment is 
foregone. At the same time, however, the salary the foreigner would have 
earned in that alternative employment is saved. Denoting the net-of-tax salary 
of the foreigner in his new employment by w, the foregone product by m and 
the foreigner's net-of-tax salary in the next best alternative by y, the cost of the 
foreigner to the host country is w + m - y.If the product of the foreigner in 
his new occupation with the project is x, the net benefit to the host country of 
employing the foreigner is thus equal to x - (w + m - y). It may be noted that 
if m and y are equal, the net benefit will be x - w, as in the first case. A simple 
example in tabular form is presented above to elucidate the analysis. 
Let us turn now to the production factor capital. The analysis is then similar 
to the labor case but slightly more complicated because we need to work with 
present values. Let us assume that we are contemplating a project with invest-
ment costs of $300 and net benefits of $360 after one year, so that the rate of 
return on investment equals 20 percent. Assume further that foreign capital 
participation will be $200 and that a total of $224 must be repaid after one year, 
so that interest amounts to 12 percent. What are the benefits and costs of the 
project to the country? 
Let us assume first that additional foreign funds are available for the pro-
ject. Just as in the labor case, the benefit to the country is then equal tox-w, 
whereby x now stands for the present value of the net benefits attributable to 
the foreign capital and w for the present value of the foreign earnings. The 
calculations are presented in tabular form in Table 6.2, but a brief explanation 
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TABLE 6.2. Example of the benefit of employing foreign capital. 
Additional Foreign 
Capital Available 
Foreign Capital 
Withdrawn from 
Alternative Employ-
ment in Host Country 
Benefit Attributable to Foreign Capital 
x = present value of net benefits attrib-
utable to foreign capital 
w = present value of foreigner's 
net earnings (12%) 
m = present value of net benefits 
attributable to foreign capital 
in next best alternative (18 %) 
y = present value of foreigner's 
earnings (14%) in next best 
alternative 
Total cost to country of employing 
foreign capital (w+m -y) 
Present value of the net benefits of 
employing foreign capital in the project 
Present value of net benefits 
attributable to domestic capital 
Benefit of Project 
-200 
-200 + 
-200 
- 1 0 0 
- 1 0 0 
240 
1.15 
224 
1.15 
224 
1.15 
16 
1.15 
120 
1.15 
136 
1.15 
- 2 0 0 + f g 
224 
1.15 - 2 0 0 
- 2 0 0 
- 2 0 0 + 
- 2 0 0 + 
- 1 0 0 + 
- 1 0 0 + 
236 
1.15 
228 
1.15 
232 
1.15 
8 
1.15 
120 
1.15 
128 
1.15 
is perhaps helpful. It is assumed that the opportunity cost of capital in the 
country is 15 percent. The x of the formula is then equal to - 200 + 240/1.15 
because the rate of return of the project is 20 percent, while the discount factor 
is 15 percent. The w in the formula is equal to - 200 + 224/1.15 because the 
foreigner requires a return of 12 percent. Hence, the benefit to the country of 
the foreign participation is equal to 16/1.15. Since we know in this case that the 
benefit attributable to domestic capital is - 100 + 120/1.15, the total benefit 
to the country, including the benefit made on the foreign capital, is - 100 + 
136/1.15. 
The case where foreign capital is withdrawn from alternative employment 
in the host country is also presented in Table 6.2. The total cost to the country 
of employing foreign capital is again, as in the case of labor, presented by w + 
m-y, whereby w is defined as in the previous paragraph, m as the present value 
of the foregone contribution of foreign capital in the next best alternative, 
and y as the present value of the earnings of foreign capital in the next best 
alternative. 
An additional point should be noted, namely, that the total benefit to the 
country of a project where foreign capital is used can also be found by deduc-
ting directly from the present value of the total benefit of the project (z) - cal-
culated under the assumption that all capital is domestic capital - the foreign 
costs and benefits. This way of looking at the use of foreign capital is presented 
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TABLE 6.3. Alternative method of calculating the benefit of employing foreign capital. 
Additional 
Foreign Capital 
Available 
Foreign Capital 
Withdrawn from 
Alternative Employ-
ment in Host Country 
z - present value of project if all 
capital domestic 1.15 
+200 ~ g t 
13 -300 + = 13 
+200 - = 5 w - present value of foreign capital in and outflow 5 
(m-y) adjustment for difference between 
earnings and opportunity cost in 
next best alternative 
Benefit of Project - m + TT5 18 - 1 0 0 + ^ | = 11 
in Table 6.3 and leads, of course, to the same result as the previous calculation, 
as it is a mere rearrangement of the variables. The principle in both calculations 
is that foreign capital can be considered a capital inflow, which reduces 
the need for domestic capital, while debt service payments on foreign capital 
can be considered an outflow, which reduces the benefits of the project. 
Table 6.3 also shows the actual present values. As may be seen, in the case 
where additional foreign capital becomes available, the benefit of the project 
is calculated as 18. whereas in the case where foreign capital is withdrawn 
from alternative employment, the benefit is only 11. This may at first seem 
surprising because in both cases foreign capital is made available on the same 
terms. The contradiction disappears, however, if we remember that, in the 
second case, a constraint exists on the availability of foreign capital. We en-
countered several instances of constraints earlier and saw that they increased 
the opportunity costs of the factor subject to the constraint. The same happens 
here. By withdrawing the foreign capital from its alternative employment, we 
lose a present value of 7 which the foreign capital would have produced. Hence, 
the benefit of the project is 18-7 = 11. 
Macro-economically, it will be advantageous for a country to borrow 
foreign capital as long as the cost of borrowing is lower than the cost of using 
domestic capital. In other words, the cost of borrowing should be lower than 
the opportunity cost of capital. Micro-economically, we can show this by 
considering a marginal investment project. In case such a project is domestical-
ly financed, the present value of the benefits will be equal to the present value 
of the investments, both values found by discounting at the opportunity cost 
of capital q. In symbols we may write NAO^ = K, where NA is annual net 
benefits. the discount factor and K the value of the investments which we 
assume take place in year 1. Suppose that additional foreign funds in the 
amount of a.K can be borrowed at rate i. The debt service payments (amortiza-
tion + interest) are then ccK/a„-\i and the present value of these payments 
(ccK/a^]i) dh-]q. The present value of the benefit of the project is presented by: 
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[A/Uflnia - {ccK/at]i) aa\g\ - (K - a.K). 
As TYA aw\q = AT for the marginal project, this may be written as a.K-{a.K- as\qj 
a„\i), and it can be seen immediately that this expression is positive only if 
ax\<i < as\t. This will be the case if the borrowing rate / is lower than the op-
portunity cost of capital q. We can illustrate the above even more clearly if we 
assume that the capital borrowed abroad will be repaid with interest at the end 
of the project's life. In order to have a positive project benefit, we should have 
(1 +qf 
Again, this will be the case only if i is smaller than q. 
The main benefit of foreign aid is that funds are made available to the reci-
pient country at a cost lower than the country's opportunity cost of capital. 
As a measure of such aid, the so-called grant element of the a id 1 5 is often 
calculated. It expresses the softness of the loan as a percentage of the face value 
of the loan and in our example it would be equal to: 
«K -
(1 +qf ^ (1 + i)» 
a>K (1 +q)n 
In many cases, a grace period is given to the recipient country before pay-
ments of principal begin, something that we did not assume in our example. 
The principle of calculating the grant element remains, however, the same. 
One expresses the difference between the face value of the loan and the present 
value of the debt service payments as a percentage of the face value. 
Unfortunately, the grant element as traditionally defined represents only a 
partial picture of the benefit of aid. It does not, for instance, take into account 
that bilateral aid is often conditional on ordering the required machinery and 
equipment from the donor country. Several studies have shown that in such 
cases the cost of the equipment may be as much as 25 percent higher than if it 
were procured on the basis of international competitive bidding. How should 
one account for the excess costs in the case of such tied loans? Let us assume 
that there will be an excess cost equal to RK, and that K( 1 + /?) will be borrowed 
at rate i. with repayment at the end of the project's life. The recipient country 
should then accept the aid if: K-[K (1 + J?) (1 + 07 (1 + q)n] > 0. Or, in 
words, the borrowing rate / should be lower than q by an amount sufficient to 
offset the excess investment cost. 
Foreign capital and foreign labor should, of course, be valued at the ap-
propriate foreign exchange rate in the same way as the foreign exchange com-
ponents of the total benefit-cost stream are valued. For instance, as regards 
foreign labor, the value of the foreigner's product in the project may consist 
of foreign exchange or the foreigner may remit his income abroad. To the 
extent that foreign exchange incurs a premium, the foreign exchange shadow 
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rate rather than the official rate should be used to value these items. A similar 
valuation should be applied to foreign capital and debt service payments. 
Problems arise when the shadow rate of foreign exchange varies over time. 
Suppose, for instance, that foreign financing can be obtained for a marginal 
project, of which all costs and benefits are domestic. Should the foreign finance 
be accepted? Denoting by R% the foreign exchange shadow rate at the moment 
the foreign capital is received and by Rz the shadow rate at the time principal 
plus interest should be repaid, we find that the recipient country should accept 
the foreign finance if A^i ~[KR2 (1 + 07 (1 + qf] > 0. To the extent that 
Ri is higher than R\, the borrowing rate should thus be lower to make it 
advantageous for the recipient country to accept the loan. 
Finally, as the last subject of this section, we would like to review the practice 
of international aid agencies and whether their aid can indeed be expected to 
help the developing countries. This subject appears to be controversial and it 
is therefore well worthwhile to examine the matter in some detail. In an interest-
ing study ZEYLSTRA 1 6 argues that development aid has been very ineffective 
and that its main purpose has been to preserve the existing political world 
order. Furthermore, he criticizes severely the policies of the international 
agencies. In his words: 'Since even the World Bank has been satisfied with the 
interpretation of repayment capacity following from the role assigned to 
capital imports in conventional theory, it appears fair to include creditor 
countries and international agencies such as the World Bank among those 
responsible for the alarming situation in which numerous developing countries 
have now found themselves for years, that they have had to borrow in order to 
be able to pay service costs on previous loans.' We will not comment on 
ZEYLSTRA'S general contention that self-interest has been the main motive 
for providing aid, except to state that a reasonable level of aid has been far 
from reached. As regards ZEYLSTRA'S criticism that lending by creditor coun-
tries and international agencies has exacerbated the situation of the developing 
countries, it seems to us that he is wrong. ZEYLSTRA is not alone in his criticism; 
in fact, it is inspired by LINDER'S theory which he quotes wholeheartedly. As 
this theory has led to much confusion, we will criticize it in some detail. 
Conventional theory tells us that a country can always overcome foreign 
exchange problems by appropriate expenditure and exchange rate policies. 
According to L I N D E R , 1 7 however, this theory does not apply to most develop-
ing countries because they will be faced with an import minimum as well as an 
export maximum which does not cover the former. Chronic foreign exchange 
gaps are, therefore, in LINDER'S opinion quite common for the developing 
countries. To explain the export maximum, LINDER makes a distinction be-
tween manufactures and raw materials. As regards manufactures, he intro-
duces the theory of representative demand, according to which a country is 
most efficient in the manufacture of goods that fit into the economic structure 
of the domestic market. Because the domestic demand structure differs greatly 
between advanced and developing countries, the goods that advanced coun-
tries demand are not typical of the demand structure of the developing coun-
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tries so that the manufactures that developing countries are particularly adept 
at producing lack foreign demand. As regards the manufactures for which a 
foreign demand does exist the production function will be at a disadvantage and 
productivity will be so low that these products will not be competitive. This 
disadvantage does not exist, of course, with regard to primary products, but 
most of the primary products are faced with inelastic world demand. Therefore, 
LINDER concludes that developing countries have an export maximum. 
On the import side, the developing countries need input imports (investment 
and operation imports) to avoid underutilization of existing resources. Invest-
ment imports (such as machinery and equipment), would not be necessary if 
simple techniques of production could be used, but such techniques do not 
exist. Because a substantial amount of inventive engineering work is required 
to develop the simpler production techniques and because this is too time 
consuming, it is more efficient to import modern machinery. If capital goods 
must then be imported for investment purposes, there must also be imports for 
operational purposes. There is thus a minimum amount of imports that is 
absolutely necessary to utilize domestic savings. 
The essential point now, according to LINDER, is that the export maximum 
may be too low to cover the import minimum, so that a typical developing 
country faces a continuous foreign exchange gap. While in conventional theory, 
capital imports serve the function of supplementing domestic savings in order 
to make possible a higher rate of investment than could be realized without 
reducing domestic consumption, in LINDER'S framework, capital imports 
supplement not insufficient domestic savings but insufficient foreign exchange 
resources, which must be augmented in order to avoid making domestic savings 
superfluous. This analysis, according to LINDER, has important implications 
in all cases where service charges arise on borrowed capital. 'Capital imports 
made now might be impossible to service later without cutting back imports 
and widening a still-prevailing foreign exchange gap . 1 8 LINDER, therefore, 
believes that it is not enough that the projects financed by a loan yield profits 
or add to GNP. In his opinion, every project must not only be efficient in this 
sense, but also when charged with the service costs of the loan. LINDER states 
that the World Bank has gradually increased its project lending to a much 
higher percentage than the foreign exchange content of a project, and he 
believes that this is wrong. According to him, it would be sufficient to lend only 
the foreign exchange content of a project. 
In our opinion, LINDER'S theory is extreme. Although we are willing to ac-
cept that the elasticity of demand for imports may be low, it is unrealistic to 
assume that a devaluation and hence an increase in the domestic value of im-
ports will not lead to a reduction in the home demand for imports. As regards 
exports, LINDER assumes that the outside world will always buy the same 
quantity of exported goods and- that the increase in domestic production of 
export goods brought forth by the increase in the domestic price due to the 
devaluation can under no circumstances be sold abroad. Again, this assumption 
is unrealistic. Accepting that the elasticity of export supply is positive, a devalua-
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tion will increase the amount of foreign exchange supplied in terms of foreign 
currency if the elasticity of foreign demand for the country's exports is greater 
than unity. As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, there are 
sound theoretical reasons to expect that the export demand elasticity is greater 
than unity, even for primary products. Empirical studies also confirm this. 
For instance, HARBERGER , 1 9 having reviewed a number of econometric studies, 
concludes that even for a country such as Brazil, which produced about half the 
world's coffee during the last decade, the elasticity of demand for its coffee 
exports can be assumed to be higher than 2. LINDER'S theory of the export 
maximum and import minimum must, therefore, be rejected. 
LINDER'S ideas are, in our opinion, dangerous. As an export maximum 
exists, it makes no sense under his theory for the developing countries to invest 
in export-generating projects, and the only possible way of improving their 
balance of payments is to substitute domestic production for imports to the 
largest extent possible. The fallacy of such a strategy has been well demonstrat-
ed in the last decade: policies of export promotion have paid off handsomely 
vide the phenomenal growth in industrial exports of many developing coun-
tries, whereas policies of import substitution, as followed in several Latin 
American countries, have resulted in uneconomic industries. There is no doubt 
that production for export markets involves an extra effort, but the cost of this 
effort is often much less than the extra resources needed to produce import 
goods domestically. LINDER'S theory underlines once again the danger of a 
macro-economic approach to development planning. In our opinion, it is 
not the conventional theory which should be held responsible for the sorry 
state of affairs in some of the developing countries, but the sort of policy 
prescriptions as advocated by LINDER. 
Having rejected the theoretical basis of the LINDER theory, it may still be 
asked whether it makes any sense to limit project lending to those projects 
that earn the foreign exchange to service and repay the loan. The answer is no. 
As W O L F S O N 2 0 has put it, 'It makes no more sense to link individual items in the 
overall assets and habilities of a country as a whole, as reflected in its balance 
of payments, than it does to impute individual assets to individual liabilities 
in the balance sheet of a bank.' We have shown above the correct method of 
calculating whether a loan should be accepted. When foreign exchange is 
becoming more scarce, the borrowing rate should be lower to offset the in-
crease in the scarcity premium. A loan should be accepted only if the additional 
resources that become available because of the loan are larger than the resour-
ces that must be used to service the loan. The shadow foreign exchange rate has 
the role of making foreign exchange resources comparable to domestic resour-
ces. This means that when the shadow foreign exchange rate is, say, Rs 5 per 
US dollar, that a project whose annual domestic benefits are equal to Rs 5 
has exactly the same priority as a project with the same investments and the 
same lifetime, but which annual benefits of US$1. Whether a project earns 
foreign exchange or whether its investments absorb foreign exchange is thus 
completely irrelevant to the question of whether a loan should be accepted. 
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Finally, we can address ourselves to the matter of whether international 
agencies follow the right procedures. In general, institutions such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank use shadow prices for labor and foreign 
exchange in calculating the rate of return of a project. This is as it should be. 
However, they do not take specific account of the foreign capital in and out 
flows and their main economic criterion for granting a loan is that the project 
should earn at least the opportunity cost of domestic capital. In other words, 
these institutions do not pay any attention to the benefit the country will have 
from their soft-term loans but determine the benefit of a project to the country 
on the basis of the total benefit-cost stream. As their loans are indeed on soft 
terms compared to the terms the developing countries have to pay for normal 
market borrowings, this procedure may at first seem rather surprising. In 
reality, however, it is entirely correct. The international agencies normally 
allocate their limited funds on a country basis, so that for a certain country the 
foreign exchange that can be borrowed for a project will not be available for 
another project. The country then finds itself in the situation discussed above 
of having a constraint on the availability of foreign exchange and the benefit 
of a loan should then be analyzed in accordance with the formula developed 
for this case. Suppose that the opportunity cost of capital in the country is 15 
percent, and that the lending rate of the institutions is 8V2 percent. We may 
then set w at 8 V2 percent, m at 15 percent and y at 8V2 percent, so that the cost 
of the foreign assistance for the project under scrutiny w + m - y equals 15 
percent. To continue the example, suppose that the present value of the total 
cost-benefit stream of a project is -300 +360/1.15 so that the present value of 
the project is 13. Assume further that the foreign assistance is 200. Then it 
makes no difference whether the net present value of the project is calculated 
on the basis of the total cost-benefit stream or on the basis of the cost-benefit 
stream reduced by the foreign capital in and outflow. In the former case, the 
present value is -300 + 360/1.15, which equals 13. In the latter case, the 
present value of the foreign assistance equals +200 - 230/1.15 = 0, and the 
benefit of that specific project is thus presented by -100 + 130/1.15, which 
again equals 13. The appraisal procedures and the lending policies of the 
international agencies are thus entirely correct. 
The international agencies ensure that the projects for which they lend have 
yields at least equal to the opportunity cost of capital in the country concerned 
so that their funds-cannot be squandered on uneconomic projects. As the 
normal lending rates of these institutions are substantially below the oppor-
tunity cost of capital of the developing countries, the latter reap substantial 
benefits. In this respect, it should also be noted that if it is expected that a 
country will have repayment difficulties, loans at softer than normal terms 
are granted. For instance, at present the International Development Associa-
tion, an affiliate of the World Bank, provides credits for 50 years with a grace 
period for repayment of 10 years, at a commitment charge of only 3/4 of 1 per-
cent. This compares very favorably with the loans of the World Bank itself, 
which are at the time of writing this study for 20 to 25 years including grace 
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periods of about 5 years at an interest rate of about 8 V2 percent. In conclusion, 
it seems to us that if a developing country encounters balance of payments 
difficulties, this certainly cannot be attributed to the policies of the international 
lending institutions. On the contrary, without their assistance the developing 
countries would be in a much worse situation than they are at present. 
6.4. MACRO-ECONOMIC IMBALANCES 
We have so far assumed that neither cyclical unemployment nor balance of 
payments problems exist; but in the real world these conditions will not always 
be fulfilled. The issue which we will discuss briefly in this section is the type of 
stabilization policies Governments should follow to counteract such distur-
bances and, as a corollary, whether the project evaluation criteria so far dis-
cussed should be amended to take account of macro-economic imbalances and 
movements towards balance resulting from Government stabilization policies. 
Since Keynes's General Theory, it is widely accepted that in order to move 
towards a situation of full employment without inflation or, as it is normally 
termed a situation of internal balance, appropriate expenditure policies may 
be used to correct, through the income multiplier mechanism, situations of 
underemployment or overemployment. More controversial still is the question 
of the appropriate instruments for attaining a situation of external balance, 
i.e., a situation where the gap between the autonomous demand and supply 
of foreign exchange on account of imports and exports of goods and services 
can be counted on to be covered by autonomous capital inflows. The literature 
distinguishes two approaches to balance of payments problems - elasticities 
and expenditure - and we will review these briefly. 
The elasticities approach has been described in a seminal paper by JOAN 
ROBINSON . 2 1 She showed that the effect of a devaluation (or revaluation) on 
the balance of payments depends on the domestic and foreign elasticities of 
demand and supply for import and export goods and services. While JOAN 
ROBINSON presented her analysis in terms of domestic currency, it is more in 
line with our discussion of the opportunity cost of foreign exchange in Chapter 3 
to present the analysis in terms of foreign currency, and we will therefore 
express the exchange rate in terms of units of local currency per unit of foreign 
exchange (say, Rupees per US dollar). We can then derive the relevant elasticity 
relationships as follows- As demonstrated in Figure 6.4, a devaluation will 
improve the balance of payments if the slope of the supply curve of foreign 
exchange has a higher absolute value than the slope of the demand curve 
of foreign exchange. In Figure 6.4, the supply curve is negatively inclined but 
its slope is steeper than the slope of the demand curve, and a devaluation 
from Ri to R2 thus reduces the balance of payments gap by AB minus CE. 
The stability condition can be expressed algebraically. Denoting the amount 
of foreign exchange supplied by Xf, the amount of foreign exchange demanded 
by Mf, and the exchange rate by R, a devaluation will improve the balance of 
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FIGURE 6.4. Exchange Rate 
(Rs per U S $ ) 
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0 Amount of foreign exchange 
payments if: 
dB -dXf -dMf 
dR^~d~R d~R~ 
is positive. This expression may be expanded as follows: 
dB -dXf R Xf -dMf R Mf 
dR dR Xf R dR Mf R 
and may thus be written as: 
dR 
dB = (XfSf + M / I J / ) — 
XV 
where e/ is the elasticity of supply of foreign exchange with respect to the 
exchange rate, and rjf the elasticity of demand for foreign exchange with 
respect to the exchange rate . 2 2 
Using the following elasticity definitions on the export side: 
r\x = elasticity of foreign demand for export goods with respect to price in 
terms of foreign currency (Px) 
Ex = elasticity of domestic supply of export goods with respect to price in 
terms of domestic currency ( i V R), 
and the following on the import side: 
e m = elasticity of foreign supply of import goods with respect to price in terms 
of foreign currency (Pm) 
rim = elasticity of home demand for import goods with respect to price in terms 
of domestic currency (Pm • R) 
we may write the above expression a s : 2 3 
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( 6 . 1 ) dB = Xf Sx(rjx - 1 ) + Mf-
r\m ( £m + 1 ) dR 
t]m + Em R 
Equation 6 . 1 is extremely valuable. As regards imports, it shows that a 
devaluation will always reduce the amount of foreign exchange demanded, 
except where the elasticity of home demand for imports (??„,) is zero, which is 
not to be expected. With respect to exports, a devaluation will not increase 
the amount of foreign exchange supplied if the elasticity of the domestic 
supply of export goods (ex) is zero but, again, this is not a realistic assumption. 
Accepting that the elasticity of export supply is positive, Equation 6 . 1 shows 
that a devaluation will increase, leave unchanged, or decrease the amount of 
foreign exchange supplied, depending on whether the elasticity of foreign 
demand (JJ*) is greater than unity, unity, or smaller than unity, respectively. 
This is interesting to know but not very helpful for operational decision-
making and the question thus arises of what will normally be the case. It is 
easy to show that the elasticity of foreign demand for a country's exports of 
a certain commodity is a function of the elasticities of world demand and 
supply 2 4. For manufactures, both elasticities may be taken as substantially 
greater than unity, and a devaluation will thus certainly increase foreign 
demand. As regards primary products, world demand is generally relatively 
inelastic. However, provided that the country in question is not the sole pro-
ducer of the commodity, the foreign demand the country faces will always be 
more elastic than world demand. This is logical because if only the country 
in question devalues while other countries do not, the country's export demand 
will increase by the increase in world demand as well as by the decrease in 
production of competing suppliers. It is generally accepted that even for 
primary products, export demand is greater than unity, and it may thus be 
concluded that according to the elasticities analysis, a devaluation will always 
improve the balance of payments, the degree of inprovement being determined 
by the values of the elasticities in formula 6 . 1 . 
It remains to be discussed what order of magnitude the elasticities normally 
assume. In this respect, we define normal as a situation of full employment 
where the Government follows appropriate policies to prevent inflation, i.e., a 
situation of internal balance. Furthermore, we will assume, as for instance is 
assumed in the BALASSA et al. study 2 5 , that there are no quantitative trade 
restrictions. Otherwise, because the elasticities depend on the degree of trade 
restriction, a meaningful discussion of the normal values of the elasticities 
would not be possible. 
Most developing countries are price takers on the import side, so that the 
elasticity of the foreign supply of import goods (em) may then be set at infinity. 
As formula 6 . 1 shows, the elasticity of demand for foreign exchange (t]f) is 
then equal to the elasticity of import demand (rim)- The elasticity of import 
demand is determined by the elasticity of domestic demand and supply 2 6 and 
will be larger the more import-competing products the country produces, and 
smaller the smaller the share of the import goods in relation to total domestic 
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TABLE 6 .4 . Import and export elasticities according to Balassa et al. 
Elasticity of Demand Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity 
for Foreign Exchange of Supply of Foreign of Supply 
( = Elasticity of of Exports Demand for of Foreign 
Demand for Imports) Exports Exchange 
nt = nm ex r\x 
Brazil (Appendix C) 1.5 5 7 - 1 3 2 . 5 - 3 . 3 
Chile (pp. 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 ) 3 3 5 1.5 
Mexico (pp. 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 ) 3 3 1 0 2 . 0 8 
Malaysia (p. 2 1 8 ) 3 - 5 1 - 4 5 - 1 0 0 . 6 7 - 2 . 5 7 
Pakistan (p. 2 5 3 ) 1-3 2 - 4 5 1 . 1 4 - 1 . 7 8 
Philippines (p. 2 8 1 ) 4 3 - 5 1 6 - 2 0 2 . 3 7 - 3 . 8 
Norway (pp. 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 ) 1.6 6 8 3 
supply and demand. In the study of BALASSA et al., which analyzed inter aha 
the rates of protection in seven countries, r\m varied from 1 to 5, the lowest 
values being assumed to apply to countries that have difficulty in producing 
import-competing products. A summary of the assumed values of t]m is present-
ed in Table 6.4. 
Regarding exports, it may be assumed as regards the smaller developing 
countries that the elasticity of foreign demand for their exports (r\x) is infinite, 
so that the elasticity of supply of foreign exchange (e/) is equal to the elasticity 
of supply of exports (sx). The export supply elasticity (ex) depends on the elastici-
ties of domestic supply and demand 2 7 and will be larger the smaller the export 
share is in relation to domestic supply and demand. In general, we may there-
fore expect that the export supply elasticity will be larger for manufactures 
than for primary products, the more so because a shift of resources to the 
production of manufactures will usually lead more easily and faster to an 
increase in production than if the resources were directed to the production of 
primary products. Nevertheless, the long-run supply elasticity of primary 
products will probably be well above unity. In general, the overall export 
supply elasticity in the case of a mixture of manufactures and primary product 
exports may be assumed to be at least 2. 
As regards the larger developing countries or those that account for a sub-
stantial part of the world production of a certain commodity, increased exports 
may tend to lower the export price. It is then necessary to estimate the elasticity 
of foreign demand (nx) in addition to the elasticity of export supply (EX) in 
order to calculate the elasticity of supply of foreign exchange (e/). The more a 
country's exports are concentrated in a few commodities, the lower will be the 
elasticity of export demand. In the BALASSA et al. study, for instance, the export 
demand elasticity is estimated at 5 for Pakistan, the bulk of whose exports con-
sisted of jute and raw cotton, and at 20 for the Philippines, whose exports were 
quite diversified. Combining export supply elasticities of 2 to 5 with export 
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demand elasticities of 5 to 20, the elasticities of supply of foreign exchange will 
vary from 1.14 to 3.8. 
Table 6.4 recapitulates the estimates of BALASSA et al. regarding the demand 
and supply elasticities in the seven countries they studied. Taking the mid-
point of the elasticities where a range was estimated, it may be seen that for five 
countries the elasticity of demand for foreign exchange was higher than the 
elasticity of supply of foreign exchange, while for two countries the reverse was 
true. In all cases, however, the sum of the demand and supply elasticities is 
significantly greater than 1, so that a devaluation would substantially improve 
the balance of payments. 
The elasticities analysis has important operational value. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, it enables us to calculate the opportunity cost of foreign exchange; 
as discussed in this section, it enables us to calculate the effect of a devaluation 
on the balance of payments. The following simplified example illustrates the 
case for a price taker. If Mf = US$600 million per annum, Xj = US$400 
million per annum, rjm = 2, e x = 4 and internal balance is maintained, the 
effect of a 5 percent devaluation will be to reduce import payments by US$60 
million and to increase export earnings by US$80 million, so that the gap be-
tween export and import values will be closed by US$140 million. It should be 
noted, however, that the values of the elasticities are not invariant with respect 
to economic conditions. For instance, during periods of depression, the export 
supply elasticity will be higher and the import demand elasticity lower than 
during periods of full employment. In an already classic article, 2 8 ALEXANDER 
has argued that because the values of the elasticities depend on the behaviour 
of the whole economic system, it would be more fruitful to analyze the system 
directly by concentrating on the relationship of real expenditures to real in-
comes and on the relationship of both of these to price levels. It is to this sub-
ject that we will now address ourselves. 
The starting point of ALEXANDER'S analysis is that the national product 
equation may be written as (X - M) = Y - (C + I), where all variables are 
expressed in domestic currency and X is value of exports, M value of imports, 
7 national product, C consumption and I investment. 2 9 Denoting the external 
balance (X - M) by B and the domestic expenditure 3 0 on consumption and 
investment goods (C + 7), which includes imported goods, by E, the equation 
may be written as B = Y - E. Differentiating, we obtain dB = dY - dE 
or, in words, the change in the external balance equals the difference between 
the change in national product and the change in domestic expenditures. As 
part of domestic expenditures depends on real income ( = national product) 
while the remainder depends on other factors, we may write E = c - Y + Ea, 
where c is the marginal propensity to spend on consumption and investment 
goods and E0 the non-income related part of expenditures. Differentiating, 
we obtain dE = c d Y + dE0. Combining this with the identity function, we 
may write: dB = {dY - c dY) - dE0. 
When resources are idle, a devaluation will lead through the foreign trade 
multiplier to a substantial increase in national production. This will improve 
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the external balance, provided that the marginal propensity to spend c is less 
than unity - i.e., saving takes place - and provided that the direct effects of the 
devaluation on expenditures (E0) are not of opposite sign. As regards the mar-
ginal propensity to spend, ALEXANDER seemed initially to believe that it could 
be greater than unity, but this assumption has not been substantiated empirical-
ly. As regards the direct effects (cash balance, redistribution of incomes, money 
illusion effects, and the like), these are mainly transitory and not very large and 
it can thus be expected that in situations of underemployment, a devaluation 
will increase national income as well as the external balance. However, under 
conditions of full employment, a devaluation cannot, according to ALEXANDER, 
lead to an increase in production, as all resources are fully employed. Because 
the effects of the devaluation on E are negligible, a devaluation will not im-
prove the balance of payments unless expenditures are reduced. In ALEXAN-
DER'S view under conditions of full employment the only way to improve the 
balance of payments is to reduce domestic expenditures. 
The conclusion of ALEXANDER'S expenditure analysis as regards the effect of 
a devaluation on the balance of payments in situations of full employment is 
thus completely contrary to the conclusion of the elasticities analysis. The 
contradiction is, however, not a real one. It is entirely correct that a deficit in 
the balance of payments is caused by the excess of real expenditures over real 
production and, at first sight, it may indeed appear that the only way to im-
prove the balance of payments in situations of full employment is to reduce 
real expenditures. However this argumentation does not acknowledge that 
devaluations have substantial resource reallocation effects. 
In the elasticities approach, it is assumed that internal balance is maintianed, 
or, in other words, that no inflation and no reductions in real income should 
be allowed to occur. Thus, in situations of full employment, the increase in 
money incomes resulting from the improvement in the balance of payments due 
to the devaluation should be negated by a reduction in the money supply, so 
that money expenditures remain constant. In these circumstances, real ex-
penditures will decrease because the devaluation increases the prices, in terms 
of domestic currency, of the internationally tradeable goods (i.e., imports and 
exports) relative to those of home goods and therewith the overall price level. 
At the same time, on the production side resources will be diverted from the 
production of home goods to tradeables as the latter have become more pro-
fitable. The end result of the process is therefore that, while real expenditures 
are brought into line with real production, the balance of payments will im-
prove. 
ALEXANDER'S expenditure analysis overlooks the fact that an external deficit 
is caused not only by an excess of expenditure over income but also by an excess 
in production of home goods. The elasticities theory as well as the expenditure 
theory are necessary to explain why in actual fact devaluations will indeed 
improve the balance of payments in situations of full employment. The task 
at hand now is to synthesize the two approaches. ALEXANDER himself suggested 
at a later date such a synthesis, but bis approach is rather formal and incor-
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porates foreign repercussions. 3 1 For our purposes, a model without foreign 
repercussions suffices. We may draw up a simple model by assuming that parts 
of imports and consumption are functions of real income, and that the remain-
ing parts as well as exports and investments are autonomously determined. We 
then have the following relationships, whereby it should be noted that all 
variables are expressed in real terms: 
AM = in - dY +dM0 
dC = c- dY + d C 0 a n d 
dB = dX„ - dM = dY - d(C + /.) 
where m and c are the marginal propensities to import and to consume, res-
pectively, and the subscript o indicates that the variables are autonomously 
determined. It follows that 
dX0 - dM0 - m-dY = dY - c-dY - dC„ - dl„ 
so that 
dY = [\/(s + m)] (dY. - dM„ + dC„ + d/„) 
where the marginal savings propensity s= 1 - c. This expression is, of course, 
the well known trade multiplier. Since dB = dX0 - dM„ - m d Y, we obtain 
dB = dX0 - dM0 - [m/(s + m)] (dX„ - dM0 + dC0 + dl0) 
which may be written as: 
dB = [s/(s + m)\ idX„ - dM„) - [m/(s + m)\ (dC 0 + d/ 0) 
In this formula, dX0 - dM0 can be considered to represent the effect of a 
devaluation on the balance of payments when real incomes are being held 
constant. The value of dX0 - dM0 can thus be found from formula 6.1 where 
the elasticities are assumed to be calculated under this assumption. As formula 
6.1 gives the change in the balance of payments in terms of foreign currency, 
it will be necessary to convert the change into domestic currency by multiplying 
it with the new exchange rate. Denoting this change by dBn, the change in the 
autonomous expenditures by dE0 and the total change in the balance of pay-
ments, including the reversal effects due to changes in income by dBt, we may 
write: 
s m 
(6.2) dB, = dB„ dE0 
s + m s +m 
This formula includes the effects of a devaluation as well as a change in 
expenditures. As an illustration, we will use it to analyze for two cases of im-
balance how overall balance can be obtained. For the first case, let us assume 
that there is full employment but, at the same time, a deficit in the external 
account. If the Government devalues without a compensating expenditure 
reduction, the increase in money incomes of dBa does not increase real income 
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but increases prices of home goods or imports. Thus no extra savings will be 
generated and s will be zero. As formula 6.2 shows, there will then be no change 
at all in Bt, i.e., the balance of payments does not improve. However, if auto-
nomous expenditures are reduced by dB„, or in, other words, if the increase in 
money incomes due to the devaluation of dBh is mopped up, the balance of 
payments improves by dBh • s/(s + m) + dBh • m/(s + m) = dBh and the 
change in the balance of payments is then determined by the elasticity formula. 
It is the resource reallocation effect of the devaluation which ensures that the 
balance of payments improves. 
For the second case, we assume a situation of underemployment and external 
deficit. In such a situation, the initial effect of a devaluation is that a surplus of 
dBh arises in the balance of payments. If the Government follows appropriate 
policies, it will ensure that money supply is elastic so that real income (= 
real production) increases by dBn/(s +m) and the balance of payments by 
dBh • s/{s + m). Our function assumes that there are no other effects on the 
balance of payments. Very probably, however, the elasticities of supply and 
demand of home goods, exports and imports will be affected because the in-
crease in real income may, for instance, increase the price of home goods 
further and therewith further curtail imports. As it is extremely difficult to 
take account of these secondary effects, we will assume that they can be neglect-
ed. In practice this means that formula 6.2 provides us with an underestimate 
of the effects of a devaluation on the balance of payments in a situation of 
underemployment, which is perhaps just as well. Assuming then that the rise 
in real incomes is dBh/(s + m), imports wil increase by m • dBh/(s + m). The 
total effect on the balance of payments is therefore dBh - m • dBh/(s + m) = 
dBh • s/(s + m). The devaluation thus increases real incomes as well as the 
balance of payments but, in general, it cannot be expected that it would result 
in the simultaneous attainment of external and internal balance. Suppose that 
external balance has been attained but that there is still underemployment. 
Increasing autonomous domestic expenditure by dE„ will then increase real 
income but at the same time lead to a deterioration in the balance of payments 
of m • dE0/(s + m). A further devaluation will be necessary to obtain external 
balance again plus further increases in expenditures to obtain internal balance 
if resources are still underemployed, and so on. Both instruments should be 
used to obtain overall balance, and one should try to achieve it at once without 
resort to miniadjustments. 
A devaluation affects the balance of payments as well as national income; 
expenditure-changing policies have similar effects. In a pathbreaking article, 
S W A N 3 2 has shown how the attainment of external and internal balance 
necessitates in general the use of both policy instruments. SWAN uses a dia-
gram in which he shows on the vertical axis a cost ratio indicating the com-
petitiveness of Australian industries versus imports and exports, and on the 
horizontal axis real expenditures. Without changing the substance of SWAN'S 
analysis, we will show in Figure 6.5, in line with our formula 6.2, the exchange 
rate expressed in terms of local currency units per unit of foreign exchange 
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FIGURE 6.5. Exchange Rate 
(Rs per U S $) 
External Balance 
Curve 
Internal Balance 
Curve 
Autonomous Real Expenditures 
(Rupees per US dollar) on the vertical axis and autonomous real expenditures 
on the horizontal axis. A devaluation is represented by an upward movement 
along the vertical axis and an increase in autonomous expenditures by a 
movement to the right along the horizontal axis. The essence of SWAN'S analysis 
is presented by the curves of internal and external balance. Both curves show 
that various combinations of exchange rates and autonomous expenditures are 
possible to keep the economy in internal or external balance. The internal 
balance curve is downward sloping because the lower the exchange rate (Rs 
per US$) which limits exports, the higher autonomous expenditures must be to 
stimulate the economy to a position of full employment. The external balance 
curve, however, is upward sloping because if the exchange rate is increased, 
autonomous expenditures should be increased in order to prevent the appea-
rance of surpluses. Noteworthy is the fact that the external balance curve turns 
steeply upwards as soon as full employment is reached, because infinite devalua-
tions would at this stage be necessary to offset the adverse effects on the balance 
of payments of autonomous expenditure increases. 
As seen in Figure 6.5, the economy may be in any of the several sectors of the 
diagram at any moment in time, but there is only one situation where internal 
as well as external balance exists. To the left of the external balance curve (Sec-
tors 8, 1, 2 and 3), the economy has balance of payments surpluses and to the 
right (Sectors 7,6,5 and 4), deficits. On the other hand, to the left of the internal 
balance curve (Sectors 1, 8, 7 and 6), there is unemployment and to the right 
(Sectors 2, 3, 4 and 5), over-employment. The internal and external balance 
curves divide the diagram up into 4 zones. On the other hand, the policy in-
struments to be used are determined by the quadrant in which the economy 
finds itself. In the two western quadrants (Sectors 2, 1, 8 and 7) autonomous 
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expenditures should be increased and in the two eastern quadrants (Sectors 3, 
4, 5 and 6) decreased. The production of home goods relative to that of trade-
ables is too low in the northern quadrants (Sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4) and a revalua-
tion is indicated; in the southern quadrants (Sectors 8, 7, 6 and 5) the opposite 
is true and a devaluation should take place. All in all, there are a total of eight 
sectors, each sector being described by its balance of payments (surpluses or 
deficits) and employment situation (under- or over-employment) and the two 
policy instruments to be used (devaluation or revaluation and autonomous 
expenditure increase or decrease). We have already discussed in detail how 
internal and external balance can be obtained starting from a full employment-
deficit situation (Point A in Figure 6.5), and from an unemployment-deficit 
situation (Point B) so we will not go into any of the other possible situations. 
A summary describing each sector is presented in Table 6.5. 
We are now finally in a position to show that the project evaluation criteria 
developed in this study are consistent with the macro-economic framework just 
described. If this is so, we should find that in each of the possible economic 
situations, the micro-economic values to be used for project evaluation pur-
poses reflect the actual economic situation. In other words, the opportunity 
costs of foreign exchange, labor and capital and the price of home products 
versus tradeables should be such that they do not detract from the Government 
objective of achieving a situation of overall balance. The task at hand is there-
fore to review the values of the micro-economic variables in each of the eight 
sectors of economic imbalance relative to the situation of overall balance. 
Following the order of Table 6.5, we may start with the opportunity cost of 
foreign exchange. As discussed in Chapter 3, this variable is the weighted 
average of the domestic values of the country's import and export prices, the 
weights being the fractions in which an additional dollar of foreign exchange 
will be used for increasing imports and reducing exports. As in Sectors 7, 6, 5 
and 4 the economy incurs balance of payments deficits or, in other words, as in 
these sectors the propensity to import is high, the opportunity cost of foreign 
exchange will also be high relative to a situation where the balance of payments 
is in equilibrium. Conversely, the opportunity cost of foreign exchange will be 
low in situations of surplus as exist in Sectors 8,1,2 and 3. 
As regards labor, the opportunity cost of labor will be high relative to a 
situation of full employment in Sectors 2, 3, 4 and 5. The resources in the 
economy are over-employed; employers are competing for the available man-
power and the supply price of labor will be high. In Sectors 1, 8, 7 and 6, how-
ever, a downward adjustment relative to a situation of full employment must 
be made to the opportunity cost of labor because laborers are unemployed. 
Furthermore, the hiring of unemployed laborers will result in multiplier effects 
as the increase in their expenditures will lead to the hiring of still more unem-
ployed. This external effect can be counted on the benefit side of the project 
under scrutiny; alternatively, the opportunity cost of labor can be adjusted 
further downward. However the effect is accounted for, it is clear that the hiring 
of unemployed laborers has substantial economic benefits. 
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TABLE 6.5. Values of variables in the different policy sectors. 
Policy Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A. Description of Actual Economic Situation 
Balance of Payments Surplus Surplus Surplus Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Surplus 
Employment Under Over Over Over Over Under Under Under 
Expenditure Insuff. Insuff. Excess Excess _ Excess Excess Insuff. Insuff. 
Production of Home Goods 
vs. Production of Tradeables Too low Too low Too low Too low Too much Too much Too much Too much 
B. Value of Variables in Project Evaluation 
Opp. Cost ofF.E. Low Low Low High High High High Low 
Opp. Cost of Labor Low High High High High Low Low Low 
Opp. Cost of Capital Low Low High High High High Low Low 
Price of Home Goods vs. 
Price of Tradeables Low Low Low Low High High High High 
C. Expected Government Policies 
Exchange Rate - - - + + + + 
Expenditures + + — — — - + + 
We come now to the policy measures the Government should use to obtain 
a situation of overall balance. In Sectors 3,4, 5 and 6, investments are at too 
high a level relative to the situation of overall balance. Expenditures will ex-
ceed the funds normally available and the Government should then use a 
budget constraint interest rate or a ratio of present value per dollar of invest-
ment to defer projects with low priority. In Sectors 2, 1, 8 and 7, on the other 
hand, the Government may wish to use a cut-off rate somewhat lower than the 
normal opportunity cost of capital rate to promote investments. 
As regards the exchange rate, the Government should revalue in Sectors 1, 
2, 3 and 4. In terms of benefit-cost analysis, this means that the price of home 
goods versus the price of tradeables is too low, and that it should be increased 
by a revaluation. The opposite holds true in Sectors 8, 7, 6 and 5; the price of 
home goods versus the price of tradeables is too high, and a devaluation should 
take place to reduce this price ratio. 
Having determined the values of the various variables to be used in benefit-
cost analysis, it is not difficult to see how they will promote or deter invest-
ments. For instance, let us assume that we are at position B in Sector 7 in 
Figure 6.5. As tabulated in Table 6.5, there are then balance of payments deficits 
and unemployment while, at the same time, expenditures are insufficient and 
too many home goods are being produced. As the actual price of home goods 
is too high, a devaluation should take place and it can thus be expected that the 
relative price of home goods will decline, making projects producing home 
goods unattractive and projects producing tradeables attractive. On the other 
hand, as the opportunity costs of capital and labor are low compared with those 
in subsequent periods and the opportunity cost of foreign exchange high comp-
ared with those in subsequent periods, there will be every incentive to promote 
investments and to choose labor-intensive projects which will produce trade-
ables. The projects that will be accepted under our benefit-cost evaluation 
criteria are thus in line with the Government's overall objective. This will, of 
course, hold true in each of the eight sectors. In general, we may express it in 
this way: that the shadow prices of capital, labor and foreign exchange are such 
that each time, not only will the right amount of investment be promoted, but 
also the right type of investment in terms of type of resources used and type of 
benefits produced. 
We have so far assumed that the Government obtains overall balance through 
exchange rate and expenditure changing measures. It is also possible, of course, 
that quantitative trade restrictions will be used in conjunction with expenditure 
changes. Suppose, for instance, that in the previous example, the Government 
were to restrict the imports of certain goods in order to improve its balance of 
payments. Then the domestic prices of these goods would rise and hence also 
the opportunity cost of foreign exchange. As was briefly mentioned in Chapter 
3, the value of the imports in the opportunity cost of foreign exchange formula 
is found in such cases by comparing the domestic prices of the restricted goods 
with their world prices valued at the official exchange rate. Thus, in principle, 
quantitative trade restrictions should not create any undue difficulty in the 
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benefit-cost analysis. 
Divergences from the overall balance situation are quite common. How-
ever, as these divergences are mostly short-term fluctuations of one or two 
years around the normal situation and, moreover, as it is difficult to estimate 
the required adjustments, one may question whether it is worth the trouble to 
revise the normal values of the project variables. On the other hand, it is only 
by taking account of the changed circumstances that one can ensure that the 
right type of investment will be undertaken. It seems to us that a practical 
approach is necessary. In this respect it is important to remember that the 
initial few years of a project are the ones during which construction takes 
place, while the later years, representing the longest part of a project's life, are 
the ones during which most of the benefits are produced. As the divergences 
from the optimum situation are short-term in nature, it is mainly the investment 
value of a project that will be affected by the adjustments and not the benefit 
value. Furthermore, because it will be difficult to change the construction 
method from one year to another or to stop an ongoing project, it will be main-
ly the projects with short construction periods that will be affected by the 
changed circumstances. We would suggest, therefore, that, in general, project 
evaluation should take place on the basis of the normal values, but that in 
periods of divergence from the norm special attention should be paid to pro-
jects with short construction periods. The investment values of such projects 
should be revised to take account of the changed values of the shadow prices of 
labor and foreign exchange, and comparison of the revised rates of return with 
the adjusted cut-off rate will then ensure that the right type of investment is 
promoted or deterred. Following this procedure, labor-intensive public works 
projects will be important instruments with which to combat unemployment 
in periods of depression. c 
Finally, we would like to turn to another type of imbalance, one which in 
present day circumstances especially, seems to be all-pervasive, but which we 
have ignored in our discussions so far by expressing all variables in real terms. 
The imbalance is, of course, inflation and we will now discuss how one should 
take account of this factor. The effects of inflation on benefits and costs can be 
complicated, since prices do not normally increase at the same rate. Relative 
prices may change substantially, and the benefits and costs of a project may 
differ substantially from what they would be if there were no inflation. The 
task of the project evaluator is, therefore, to not only estimate the general rate 
of inflation but also the specific rates of inflation of the project's various inputs 
and outputs. Suppose that he has done so; how should he then proceed? 
There are, theoretically, two methods possible for taking the various infla-
tion rates into account. The first is to calculate the values of benefits and costs 
in current terms, i.e., in prices of each period, and to discount at the inflation 
adjusted discount rate. The second is to evaluate all benefits and costs in real 
terms and to discount at the unadjusted discount rate. 
The two methods are identical, as may be seen from the following. Suppose 
that all prices increase at the same rate / . Then the benefit-cost criterion will be 
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Bt(l +f>' G(l +/)< 
^ ( 1 +d)'(l +J)' + d)'(l +J)'>0 
where d is the cutoff discount rate. Since the factor (1 + f) drops out of the 
formula, it can be seen immediately that we have here the normal benefit cost 
formula. Suppose now that while the general inflation rate is / , the prices of B 
increase at the rate / i and the prices of C at the rate fi. Then our formula 
becomes: 
Btd +AY c,(i 
^(l +d)'(i +j)'>0 
which corresponds to the first method. Alternatively, the formula may be 
written as: 
B (±^M cfX+M 
' (i +f>' (i +jy 
^ (1 +d)r ~ ^ (1 +d)' > ° 
which is the second method. Under both methods then, the underlying prin-
ciple is to deflate the prices in each successive period by the general inflation 
rate. Or, in other words, the prices must be expressed in real terms, i.e., in 
terms of the purchasing power of the national currency unit, say, the Rupee, 
as it is in the base year. Thus, for instance, if the price of a certain project input 
or output is expected to increase at the rate of 9 percent per annum while the 
domestic inflation rate is only 5 percent per annun, then the real price of this 
item increases by 4 percent per annum. 
An additional complication might seem to arise when project inputs or out-
puts are imported or exported and the domestic inflation rate differs from 
the rate of inflation of the country's trading partners. To the extent that such a 
differential is continuously offset by exchange rate adjustments, the ratio 
between domestic prices and foreign prices will not change and the project 
evaluator does not need to make any adjustment to the base prices. For in-
stance, suppose that the domestic inflation rate is five percent per annum. 
Then, when the prices in foreign currency of the inputs procured from abroad 
or of the outputs exported increase at the rate of 2 percent per annum, the real 
prices of these foreign items will remain constant if the domestic currency 
depreciates at the rate of 3 percent per annum. Suppose, however, that it is 
expected that the country will not devalue its currency. We may assume then 
that the opportunity cost of foreign exchange will increase at the rate of 3 per-
cent per annum, so that here also no adjustments need to be made to the base 
prices. 
As a practical rule, we would suggest that it may be assumed that grosso 
modo the exchange rate or the opportunity cost of foreign exchange will tend 
to equalize the differential between the domestic and foreign inflation. Further-
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more, as regards the specific rate of inflation of a particular input or output-
only significant variances from the general rate of inflation should be consider-
ed. Where the project evaluator is at a loss as to the likely change in real prices, 
sensitivity tests should be applied to provide a likely range of the rates of return. 
We have now come to the end of this part of the study. We have reviewed the 
project planning rules when income distribution does not count. However, 
it often does count and it is time to consider how the normal benefit-cost 
criteria should be amended. It is to this task that Part II of the study is devoted. 
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PART II 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION ASPECTS 

7. SOCIAL WELFARE AND BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
7.1. COMPENSATION TESTS 
In the first part of this study we assumed that the distribution of income in a 
country was optimal. In many countries, however, the distribution of income 
is not optimal and projects could then be used towards redressing any such 
imbalances. In addition, it is also possible that, when the existing income 
distribution in a country is optimal, projects may cause divergences from the 
optimum. In our opinion, therefore, if a project has distributive consequences, 
benefit-cost analysis should take these into account along with economic 
considerations in determining the priority of projects. To measure distributional 
effects some weighing of the gains and losses of the different income groups is 
required and the task at hand, therefore, is to estimate the social value of addi-
tions to income at different levels of income, i.e., to determine the social welfare 
function that expresses such weights. 
There is a considerable body of literature that does not accept this premise. 
Most recently, MISHAN 1 has defended the traditional analysis by lmking it to 
the so-called compensation criterion. Suppose, as the result of a project, the 
rich become better off by $ 250,000, while the poor will be worse off by $ 150,000. 
Then, according to the compensation criterion, there would still be a gain of 
$ 100,000 because the poor can be compensated for their loss. The compen-
sation need not actually take place; the criterion states only that it should be 
possible. MISHAN agrees that the criterion would be much more appealing if 
indeed the poor were compensated for their loss, so that one can speak of a 
true PARETO improvement - i.e., some are made better off, no one is made 
worse off. In MISHAN'S view benefit-cost analysis may, therefore, be accom-
panied by observations on the resulting income distribution, and even by 
recommendations, but the analysis itself should not attach different weights 
to the dollars lost or gained by the different income groups. These weights are, 
according to MISHAN, too arbitrary. Benefit-cost analysis itself can only show 
that the gains exceed the losses, no more. 
It seems to us that MISHAN fails to address the problem. Merely noting the 
income effects of a project is not very meaningful. Moreover, often it will not 
be possible to actually compensate the losers and it may well be that a project 
should then not be undertaken. In our example, for instance, the social value 
of the $ 150,000 loss of the poor might be much greater than the social value of 
the $ 250,000 gain of the rich. Clearly, therefore, if income distribution is 
important, and he agrees that it is, one should try to measure it. In fact, the 
long discussion in the economic literature on the so-called compensation tests 
concluded that statements about income distribution are necessary and that 
they should be made by referring to a country's social welfare function. Since 
this point is crucial, it will be useful to review the discussion briefly. 
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The debate on the compensation tests was essentially a debate between two 
schools of thought. One, influenced by ROBBINS'S well-known essay2 on the 
underlying philosophy of economic science, held that economic analysis should 
not be based on value judgments, and it was, therefore, logical that this group, 
including KALDOR, 3 HICKS, 4 and SCITOVSKY,5 resorted to compensation tests. 
The other, including perhaps LITTLE, 6 but especially SAMUELSON,7 felt that 
judgments about income distribution could and should be made. 
Instead of representing all the arguments in their original form, it will be 
useful to summarize the discussions with the help of a device introduced by 
SAMUELSON : the utility-possibility curve. Analogous to the production trans-
formation curve between two goods, it is possible to construct utility-possibility 
curves for two consumers. In Figure 7 . 1 , the axes UA and UB represent the 
ordinal utilities of two consumers A and B on any arbitrary scale. Curves I and 
II are two utility-possibility curves, each curve representing a point on the pro-
duction transformation curve, i.e., a possible production combination of two 
goods. Each point on a utility possibility curve represents a point of highest 
Utility for each of the consumers, given the division of the available commodity 
package over the two consumers. A's utility can only increase if B's utility 
decreases. The curves are therefore downward sloping from left to right. 
It may be useful to clarify the concept with an example. Suppose that a 
community consists of two homogeneous groups, A and B, each having its own 
preference between manufactured products and food. Assume that the com-
munity produces annually 3 ,000 units of manufactures plus 50 ,000 units of 
food. Then curve I may represent all the possible ordinal welfare combinations 
of groups A and B, depending on each one's share in the combination of manu-
factures and food. Thus, point C is best for Group B since it gets the entire 
combination, while it is worst for Group A which receives nothing. On the other 
hand, at point D, the reverse would apply. Along Curve I from C to D, group A 
receives more manufactures and food and its welfare thus increases, while 
Group B becomes worse off. Depending on the income of each group, a 
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position may be reached anywhere along Curve I, say, at point Qi. 
Suppose now that the Government feels that the country should strengthen 
its industrial sector and it, therefore, subsidizes industry and taxes agriculture. 
This policy would have several consequences. First, more manufactures and 
less food will be produced; say that the new equilibrium is 3,500 units of manu-
factures and 45,000 units of food. Second, the change in relative prices of manu-
factures and food will alter the welfare position of each of the two groups; 
say that Group B is now better off and Group A worse off than before the chan-
ge and that the new position is Q 2 . Since there is a new production combination, 
Q2 must He on a new utility-possibility curve, which is depicted as II in Figure 
7.1. Curve II shows that point E is best for Group B, since it would get all of 
the 3,500 units of manufactures and 45,000 units of food, while point F, for the 
same reason, is best for Group A. Since Group B prefers E over C, while Group 
A prefers D over F, the two curves intersect. Is it now possible to say that Q2 is 
better than Qi from a welfare point of view? Several criteria have been suggest-
ed. 
I. PARETO'S Criterion: An economic change is desirable if at least one person 
is better off while all the others are no worse off. It is clear that this criterion is 
very limited; it can tell us only that a new position is better than Qi, if it is 
situated in the northeast quadrant with origin at Qi. 
II. KALDOR-HICKS Criterion: The change is an improvement if the gainers 
from the change could compensate the losers for their losses. It is not necessary, 
according to this criterion, that the compensation actually takes place because 
it is only the potential gain that is relevant. It will be clear from Figure 7.1 that, 
after the change from Qi to Q 2 , the gainer B can only travel from Q2 to Q3 if 
he is not to give up more than he has gained. But at Q 3 , loser A is worse off 
than he was in the initial situation. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is thus not 
satisfied and it cannot be said that the new situation is better than the old one. 
Suppose, however, that the change involved a movement from Q4 to Q3. The 
gainer is now A, who could move to Q 2 to compensate B, so that, clearly, B 
would be better off while A stayed the same. The criterion would then be satis-
fied. However, SCITOVSKY has pointed out that this situation is reversible. 
Suppose Q 3 was the initial situation and Q4 the final one. Then gainer B could 
move to Qi to compensate loser A, and A would be better off. Hence, Q4 is 
better than Q3, but at the same time Q3 is better than Q4. For this reason SCI-
TOVSKY has suggested a different criterion. 
III. SCITOVSKY'S Criterion: The gainer should be able to compensate the 
loser but, at the same time, the loser should not be able to bribe the gainer to 
oppose the change. The result of this criterion is that we can only say that a 
change is good if (a) utility-possibility curve II cuts curve I to the right of Qi, or 
(b) curve II lies outside curve I, or (c) Q 2 lies in the quadrant northeast of Qi. 
The last possibility is PARETO'S criterion and has thus very limited application. 
What about possibilities a and b? Suppose that the curves cross as depicted in 
Figure 7.2. Then the gainer after a change from Qi to Q2 is B, who can travel 
to Q3 to compensate A (Criterion II satisfied). Before the change takes place, 
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loser A can travel from Qi to Q4 - he is then in the same position as if he were 
at point Q2 after the change - and give a bribe Qi C to B. But QiC is only worth 
Q4C to B, while the change gives him Q2C so that B will not accept the bribe. 
Criterion I I I is thus satisfied, and according to SCITOVSKY the change from Qi 
to Q2 should be accepted. The same analysis applies if curve I I lies outside 
curve I . 
However, as GORMAN 8 has pointed out, criterion I I I may give rise to con-
flicts. This is shown in Figure 7.3, where four utihLy-possibility curves represent-
ing four bundles of goods and four welfare distribution situations are shown. 
Suppose that the changes involve a movement from Qi to Q2 to Q3 to Q4. 
Now Q2 is better than Qi ( I I cuts I to the right of Qi) and Q3 is better than Q2 
( I I I outside I I ) , and Q4 better than Q3 (Q4 in northeast quadrant of Q3). Thus 
one would have thought that Q4 was better than Qi, but it is clear from Figure 
7.3 that Qi is better than Q 4 (I outside I V ) . Thus the SCITOVSKY criterion is not 
transitive and cannot be used for decision-making. The objection may be raised 
that the non-transitivity appears only after several changes and that for a simple 
decision such as whether to undertake a project, this criterion could still be 
used. This is, however, not valid, because there is always a whole range of 
projects about which decisions have to be made. 
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IV. LITTLE'S Criterion. LITTLE has seen that the difficulty with criteria II and 
III lies in the comparison which must be made between the distributive aspects 
of the old and new bundles of goods. Since the first edition of his book, LITTLE 
has substantially changed his argument due to several criticisms, but it is not 
worthwhile here to repeat the whole polemic.9 One of the initial positions which 
LITTLE took was that even if only the second part of the SCITOVSKY criterion 
(loser not able to bribe gainer) was taken into account, the change would be an 
improvement if it also resulted in a better welfare distribution. In Figure 7.4 
the change is from Qi to Q2. The broken line from the origin indicates points of 
equal welfare distribution, so that point C has the same distribution of welfare 
as point Q2. Is it possible to arrive at point C by means of a compensation? 
Obviously not. The SCITOVSKY condition is satisfied: to oppose the change 
from Qi to Q 2 , loser A can only move to D. LITTLE, therefore, considers Q2 
better than Qi. 
As K E N N E D Y 1 0 has pointed out, one wonders, however, why the SCITOVSKY 
reverse criterion is necessary. Under the SCITOVSKY criterion, to oppose the 
change, A can move to point D; LITTLE, however, moves directly to point C. 
If C is considered better than Qi, it is evident that Q 2 is better than C on the 
basis of PARETO'S criterion. What LITTLE has done implicitly is to introduce a 
social welfare function, whereby C represents a point on a higher welfare 
function than Qi, and Q2 a point on a higher welfare function than C. 
The inherent difficulty of the compensation tests is that they measure only 
one thing, whereas there are two things which must be measured. In Figure 7.2, 
for instance, after the change from Qi to Q2 gainer B can travel to Q3 and give 
O2C to A. When measured by curve II, this is worth Q3C to A but when mea-
sured by curve I it is worth a different amount. This means that we must give 
an opinion as to whether the new welfare distribution is better or worse than the 
old one. 
The entire discussion so far has been quite formalistic, and it is now time to 
rephrase the argumentation. What it all boils down to is that there is ample 
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evidence that income distribution is important and that compensation tests 
can lead to serious errors. If a group of poor persons is worse off by $ 150,000 
while a group of rich persons is better off by $ 250 ,000 , the fact that the poor 
can be compensated for their loss must be considered completely irrelevant if 
the poor are in fact not compensated. In such circumstance the only meaningful 
measure of whether the change is good or bad, is by evaluating the losses and 
the gains at the appropriate social marginal utilities of income. If compensation 
payments do take place, losses and gains should be measured after compen-
sation transfers, but still the issue of the social values remains. Suppose, for 
instance, that after compensation payments a certain project results in a gain of 
$ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 for the rich while another project results in a gain of $ 100 ,000 for 
the poor. Then again we cannot say that the first project is better than the second 
without referring to a social welfare function. In our opinion, therefore, com-
pensation tests are worse than useless. 
7.2. THE CONCEPT OF A SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION 
Every Government project will result in some redistribution of income be-
cause, on the one hand, it curtails either consumption or investment and, on 
the other hand, it provides benefits either to the Government itself or to indivi-
duals. For that matter, any economic change will alter the relative income 
positions of various groups in the population. As we have seen, even the 
ingenious compensation tests cannot evaluate a change without referring to a 
value judgment, i.e., a social welfare function. 
The social welfare function was first described by BERGSON, 1 1 who postulated 
its existence to determine in a precise form the value judgements required for 
the derivation of the conditions of maximum economic welfare. BERGSON 
started his analysis by postulating that, 'Among the elements affecting the 
welfare of the community during any given period of time are the amounts of 
each of the factors of production, other than labor, employed in the different 
production units, the amounts of the various commodities consumed, the 
amounts of the different kinds of work done, and the production unit for which 
this work is performed by each individual in the community during that period 
of t ime. ' 1 2 For a position of maximum welfare, the first derivative of welfare 
must equal zero subject to the Umitations of the given production techniques 
and the given resources. It is thus possible to find in general terms the conditions 
for maximum welfare. Any set of value propositions may be introduced and 
this will, of course, affect the optimum conditions. However, as BERGSON states, 
' . . . in any particular case the selection of one of them must be determined by its 
compatibility with the values prevailing in the community, the welfare of which 
is being studied. For only if the welfare principles are based upon prevailing 
values can they be relevant to the activity of the community in question.' 1 3 
SAMUELSON 1 4 has futher clarified the concept of the social welfare function 
with the help of utility possibility curves. In any country there are, of course, 
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a whole range of utility possibility curves corresponding to all the various 
production possibilities, given the resources. Any single utility possibility curve 
corresponds to a single point on the country's production possibility curve. If 
we take all the production possibilities with a given resource basket into account, 
a whole series of utility possibility curves will be obtained which, for the greater 
part, will overlap. The outer envelope of this family of schedules may be called 
the utility possibility frontier. Each point on this frontier represents a PARETO 
optimum - it is impossible to put an individual on a higher satisfaction level 
without making someone else worse off - because each point on the frontier is 
a tangency point with a certain utility possibility curve. But the optimum point 
from a social welfare point of view can only be found if we know the social 
welfare function which defines the most desirable distribution of welfare in the 
economy. Furthermore, it is even possible that the social optimum will be 
inside the utility-possibility frontier, e.g., if society is willing to accept a trade-
off between production and a more equitable income distribution. Conse-
quently, welfare economics cannot give rules for changes without taking into 
account the desired distribution of welfare. We must look at every proposed 
change to determine who the losers and gainers are, and then evaluate the gain 
of the gainers and the loss of the losers in accordance with a specified distri-
butional criterion in order to evaluate the change. 
How is the distributional criterion to be found? SAMUELSON assumes that 
the value judgments defining the criterion are those given by 'some ethical 
belief - that of a benevolent despot or a complete egotist, or 'all men of good 
will,' a misanthrope, the state, race, or group mind, God, etc . ' 1 5 Clearly, this 
is not very helpful for operational work. 
7.3. OBJECTIONS TO THE CONCEPT 
The BERGSON-SAMUELSON concept of a social welfare function has given rise 
to substantial criticism by those who consider it too general to be useful as an 
operational tool. The following quote from DOBB may illustrate this: 'The social 
welfare function (if one has understood it correctly) is an elegant example of the 
kind of formalism, so much in vogue today, which greatly facilitates analysis 
by supposing crucial problems to be solved by some ingenious (but undisclosed) 
device, without providing any actual means of their solution.' 1 6 We subscribe 
to this criticism to a large extent. If we are to make use of the concept, then we 
have to be much more specific than BERGSON and SAMUELSON are. The question, 
therefore, arises of how the social welfare function can be determined? 
A R R O W 1 7 sees the social welfare function as a collective choice rule to be de-
rived from individual preferences. He postulates that five conditions are 
necessary to accept individual preferences for social decision-making. Three of 
these conditions concern 'citizen sovereignty' and imply that a social welfare 
function should not be dictatorial or imposed on the community, and that there 
should be consumer sovereignty, i.e., the social choice must not be independent 
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of the individual preferences. As such, although being value judgments, they 
are very appealing. The fourth condition relating to non-transitivity of social 
choice also appears plausible at first sight. It means that in the social decision-
making process, if A is preferred over B, and B over C, then C should not be 
preferred over A. Finally, there is the condition of 'the independence of irre-
levant alternatives,' which means that when individuals are ranking a set of 
possible decisions, they should consider this set only so that the social ranking 
which is derived from the individual rankings will not be affected by some 
alternative beyond those under consideration. ARROW shows by means of 
symbolic logic that in proceeding from individual preferences to social decisions, 
one or another of the conditions will always be violated. 
The following example regarding an investment decision in the hypothetical 
republic of Xalandia, which recently achieved its independence, may be useful. 
Its Planning Department, recently established, has three projects in the pipe-
line, each costing about Xalandia dollar (X$) 50 million, and each having 
about the same economic rate of return of about 15 percent. The first project 
is an irrigation project that mainly favors the lower income groups, the second 
a road improvement program that is distributionally neutral, and the third a 
bridge that would mainly favor high income suburban communities. Since the 
Planning Department is new and a Development Plan reflecting the wants and 
needs of the population has not been drawn up, it is decided to poll the three 
political parties - each of equal strength - as to the priority they attach to the 
projects. The Action Party is rather conservative, the Freedom Party follows a 
middle of the road policy, the Progress Party is labor-oriented. There is uni-
formity of opinion within each party but opinions differ between the parties. 
The parties' priorities - indicated by high (H), medium (M), or low (L) for 
each project - are shown in the table below. 
Unfortunately, as shown in the table, the poll has not been very helpful. 
The Action and the Progress parties prefer the irrigation project over the roads 
project; the Freedom and the Progress parties prefer the roads project over the 
bridge; and the Action and the Freedom parties prefer the bridge over the 
irrigation project. There is thus complete circularity and, since the parties are 
of equal strength, no majority decision can be reached. In other words, it is 
not possible to aggregate the individual votes without violating the principle 
of non-transitivity of social choice. 
Is there a way out of this dilemma? Several writers 1 8 have argued that 
TABLE 7.1. 
Project 
Parties 
Irrigation Roads Bridge 
Action (conservative) 
Freedom (middle) 
Progress (labor) 
M 
L 
H 
L 
H 
M 
H 
M 
L 
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ARROW'S problem has nothing to do with the concept of a social welfare func-
tion. We tend to agree. ARROW'S dilemma belongs more to the realm of political 
decision-making. In this context it may be pointed out that ARROW'S five 
conditions are value judgements and that they thus do not need to be univer-
sally accepted. Indeed, further analysis shows that they are rather restrictive. 
For instance, three of ARROW'S conditions refer to citizen sovereignty. But does 
this really exist in the way ARROW suggests? Consumer sovereignty is, of course, 
a very appealing concept, especially to the Western World. But even in the 
Western world it is doubtful that social choices are never imposed. In our 
Xalandia example it might well be possible that two of the political parties band 
together and that the political leadership imposes its will on the individual 
members to solve the dilemma. As to the condition of non-transitivity, empirical 
observation confirms that inconsistencies do appear in the political decision-
making process, so why should they not be allowed as ARROW postulates. 
Finally, it has been argued by some writers that the condition of independence 
of irrelevant alternatives, as defined by ARROW , means that the ranking of social 
preferences depends only on individual orderings and not, for instance, on the 
individuals' intensities of preference. This is also restrictive. In the Xalandia 
example, for instance, there would be no dilemma if the Progress Party's vote 
was weighted more heavily than those of the other parties because, for example, 
there was a general consensus that the poor should be represented more heavily 
than under the one-man, one-vote rule. This, of course, is again a value judg-
ment. The condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives also implies, to 
give an example from ROTHENBERG, 1 9 that 'modern (non-Faustian) man should 
make his choice of a wife between two women on the basis of which of the two 
he prefers, and not be unduly influenced by the fact that what he would really 
prefer is Helen of Troy.' But such an irrelevant alternative may very well in-
fluence his choice and also, therefore, the condition may be too restrictive. 
The analysis of whether a condition is acceptable is subtle. What is clear is that 
the conditions as originally postulated by Arrow are too restrictive for general 
analysis of political decision-making. 
7.4. THE NEED FOR A POSITIVE APPROACH 
ARROW'S conditions are value judgments and, as such, much too specific 
to lead to a meaningful aggregation. How then should we proceed in construct-
ing the community's social welfare function? As ROTHENBERG has pointed out, 
findings in allied sciences like anthropology, sociology and social psychology 
suggest that there are generally accepted values in a community from which 
most other, more specific, values flow. The search according to ROTHENBERG 
is thus for a generalization about the valuation rules of the population at large; 
that is, for the values which are strategic in that they form a matrix from which 
most other values in the community flow. ROTHENBERG adds that this value 
consensus should be derived from the social decision-making process and that 
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'a Social Welfare Function is acceptable only when it accurately describes a 
social decision-making process for which there exists in the observable real 
world a matrix-value consensus supporting i t . ' 2 0 
BERGSON disagrees with ROTHENBERG on this latter point and feels that the 
welfare economist should only refer to prevailing values and not to social 
decisions since the former may or may not be expressed in social decisions. He 
points out that, 'carried to its logical extreme, ROTHENBERG'S analysis actually 
leaves welfare economics devoid of both ethics and counselling. What is there 
for the welfare economist to do but count ballots if the collective choices are 
taken as da ta? ' 2 1 BERGSON appears to be very much afraid that individuals will 
not always choose consistently in the light of their own values when complex 
social questions are involved and sees the principal task of the welfare econo-
mist as one of counselling individuals. If the objective is to counsel any and all 
citizens at the same time, then the counsel should be based on the values held 
in common. If the objective is to counsel individual citizens, then one should 
take as data in counselling the person in question. The welfare economist may 
wish to consider his own values in the counselling but, as a social scientist, he 
should make his own values explicit. If there is disagreement on values, the 
extent of the disagreement is a matter for enquiry and the welfare economist 
may then even criticize the individually held values. Thus, according to BERGSON, 
welfare economics includes value criticism and it is, therefore, necessarily of an 
ethical nature. A frequent topic of concern for economic analysis is whether 
utilities are empirically comparable. But this is not the relevant question. What 
we should be looking for is the common dimensional unit, and ' . . . just as the 
common dimensional unit of apples and nuts is found in utility, the common 
dimensional unit of utilities is found in the welfare of Social Man . ' 2 2 
We very much tend to agree with BERGSON. Social questions are complex 
and the social decision-making process may often give wrong answers. ROTHEN-
BERG'S position that the social welfare function should be derived from an em-
pirical analysis of social decisions, therefore, does not appear justified as a 
general rule. In every community, there are prevailing general values and in 
constructing the social welfare function, one should go beyond the individual 
values to discover it. In trying to do so, one should not, of course, follow the 
noted economist who, as B A U M O L 2 3 reported, asked the Chief Minister of a 
lesser developed country for a description of the country's social welfare func-
tion. Prevailing values can and should be found by experiments, interviews and 
analysis of social decisions, writings and actions of politicians, economists, 
community leaders and the public at large. In all of this, good common sense 
is just as important as theoretical insight. 
We differ with BERGSON on the counselling function of the welfare economist. 
Whilst there is no doubt that welfare criteria are ethical in nature, it seems too 
much to suppose that the welfare economist is also a thought leader in ethics. 
The welfare economist may, of course, use other values - even his own values -
to investigate to what this would lead to for an individual or a community, but 
he should not criticize. However ethical the welfare economist may be, who 
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is he to say that his thoughts are right? 
A very important task of the welfare economist is to discern the prevailing 
values of a community and how they change over time, to define norms based 
on such values for operational work, and to point out inconsistencies that may 
occur in operational work due to confusion, ignorance or a misunderstanding 
of basic value precepts. Herewith we have come to the two basic questions in 
connection with this study. Does income distribution count in a Government's 
investment decision and, if so, can such considerations be expressed in a form 
which makes it suitable for decision-making at a lower level? As mentioned 
before, we believe the answer to the first question is clear. When we look at the 
types of projects that Governments are implementing, we see that many of them 
have as their sole objective the raising of the income levels of certain groups of 
beneficiaries. Sometimes, some trade-off between output increases and im-
provement in income distribution seems to be accepted. Even in a competitive 
economy such as the USA, HAVEMAN found that equity considerations play a 
role. Of some 147 water resource development projects in the ten southern 
states - the nation's lowest income region - some 50 percent had an economic 
rate of return of less than 5.5 percent. 2 4 In the developing countries we fre-
quently find that in land settlement projects smallholder land is not as efficient 
as plantations. In irrigation projects water charges are often not levied, or the 
water is distributed over so many smallholdings that clearly a higher output 
could be achieved by concentrating the available water on a more limited 
number of smallholdings. Preference is often given to investment in roads in 
underdeveloped areas although the rates of return may be lower than if the 
investment took place in a developed area. The strategy of directing industry 
to less developed regions is also clearly based on income distribution considera-
tions. And so on. 
Income redistribution objectives are thus important; many would say of 
overriding importance. Recently, the belief that the pursuit of national income 
growth alone is not enough has received more emphasis. 2 5 As MCNAMARA, 
President of the World Bank, has stated: 'Despite a decade of unprecedented 
increase in the gross national product of the developing countries, the poorest 
segment of their populations have received little benefit. Nearly 800 million 
individuals - 40 percent out of a total of two billion - survive on incomes esti-
mated (in U.S. purchasing power) at 30 cents per day, in conditions of malnu-
trition, illiteracy and squalor. They are suffering poverty in the absolute sense. ' 2 6 
In general we might say then that the search is not one for economic growth 
alone but for growth in which the benefits of growth are equitably distributed 
in accordance with some prevailing distributional criterion. Assuming that this 
is correct, it is not justified to base project evaluation criteria on the objective of 
maximizing output without considering the distributional aspects of output 
increases. 
We come now to the second question, which we may rephrase as follows. 
Is it possible to draw up an objective function that should be maximized which 
includes income distribution aspects? We believe it is, but wish to add imme-
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diately that certain assumptions are necessary which are, to a certain extent, 
speculative. The function we have in mind is not an aggregation of individual 
utilities - we will show that this cannot be correct - but a social welfare function 
which assumes that there is indeed a value consensus in the community as 
regards what an equitable income distribution should be. Our present state of 
knowledge is such that it is inevitable that the income distribution weights we 
will propose are speculative. However, if we indeed wish to proceed further in 
this field, we should be willing to accept this. Sensitivity testing of the weights 
can show whether the proposed decision rules should be applied with caution. 
Our function assumes that efficiency counts. A substantial part of our review, 
therefore, will be concerned with whether there will be a trade-off between 
growth and equity. 
Income distribution may have intertemporal as well as interpersonal aspects. 
In many countries we find that the growth rate of national income is considered 
inadequate or, in other words, that the distribution of income over time needs 
to be improved. In Chapter 8 we will review this matter. Chapter 9 will discuss 
how the interpersonal distribution aspects can be incorporated in benefit-cost 
analysis. 
It may be asked why this study emphasizes the growth and equity aspects of 
social welfare since there are, of course, other dimensions of social welfare. 
Most plans set targets such as reducing the rate of inflation, obtaining self-
sufficiency in certain products, improving the balance of payments, and raising 
employment. As regards inflation, benefit-cost analysis is clearly not the right 
instrument with which to combat inflation problems. Self-sufficiency objectives 
have been discussed in this essay: they are determined at a higher level of the 
planning process and should be taken as given to the project evaluator so that 
the analysis becomes a cost effectiveness analysis. As regards the objectives of 
improving the balance of payments and increasing employment, we believe 
these are inherently the same as the objectives of growth and equity. In other 
words, balance of payments and employment objectives are derived from the 
principal objectives of increasing income and improving the distribution of 
income at least cost to the economy. 
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8. I N T E R T E M P O R A L I N C O M E D I S T R I B U T I O N A S P E C T S 
8.1. THE CONCEPT OF A SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE 
Under conditions of perfect competition, the market interest rate equates 
individuals' marginal time preferences with the marginal rate of return on 
investment. But, in the real world capital markets have many 'imperfections'. 
Corporate and personal income taxes, risk elements, government interventions, 
limited access to capital markets and monopoly elements are just a few of the 
many factors that drive a wedge between the time productivity of capital (the 
rates of return) and lenders' time preference rates. In Chapter 3 we argued that 
when investments are optimal for the country as a whole, the opportunity cost 
of capital to the Government should be measured by the rates of return fore-
gone in the private sector. This argumentation is valid under the stipulated 
condition. However, it may be possible that the investments of the country as 
a whole are considered suboptimal, and several writers have argued that in 
such a case public sector investment decisions should not be based on rates of 
return foregone in the private sector, but on a discount rate - which we shall 
call the social discount rate - that takes into account that investments should be 
promoted. 
KRUTILLA and ECKSTEIN proposed, as discussed in Chapter 3, that the social 
discount rate should be equal to the estimated time preference rates of the sup-
pliers of capital to the Government, and estimated the value of the social dis-
count rate to be between 5 and 6 percent in the United States. However, in a 
subsequent study, ECKSTEIN 1 revised his former position and argued that the 
estimate had no normative significance because it was based on the mistaken 
assumption that only the individual time preferences of the present generation 
count for intertemporal decisions. This is, of course, a familiar argument that 
had already been postulated a long time before by PIGOU. 
In his monumental work on the economics of welfare, PIGOU stated 2 that 
there are two reasons for rejecting individuals' time preferences. The first is 
that we see future pleasures on a diminished scale, even though they may be of 
the same magnitude as our present satisfaction. As a result, people will often 
devote themselves to satisfying a present want now rather than a larger one 
several years hence. Second: 'Our desire for future satisfaction would often be 
less intense than for present satisfaction, because it is very likely that the future 
satisfaction will not be our own.' In other words, in making our present deci-
sions we do not count the preferences of the unborn generation. PIGOU and 
ECKSTEIN feel, therefore, that the time preferences of the present generation 
should be rejected as a basis for collective intertemporal decision-making. 
Regarding the first part of PIGOU'S argumentation, we will discuss in Section 
8.2 that there are perfectly good reasons for an individual or a country to have 
a time preference rate, and that it is unfair to treat this as a kind of 'myopia.' 
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Regarding the second part of PIGOU'S argumentation, it should be noted that 
almost every country shows some growth in per capita incomes. Hence, in 
general, the future generation will be richer than the present, and one may 
question, therefore, whether the preferences of the future generation should 
be counted. In many countries we see that funds are transferred from the rich 
to the poor and similarly it might seem logical to reduce the rate of transfer of 
funds to the future rather than to increase it. 
PIGOU'S and ECKSTEIN'S argument that the time preference of the present 
generation should be rejected is unfortunate because it may lead to rejection of 
citizens' sovereignty in favor of an authoritarian social welfare function3. 
However, in many cases we see that democratic governments are indeed trying 
to increase the savings rate of their countries. Development plans include target 
growth rates and investment programs designed to reach them. Hence, we 
should accept the possibility that prevailing social values, as expressed in a 
social welfare function which recognizes citizen sovereignty, may indeed reflect 
the view that the consumption-investment division of the community's income 
is not optimal. 
We may illustrate this possibility with the help of Figure 8.1. The curve AB 
represents the possibility in the economy of transferring present consumption 
goods into next year's consumption goods. Suppose we find ourselves at a point 
like C. If we denote the slope of the transformation curve at C by 1 + q, then 
the marginal rate of return which investments earn in that situation is q. Total 
consumption in the economy will be OD, and total investments DB. The 
marginal investment close to D will earn q, but intra-marginal investments will 
earn more, so that the total investments DB will produce CD in future con-
sumption goods. Under conditions of perfect competition, the market interest 
rate - and there would be only one market interest rate - would be the same as 
the opportunity cost of capital q and there would be an equilibrium situation in 
the sense that lenders' time preference rates would equal the time productivity 
of capital. It is still possible, however, that the social welfare function expressing 
the collective preference as to the division of national income between con-
sumption and investment indicates that investments are not optimal. Let the 
social welfare function be represented by a set of indifference curves W. Then, 
at point C, the slope of the indifference curve, as depicted by dd, is equal to one 
plus the social discount rate. Hence, more consumption goods should be trans-
ferred to the future than takes place in accordance with the market interest 
rate q. 
Thus, even under conditions of perfect competition, the market interest rate 
may not represent the optimal interest rate. This is not surprising, since we have 
seen already that such questions as to whether there is an optimal interpersonal 
distribution of national income can only be answered by referring to a social 
welfare function. Similarly, the optimum of the intertemporal distribution of 
national income can also only be found by considering prevailing social values. 
In Figure 8.1, the optimum point would be at F, where the social indifference 
curve is tangent to the transformation curve. 
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How then can we proceed from a position like C to the optimal point F? The 
point C is characterized by high consumption and a low rate of investment. 
Traditional economic theory prescribes that Government should move from 
C to F by curtailing consumption by means of, for instance, increasing taxes on 
consumption; by tax breaks stimulating investment such as extra depreciation 
allowances; or by an easy money policy using open market operations by the 
Central Bank. These fiscal and monetary policies would result in a lowering of 
the opportunity cost of capital in successive time periods and finally lead to a 
position where the consumption-investment ratio would be in agreement with 
collective preferences. There would, therefore, be no need to take the social 
discount rate into account for public investment decisions because the discount 
rate would be determined by the projected opportunity cost of capital rates 4. 
However, proponents of the social discount rate approach to benefit-cost 
analysis - as elaborated in the UNIDO Guidelines and the OECD Manual -
contend that governments often will not be able, because of political con-
straints, to apply appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, and that in such 
a case the only way to proceed from C to F is choosing more longer-life projects 
than would be undertaken under the opportunity cost of capital approach. 
Both the UNIDO Guidelines and the OECD Manual develop a special invest-
ment algorithm to ensure that this capital deepening will indeed take place. 
The UNIDO and OECD approaches are both of current operational signi-
ficance and deserve further scrutiny. We will, therefore, focus for the remainder 
of this chapter on the two approaches with the objective of revealing a variety of 
dichotomies and inconsistencies that would be involved in their operational 
application and with a view towards arriving at our own recommendations. 
Section 8.2 will review how UNIDO and OECD propose to estimate the social 
discount rate, and Sections 8.3 and 8.4 will discuss the operational implications 
of the proposed criteria. Finally, Section 8.5 will critically review the approaches 
from an immanent point of view. 
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8.2. THE VALUE OF THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE 
Both the OECD Manual and UNIDO Guidelines maintain that there exist 
direct relationships between the social discount rate, on the one hand, and the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and the rate of growth of per 
capita consumption (UNIDO) and the pure time preference rate (OECD), on 
the other hand. The first of the recent writers who pointed out the usefulness 
of such relationships in connection with public investment decisions was again 
ECKSTEIN , 5 but the theory dates back to RAMSEY'S classic paper of 1928 on 
optimal savings,6 and has recently been discussed extensively in this connec-
tion. 7 Rather than repeating the mathematical exposition of the theory, we 
will try to clarify the concepts by analyzing in detail the individual consumer's 
consumption-investment decision. 
The most elementary form of consumer equilibrium is characterized by the 
condition that the consumer equalizes the marginal utility per dollar spent on 
different commodities. The underlying premise is that the more a consumer 
consumes of a good, the less is his marginal utility. The time element is brought 
in if we, similarly, accept that a consumer discounts the future utility of a unit 
of consumption, i.e., that he attaches less utility to a future unit of consumption 
than to a present unit. 
A consumer's consumption-saving decision can be expressed in terms of 
benefit-cost analysis. Consider Figure 8.2. Assuming that the consumer con-
sumes his entire income, then the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on 
consumption may be represented by OA. Every dollar that is withdrawn from 
present consumption, i.e., saved, will be valued by him at an increasingly higher 
marginal utility because his present consumption is decreasing. Thus, if we 
denote the present marginal utility of a dollar saved by u0, then every subsequent 
dollar saved will have a higher u0 as indicated by the curve ACE. Let us look 
now at what happens with the saved dollars. Since the consumer can invest a 
dollar at the interest rate / which he faces - a constant for him - he will receive t 
periods from now (1 + i)' dollars per dollar saved or expressed in continuous 
compounding terms eu dollars.8 However, the utility of a dollar which the 
consumer will receive in period t may be quite different from the utility of a 
present dollar because, for instance, he may have become much richer. If we 
denote the future utility of a dollar by ut, then we can denote the consumer's fu-
ture utility per dollar saved by u%- eu because of the interest he receives. Further, 
as discussed, the consumer will discount that future utility by his time prefe-
rence rate which we denote by p , and the present value of the future utility is 
thus ur e<-i~p)t. 
Since the consumer's future marginal utility curve is downward sloping, the 
present worth of the future utility of each subsequent dollar saved will decrease, 
as indicated by curve BCF. An equilibrium position will be reached at the point 
C, where u0 = ut- eli~p)t, or in words, where the present utility of a dollar of 
consumption foregone equals the time preference discounted value of that 
dollar's interest-compounded future utility. 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 175 
FIGURE 8.2. Present va lue of 
marg ina l ut i l i ty 
B 
E 
A F 
Sav ings 
0 D 
The consumer will thus save OD dollars when the interest rate is i. The curve 
BCF will move to the right when the interest rate increases and more will be 
saved and will move to the left inducing lower savings when the interest rate 
decreases. This analysis also allows for consumers who will not save at all 
because their time preference rate is so high that the curve BGF will be outside 
the savings quadrant so that they borrow funds. For each consumer, a savings 
curve can be constructed showing the savings of that consumer as a function of 
the interest rate. Summation for all savers will produce the savings curve for 
the country as a whole and intersection of that curve with the demand curve for 
capital will show the savings of the country. 
So far, the classical theory. Suppose now that our consumer represents the 
community as a whole and that his consumption equals the per capita con-
sumption of the community. Then his marginal utility u refers to the marginal 
utility of per capita consumption. Furthermore, we may assume, since our 
consumer speaks for the community, that he knows the value of the social 
discount rate d. Then the equilibrium position will be represented by the for-
mula u0 = ut- e(d~p)t or, alternatively ut = Uoe~id~p)t. From this it follows that 
the rate of decrease of marginal utility over time must equal p — d. Thus 
(du/dt)/u = p — d. For (du/dt)/u we may write: 
The bracketed expression in the formula represents the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of consumption with respect to per capita consumption, and the last 
term represents the growth rate of per capita consumption. The value of the 
marginal utility of consumption can, of course, only be found if we know the 
marginal utility function showing the consumer's marginal utility as a function 
of his 'richness.' One such function9 would be u = (b/c)" where b is a constant 
representing base level consumption, c is the actual consumption level of the 
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consumer and, as is well known, a is the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption with respect to consumption. 1 0 If we denote the growth rate of 
per capita consumption by g, it follows that: (du/dt)/u = p - d = - ccg, so that 
d = ag + p. Or in words, the social discount rate must equal the sum of the 
pure time preference rate and the decrease over time of the marginal utility of 
per capita consumption - expressed as the product of its elasticity with respect 
to per capita consumption and the growth rate of per capita consumption. 
This formula is intuitively easy to understand. If the marginal utility of con-
sumption decreases over time at the rate ag + p, then future consumption 
should be discounted at this rate to find its present value. 
Let us review now how the various writers have used this formula. ECK-
STEIN 1 1 assumes that the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (a) 
lies between 0.5 and 2.O. 1 2 Hence with a growth rate of per capita consumption 
of, say, 2 percent - in his opinion a not unreasonable figure for developing 
countries - the value of ag varies from 1.0 to 4.0 percent. Regarding the pure 
time preference rate, ECKSTEIN suggests that it can be computed from mortality 
statistics. Any individual should prefer a consumption plan that stresses early 
years to a plan that stresses later years, since the probability of survival is 
greater in the earlier years. 1 3 For consumption one year after the present, the 
time preference rate is equal to the probability of not surviving the next year. 
ECKSTEIN found that the probabilities of not surviving the next year for a coun-
try like India vary from 1 to 5 percent over a range of ages, which includes most 
of the population. Hence, there appears to be a perfectly rational explanation 
for individuals' time preferences. ECKSTEIN then discusses whether planners 
should take individual pure time preferences into account. On the one hand, 
society goes on forever and ignoring individuals' pure time preferences may 
well be in the long-run interest of society. On the other hand, ignoring indivi-
duals' preferences implies a dictatorial social welfare function. Moreover, 
there is evidence that the people in developing countries prefer projects yielding 
immediate benefits to projects yielding benefits at a later stage - such as large 
scale construction works. In ECKSTEIN'S opinion, the choice of the social dis-
count rate remains essentially a value judgment. There are objective factors 
that enter into the choice, such as the values of <x, g and p, but these must be 
combined with value judgments. 
The OECD Manual suggests that the social discount rate should be set at 
4 or 5 percent. In its first example, the Manual assumes that a = 2.0, g = 2 
percent and p = 0 percent, so that the social discount rate equals 4 percent. 1 4 
In its second example, the Manual distinguishes between workers in the tra-
ditional and in the modern sector and assumes that the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of consumption varies from 3.0 for the low-paid workers in the traditional 
sector to 0.67 for the high-paid workers in the modern sector. As typical annual 
income growth rates for the two sectors are 0.5 and 1.8 percent, respectively, 
the rate of fall over time of the marginal utility of consumption in the two sectors 
will be 1.5 and 1.2 percent per annum, respectively. Postulating that there is a 
pure time preference rate of around 2.5 percent, the Manual suggests that the 
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social discount rate cannot assume a higher value than about 5 percent. 1 5 
The UNIDO Guidelines sees the social discount rate as being determined 
solely by ag and does not pay any attention to the pure time preference rate, 
presumably because of the 'myopia' of individuals. It states explicitly that the 
determination of the social discount rate is a value judgment. However, since 
'it is unlikely that the political process, such as it is presently, is capable of 
quantitative articulation of such value judgments as the elasticity of marginal 
utility embodies,' 1 6 the UNIDO Guidelines recommends that the social dis-
count rate, like redistribution weights, be treated as an unknown in project 
formulation and evaluation. The hope is that by focusing policymakers' atten-
tion on the relevant social choices, the weights will eventually become known. 
Is there anything that can be added to all this? It has been shown 1 7 that an 
intertemporal utility theory is not possible without considering at the same time 
a rate of pure time preference. This can best be demonstrated as follows. Assume 
that the economy is on an optimal growth path. Then, as is customary in growth 
theory, we may treat wages - expressed in terms of used-up consumption 
goods - as interest on the 'capitalized value of labor.' Hence, we may define the 
value of the capital stock as the sum of the discounted value of consumption 
from zero to infinity, and this is presented by: 
K„ = SC,e-"'-dt = Cole-V-^'-dt 
If d = g, this expression will be infinite, which obviously cannot be correct. 
Because d = ag + p , it follows that if a = 1 there must be a pure time preference 
rate p in order to have a finite value for the capital stock. 
Let us assume now that p = o, but that a =f= 1. Integration of the expression 
is then possible because d =f- g and the formula for the capital stock is then 
K0 = C0/(d - g). However, if p — o and a < 1, it is readily seen from d = 
ag + p that d < g so that the value of K0 will be negative. Obviously, this 
cannot be correct and we may, therefore, conclude that in this case also p 
should be positive. This could also be illustrated by considering savings. The 
equation for K0 may be written as d- K0 = C0 + g- Ka, from which follows, 
because Y„ = C„ + I0 and d- Ko = Y0, the well-known growth theory formula 
that the optimal proportion of income saved s = I0/Y0 = g-K0/d-K„ = gjd. 
Substituting the value of d, this formula may be written as s = g/(ag + p). 
Hence, if p = o, and a < 1, we would arrive at the untenable result that more 
than present consumption should be saved. Thus, if a < 1, there must be a 
positive pure time preference rate p to get a finite value for the capital stock 
and a savings ratio of less than 1. 
Let us turn now to the case where a > 1. Then, if p = o, d would be larger 
than g and integration is possible. However, it is useful here to consider the 
total utility function. Integration of the marginal utility of consumption 
function u = (&/C)°\ gives two total utility functions: 
U = b« In C + A for a = 1, and 
178 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
U=Z - - ^ C - ' " - - 1 ' f o r c e d i. 
a - 1 
where A and Z are constants of integration. Consideration of the second 
equation shows that when a > 1, total utility approaches Z - the bliss level -
when C assumes large values. Since C, = C„- egt, so that C , ( 1 _ 0 , ) = C„- u - 0 , , • 
e(s~ag)t, the discounted value of the utility at a certain time t is: 
= Z ^ ' — • c 0 ( 1 <?- (<,-»>' 
a - / 
The integral of this from zero to infinity is the present value of the total expected 
utility. So long as d > g, the negative term will have a finite value. However, 
Z e _ p t will only be finite if p is positive. Because it is total utility that must be 
maximized and one cannot maximize something which is infinite, it is clear that 
in the case a > 1 the pure time preference rate must also have a positive value. 
Thus, in all cases, whether a. < 1, = 1 or > 1, there must be a positive pure 
time preference rate. As a result, the social discount rate cannot have extremely 
low values. As regards the pure time preference rate, we would be surprised if 
it were, say, lower than 5 percent. If a = 1, which, as discussed in the next 
Chapter, is probably the minimum value it can assume for low-income groups, 
which represent the bulk of the population, and the growth rate of per capita 
income is about 2 -3 percent, which is normal for developing countries, then 
the social discount rate will be about seven to eight percent. If one is not willing 
to accept this and wishes to use a lower time preference rate and a lower a, then 
the social discount rate would still probably not be lower than about five per-
cent. 
Various objections can be raised to the intertemporal utility analysis used 
above. The use of marginal utility of consumption curves with constant elasti-
city is mathematically convenient, but there is no reason why the curves must 
take this form. In addition, it is unrealistic to assume that the intertemporal 
optimum position is determined by equating the present marginal utility fore-
gone with the discounted value of the marginal utility at a certain future time. 
In reality, one does not normally give up present consumption for an increase 
in future consumption in a certain year, but for a flow of consumption in the 
future. 1 8 No satisfactory way of handling these problems has yet been devised. 
The theory which was presented here is, therefore, incomplete and presents 
only a partial description of reality. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the 
last section of this Chapter, we doubt seriously the validity of using a single 
discount rate for the community as a whole. In the next two sections, however, 
we will follow the literature in its use of a single social discount rate and will see 
where this leads us. 
Z — C 0 ( 1 _ o t ) - e<0-"*>' 
a — / 
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8.3. THE SHADOW PRICE OF INVESTMENT CONCEPT 
As was briefly mentioned, the first of the recent writers who proposed to 
base public investment decisions on a social discount rate lower than the market 
interestrate was ECKSTEIN. However, ECKSTEIN was well aware of the dangers 
of such an approach, i.e., that a naive use of a low cut-off rate would justify 
many projects of little economic value. He, therefore, makes the following 
suggestion: T propose the following compromise, which is designed to pre-
serve the long-time perspective of the federal program, yet would assure that 
only projects are undertaken in which capital yields as great a value as it would 
in its alternative employments: let the Government use a relatively low interest 
rate for the design and evaluation of projects, but let projects be considered 
justified only if the benefit-cost ratio is well in excess of 1.0.'19 
In the study just quoted, ECKSTEIN seems to feel that in the United States 
the social discount rate - d- is about 21J2 to 3 percent, and that the rate of return 
in the private sector - q - is about 6 percent. It may be remarked immediately 
that ECKSTEIN'S estimate of the return in the private sector appears rather low 
compared with those in most other studies. Be that as it may, ECKSTEIN uses 
the above quoted values of d and q. He assumes that investment and operating 
costs of the different projects are to be borne by the Government budget and 
he then shows that a typical Government project with an economic life of 50 to 
100 years must have a B/C ratio of about 1.3 if it is to produce a rate of return 
of 6 percent when its benefits are discounted at 3 percent. ECKSTEIN proposes 
that this ratio of 1.3 should be used as the cut-off B/C ratio for all Government 
projects. 
What ECKSTEIN has done is to put a shadow price on Government invest-
ments so that all Government projects should be evaluated in accordance with 
the norm: 
It may immediately be pointed out that ECKSTEIN'S criterion discriminates 
against projects with a short economic life for such projects must earn sub-
stantially more than six percent to pass the 1.3 cut-off test. This can most easily 
be shown if we use in the calculation of the shadow price of investment the N/K 
ratio which we believe is more in line with reality than the B/C rat io. 2 0 If we 
calculate the shadow price of investment (Pi„v) for a project with a very long 
economic life as ECKSTEIN suggests, say 100 years or more for simplicity's sake, 
the value of Pt„v = 0.06/0.03 = 2. Hence, in case of constancy of benefits, 
ECKSTEIN'S criterion is NAaiqz 2 K which can be written for the marginal 
project as: Vz-A^a^a = K. The internal rate of return criterion is: NAag]r = K. 
Thus, for the marginal project: 1/2dnj3 = atjr. Hence, we can calculate r which 
has been done below for a few projects with different economic lives. As the 
Table shows, the economic internal rates of return vary\ inversely with project 
t"i (1.03) ,= ! (1.03)' 
n 
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TABLE 8.2. Minimum internal rates of return of projects according to Eckstein's criterion. 
(Pmv = 2) 
Project Life 
0 0 years 
50 years 
25 years 
10 years 
6.0% 
7.6% 
10.5% 
19.5% 
life. In practice this means that under ECKSTEIN'S criterion Governments will 
mainly undertake projects with long lives so that it can be expected that the 
capital structure of a country will be deepened. 
While ECKSTEIN'S criterion was principally designed to preserve the effi-
ciency of the federal program and the capital-deepening effect appeared as a 
byproduct, other writers saw this effect as the principal justification for applying 
the criterion. It became, therefore, necessary to justify the criterion on theo-
retical grounds, rather than to base it on a suggestion. SEN, STEINER, MARGLIN 
and FELDSTEIN 2 1 have cast the benefit-cost analysis of public projects in terms 
of consumption created or foregone and have tried therewith to provide the 
theoretical foundation for the ECKSTEIN proposal. The benefit of a project 
should be measured in terms of the consumption it generates; its cost in terms 
of the consumption it foregos. MARGLIN , particularly, has written extensively 
about the social discount rate concept, and it may, therefore, be useful to 
review the concept as it appeared in his 1967 book on Public Investment 
Criteria 2 2 and in the 1972 UNIDO Guidelines 2 3 which he coauthored. 
The concept as such is relatively simple. The basic principle to remember is 
that consumption is to be taken as the numeraire. Suppose that the rate of return 
in the private sector is q percent and that this rate of return is entirely consumed. 
It then follows immediately that, if the public project displaces private invest-
ment, the shadow price of public investment is q/d, where (/represents the social 
discount rate at which consumption is to be valued. Assume that the opportuni-
ty cost of capital - the rate of return in the private sector - is 12.5 percent and 
that the social discount rate has the value of 5.0 percent. Then the shadow price 
of public investment is 2.5. Hence, the present worth of the benefits of the 
government project should be 150 percent higher than the present value of the 
investments - where both present values are calculated at the social discount 
rate of 5.0 percent. Or. expressed as a formula: 
However, the rate of return in the private sector is never entirely consumed, 
part of it is reinvested. MARGLIN has shown 2 4 that then the shadow price of 
investment - Pi„v - can be represented by the formula (q - sq)/(d - sq), where 
s is the reinvested part, i.e., the marginal savings coefficient of the private sector. 
( =i (1 + dy 
- > 2 . 5 £ 
= 1 (1 + d)' 
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The proof is easy to follow. The numerator q - sq represents that part of the 
returns that will immediately be consumed. The remainder sq will immediately 
be reinvested. However, since sq will produce an annual return, it should also 
be valued at the shadow price of investment. The annual return from a dollar 
of investment is thus {q - sq) + Pu,v sq. Since the present value of that annual 
return must be equal to Pi„v, we have 
Pi„v = — s4)_+^Pmvsq^ which when solved for PmV reduces to: 
d 
P - sq 
1 mv — 
a - sq 
Thus, if q = 12.5 percent, d = 5 percent and s = 20 percent, the shadow price 
of public investment is (12.5 - 2.5)/(5 - 2.5) = 4.0 and any public investment 
should be valued at a premium of 300 percent. 
Let us illustrate the principle with an example using the shadow price of 
investment found above. Assume that the public investments are 100 and the 
annual returns - for simplicity's sake in perpetuity - are 12.5. Assume that of 
those particular returns, 20 percent will be reinvested. What is then the social 
rate of return of the project? Consider the following cost-benefit stream: 
TABLE 8.3. 
Yr. 0 Annually Yrs 1 thru 0 0 
Costs 
Investment 100 
Premium on Investment (300 %) 300 
Social Value of Investment 400 
Net Benefits 
Consumption Part of Benefits 
Investment Part of Benefits 
Premium on Ivestment Part (300 %) 
Social Value of Benefits 
10.0 
2.5 
7.5 
20.0 
The social rate of return is 20/400 = 5 percent and equal to the social discount 
rate. This result is, of course, not very surprising because the values of the 
benefit stream are exactly the same as those used for the calculation of the 
shadow price of investment. 
Following the procedures outlined above for estimating the social rate of 
return of a project, we may write the general criterion for acceptance/rejection 
of a Government project as: 
(8.1.) tW-*) + "<*_l!->KP^ 
t = ! (1 + d)' 
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where s* is the invested part of the net benefits and as before N is net benefits, 
Ptnv is the shadow price of investments, d is the social discount rate, and K is 
the present value of the investments, found by discounting at the rate d. 
Before proceeding further we must mention that M A R G L I N in the UNIDO 
Guidelines also mentions briefly that the resources required for public invest-
ment may come out of consumption rather than alternative investment. 2 5 It 
is stated that in such a case, the righthand side of formula 8.1 should read 
K (a™ Pinv + acons) rather than K P^v, where ainv and acons represent the pro-
portions of private investment and private consumption displaced, respectively. 
However, the Guidelines do not consider this possibility further 2 6 and seem to 
assume that the funds for the Government investment come entirely from 
foregone private investments. The same assumption is implicity made in the 
OECD Manual. We will discuss this matter further in Section 8.5. 
Finally, we may mention that the OECD Manual does not follow the ap-
proach outlined above but that it takes savings instead of consumption as the 
numeraire. Since the present value of the consumption generated by $ 1 of 
investment is Pj„„, the value of a dollar of present consumption expressed in 
terms of savings is 1/P&,„. Furthermore, the benefits of a project are not dis-
counted at the social discount rate d- which the Manual calls the consumption 
rate of interest - but at a so-called investment or accounting rate of interest 
a.21 The use of this accounting rate of interest is necessary because under the 
OECD approach savings are used as the numeraire. Hence, the discount rate 
to be used - the accounting rate of interest - should be the rate at which the 
weight on savings relative to consumption falls over time. In terms of a formula, 
the relationship between a and d may be written as: 
In words, this formula tells us that the accounting rate of interest is equal to the 
consumption rate of interest plus the rate of fall over time of the premium on 
savings. Thus, only if Pi„„ is constant over time will the accounting rate of 
interest be equal to the social discount rate. 
The difference between the OECD approach and UNIDO formula 8.1 may 
be illustrated with a simple example. 2 8 Consider a two period cost-benefit 
stream. Then the OECD criterion is: 
For the above formula of the accounting rate of interest we may also write 
a, = d, + Pinv(t) — Pirw(t+l) 
Pinv(t) 
+ Nis* 
> K 
(1 + «) 
Pinv (1+1) 
Substituting this into the OECD formula, we get 
(1 + at) = (1 + d t ) ~ 
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This is the same as the UNIDO formula 8.1 which assumes that the value of Pim 
is constant over time. The OECD Manual is, of course, quite right that over 
time Pi„c should assume lower values so that eventually Pu,v = 1 when indeed 
an optimum savings situation has been reached. Also, the social discount rate 
for discounting the benefits of period t is then not (1 + d) but (1 + di) ... 
(1 + dt-i) (1 + dt). However, the Manual gives no guidance as to how the 
successive discount rates should be determined. In fact, in all its case studies it 
assumes a constant shadow price of investment and a constant discount rate. 
The OECD Manual also derives a shadow price of investment by considering 
reinvestments. However, the Manual emphasizes that within a reasonable time 
period - its examples are 1 0 years and 2 0 years - consumption and investment 
will be equally desirable. Its standard formula is, therefore, different from the 
standard UNIDO formula, which assumes that the relevant parameters d, q, 
and s remain unchanged over t ime. 3 0 It should be noted that the OECD Manual 
makes an error 3 1 in deriving Pi„v and that in our annotation it should be pre-
sented by : 3 2 
(q ~ sq) (1 + d) (1 + sqf \(q- sq)(l+d) l 
(1 + df \ (sq - d) (sq - d) 
The OECD formula will lead to much lower values for Pi„v than the UNIDO 
formula. For instance, if we use values of q = 12.5 percent, d = 5 percent and 
s = 2 0 percent, and if we take Tat 2 0 years as OECD suggests, then the OECD 
shadow price of investment will be 2.2 , while UNIDO's value is 4 .0 . Two 
different assumptions underly these formulas. The UNIDO approach assumes 
that the Government faces severe constraints in expanding its budget so that 
the optimum investment situation is a long way off. OECD assumes a more 
flexible Government budget. It seems to us that the OECD assumption that it 
takes only 1 0 to 2 0 years before the optimum investment level is reached, is 
rather optimistic in that one could have made the same assumption 1 0 or 2 0 
years ago as regards the present situation. The UNIDO assumption may, there-
fore, be more realistic. 
8.4. COMPARISON O F T H E U N I D O A N D O E C D CRITERIA W I T H T H E 
TRADITIONAL CRITERION 
We have so far discussed the principles of the social discount rate approach 
and how the various manuals propose to estimate the social discount rate and 
the shadow price of investment. It will now be useful to analyze what the conse-
quences are of the application of the social discount rate cum shadow price of 
investment criterion in terms of the traditional economic rate of return criterion. 
To analyze this matter we will make the simplifying assumption that the net 
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benefits of the project in question are constant. Denoting as before the invested 
part of the benefits by s*, the social discount rate cum shadow price of invest-
ment criterion for the marginal project is 
7V(1 - s*)ag]i + Ns*Pinv a„ld = KPinv 
The internal rate of return criterion is Nah~jr = K. Hence, it follows that for the 
marginal projects: 
_ (1 - s*)agjd + s*PmV a„-jd 
Un]r 
Pinv 
If we calculate the values of <%> for various values of a^a, Pinv and s*, we can 
find the minimum internal rate of return which a project should have before 
it qualifies for acceptance under the social rate of return criterion. It should 
be noted that this minimum internal rate of return is calculated in the conven-
tional way, i.e., the benefit and cost streams do not include the shadow price 
of investment. 
We may illustrate the approach with two examples. What we are interested 
in finding is the economic internal rate of return of a Government project that 
would just be accepted under the social rate of return criterion proposed by 
UNIDO and OECD. Thus, if the social discount rate d is 5 percent, then the 
social internal rate of return of such a project should be 5 percent. Consider 
the following two cost-benefit streams. In both cases the social internal rates of 
return of the projects are 5 percent, but the economic internal rates of return are 
9 percent and 19.6 percent, respectively. 
The calculation illustrated in Table 8.5 has been done for a number of projects 
with varying parameters. Consider Tables 8.6 and 8.7. We have taken the 
previously used values for the opportunity cost of capital q of 12.5 percent and 
TABLE 8.5. 
Project A Project B 
Project Life ° ° Project Life 10 years 
Costs in Year 0 
Investments 100 100 
Premium on Investments (300 %) 300 300 
400 400 
Annual Benefit Stream 
Consumption Part of Benefits (60%) 5.4 14.1 
Reinvestment Part of Benefits (40 %) 3.6 9.4 
Premium on Reinv. Benefits (300%) 10.8 28.2 
Social Benefits 19.8 51.7 
Social Internal Rate of Return 5% 5% 
(from 19.8/400) (from 51.7 x an\, 
Economic Internal Rate of Return 9% 19.6% 
(from 9/100) (from 23.5 x aw\i 
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for the overall savings ratio of 20 percent. However, the social discount rate d is 
assumed to take values of 5 percent through 15.0 percent. Table 8.6 follows the 
UNIDO approach in calculating P™, Table 8.7 the OECD approach. 3 3 With 
the given values for q, s and d, the UNIDO values for Pinv are 0.8 through 4; 
the OECD values 0.93 through 2.22. Both tables include three series of calcu-
lations. The first assumes that all the project benefits will be consumed (s* = 
0 percent); the second that 20 percent of the benefits - the same as the national 
marginal savings rate - will be invested (s* = 20 percent); and the third that 
40 percent of the benefits - a very high rate - will be invested {s* = 40 percent). 
Let us analyze the tables for the cases d = q, d > q and d < q. As is to be 
expected, each table shows that when d = q, then q - the opportunity cost of 
capital - represents the cut-off rate. This case represents no special features 
and we may turn, therefore, immediately to the other cases. 
A series of interesting conclusions can be drawn when d < q. In all examples, 
the economic rates of return of the projects should be higher than d. But the 
series s* = 0 percent has a higher cut-off rate of return than the series s* = 
20 percent and the series s* = 20 percent a higher cut-off rate than the series 
s* = 40 percent. In other words, there is a penalty on projects when the benefits 
TABLE 8.6. Minimum internal rates of return of projects according to UNIDO Intertemporal 
Social Analysis 1. 
s* = 
T 
0% 
? s d Pino 
Project Life in Years 
° ° 50 25 10 
CO 
o o 
o o 
o o 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
5% 
7.5% 
12.5% 
15.0% 
4 
2 
1 
0.8 
20.0% 21.9% 28.2% 54.7% 
15.0% 15.4% 18.0% 26.4% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
12.0% 12.0% 11.6% 9.5% 
S* = 
T 
20% 
q d Pinv 
Project Life in Years 
o o 50 25 10 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
5% 
7.5% 
12.5% 
15.0% 
4 
2 
1 
0.8 
12.5% 13.7% 17.6% 30.0% 
12.5% 12.8% 14.4% 20.5% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.2% 10.5% 
S* = 
T 
40% 
<? s d Pinv 
Project Life in Years 
o o 50 25 10 
o o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
5% 
7.5% 
12.5% 
15.0% 
4 
2 
1 
0.8 
9.0% 9.9% 12.2% 19.6% 
10.7% 11.0% 12.1% 16.2% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
13.0% 13.0% 12.8% 11.5% 
1 Formula: 
„ _ (1 - S*)Onld + S*PinvOhld 
uhlr — ' 
Pinv 
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TABLE 8.7. Minimum internal rates of return of projects according to OECD Intertemporal 
Social Analysis. 1 
s* = 
T 
0% 
1 s d 
Project Life in Years 
o o 50 25 10 
20 
20 
20 
20 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
5% 
7-5% 
12.5% 
15.0% 
2.22 
1.71 
1.00 
0.93 
11.1% 12.1% 15.3% 
12.8% 13.2% 14.9% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
13.9% 13.9% 13.8% 
26.0% 
21.3% 
12.5% 
13.1% 
= 
T 
20% 
1 s d Pinv 
Project Life in Years 
c o 50 25 10 
20 
20 
20 
20 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
5% 
7-5% 
12.5% 
15.0% 
2.22 
1.71 
1.00 
0.93 
8.9% 9.7% 11.9% 
11.2% 11.5% 12.8% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
14.1% 14.1% 14.0% 
19.1% 
17.4% 
12.5% 
13.5% 
s* = 
T 
40% 
1 s d Pinv 
Project Life in Years 
o o 50 25 10 
20 
20 
20 
20 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
5% 
7-5% 
12.5% 
15.0% 
2.22 
1.71 
1.00 
0.93 
7.5% 8.0% 9.6% 
10.0% 10.2% 11.1% 
12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
14.4% 14.4% 14.3% 
14.2% 
14.7% 
12.5% 
13.8% 
1 Formula: 
„_ _ (1 - s*)ahid + s*Ptnv- aha 
Unlr • 
Pinv 
In this Table, Pi„v has been calculated as per the OECD formula quoted in the main text, 
except for the case that d = q where P-mv has been set at 1. OECD's value of Pinv in this case 
would be slightly higher than 1. This is due to the simplifying assumption which was made in 
deriving the OECD formula for Phw that the consumption stream is instantaneously generated. 
are consumed rather than invested. Second, the lowest cut-off rates are found 
for projects with long lives. Hence, there is a penalty on projects with a short 
life. All of these conclusions are to be expected if we accept the criteria. 
However, both tables, in particular the UNIDO table, show surprising results. 
For instance, the UNIDO approach implies that the Government should not 
undertake a project with a short life of 10 years and zero reinvestment unless 
the project's rate of return is at least 54 percent. In the OECD case the rate of 
return should be at least 26 percent. This means that unless one attaches weights 
to the income increase of project beneficiaries, which would increase the rates 
of return, such projects should not be undertaken. In practice, Governments 
should thus not undertake projects for middle-income groups - the groups on 
whose incomes no distributional weights can be placed. Thus Governments, 
for instance, should never undertake a tube-well program or construct feeder 
roads and the like for average income farmers. 
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Let us now turn to the case where d > q. None of the manuals mention this 
possibility, but it is quite possible - namely, if the investment program is con-
sidered too large - and we see, therefore, no reason not to discuss it. Both tables 
show that the cut-off rates are lower than d. Furthermore, short-life projects 
are favored and depending on the value of PmV, the cut-off rate may even be 
lower than the opportunity cost of capital rate q (Table 8,6). Thus, tube-well 
and feederroad programs would not even need to earn the opportunity cost of 
capital rate q. 
It thus appears that the social discount rate cum shadow price of investment 
approach results in dichotomies.In the case ofd<q, we find that Governments 
should not undertake short-life projects for average income groups unless the 
economic rate of return is extremely high. In the cases where d > q, short-life 
projects do not even need to earn the opportunity cost of capital rate q. Re-
garding the first possibility, which is normally the case, we see of course that 
Governments in developing countries undertake short-life projects. Regarding 
the second possibility, we would expect that Governments would not undertake 
short-life projects for average income groups if they intend to curtail their 
investment programs. It is clear that something is wrong with the proposed 
criteria and that the UNIDO and OECD analyses should be reconsidered. 3 4 
8.5. CRITICISM OF THE UNIDO AND OECD CRITERIA 
Our criticism of the UNIDO and OECD criteria for investment planning 
will be brief. We believe that the distribution of income between consumption 
and investment is not the relevant concept for analyzing the intertemporal 
income distribution problem, but that the correct concept should be the distri-
bution of income between persons. In other words, we see the intertemporal 
income distribution problem as a special aspect of the interpersonal income 
distribution problem. We will illustrate this by reviewing in detail (a) the shadow 
price of investment; (b) the so-called shadow wage rate; and (c) the social 
discount rate. 
To start our critical review of the shadow price of investment concept, it 
may be useful to reconsider briefly the general formula for the acceptance of 
a project: 
(8.1.) 2, :. > KPinv 
«=» (1 + dy 
The underlying assumption for Government projects with respect to the right-
hand side of the formula is that the Government investment displaces an 
equivalent amount of private investment. Is this correct? The criterion seems 
rather odd because in many developing countries, Government funds are ob-
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tained from export duties and import duties which displace private consumption 
rather than private investment. It is worthwhile then to review the few cases 
where the literature discusses the possibility that public investments displace 
private consumption. 
As mentioned in Section 8.3, MARGLIN mentions explicitly the possibility 
that private consumption can be displaced. The right-hand side of (8.1) is then 
K (ainvPinv + acms) rather than K Pi„v. However, it also seems that he does not 
attach much importance to it. In the Harvard study 3 5 MARGLIN shows an 
example where the amount of private investment displaced by each dollar of 
public investment is 75 percent, so that the amount of private consumption 
displaced is 25 percent. In an example in his Public Investment Criteria, 3 6 the 
amount of private investment displaced has risen to 90 percent. In the UNIDO 
Guidelines the examples assume that public investment displaces only private 
investment and not consumption, and one is led to believe that MARGLIN feels 
that this must be true in approximation. 3 7 Why this should be so is nowhere 
explained. 
In the first edition of his book M I S H A N 3 8 seems to feel that public investment 
can displace private consumption to a considerable extent. He quotes MARGLIN'S 
general displacement formula and then makes the distinction that the public 
funds can be raised by taxes or by borrowing. In the latter case, he states that 
the Government investment would displace private investment. However, if the 
funds were raised by direct taxation and the aggregate marginal propensity to 
save of the country were 20 percent, then 80 percent of the funds required for 
a public project would displace consumption and 20 percent private investment. 
Nevertheless, MISHAN then argues that since the funds taken from consumption 
could just as well have been invested instead in the private sector, these funds 
should be valued similarly to the funds taken from private investment. In other 
words, MISHAN feels that the right-hand side of (8.1) should remain P mv even 
if 80 percent of the public investment represents consumption foregone. 
As FELDSTEIN 3 9 has pointed out, MISHAN'S reasoning is not correct. The 
actual opportunity cost of any resource is its value in the alternative use to 
which it would have been put and not to which it could have been put. The 
funds taken from consumption can indeed be invested by Government in the 
private sector but if there is a constraint on public funds, Government will use 
the resources for public investments. It is this second-best consideration that 
should be instrumental in valuing the appropriated funds as displaced con-
sumption. In MISHAN'S example then, if the funds raised by the Government 
displace private investment for 20 percent and private consumption for 80 
percent, the correct shadow price of Government funds would be (0.2 Pi„v + 
0.8). 4 0 
The sources from which the Government obtains its funds are thus impor-
tant. As M U S G R A V E 4 1 has pointed out, if the funds are withdrawn from con-
sumption, the likelihood that a public investment would qualify would be much 
greater than if the funds are largely withdrawn from private investment. 
FELDSTEIN 4 2 accepts this and analyzes in detail the relation between the sources 
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of finance and the value of public projects. However, this very interesting ana-
lysis does not concern us here. The point we wish to make is that if the shadow 
price of Government funds does depend on the relative displacements of con-
sumption and investment, then it is also crucially important to know whose 
consumption and whose investment is being displaced. In other words, inter-
personal income distribution considerations must be taken into account. 
Let us turn now to the so-called shadow wage rate formula. Both the OECD 
Manual and the UNIDO Guidelines seem to have been inspired for the deriva-
tion of this formula by the LEWIS labor surplus theory. We reviewed this theory 
in Chapter 3 and saw there that the opportunity cost of a laborer in the urban 
area is not equal to his foregone marginal product in agriculture because other 
agricultural workers are induced to migrate to the cities. This subject is not 
discussed in the Manual or the Guidelines; it is assumed in both that it is eco-
nomically advantageous to transfer a laborer from the agricultural sector to the 
industrial sector as long as his marginal product in agriculture is lower than in 
industry. 
Let us assume that the creation of one new job causes indeed only one man 
to shift out of agriculture. Then if investments are optimal in the economy, the 
traditional theory would argue that investments in industry are justified when 
where the incremental output to capital ratio in the industrial sector is y, the 
number of laborers per dollar of investment is /, the marginal product of labor 
in agriculture is m, and the opportunity cost of capital is q. Let us now assume 
that the country's investment program is not optimal and that the Government 
funds displace an equivalent amount of private investments. Then the OECD 
Manual argues that the relevant formula should be: 
In this formula w represents the wage rate, a the accounting rate of interest, 
y-lw the capitalists' profits which the OECD Manual assumes will all be rein-
vested, and Iw - Im the increase in consumption of the laborers, which incurs 
a penalty (it should be recalled that OECD uses investment as the numeraire). 4 3 
The numerator of the formula can be rearranged as follows: 
This is easy to understand. Employing a laborer reduces capitalists' investments 
by w and increases a laborer's consumption by w - m. Since consumption is 
worth 1 jPi„v of investments, the social cost of employing a laborer must be the 
y - Im 
(y - lw) + 
> 1 
a 
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bracketed expression. The OECD Manual calls this the shadow wage ra te . 4 4 
In their sequel volume 4 5 to the OECD Manual, LITTLE and MIRRLEES 
consider the matter further. There are now two ways to estimate Pi„v. The first, 
as discussed in Section 8.3, and the second by analyzing what the social value of 
the consumption increase of the workers would be. Denoting the utility increase 
of a worker by Uw - Um, it follows from the shadow wage rate formula that 
Uw - Um = (w - m)/PmV. The utility increase can, of course, only be measured 
if a marginal utility of consumption function is specified.46 L and M suggest 
that the function u = (b/cf should be used, where u is marginal utility of con-
sumption, b the base consumption level, c the per capita consumption of the 
group being analyzed, and a. the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption 
with respect to consumption. As regards b, L and M postulate that this is the 
level at which the Government makes subsidy payments to the poor. 4 7 Hence, 
by estimating b. w. m and a, the value of Pinv can also be calculated in this alter-
native manner. 
Let us see how the actual calculation takes place. We will use values for b, w, 
m and a from an example of L and M, and will ignore such complications as the 
possibility that the consumption level of the migrants in the backward sector 
may be higher than their marginal product of labor or that an increase of demand 
for labor in the modern sector may cause an increase in the urban wage rates. 
These complications can easily be introduced into the formula but will only 
clutter the example. Assuming the following values: 
b - Rs 600 
w = Rs 1500 
m = Rs 750 
a = 2, 
then w - m = Rs 750. and Uw- Um = 255 utils, 4 8 and from Pinv = (w - m)j 
(Uw - Um), it follows that the value of Pua, is 2.94. 
L and M's analysis invites comment. First, it seems to us that the alternative 
method for estimating Pi„v is not very helpful for operational work, since the 
estimate of b - the base consumption level - will always be very haphazard. 
Furthermore, in most developing countries no direct subsidy payments are 
made to the poor. Nor is there much sense in looking at the income level at 
which a man just escapes the direct income tax - as also suggested by L and 
M 4 9 - , because income tax levels are notoriously rigid, seldom adjusted. As 
regards the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption function, L and M 
suggest that a may assume values varying from 0.67 to 3, but no guidance is 
given as to which value should be chosen. Much more fundamental, however, 
is the question why L and M choose the subsidy to the poor level as a measure of 
base consumption. The answer is, of course, that only then will the alternative 
method of estimating Pi„„ give values comparable to the Pmv estimates of Sec-
tion 8.3. Furthermore, only by choosing the subsidy to the poor level as the base 
consumption level does the shadow wage rate formula continue to be valid. 
As the marginal utility of consumption function u = (b/c)x shows, if c is much 
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FIGURE 8.3. Income 
we igh t s 
larger than b, as would be the case for capitalist consumption, then the inter-
personal distribution weight for that class would be zero. But since savings are 
reckoned at face value, capitalists' income - which is supposed to be saved -
receives again the weight of one. Thus, in the shadow rate formula, capitalists' 
income (y - Iw) continues to receive the weight of one, even though from an 
interpersonal income distribution point of view the weight should be zero. 
The discriminatory nature of L and M's method will by now, have become 
very clear. Figure 8.3 depicts the income weights which L and M use: the weights 
are greater than 1 for incomes below the base level income b, they decrease 
rapidly to 0 and rise to 1 for the rich groups who save almost all of their in-
comes. It appears then that the social discount rate cum shadow price of invest-
ment methodology does after all include interpersonal income distribution 
weights. However, these are so discriminatory that it needs no elaboration that 
the methodology will probably not be accepted by the body politic if the values 
of the weights are brought out into the open. 
Finally, a few words about the social discount rate concept. In Section 8.2 
we defined the social discount rate as the rate of fall of the marginal utility of 
consumption of the representative consumer over time. Hence, if the marginal 
utility of consumption function is u = (b/cf, we get 
du/dt _ du/dt c dc/dt _ _ 
u u dc/dt c 
The same result is obtained if we work with a marginal utility of income 
schedule of the form given above instead of a marginal utility of consumption 
schedule. 
We would like to show now that the social discount rate can also be derived 
from the general formula for the derivation of interpersonal income distribution 
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weights, and we will proceed as follows. The social weight (vp) to be attached to 
additions to income of a person at a certain income level is, of course, deter-
mined by the formula v„ = up/ub where up is the marginal utility of additions to 
the income level yp and m is the marginal utility of additions to thé base income 
level yb. Hence, with a marginal utility of income schedule of the form u = 
(b/yf we get vp = yp-'/jn,-' = yb/yP. 
Essentially the same formula can be used to derive the social discount rate 
by applying it to utility levels at different points in time. The relevant formula 
is then : 
Zat = = — — - - = e 
Uao (yao) " (jao) * 
where the subscript a denotes that we are dealing with our representative 
consumer and zt = the intertemporal weight, ut = the marginal utility of in-
come at time t, u„ = the marginal utility of income at time o, and g„ = the 
growth rate of income. We thus obtain the familiar result that the marginal 
utility of future income falls at the rate - <xga. Hence, if there is also a pure time 
preference rate pa, project benefits and costs should be discounted at the rate 
da= Pa + ga-
Let us now suppose that we wish to calculate the intertemporal weight on the 
incomes of a group of persons whose incomes are not representative and whose 
incomes grow at a rate different to ga, let us say the poor. Then the intertemporal 
weight for the poor over time will be presented by the formula dp=pP + txPgP50-
Benefits and costs of projects geared toward raising the incomes of the poor 
should not, therefore, be discounted at the rate da but at a different rate dp. 
The upshot of this discussion is that we cannot speak of a single social discount 
rate when incomes of different income classes grow at different rates, since 
there are then as many social discount rates as there are income classes. This is 
not surprising of course. In the real world we cannot identify a representative 
income earner or consumer and the concept of a single social discount rate based 
on such an average person, therefore, breaks down. 
It may be argued that there is still the possibility that the social discount rate 
would equal the rate of fall of the marginal utility of total income. Although it 
may well be possible that a planner has somehow dreamed up a function of the 
marginal utility of the economy's total income, we believe that such a function 
cannot be defended because it is not the growth of national income that is 
important but the growth of the different income classes. H A Q 5 1 has discussed 
this point in detail. The hot pursuit of growth in the Sixties has indeed resulted 
in fairly respectable GNP growth rates, especially by historical standards, but 
at the same time has increased income disparities. Pakistan, for instance, which 
was considered a model of development, showed during the Sixties an increase 
in unemployment, a decline in real wages in the industrial sector by one-third, 
a doubling of the income disparity between East and West, and an increased 
concentration of industrial wealth. As a result, according to HAQ , the system 
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exploded in 1968, not only for political reasons, but also because of economic 
unrest. 
If we are so critical of the social discount rate cum shadow price of investment 
methodology and its growth of national income approach, the question arises -
.what then? The difference between the UNIDO and OECD criteria and the 
approach we propose can be brought back to our view of the role of Govern-
ment. Both the UNIDO and OECD approaches see Governments as having 
all-encompassing powers with respect to what type of investments should be 
undertaken. Because in the UNIDO approach no guidance is given as to the 
estimate of the interpersonal consumption weights, all the decisions have to be 
taken at the top level. In the OECD approach, decentralized decision-making 
is possible. However, both criteria are discriminatory. LITTLE and MIRLEES 
consider their system specially suitable for a well-managed socialist economy 5 2 
but, in reality, of course it can only be applied if the Government assumes a 
dictatorial role, discriminating against average income earners. 
In our approach, the level of investments as well as the distribution between 
persons of the benefits of investments are the relevant concepts and the role of 
Government is seen as that of an intermediary which should implement the 
population's value consensus objectives. If the investments of a country are 
considered too low, then the Government's role is to promote private invest-
ments by appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. Often we see in the develop-
ing countries that Governments do use these instruments and that they are 
able to influence the profit rate of the private sector and therewith the overall 
investment level. As discussed in Section 8.1, there is then no need to introduce 
the concept of a social discount rate and, in the absence of budget constraints, 
the opportunity cost of capital is then the relevant concept. A budget constraint 
would become binding if the Government is not allowed to transfer funds from 
the private sector and it wishes to undertake more projects than it has funds 
available. As discussed in Chapter 5, the relevant cut-off rate for the evaluation 
of Government projects is then no longer the opportunity cost of capital q but 
the budget constraint rate b. 
If the Government is not allowed to use fiscal and monetary policies to ex-
pand the overall investment level, then it may well be that the consensus of 
opinion in the country is that investments should not be expanded. Also, in this 
case, there is then no need to apply the shadow price of investment algorithm. 
Suppose, however, that the consensus of opinion is that investments are 
suboptimal. Suppose further that the body politic does not allow the Govern-
ment the use of fiscal and monetary policies to promote investments. Then the 
algorithm could be used to deepen the capital structure of the country provided 
at the same time appropriate personal weights are attached to additions to the 
incomes of the poorest and the richest income groups in order to adhere to the 
principle that these groups should have social discount rates different from that 
of the middle income group. However, even then it would remain valid that 
this system of project evaluation discriminates against the middle income groups. 
194 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
It seems to us, therefore, that usually the body politic will reject the system if it 
becomes aware of the system's discriminatory nature, and that it will prefer to 
achieve its objectives through the use of fiscal and monetary policies. 
Our analysis thus leads us to conclude that the social discount rate cum 
shadow price of investment approach to public investment decisions should 
usually be rejected and that usually the normal traditional discount rates should 
be used to evaluate Government projects. However, the analysis of which 
investments - public as well as private - are acceptable and which are not, can 
only be undertaken if interpersonal income distribution aspects are taken into 
account. How this should be done will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
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differ from the pure time preference rate of the average income earner pa. 
5 1 HAQ, M. ul, 'Employment in the 1970s: A New Perspective,' Speech at World Con-
ference, Ottawa, May 1971. 
5 2 LITTLE and MIRRLEES, 'Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries,' p. 
350. 
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9. I N T E R P E R S O N A L I N C O M E D I S T R I B U T I O N A S P E C T S 
9.1. PROJECT PLANNING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
INCOME BETWEEN PERSONS 
So far the discussion in this study has centered on the rules to be followed 
for project planning purposes if interpersonal income distribution considera-
tions are not taken into account. Often, however, the purpose of a project is to 
raise the incomes of certain groups of people - rural poor, urban poor, target 
groups in particular regions, and the like. How should such projects be designed, 
evaluated and ranked? 
The basic objective of the theory of project planning is to find rules for the 
maximization of national welfare. Where income distribution is neglected, the 
marginal utility of income of every individual either benefitting or losing from 
a project is assumed to be the same and constant. Hence, the net benefit of a 
project is then the sum of the gains and losses in real income accruing to the 
participants, which is represented by the area between the demand and cost 
curves. The objective function can be written as: W = YP + Ya where Yp and 
Ya are the gains in real income of consumers and producers, respectively. 
Since Yp equals (B - R) and Ya equals (R - C), where B is benefits, R revenues 
and C costs, this can also be written as W = (B - R) + (R - Q, which is, of 
course, the familiar criterion that B - C should be maximized. 
In cases where income distribution is deemed to have an influence on national 
welfare, the objective function becomes more complex. Traditionally, it has 
been held that income distribution was not important in project planning and 
evaluation because an appropriate distribution of income between persons 
could always be achieved through the transfer mechanism, i.e., by taxing high-
income persons and transferring to low-income persons. In other words, the 
baking of the pie was to be considered separately from the slicing of the pie. 
The traditional benefit-cost analysis would ensure that the largest possible pie 
would be baked; the transfer mechanism would ensure that it would be distri-
buted in appropriate slices. ECKSTEIN and others, however, believe that income 
distribution considerations should be included in the objective function. If the 
policymaker specifies some detailed rules, such as one that states that a certain 
minimum amount of income must accrue to a particular group, the formulation 
of the objective function is a relatively simple task. Often, however, no such 
rules are provided. ECKSTEIN suggests that the economist should then try to 
draw up specific objective functions and experiment with these. The following 
quote may illustrate this. 'For example, he (the economist) can assume a certain 
shape for the marginal utility of income function. He may assume some elasti-
city to his curve, or he may choose to use a form of the function that has been 
implicitly produced by the political process. The effective marginal rates of the 
personal income tax at different income levels can be interpreted as implying a 
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marginal utility of income curve. If the Government is assumed to act on the 
principle of equi-marginal sacrifice, then marginal effective tax rates can be the 
basis for deriving a measure of the Government's notion of marginal utilities 
of income.' 1 
Accepting ECKSTEIN'S suggestion, HAVEMAN 2 analyzed some 147 water 
resource development projects in the 1 0 southern states of the USA and found 
that the rate of return of 7 2 projects, about 5 0 percent of the total number, was 
less than 5.5 percent. When, however, welfare weights based on personal income 
taxes were attached to the benefits and costs of the different projects, it appeared 
that only 2 5 of the projects, about 1 8 percent, earned less than a 5.5 percent 
rate of return. 3 HAVEMAN concluded that the redistribution of income through 
some economically inefficient projects may well be a desirable technique.4 
MARGLIN also maintains that the objective function should include income 
redistribution considerations. According to him, income cannot be redistri-
buted by means of a transfer mechanism without violating institutional and 
political barriers. Direct subsidies are often vigorously opposed and lump-sum 
taxes are politically even more undesirable. Thus MARGLIN concludes that 
'income must be redistributed through such means as development of water 
resource projects with accompanying inefficiencies, if desired income redistri-
bution goals are to be achieved without violating institutional and political 
arrangements valued in the community.'3 MARGLIN accepts as an established 
fact that the price of a project's output will be determined at a higher level of the 
planning process and discusses three alternative ways of formulating the ob-
jective function. 
The first is that net benefits should be maximized with respect to project size, 
subject to the constraint that the income of system beneficiaries should be 
raised to at least a certain specified level. Using the notation followed here, 
this may be expressed as: 
.Max. B - C subject to B - R > Ai 
The second is that the income distribution weighted sum of the net benefits 
should be maximized. If the consumers of the project's product are a homo-
geneous group, we may write this as: 
Max. v(B - R) + (R- Q 
where the weight v is determined in relation to the Government's income 
(R - C) which assumes a weight of unity. Finally, the third alternative: this 
states that the objective is to maximize the redistribution benefits subject to the 
constraint that the loss in efficiency should not exceed a certain level. The 
objective function is then: 
Max. (B - R) subject to B - C > A2 
Assuming that the constraints are binding, and solving the Lagrangean 
formulations of the first and third alternatives, the first order condition as 
regards X is: X = (dC - dB)/(dB - dR). The same value is found for (v - 1) 
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when the first order condition for the maximization of the second objective 
function is determined. It means that project size should be expanded until 
the marginal loss in efficiency (dC - AB) equals the marginal net redistribution 
gain (AB - AR) weighted with the distribution premium (v - 1). The condition 
may also be written as 1 + X = v = (AC - AR)/(AB - AR), which is perhaps 
intuitively more clear. In words, it means that project size should be expanded 
until the marginal loss in income of the producer equals the marginal redistri-
bution gain weighted with the distribution weight v. Under the first and third 
formulation, the constraints are expressed in amounts of income and the value 
of the constrained income - as represented by 1 + X - is then the value which 
one additional (or foregone) unit of the constrained income would have in the 
rest of the economy. Or, in other words, the value of the constrained income is 
then determined by the costs that must be incurred to increase or decrease the 
constrained income by one unit. Under the second formulation one specifies 
in advance the costs - as represented by the weight v - that one is willing to incur 
to increase the constrained income and the optimization procedure will then 
show the amount of additional income by which the constraint can be relaxed. 
The three formulations are, therefore, theoretically equivalent, leading to the 
same result. 
MARGLIN seems to prefer the use of either the first or third formulation. If 
some indication of the levels of either Ai or Az can be elicited from the decision-
maker, then the problem is solved. It seems to us, however, that even if the 
policymaker were willing to specify these levels, the procedure could easily 
lead to confusion because A \ may not be consistent with A2. Furthermore, in 
practice it is highly unlikely that any policymaker would be willing to indicate 
what additional income a certain target group should receive or what the maxi-
mum loss in efficiency benefits should be. It would, therefore, appear preferable 
to work with the second formulation and to make the welfare weights explicit. 
An artificiality which MARGLIN introduces is that he sees the repayments R as 
determined by a higher authority so that the project planner has only one 
instrument variable - the size of the project - at his disposal. If the objective is 
indeed to increase the incomes of a certain target group, then the lowering of 
repayments must surely be an efficient way of increasing the incomes of such 
a group even though this means that the Government would receive less reve-
nues. In our opinion, R should, therefore, also be considered an instrument 
variable, albeit perhaps only over a certain range. 6 The analysis can easily be 
extended to take account of the repayment variable. The first order condition 
for the maximization of the weighted objective function when R is a function of 
the market clearing price is v = (AC - AR)/(AB - AR). It would be pure chance, 
of course, if v would equal unity at the efficiency size of the project and normally 
repayments should be lowered to increase the income of the target group. If, 
however, with zero repayments, v is still greater than unity, then project size 
should be expanded. As AB would then represent the marginal redistribution 
gain rather than AB - AR, the expansion of project size should continue until 
the gain AB weighted with v equals the marginal increase in costs AC. Some-
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times a constraint has been set on the lowering of repayments. For instance, 
the Government may insist, for administrative reasons, that operating costs 
should be recovered. The optimum condition is then v = (dC - dO)/(dB - dO) 
= dK/dN. If the target group's income at the efficiency optimum size is still 
considered to be below the norm when repayments have been reduced to the 
level of operating costs, then again project size should be expanded. 
The above discussion is far from exhaustive, but it may have made clear that 
there is a trend in the recent literature towards accepting that income distri-
bution aspects should count in the design and selection of projects, a trend which 
is also reflected in the recent manuals on project evaluation. The UNIDO 
Guidelines state explicitly that income distribution counts, and the sequel to 
the OECD Manual also considers income distribution aspects. This trend also 
seems to be followed by the practitioners of benefit-cost analysis, those who 
have the hard task of designing projects and of detennining which projects meet 
stated economic and social objectives. In a speech to the Board of Governors, 
the President of the World Bank states that the question of equity should be an 
integral part of project evaluation procedures both within the developing 
countries and the lending agencies, and that the World Bank is beginning to 
develop this approach. 7 Also, several of the OECD case studies consider in-
come distribution an integral part of project analysis.8 
On the other hand, there are still writers such as HARBERGER - albeit heavily 
criticized9 - who do not consider income distribution weight adjustments and 
who firmly believe that only the traditional benefit-cost analysis leads to useful 
results. Is it possible that the truth lies somewhere between the two extreme 
positions? 
The remainder of this Chapter will be devoted to this question. Since the 
level of the distribution weights determines the extent to which efficiency losses 
should be accepted to comply with the equity criteria, the next two sections will 
review how such weights can be detenriined. Having obtained some under-
standing of this matter, the Chapter concludes with a critical review of the pro-
posed new criteria and an attempt to reconcile these with the traditional ana-
lysis. 
9.2. THE MARGINAL UTILITY OF INCOME SCHEDULE 
Probably the simplest method of estimating the marginal utility of income, 
if it were a correct method, would be to follow ECKSTEIN'S suggestion to cal-
culate it from the personal income tax rates under the assumption that the 
Government fixes tax structure on the principle of equal sacrifice. If we denote 
by HI, 7i and Y%, the marginal utility of income, the income tax rate and the 
income level of individual 1 respectively, ECKSTEIN'S proposal is that it should 
hold for individuals 1, 2, 3, etc., that ui(dTi/dYi) = u2(dT2/dY2) = ... etc. 
Hence, by choosing a base level of income subject to income tax and setting 
the marginal utility of that income at unity, the marginal utility of all other 
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incomes subject to income tax can be determined relative to the base level. For 
instance, if the marginal income tax is 0.50 at a level of income of $ 15,000 which 
we choose as the base level, and 0.25 at a level of income of $ 5,000, it would 
follow from ui = (dr2/dF2)- (dYi/dTi) = 0.50 (1/0.25) = 2, that the marginal 
utility of income at the $ 5,000 level would be twice as much as that at the $ 15,000 
level. 
There are, however, several objections to this method. First, a practical one. 
Income taxes start only at a certain level of income so that, in many cases, 
especially for the ultra poor, no income weights can be determined. The method 
therefore has not much operational value. Second, if the principle of equal 
sacrifice is accepted, then the indirect taxes which an individual pays should 
also be taken into account. The procedure then becomes very complicated and 
is probably, again, no longer operational. Third, this method assumes that the 
incidence of the income tax will be fully borne by the taxpayer; in reality, of 
course, the tax will be passed on to others. Fourth, it may be questioned whether 
indeed the principle underlying the methodology - equal absolute sacrifice -
is a correct one. While there are writers who have defended this on the grounds 
that it is, in their opinion, the most equitable principle, other writers have postu-
lated different principles: for instance, that of equi-proportional sacrifice, 
which should leave relative positions in terms of total utility unchanged; or 
that of equal marginal sacrifice in which each individual after paying the tax 
should end up with the same marginal utility of income level. 1 0 Finally, of 
course, none of these principles takes into account that different levels of in-
come may well have been obtained with different levels of effort. The principles 
can, therefore, be applied only to effortless incomes. All in all, it must be con-
cluded that ECKSTEIN'S suggestion does not present an appropriate basis on 
which to determine income distribution weights. 
The question arises, what then ? There are, of course, many possible marginal 
utility of income functions. Are there any a priori reasons why a certain one 
should be chosen? Some writers believe so and it may, therefore, be useful to 
review briefly some of the possible functions. A very convenient table has been 
produced by FREEMAN , 1 1 showing alongside the type of function, the weights 
that should be placed on marginal additions to incomes of persons at various 
income levels. A slightly revised version of the FREEMAN table is presented below: 
the weights have been normalized to give a weight of 1 to US $ 1 of income 
accruing to families with US $ 2,000 current income. 
The base against which the income weights were calculated was purposely 
put in the revised table at US $ 2,000 of annual income, so that the weights 
would have some relevance for developing countries where average annual 
family income of a typical middle income level country was about US $ 2,000 in 
1974. All the functions - except function 5 -.are downward sloping, so that 
the weights decline with income levels. Function 5 is the one assumed by the 
traditional benefit-cost analysis: all incomes have the same weight. Other 
functions in the table would value a dollar to a family earning only US $ 200 
per annum at from 100 to 2 x / 2 times more than a dollar accruing to a family 
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TABLE 9.1. 
Marginal Social Utility Value Placed on US$ 1 Extra Income to a Family with 
Function an Annual Income (in 1974 US dollars) of: 
US $ 200 US $ 2,000 US $ 20,000 US $ 200,000 
1. Y~2 100.00 1.00 0.01 0.0001 
2. y - 1 - 5 31.62 1.00 0.03 0.001 
3. Y~l 10.00 1.00 0.10 0.01 
4. y - ° - 5 3.16 1.00 0.32 0.10 
5. Y° 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 e~OT2,000) 2.46 1.00 0.001 Nil 
?- (li) + 2.50 1.00 0.14 0.01 
8- Coo+1)_2 6.25 1.00 0.02 0.0002 
with an income of US $ 2,000 per annum. 
Which of the several functions shown have some a priori grounds for pre-
ference? In an interesting study, 1 2 CHENERY et al. propose that the so-called 
Equal Weights Index should be used to measure whether the welfare of a 
country has increased. Under that index, a one percent increase in income at a 
low income level is considered as valuable socially as a one percent increase in 
income at a high income level. Hence, an increase of one percent at the US $ 200 
income level should be weighted with the factor 10 to make it equally valuable 
as an increase of one percent at the US $ 2,000 level. As many be seen in Table 
9.1. CHENERY et al. thus favor function 3. TINBERGEN also seems inclined to ac-
cept this function, which - it should be noted - had already been postulated as a 
plausible one in the 18th Century by BERNOUILLI and in the 19th Century by 
WEBER and FECHNER. TINBERGEN proposes it as follows: 'When it comes to 
specifying in explicit mathematical shape my concept of welfare, I am inclined 
to use Weber-Fechner's law, and propose that the welfare feeling derived from 
income available per consumer rises with the logarithm of that income, that is, 
by equal steps for equal percentage increases of income.' 1 3 Since neither 
CHENERY nor TINBERGEN discuss the immanent reasons for preferring this 
function, let us see what BERNOUILLI and WEBER and FECHNER had to say on the 
subject. 
BERNOUILLI postulated the existence of a downward sloping individual mar-
ginal utility of income function in connection with the so-called St. Petersburg 
paradox. As it would lead us too far from our main line of discussion to present 
this paradox here, we have relegated it to the Annex to this Chapter and it may 
suffice to mention that BERNOUILLI believed that the function he proposed 
(function 3 in Table 9.1) would be highly probable but that he had no specific 
reasons for defending the postulate. In fact, he found a different function pro-
posed by Gabriel CRAMER, a contemporary - who also solved the paradox, 
independently of him - quite acceptable. For an explanation as to why the 
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marginal utility of income should assume a particular shape, we must, therefore, 
look elsewhere. 
In fact, further advances in the field had to wait until the next century. In 
1846, W E B E R 1 4 published the results of his experiments on touch and concluded 
that the just noticeable difference of an increase in a stimulus bears a constant 
ratio to the original level of the stimulus. If we denote the just noticeable 
difference by A Y and the stimuls by Y, then his finding may be expressed as: 
AY/Y = constant. FECHNER, a philosopher, physicist, psychophysicist and 
mathematician, believed that WEBER'S law, as he called it, had universal validity 
applicable to probability analysis, stellar magnitudes, tonal pitch, and such 1 5 
and developed it as follows. 1 6 He postulated that just noticeable differences in 
stimuli would cause constant increments in sensations. If we denote sensation 
by U, FECHNER'S fundamental law may be written as AU = b- AY/Y, where b 
is a constant. Or, in other words, geometric increases in a stimulus produce 
only arithmetic increases in sensation. The equation can also be written as 
u = dU/dY = b/Y. The integral of this is: U = b In F_+ C, where C is the 
constant of integration. By setting this constant at - b In Y, where Yis the value 
of Y at which U = 0, the formula for U becomes U = b In Y. Transforming 
this formula from a natural logarithmic expression into a common logarithmic 
one, it becomes U = 2.3026 b log Y. This equation has important operational 
value. Although it contains the unknown parameter b, we can dispose of it by 
using two such equations. If the sensation levels of two stimuli are denoted by 
Ui and Ui and the stimuli by Yi and Y2, then it follows from the formula that 
U1/U2 = log yi/log Y2. Hence, if we know the levels of two stimuli Yi and Y2, 
then we can always calculate the corresponding levels of sensation. 
The WEBER-FECHNER formula - as it is now called - is, of course, the same as 
the one postulated by BERNOUILLI a century before. While BERNOUILLI - a 
mathematician - developed the formula only as a hypothesis to solve the St. 
Petersburg paradox, FECHNER derived the formula from WEBER'S actual obser-
vations. FECHNER'S work has been invaluable for psychology and gave rise to 
the entire new field of quantitative experimental psychology. 1 7 
The WEBER-FECHNER law has mathematical properties which are very 
convenient for utility theory. Proportional increases in income produce 
arithmetic increases in utility. Also, income multiplied by the marginal utility 
of income is a constant. Further, a one percent increase in income results in a 
one percent decrease in marginal utility, or, in other words, the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of income with respect to income always equals unity. 1 8 If the 
WEBER-FECHNER law were universally applicable, then income distribution 
weights could easily be determined: they would be inversely proportionate with 
income. Recent experiments in psychophysics by STEVENS 1 9 have cast some 
doubts, however, on the validity of the WEBER-FECHNER law. 
STEVENS'S fundamental contribution to psychophysics is that he queried why 
proportionate increases in a stimulus should increase sensation by constant 
increments. Although constant percentage increases in a stimulus may be 
necessary to find the just noticeable difference, this does not necessarily imply 
206 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 
that the sensation increases are constant. STEVENS invented a method of ex-
perimentation - the so-called magnitude estimation - whereby the observer is 
free to assign any number to his subjective impression of the sensation a parti-
cular stimulus produces. In pathbreaking experiments, he showed that our 
sensation as a function of variations in stimulus appear to follow a power 
function rather than the logarithmic function postulated by BERNOUILLI. In 
terms of a formula, the relationship may be written as U = bY11, where the 
exponent /? - the elasticity of sensation with respect to stimulus 2 0 - determines 
the curvature of the function. When the exponent is greater than 1, the U 
function curves upwards and reaches an infinite value at a certain limit of Y. 
On the other hand, when the exponent is smaller than 1, additions to Y beyond 
a certain value of Y will not increase U. When the exponent equals 1, the U 
function becomes a straight line. STEVENS'S law tells us that constant percentage 
changes in a stimulus do not produce constant increases in sensation as FECH-
NER believed, but constant percentage changes. 
STEVENS is eloquent in his explanation of why this relationship seems plau-
sible. Suppose that the law does not apply. Then, when we walk towards a 
house, the proportions of the house would become distorted. Or, similarly, 
when the sun goes behind a cloud and the light intensity falls, pictures become 
unrecognizable. Perhaps the power law - which allows us to perceive relations 
among objects as they are - is the only reason why we are able to survive in our 
heterogeneous environment. 
The power law seems to apply to such sensory continuums as taste, smell, 
warmth, cold, vibration, shock, and also - according to STEVENS - to the utility 
of income. A simple experiment STEVENS repeated many times with classroom 
students was the following. A student is supposed to receive $ 1 0 and to answer 
how much he would need to receive to make him twice as happy. The answers 
ranged from about $ 3 5 to about $ 50 . STEVENS concludes that this corresponds 
very well with the result obtained from the power function which CRAMER 
postulated for the solution of the St. Petersburg paradox because CRAMER'S 
function, 2 1 which has an exponent of 1/2, gives the answer as $ 4 0 . 2 2 It is 
interesting to note that, according to the WEBER-FECHNER law, the answer 
should be $ 1 0 0 . 2 3 
If the utility of income function is indeed a power function, as proposed by 
CRAMER and STEVENS, then the function has the interesting property 2 4 that the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income is a constant equal to p - 1. Hence, 
if the exponent of the total utility function is 0 .5 , the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of income would be minus 0 .5 . However, whether this is the correct 
value is, in our opinion, open to dispute. STEVENS'S classroom experiment is a 
very crude one. Moreover, it does not take into account a person's income po-
sition. 
Turning from psychophysics to economics, the values postulated by CRAMER 
and STEVENS for the elasticity of the marginal utility of income appear indeed 
to be on the low side. In pathbreaking work, F I S H E R 2 5 and F R I S C H 2 6 showed, 
independently of each other, that there is a method by which the marginal 
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utility of income can be measured directly. The procedure, which was sub-
sequently further refined by F E L L N E R , 2 7 is basically as follows. 
It is generally accepted that the consumers equilibrium position is character-
ized by the condition that MUX/PX = MUy\Py = MUZ\PZ = ... = u, where 
MUX and Px are the marginal utility of good x and the price of good x, respec-
tively, and u the marginal utility of income. Suppose now that two consumers 
are observed consuming the same food package, but each is in a different price 
and income situation than the other. Assuming that these two consumers have 
identical tastes, it must hold that the marginal utility of food MU/ is the same 
for both consumers. The equilibrium conditions for the two consumers are: 
MUf/Pi = MI -and MUfjPz = u% where Pi and P% indicate the different prices 
the two consumers pay, and m and w2 indicate the different marginal utilities of 
income they have. Since MUf is the same in both cases, it follows that: u2 = 
(pi/p2)-ui. This simple equation can also be written as: ui - ui = ui{(pi/ 
pz) - 1} . Substituting this in the formula of the elasticity of the marginal utility 
of real income, eu = (du/dY)-(Y/u), gives eu = {(pi - p2)/p2}- (Y/dY). In 
words, eu is the percentage change in food prices necessary to compensate a 
one percent change in real income in order to keep the quantity of food con-
sumed constant.. Taking data on the cost of living for a couple and two children 
in 1 4 large cities in the USA and combining these with price and income data, 
FELLNER used basically this equation to estimate eu and found a value of 1.8 
for incomes ranging from about $ 4 0 0 0 to $ 12 ,000 (fall 1959). 
The elasticity of the marginal utility of income can also, however, be measured 
in another way since eu also equals e 2 / e i , where e 2 = % change in quantity of 
food consumed due to a one percent change in real income while prices are 
kept constant, and a % change in quantity of food consumed due to a one 
percent change in food prices while real income is kept constant. This identity 
can perhaps best be shown by the following reasoning. A one percent change in 
real income (prices constant) will increase the quantity of food consumed by e 2 
percent. However, to measure eu, the quantity of food consumed must be kept 
at the same level. From the definition of ei, it follows that if the quantity of 
food consumed has to decrease by e2 percent, food prices should change by 
e 2 / e i percent (real income constant). Hence, to keep the quantity of food con-
sumed constant, a one-percent change in real income should be compensated 
by an e2/<?i percent change in food prices. Since this is the definition of eu, we 
have eu = e2/ei. 
The difficulty with this equation is that demand elasticities are normally 
calculated under the assumption that money income does not change, whereas 
ei is the demand elasticity with respect to price under the assumption that real 
income does not change. Hence, to estimate ei, the effect of a price change on 
real income should be eliminated from the normal demand elasticity. FELLNER 
did this as follows. The elasticities he used were those determined by T O B I N 2 8 
for the United States as a whole, namely, 0 . 5 6 for e2 and 0 . 5 3 for the normal 
demand elasticity. The real income effect had to be eliminated from the latter. 
Since the propensity to consume food in the United States is 2 5 percent, a one 
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percent increase in food prices reduces real income by 0 .25 percent. This 
reduction will itself lead to a reduction of 0 .25 .e 2 = 0 . 1 4 percent in food con-
sumption. Hence, ei = 0 . 5 3 - 0 . 1 4 = 0 .39 . It follows that eu = e2/ei = 0 .56 / 
0 .39 = about 1.5. 
FELLNER thus derived two values for the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
income, namely, 1.8 and 1.5. However, as FELLNER pointed out, taste differen-
ces were not completely eliminated from the data on the cost of living and this 
tended to cause a slight over-estimation of the first estimate. Another factor 
leading to over-estimation is the following. The FISHER-FRISCH-FELLNER 
procedure of estimating the marginal utility of income works only if it can be 
assumed that food consumption is independent of the consumption of any other 
consumer item. Suppose that there is complementarity between food and non-
food. Then the marginal utility of food for two families consuming the same 
food package but different non-food packages would not be equal. The family 
with the largest non-food package (and the higher real income) would have in 
reality a higher marginal utility of food than the other family because of the 
complementarity relationship. In reahty, therefore, the fall in the marginal 
utility of income when real income rises would be-slower than under the FISHER-
FRISCH-FELLNER assumption. Also, the estimate of 1.5 may thus be somewhat 
too high. Nevertheless, taking into account that the first estimate is higher, 
FELLNER feels that 1.5 should remain the most reasonable estimate of the elasti-
city of the marginal utility of income. 
FELLNER'S estimate is not consistent with those of FRISCH, who estimated the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income at 3.5 for a French group of workers 
and at 1 for a wealthier group of American workers. FRISCH concluded that the 
elasticities would decline (in absolute terms) with increases in real income. 
FELLNER, on the other hand, feels that his analysis confirms that the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of income is constant over a wide range of incomes. The 
data which FRISCH used were much less sound than those of FELLNER. Never-, 
theless, FELLNER'S data also leave much to be desired, and, as FELLNER himself 
mentions, the results of his investigations 'continue to be speculative to a con-
siderable extent.' 
While the original findings of FRISCH were almost generally rejected because 
of the shaky data base, in a later article F R I S C H 2 9 has affirmed his belief that the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income would decrease (in absolute terms) 
with increases in real income. FRISCH conjectures that the elasticity of the mar-
ginal utility of income would vary from 1 0 for the extremely poor and apathetic 
part of the poluation to 0.1 for the rich part of the population with ambitions 
towards conspicuous consumption, while a value of 2 would apply to the middle 
income bracket. THEIL and BROOKS 3 0 have tried to verify this conjecture by 
analyzing empirically determined demand equations for the Netherlands in 
the period 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 6 3 . They found a point elasticity of 1.56 for the median of 
the income distribution, which compares with a value of 2 conjectured by 
FRISCH, but also found that the elasticity increases (in absolute terms) when real 
income rises, which is the opposite of FRISCH'S conjecture. However, the esti-
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mates were subject to so much error that on equally plausible assumptions a 
constant elasticity of 1.79 could be estimated. The degree of variation of real 
income was not large in their sample: the largest value of real income per capita 
exceeded the lowest value by about two-thirds. All in all, the estimates by THEIL 
and BROOKS must also be considered quite speculative. 
Finally, we may mention that a new theory as regards consumer behavior 
has recently been put forward by VAN P R A A G , 3 1 who postulated that the indivi-
dual utility function of income will tend to a lognormal distribution. In sub-
sequent empirical investigations in Belgium, 3 2 VAN PRAAG found that this 
hypothesis could not be rejected and, at the same time, inter alia that the empi-
rical findings of others as regards the value of the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of income were consistent with his own estimates of values of somewhere 
between 1.6 and 2 .9 . However, under VAN PRAAG'S theory, the elasticity would 
increase (in absolute terms) if income rises.33 To VAN PRAAG such an increase is 
more appealing than FRISCH'S conjecture that it would decrease, although he 
does not state on what grounds he bases his preference. 3 4 
We have now reviewed what the rather scarce literature has to say about the 
value of the individual marginal utility of income schedule. At the lower end 
of the scale are the experiments of STEVENS, resulting in an estimated value of 
the elasticity of 0 .5 . However, these experiments were crude, and the findings 
of FRISCH, FELLNER, THEIL and BROOKS, and VAN PRAAG contradict this low 
estimate. 
In our opinion, the matter of what elasticity the marginal utility of income 
schedule may assume is still an open question; we can speculate but further 
empirical studies are necessary before a definitive answer can be given. It 
seems to us, however, that it can generally be accepted that the elasticity has 
at least a value of unity for the low income groups and we will, therefore, work 
in the following parts of this study with a value of unity. We thus accept the 
proposition of BERNOUILLI, WEBER-FECHNER, and CHENERY and TINBERGEN 
that the individual marginal utility of income is inversely proportional to in-
come level, but with the proviso that the so found marginal utilities of income 
should be considered minimum values for the poorest income classes. 
9 .3 . THE DERIVATION OF SOCIAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION WEIGHTS 
We will begin this section by attempting to derive social income distribution 
weights from the individual marginal utility of income schedule - the procedure 
generally adopted in the literature. We will see where this leads us, show that 
the method cannot be correct, and propose how it should be amended to arrive 
at plausible social weights. 
Social weights are the social utilities to be attached to additions to different 
levels of income. A meaningful aggregation of utilities is, of course, only 
possible if each utility is determined in the same way, i.e., expressed in terms of 
some numeraire level of utility. If we denote that numeraire level by m, the 
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social weight of a marginal increase to any given level of income can be repre-
sented by v p = Up/Ub, where up is the social utility of additions to income level 
Yp, and ub the social utility of additions to the base income Yb. Using the 
function u = (b/Yf for the individual schedule, the formula for the weight to 
be imputed to a marginal addition to a certain income is vp = up/m =bYf/ 
bYb~" = {Yb/Ypf. Since this is a monotonically decreasing function when Yp 
increases, the choice of Yb - the base level income - is completely arbitrary. 
Varying Yb shifts the function, but does not change the slopes of the function; 
hence, the absolute value of vp will change when Yb changes but the ratios of the 
Vp's will remain the same. In the literature's view, any income and its marginal 
utility level can be used as a base provided the social values of all income changes 
are calculated with respect to the same base. 
Let us review an example of how the weights are to be calculated. If we 
assume that the elasticity of the individual marginal utility of income function 
equals unity, which, as discussed in the previous section is a reasonable assump-
tion for operational work, then the formula for the derivation of the weights to 
be attached to marginal changes in income may be represented by v = b/ Y, 
where b = Yb. Suppose that b equals $ 1,200 per annum and that the incomes of 
a certain target group are $ 300 per annum. Then the weight in the case of a 
marginal change of this income level is $ 1,200/$ 300 = 4.0. For cases of non-
marginal changes, however, the weights are to be derived from the total utility 
function, as may be shown as follows. Suppose that the incomes of our target 
group increase from $ 300 to $ 500 per annum. Then the weights in case of 
marginal changes of these two income levels are 4 and 2.4, respectively. How-
ever, it would be wrong to calculate the utility increase on the basis of the appa-
rent average weight of 3.2. The marginal utility curve is not linear but concave 
and the increase in total utility is, therefore, somewhat less than the 640 'utils' 
($ 200 x 3.2) which this method indicates. The total utility function when u = 
b/Y is represented by U = 2.3b log Y. Hence, the increase in total utility is 
represented by A U = 2.36 log Y2 - 2.3b log Yi, and, in our example, A U is, 
therefore, 607 utils. 3 5 As the increase in income A Y = $ 200, the weight on the 
additional income is 607/200 = 3.0, rather than 3.2. 
After these preliminary remarks we can turn to the issue as to how project 
costs and benefits should be weighted. As an example, let us assume that the 
beneficiaries of a certain project consist of a homogeneous group of low income 
people - the poor - and that their incomes can be increased by providing them 
with an input, for instance, irrigation water, which will enable them to expand 
their production. There are then two parties - the target group and the Govern-
ment (the supplier of the input) - and the objective function that should be 
maximized is the welfare function A W = vp Yp + va Ya, where Yp is the in-
crease in income of the target group, Ya the increase or decrease in income of 
the Government, and vp and v„ the respective welfare weights. 
How can we determine the weights? The literature is divided in its approach. 
S E T O N 3 6 uses values for the elasticity of the individual marginal utility of in-
come schedule varying from 1 to 2, and assumes that the Government will 
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obtain its funds through some package deal of direct and indirect taxation which 
will diminish every worker's consumption by the same proportion. In his system, 
the foregone utility of the workers is the numeraire, and the weight v„-the value 
at the margin of Government funds - is equal to the value of the numeraire, 
while the weight vp - the value of an addition to the income of the poor - is 
derived from the individual marginal utility of income schedule by calculating 
the marginal utility of the poor relative to the numeraire. FELDSTEIN 3 7 takes 
as the numeraire the uniformly distributed dollar, that is, a single dollar divided 
equally among all the families in the nation, and assumes that all incremental 
projects are financed by a proportional increase in the personal income tax. 
The weights v0 and v p are then again derived from the individual marginal utility 
of income schedule. In our opinion, both models are not logically consistent. 
As FELDSTEIN himself states, the attachment of weights to income increases of 
the poor will lead in his model, and we may add also in the SETON model, to the 
acceptance of uneconomic projects, i.e., projects with economic rates of return 
lower than the opportunity cost of capital. This appears contradictory to us. 
Both writers seem to assume that the Government budget is flexible and we see 
then no reason why the Government would not be able to transfer its funds to 
the poor. As will be discussed in detail below, if such transfers are possible, then 
there is no need to accept uneconomic projects. There is further the important 
point that both writers work with the individual marginal utility of income 
schedule. As will be discussed below, this cannot be correct. 
The SQUIRE and VAN DER T A K 3 8 methodology is, in our opinion, also subject 
to criticism. They take as the numeraire the marginal utility of consumption at 
the average level of consumption and postulate that the value of public income -
the weight va - is determined by applying to Government investments the Pi„v 
formula, a formula which we discussed in the preceding chapter for private 
sector investments. Furthermore, they derive the weight vp from the individual 
marginal utility of income schedule, the elasticity of which they assume varies 
from 0 to 2. As it is not entirely clear which assumptions SQUIRE and VAN DER 
TAK apply as regards constraints, it may be useful to analyze their system under 
the assumption that the Government has a flexible budget as well as that the 
Government has an absolute constraint on its funds. In the first case, there is, 
as extensively discussed in the preceding Chapter, no need to work with a sha-
dow price of investment and the value of public income should then be deter-
mined by the foregone marginal utilities of income. As SQUIRE and VAN DER 
TAK take average consumption as the numeraire, it would appear as if they 
assume implicitly that the Government funds are obtained by taxing average 
consumers. This is obviously not correct. In this case, the SETON and FELDSTEIN 
assumptions are more realistic but, as discussed above, there is then no need to 
accept uneconomic projects, which SQUIRE and VAN DER TAK appear willing to 
do. Let us assume then that they assume that public investment is absolutely 
constrained. Then, as discussed in Chapter 5, the value of public funds is deter-
mined by the rate of return of the marginal Government project and we believe, 
as discussed in Chapter 8, that usually also there is no need to introduce a 
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shadow price of public investment. 
As a final remark concerning the logical consistency of the three methodolo-
gies, we may point out that under these systems the social rates of return of 
projects geared towards increasing the incomes of the poor may be extremely 
high, even when the very reasonable value of 1 is assumed for the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of income schedule. Under the SETON and FELDSTEIN 
methodologies, these high rates of return are obtained because the incomes of 
the poor are low compared to numeraire income so that high weights will be 
attached to income increases of the poor. Under the SQUIRE and VAN DER TAK 
methodology, the high rates of return will appear if the investment program in 
the relevant country is optimal. In that case, the value of public funds is equal 
to that of average consumption and the value of additions to the incomes of the 
poor, which is high relative to the value of average consumption, will then also 
be high relative to the value of public funds. As a matter of interest, it may be 
noted that under the SQUIRE and VAN DER TAK methodology the land settlement 
projects in Malaysia, which will be discussed in Chapter 10, have social rates of 
return of more than 5 0 percent under the stipulated assumptions, i.e., Govern-
ment expenditures as valuable as private consumption and an elasticity of the 
marginal utility of income schedule of 1. This result is obtained because the 
average family income in Malaysia in 1974 was about M$ 5 ,000, whereas the 
income of the prospective settlers was only about MS 900 , so that the weight of 
an additional settler dollar assumes the very high value of 5.6. Other examples 
with even more extreme results could have been taken from recent project 
analyses. We believe, however, that this example will suffice to suggest that the 
methodologies lead to results with very little meaning. 
The inconsistencies of the above methodologies stem, in our opinion, to a 
great extent, from one fundamental point that these approaches have over-
looked : namely, that weights based on the individual marginal utility of income 
schedule are not necessarily those accepted by the community as a whole. For 
if they were, then every person in the community should have the same income 
level. This can best be shown with the help of the so-called LERNER-box, 3 9 
presented in Figure 9 . 1 . The total amount of income of two persons equals AB. 
The first person has an income of AO measured in the direction of AB and the 
second person B has an income BO, measured in the direction of BA. Both 
persons have identical marginal utility of income schedules uu' which, for 
simplicity's sake, have been drawn as straight lines. What would be the position 
of optimum income distribution? At point O, A's total utility is only A U A Q O , 
while B's is B U B P O . A 'S marginal utility OQ is much higher than B's, which is 
only OP. It, therefore, makes sense to transfer a dollar from B where it has a 
low marginal utility to A, where it has a high marginal utility. The optimum 
position will be reached at R, where A and B have the same marginal utility of 
income RS. 
The use of income distribution weights based on the individual marginal 
utility of income schedule thus leads inevitably to the conclusion that all persons 
should have equal incomes. Since equality of income does not exist in any 
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society, not even in the centrally planned ones, it is clear that society does not 
accept transfers leading to complete equality. On the other hand, some transfers 
may be acceptable. For instance, turning again to Figure 9.1, it may well be 
possible that, while equality is rejected, it is socially acceptable to end up with 
an income for A of AT and for B of BT. What this means is that the distribution 
weights based on the individual marginal utility of income schedule have been 
replaced by social weights. A's individual marginal utility of income has been 
lowered, B's increased, so that, at the equilibrium position, the marginal utility 
of A's income as well as that of B's is considered socially equal (TW in Figure 
9.1). 
Our analysis has led us to conclude that, in order to arrive at a position of 
optimum income distribution, social weights instead of individual income 
distribution weights should be used. The task at hand is, therefore, to discuss 
how these weights can be determined. To us it is immanently acceptable that 
societies, although concerned about the incomes of the poor and the rich, do 
not strive towards equality of incomes so that we can assume that over a wide 
range of middle incomes they are indifferent as to how incomes are actually 
distributed. To others, perhaps, this point of view is not so readily acceptable. 
However, because education and own efforts cause divergences in income and 
unacceptable losses in efficiency would occur if everyone had the same income, 
they would nevertheless agree that equality cannot be reached in practice. Thus, 
even if we tend towards a philosophy of complete egalitarianism we still arive 
at the conclusion that income differences must be accepted for a wide range of 
middle incomes. It is, therefore, only with respect to the poorest and the richest 
groups that income distribution considerations play a role, so that the matter is 
essentially one of choosing social weights for these groups. 
One method of determining these social weights would be to interview a 
select sample of the population as to what they believe the social weights for the 
poorest and richest groups should be. However, this technique is more suitable 
for developed than developing countries as it is a rather sophisticated and 
costly method which needs to be repeated periodically because of the inflation 
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factor. Furthermore, such interviews have not been undertaken. Therefore, it 
seems to us that a more practical method is in order. To illustrate how we would 
propose to derive the weights, it is perhaps useful to discuss an example. 
P A U K E R T 4 0 has calculated the income shares of each quintile of the population 
for 56 countries at different levels of development and A H L U W A L I A 4 1 provides 
similar data for selected countries. Expanding on their findings as regards the 
top level incomes - albeit speculative to a certain extent - the following table 
(figures in 1974 US dollars) can be established for a typical middle level develop-
ing country. In such a country, mean family income would be about US $ 2,000, 
modal family income about US$1,200, unskilled labor income about US $ 600, 
and subsistence level family income about US $ 250 per annum. If we use 
WEBER-FECHNER'S function with modal income as the base, the individual 
weights would vary as shown in the Table, from about 0.11 for the top 5 percent 
of the population to 4.8 for subsistence level incomes. The income of a subsist-
ence level farmer would thus have an individual weight over 40 times that of a 
person in the richest group. However, the social weights are the ones that count 
and, as discussed, we believe that for a wide range of incomes these weights 
approximate unity. At the lower end of the income scale, it seems to us that most 
societies do not attach a weight to the income of a fully employed unskilled 
laborer. Taking this income as a base, and applying WEBER-FECHNER'S law, the 
minimum 4 2 social weights can then be found for the lower level incomes. At the 
high income end of the scale, we may assume that the incomes of highly trained 
professionals such as physicians, cabinet members, and managers receive a 
unit weight. Taking that income level as the base, and applying WEBER-FECH-
NER'S law, the weights on the incomes of the richest groups can again be deter-
mined. Government salaries provide the best means of determining the range 
TABLE 9.2. 
Income Class Share Average Income Social 
in Total Family Distribution Weights 
Income Income Weights (br = US$4,800) 
per Class Weights (bp = US$600) 
(US$1200 = 1) 
(Top 5%) (27%) (US$10,800) (0.11) (0.44) 
(Next 5%) (12%) (4,800) (0.25) (1.00) 
(Next 10%) (14%) (2,800) (0.43) (1.00) 
Top 20% 53"% 5,300 0.23 0.91 
Next 20% 22% 2,200 0.54 1.00 
Middle 20% 13% 1,300 0.92 1.00 
Next 20% 7% 700 1.71 1.00 
Poorest 20% 5% 500 2.40 1.20 
Average Income US$2,000 0.60 1.00 
Modal Income 1,200 1.00 1.00 
Income Unskilled Laborer 600 2.00 1.00 
Subsistence Level Income 250 4.80 2.40 
Income Highly Trained Professional 4,800 0.25 1.00 
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of the unit weighted incomes, since it may be assumed that these are the socially 
acceptable salaries. The various social weights for our typical country are shown 
in the table and are half of the individual weights for the poorest groups. 
The procedure may also be clarified with the help of Figure 9.2, which pre-
sents the two different welfare functions in graphical form. The individual and 
social marginal utilities of income are on the'vertical axis and income is on the 
horizontal axis, the latter with a logarithmic scale. The curve AA represents the 
individual weighting function, taking modal income as the base, the curve BB 
the social welfare function that we are proposing. BB is, in our opinion, quite a 
plausible social welfare function. If income distribution considerations are 
indeed to be incorporated into project planning, then one should work with a 
function which approaches reality to the maximum extent possible. BB shows 
that, over quite a range of incomes, income distribution considerations do not 
count 4 3 and realistic weights for the lowest and highest incomes are assumed. 
No weights are shown, on purpose, for lower than subsistence level incomes. 
If one, nevertheless, wishes to do so, a weight of infinity might be attached to 
such incomes because, in the face of starvation and misery, economic consider-
ations recede and any weight derivation is a rather meaningless exercise. There 
would also seem to be little merit in attaching a weight to the richest incomes, 
and a weight of zero might be appropriate for the incomes of the ultra rich. 
The social weights indicated by the curve BB should not be considered precise 
and absolute. For instance, it may well be that the unit weighted income range 
should be somewhat extended to the lower end as well as to the higher end of its 
range. On the other hand, this would not influence the weights very much. If, 
for instance, the base were $ 500 at the lower end, then subsistence income would 
have a weight of 2.0 rather than 2.4. Another open question is whether one can 
indeed apply WEBER-FECHNER'S law. If, for instance, the elasticity of the margi-
nal utility of income were greater than unity for low incomes, then the weights 
should be somewhat larger for the low incomes than indicated in the graph. 
With our present state of knowledge, these matters remain open to dispute. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, in our opinion, it seems likely that 
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the mmimum range of the social weights for the poorest groups is as indicated 
in the table and the graph. 
There are two more remarks we would like to make about the postulated 
social welfare function. First, although in our opinion the function sets forth 
the prevailing values of most countries in the world, there are exceptions. For 
instance, it has happened that Government officials have exploited the poorer 
groups to enrich themselves. We do maintain, however, that such cases do not 
occur often and that the normal situation is one of serious concern about the lot 
of the poor. Second, we would like to mention that the middle segment of our 
function does not take account of sudden income changes. This implies that if 
an engineer loses his job and has to live on a fraction of his salary, the loss of 
his income is valued socially the same as it is economically. Or, to take another 
example, if somebody at a subsistence level of $ 250 per annum receives annual-
ly, because of a Government project, an additional $ 3,350, a weight is attached 
only on the income additions up to the unskilled wage level of $ 600, and the 
subsequent addition of $ 3,000 is valued at unit weight. Is this correct? It seems 
to us that there is much to be said for an income weighting related to a worker's 
profession so that, for example, any underpayment to an engineer or overpay-
ment to a subsistence level worker would be valued in accordance with their 
role in society. Rather than having one social welfare function of the type 
depicted in Figure 9.2, there might then be as many functions of this type as 
there are professions. Unfortunately, however, our present state of knowledge 
is such that no meaningful estimates can be made of the income range per 
profession that should receive a unit weight. For our purposes, this is also not 
necessary. In this study we are interested mainly in projects geared towards 
raising the incomes of the poor and we cannot imagine that overpayments will 
be made to such an extent that they should be discounted. We see our function 
as applicable to a society where the poor receive substandard incomes, the 
middle classes earn in accordance with their profession a range of salaries that 
are socially acceptable, and the rich earn rather high incomes. From all points 
of view, we feel that the postulated function is a reasonable one and the most 
feasible for practical work. 
The difference between, on the one hand, the traditional as well as the appro-
ach of the most recent literature and, on the other hand, our approach may now 
be explained as follows. In the traditional approach, the income distribution 
in an economy is assumed to be optimized by means of income transfers 
between persons so that willingness to pay can be used as the guiding principle 
for the allocation of resources. In the recent version of benefit-cost analysis, it 
is assumed that income distribution is not optimized by means of income trans-
fers and it is, therefore, postulated that projects should be used for this optimi-
zation process. In these approaches, the individual marginal utility of income 
schedule which underlies, for instance, the taxation principles in the distribution 
branch of government is also used as the guiding principle for investment plan-
ning. That this leads to unacceptable conclusions has been discussed above. 
The fundamental principle that is overlooked in suggesting the use of individual 
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weights is that the valuations which individuals use in their personal decisions 
do not necessarily reflect the valuations which individuals use in making 
decisions that concern the community at large. Such a discrepancy is most 
notable in the case of the marginal utility of income schedule: the use of the 
individual weighting function leads to the inevitable conclusion that incomes 
in the economy should be equal. As we have discussed, no community is 
willing to accept this proposition, either on practical or on principal grounds. 
In contrast to the traditional and more recent approaches, we believe that 
for large groups of the population, the existing income distribution can be 
considered optimal and that, therefore, the allocation of resources should 
take income distribution aspects into account only when the poorest and 
the richest groups are involved. We accept that the individual marginal utility 
of income schedule is the guiding principle for the distribution branch of 
government, but reject it for the allocation branch. We attach, therefore, 
no weight to uncommitted government income, i.e., the weight v„ assumes 
in our approach the value of unity, and we only attach a weight -vp - on the 
change in income of project beneficiaries if they consist of ultra-poor or 
ultra-rich persons. The weight v p assumes in our system a value larger than unity 
in case of the ultra-poor and smaller than unity in case of the ultra-rich. As 
discussed, it is not possible to determine the precise values of these weights with 
our present state of knowledge and the best we can do is to accept the values as 
indicated by the BB function. Efficiency considerations play an important role 
in our system, and we will therefore review in the next two sections what impli-
cations the social weights will have for project design and project selection. 
9.4. REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PROJECT DESIGN 
In Section 9.1 we observed that if we follow the literature's approach of 
including distribution weights in the objective function, the condition for a 
maximum is presented by v = dC/dB when no repayments are levied, or v = 
dK/dN when repayments should cover operating costs. What are the implica-
tions of this regarding project size? If we make the simplifying assumption that 
project benefits are constant over time, we may write for the first case v = 
dC/dB = dBAamrldBAan\q where C is the present value of costs, B the present 
value of benefits, dBAamr the annual benefit stream of the marginal invested 
dollar discounted at the marginal invested dollar's rate of return, and dBAamq 
the same benefit stream but discounted at the opportunity cost of capital rate q. 
From this it follows that am, = v- am «. Using the optimum condition, v = dK/dN 
would lead to the same result, since then dA^ would drop out of the formula. 
Let us assume that the project we wish to analyze is geared towards raising 
the incomes of a group of poor persons and that the weight at the margin which 
should be attached to an increase in income of the project beneficiaries is 1.5. 
Let us assume also that the opportunity cost of capital is 10 percent and that the 
project's life is about 20 to 25 years. Then, from the above formula amr = v- amq 
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and from discount and compound tables, we find that r should be about 5 
percent. If the weight were about 2, then r should be about 2 percent. If the 
project life were shorter, then the required rate of return would still be lower and 
with a very short life it could even become negative. What all this would mean 
is that, if we really wish to incorporate income distribution weights into project 
analysis, projects should be oversized to the point that in many cases the rate 
of return on the marginal investment dollar should be negligible or even nega-
tive. 
According to the literature, oversized projects should thus be quite normal. 
Can this be true? We would like to clarify the matter with the help of Figure 9.3, 
which may be considered a graph of the income transfer which a certain Govern-
ment project would make possible from the Government to project beneficia-
ries. The various values which R-C, i.e., repayments by project beneficiaries 
minus Government costs, can assume as repayments are lowered or project size 
is expanded are set out on the vertical axis on a positive and negative scale. 
These values are thus what the Government can expect to get back from the 
project if it levied a normal market clearing price, or what it should be willing to 
lose if it reduced the price of the project's output. The net benefits of the project 
beneficiaries equal B-R, i.e., gross benefits minus repayments, and are set out 
on the horizontal axis. These net benefits would increase if either repayments 
are lowered or project size is expanded. 
The curve OMEAP shows the relationship between Government income 
(R-Q and beneficiary income (B-R) under the assumption that, while project 
size is being expanded, the Government charges the normal market clearing 
price. The values of R-C and B-R are, of course, determined by the normal cost 
and demand functions such as, for instance, in Figure 4.1. At the point M in 
Figure 9.3 the Government would make maximum profits but, as we discussed 
in Chapter 4, it is not the position of maximum total net benefits. This optimum 
position is found by maximizing benefits minus costs or, in our present model, 
by maximizing (B-R) - f (R-Q and the first order condition may thus be written 
as d(B-R) = -d(R-C). In Figure 9.3 this condition is fulfilled at the point E: 
the tangent line to the OMEAP curve has a negative slope of 45 °. At that posi-
tion Government income is ESi, beneficiaries' income is OSi and the combined 
income is at a maximum. Beneficiaries' income can be increased by increasing 
plant size but the Government income will then be reduced. For instance, at 
position A project size has been expanded until average cost is equal to price. 
The Government income is then zero but beneficiaries' income OA has been 
increased by Si A. Further expansion of project size means that average costs 
rise above the demand curve, and the Government is then losing money. The 
curve OMEAP has, therefore, a negative part AP. 
Suppose now that the Government does not charge any price at all for the 
project's output so that R is zero. Then, by increasing project size we would 
develop the normal cost-benefit curve. By turning Figure 9.3 one-quarter to the 
left, one can see that the curve OE'D is such a curve. The efficiency optimum 
on this curve is represented by E', a position which fulfills the condition that 
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dC/dB = 1. The relationship between the points E and E' may now be shown 
as follows. Suppose we are at position E, i.e., the situation where beneficiaries 
pay the normal market clearing price and the size of the project is optimal. Then 
the income of the beneficiaries can be increased by lowering price and therewith 
repayments to the Government. As this is a pure transfer from the Government 
to the project beneficiaries, this is represented in graphical form by a movement 
to the right along the EE' line. At point E' repayments are zero, all the costs -
S 2 E' - are borne by the Government, all the benefits - OS 2 - accrue to project 
beneficiaries, and we find ourselves on the normal cost-benefit curve. It is thus 
obvious that the EE' line is a tangent line to the two curves. 
The analysis has thus made it clear that it is much more efficient to lower 
repayments than to expand project size while insisting on repayments: E' 
provides the project beneficiaries with more benefits than any other position on 
EAP would make possible. So far so good. Suppose now that the income of 
project beneficiaries should be still further increased. Then, if we follow those 
writers who are willing to accept inefficiency for redistribution purposes, the 
optimum should be at a point such as D, where the social welfare function is 
tangent to the benefit curve. This is, however, a very inefficient way of transfer-
ring income. As shown in Figure 9.3, beyond the efficiency point E', costs 
continue to rise, while the income of project beneficiaries increases only margi-
nally. It is, therefore, not surprising that we found that the rate of return on the 
marginal invested dollar becomes negligible if the optimum condition is adhered 
to by expanding the size of the project in question. 
It seems to us that it has been overlooked that the income of the project's 
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target group can also be increased by other means than expanding project size 
beyond the efficiency optimum. It is simply not true that institutional or politi-
cal constraints would bar the raising of incomes of the target group except by 
the expansion of one specific project. The one method of income transfer that 
may, perhaps, not be feasible is the extension of the line E E ' to the right of E ' , 
i.e., the normal transfer of money. However, an equally efficient way of trans-
ferring money to the target group would be to start another project, also geared 
towards raising the group's income. Such a project would start from E ' as the 
origin, or somewhere to the left of E ' on the tangent line E E ' if operating costs 
were to be covered, and its transfer curve would be similar to the curve O M E E ' . 
Also, the price of that project's output can then be lowered if at the efficiency 
optimum the group's income would still remain below the norm. There are, of 
course, many possible projects of this nature in education, family planning, 
roads, power, housing, and other fields. Furthermore, there may be the 
possibility of increasing incomes by means of transfers in kind, price-subsidy 
or price-support programs. It is, therefore, not necessary to expand project 
size beyond the efficiency optimum size except in the case that other methods 
of income transfer are excluded. We believe that such situations seldom 
occur in real life. 
We can now recapitulate the argument. Projects are a highly efficient way 
of transferring income to the poor. When at the optimum size of a project -
the size where the rate of return on the marginal investment dollar equals the 
appropriate discount rate - incomes of the target group are still below the norm, 
either the price of the output should be lowered or other means of income trans-
fer should be used to increase these incomes. Which method to choose will 
depend on efficiency considerations. For instance, if price reductions of the 
project's output cause rationing to be necessary, then this method may be more 
costly than starting another project or using a subsidy. In reality, we believe 
that the opportunities to raise incomes with the help of other types of projects 
are abundant. Usually there is thus, in our opinion, no need to build oversized 
projects. 
9.5. REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PROJECT SELECTION 
We have seen in the previous section that interpersonal income distribution 
weights should not be considered when designing the size of a project. The 
question now is whether they should also be ignored in the selection of a pro-
ject; in other words, should economic rates of return rather than social rates of 
return be used for project selection? We assume that there is no budget con-
straint and would like to clarify the matter with the help of Figures 9.4A and 
9.4B. 
The curves E R O R represent the economic rates of return of Government 
projects, the beneficiaries of which are the poor in Figure 9.4A, and the rich in 
Figure 9.4B. The social rates of return are found by attaching income distri-
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bution weights to the benefits and are represented by the SROR curves. The 
'Transfer' curves show the values of transferred dollars in terms of yield. For 
transfers to middle income groups the transfer curve is horizontal because the 
values of transferred dollars in terms of yield are then equal to the opportunity 
cost of capital. Transfers to the poor, however, are worth more. For instance, 
suppose that the opportunity cost of capital is 10 percent and that at income 
position A, in Figure 9.4A, the marginal utility of income of the poor is 1.5 
utils. Then, as shown by the Transfer curve in Figure 9.4A, the value in terms of 
yield of an additional dollar at income position A is equal to a social rate of 
return of 15 percent. 4 4 At point C, the weight on income accruing to the poor is 
unity, and the social rate of return of a transfer is then 10 percent. The transfer 
curve in Figure 9.4B is similar, but since the weights on income accruing to the 
rich are lower than unity starting somewhat to the left of C , the curve lies 
below the 10 percent line to the right of this point. 
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Turning again to Figure 9.4A, we see that the minimum target income of the 
poor is at point C where their marginal utility of income is unity. How can they 
be brought to this position? Investing in projects geared towards raising the 
incomes of the poor appears to be highly efficient up to point A, since the eco-
nomic rates of return are above the opportunity cost of capital. Beyond this 
point, however, the economic rates of return are lower than the opportunity 
cost of capital and the transfer curve rises above the social rate of return curve. 
In other words, transfer of income to the poor by other means than the project 
method is then a much more efficient way of redistributing income. Hence, in 
order to maximize total utility, the policy to be followed should be one of in-
vesting up to A, and then transferring AC. Although the mechanism of direct 
money transfers may then perhaps not be used because of political constraints, 
the indirect method of supporting the prices of farm outputs or subsidizing 
such farm inputs as credit, fertilizers and extension services, is commonly used 
and there is much to be said for this approach. Turning to Figure 9.4B, we see 
that from a social point of view O C should be invested. It is theoretically 
possible to invest up to A' and then mulcting from the rich the returns generated 
by C'A', but it is then essential that appropriate taxation measures be devised 
to obtain these returns. If this is not feasible, then it seems to us that such pro-
jects should be abandoned rather than going ahead to benefit the rich. 
The basic principle which has emerged is that - irrespective of whether the 
projects are geared towards the poor, the rich or the middle classes - only those 
projects whose economic rates of return are higher than the opportunity cost of 
capital should be accepted. This is logical because we have assumed in all cases 
that there are more efficient ways of transferring income than by expanding 
project size unduly or selecting projects with low rates of return. 
Is there then no need at all for a social rate of return analysis? We believe 
there is because usually incomes can not be sufficiently increased by means of 
transfers so that then indeed the social rate of return analysis of projects becom-
es important. Caution is, however, necessary. A naive use of social weights 
can lead to the acceptance of many unsound projects and can even put into 
jeopardy the credit worthiness of the country in question. As in reality, in our 
opinion, poverty projects with reasonable economic rates of return usually can 
be found, we would like to propose as a pragmatic rule - in order to induce 
project planners to follow sound principles - that projects should only be 
subjected to a social rate of return analysis if they have satisfactory economic 
rates of return. The acceptable projects should then be ranked according to 
their social rates of return and those with unsatisfactory social rates of return 
should be rejected. Since under this procedure each project will have an econo-
mic rate of return higher than the cutoff efficiency rate of return, a minimum 
efficiency rate of return is ensured for each project. At the same time, since 
only projects with high social rates of return will be chosen, the social priority 
of the projects will also be ensured. This procedure has important implications 
with respect to a country's development strategy because many projects that 
would not be considered under the traditional analysis may now well appear 
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to have higher social values than their alternatives. For instance, while ac-
cording to the normal analysis, in many cases, land settlement projects 4 5 
should not be undertaken because they may be less efficient than plantations, 
under our methodology these projects should be preferred if their social rates 
of return are higher than those of plantations. In other words, under our 
methodology there may well be some trade-off between efficiency and equity 
but not to the extent that projects earn less than the opportunity cost of capital 
qA6. The latter would only be acceptable if no projects can be found with 
satisfactory economic rates of return. However, as we have stated, we believe 
that such cases do not occur often. Our procedure also underlines what we 
have argued before: projects cannot be considered in isolation; they form part 
of an overall investment program. The macro-economic goals set by the Central 
Planning Unit regarding employment, income growth of the economy as a 
whole and per income class, foreign exchange earnings, and the like can be 
attained only if the overall investment program is successful. It is the task of the 
micro-planners to assess whether the proposed individual investments are 
likely to succeed, economically as well as socially. By calculating the expected 
economic and social rates of return of individual projects one can ensure that 
these objectives will be attained. In the next Chapter we will illustrate the metho-
dology with the help of a number of actual case studies. 
9.6. REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT TRANSFER MECHANISMS 
Reference has been made in the preceding sections to the several possible 
ways in which the Government can increase the incomes of the poor. In 
devising such measures, efficiency counts and the question, therefore, is: How 
can the incomes of the target group be raised with least cost to the rest of the 
community? In the following we will discuss this matter but without pretension 
that the discussion will be exhaustive. There are so many ways of increasing 
income, each with its own peculiarities, that only a global review can be under-
taken in the space of this study. Several classifications are possible; a useful one 
for our purpose is to distinguish among Government policies that intervene 
directly at the income level, the price level and the investment level, and we will 
discuss each of these. First, however, it may be useful to give some indication 
of the order of magnitudes that are involved in raising the incomes of the poor. 
Assume that a country's per capita income is about US $ 400 and its income 
distribution is as shown in Table 9.2. Then, in such a typical country, the per 
capita income of at least 10 percent of the population (US $ 40) would be about 
US $ 80 below per capita base level income (US $ 120). Hence, if one were to 
use the normal transfer method to wipe out poverty, the annual income transfer 
would amount to at least 2 percent of national income. On the other hand, if 
one were to follow the project method, investments in projects for the poor 
would amount to at least 20 percent of national income, assuming that the 
economic rate of return is 10 percent. Obviously this is not possible and it must, 
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therefore, be accepted that a combination of the various possible transfer 
mechanisms should be used, the actual mixture depending on efficiency and 
time preference considerations. 
In principle, the allocation of Government funds over the various expenditure 
categories should be such that the social value of the last dollar spent in every 
category has the same value. Budget constraints complicate the principle, but 
do not present a theoretical problem. We discussed in Chapter 5 that in the 
case of a single period budget constraint the cut-off N/K ratio assumes a higher 
value than unity and that in the case of multiple period budget constraints the 
cut-off rate of return assumes a higher value than the opportunity cost of capital. 
As regards transfers the same principle applies. Suppose, for instance, that the 
cut-off N/K ratio must be set at 1.2 instead of at the normal ratio of 1.0. Then, 
the social value of the last transferred dollar should be 1.2 rather than 1.0. The 
same would be true in the case of multiple period budget constraints if the cut-
off rate of return had to be set at 12 percent. Budget constraints limit thus the 
amount of public investments as well as the amount of transfers that can be 
undertaken. 
A curtailment of the transfers under a certain transfer method will also occur 
if the transfers involve additional costs. A simple example may illustrate this. 
Assume that there is no budget constraint, and that the opportunity cost of 
capital is 10 percent, so that the social rate of return of the last dollar spent in any 
direction should be 10 percent. Suppose now that, for a certain method of 
transfer, costs of $ 0.20 are incurred. Then $ 1.20 must be foregone to give to 
the poor the last additional dollar of unit weight, and the social rate of return of 
the last transferred dollar would thus be 8.33 percent, which makes it inefficient 
compared to the other possible methods of transfer. Hence, to the extent that 
additional costs are incurred, expenditures will be curtailed. Additional costs 
in the form of dead weight losses may arise in the case of a subsidy program 
and we will discuss this matter further in detail below. A special issue is posed 
by the administrative costs of Government programs. Should they be taken into 
account when considering the efficiency of the various possible transfer 
methods? In our opinion, this is, in general, not necessary because the admin-
istrative Government apparatus does exist and the marginal cost of administe-
ring either normal transfers, subsidy programs or public projects may be assum-
ed - as is generally done in the literature - to be negligible. We maintain, there-
fore, that when transfers are possible projects geared towards increasing the 
incomes of the poor should have satisfactory economic rates of return because 
otherwise normal transfers or subsidies with negligible deadweight losses will 
be more efficient. 
The direct method of income transfer can take many forms: it may be a 
straight money transfer; it may also be a transfer in kind, such as in the case of 
school feeding, housing and health care programs or where consumption goods 
- food, electricity, water supply - are provided to the poor. In all such cases, the 
analysis is the same as if it were a direct money transfer. 
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We may turn our attention now to measures that intervene at the price level. 
Our objective is to analyze whether such measures are feasible, and it is useful 
for this purpose to classify them as to whether the goods and services are: (a) 
produced by the poor; or, (b) consumed or used as an input by the poor for the 
production of other goods and services. As regards the first case, an example 
would be a general price subsidy on an agricultural product produced by the 
poor. If we denote the extra income of the poor due to the price subsidy by Yp, 
then the benefit of the poor is presented by vp Y„. On the cost side, the communi-
ty must pay Yp plus the costs of the subsidy program - which we denote by X. 
Hence, the objective function is: vpYp - (Yp + X). This is maximized when 
VpdYp - dYp - dX = 0, which may be written as vp = (dYp + dX)/dY„. It 
may be noted that this is basically the same formulation we used when we 
considered the cost of a project expansion beyond the optimum size (Section 
The above analysis lends itself to graphical presentation. Consider Figure 
9.5. The curve SS' represents the supply curve of the goods produced by the 
poor, the curve DD' the demand curve of the rest of the community. We are 
interested in the costs of a subsidy program and assume that the Government 
pays a subsidy of AB per unit. Producers receive then AC per unit while con-
sumers pay BC per unit and the output level is, therefore, OC. The total 
amount paid by the Government is JABK, by consumers KBCO, so that pro-
ducers receive a total of JACO, of which OSAC is used to pay the factors of 
production. On the other hand, at the output level OC, the value of the goods 
produced as valued by the consumers is ODBC. Hence, the net surplus of pro-
ducing OC is ODBC minus OSAC, which equals DMS minus MAB. It should 
be noted that this is equal to the producers' surplus SJA plus the consumers' 
surplus DBK minus the Government payment JABK. Without the subsidy, 
the output level is ON and the surplus SDM; with the subsidy the output level 
is OC and the surplus SDM minus MAB. The effect of the subsidy is thus that 
a loss is incurred of MAB. This can also be seen by considering the costs and 
9.3). 
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benefits of the extra output NC. While its cost of production is NMAC, its 
value is only NMBC, the difference MAB representing the loss resulting from 
expanding the output beyond the optimal point. 
Since the optimum for an income transfer is a marginal condition, let us 
assume now that the subsidy of AB per unit is increased to a level of EF per 
unit. Producers' surplus and hence producers' income increases then by HEAJ, 
which is equal to the dYp of our formula. On the other hand, the Government 
pays an extra amount equal to HEFL minus JABK. Assuming that the weight 
on the Government's as well as consumers' income equals unity, the Govern-
ment's loss may be compensated with the gain in the surplus of the consumer, 
which is KBFL. Hence, the effect of the subsidy on the income of the rest of 
the community (Government and consumers) is a loss in income equal to HEAJ 
plus AEFB, which is the dY„ + dXof our formula. Neglecting changes of the 
second order of smallness, it can be seen in the figure that d Yp = HEAJ = 
OC- APS = Q- APS, and dX = AEFB = AB- AQ = T- AQ, where Q is 
output, Ps the supply price and T the subsidy per unit. Hence, our formula 
reduces to vp = (Q- APS + T- A Q)/(Q- APS), which may be written as (vp - 1) 
= (T- A 0 / ( g - APS). Since the elasticity of supply es = (dQ/dP,)- (Ps/Ql we 
may write (vp - 1) = (T/Ps)- es.47 
As the equation shows, the relative subsidy (T/Ps) is a function of the elasticity 
of supply of the product produced by the poor and the weight on the poor's 
income. Hence, if this procedure of subsidizing the poor's production were to 
be followed consistently, each different type of product produced by the poor 
should receive a different subsidy. In rural areas where the poor produce only 
one or two products, this may well be feasible. However, such subsidies may 
need to assume very high values. For instance, let us assume that the weight on 
the targeted income increase is 1.5 and that the elasticity of supply of the product 
produced by the poor is less then unity as it is for most food grains, say, 0.2. 
Then it follows that the Government should provide a subsidy equal to 250 
percent of the price (T/Ps = 2.5). Even if the elasticity of supply were unity - a 
most unlikely possibility for goods produced by the poor - the subsidy should 
be 50 percent of the price. 
The same analysis applies regarding the subsidization of the prices of goods 
or services used by the poor as inputs or for consumption purposes. In Figure 
9.5, let the curve DD' represent the demand curve of the poor and the curve SS' 
the supply curve of the good in question. Increasing the subsidy from the level 
AB to EF per unit results then in an increase in consumer surplus of KBFL, 
which is equal to Q- APd where Pa is the demand price, and a loss of income in 
the rest of the community of KBFL plus AEFB, which is equal to Q- APd plus 
T- AQ. Hence (vp - 1) = (T- AQ)/(Q- APd) = (T/Pd)- ed where ed is now the 
elasticity of demand of the poor for inputs or consumption goods. Also, since 
this elasticity is normally much less than unity, high subsidies would be neces-
sary. 
Why is it that we do not find such high subsidies in practice? The reason is 
that if the TjP ratios increase the deadweight losses also increase, making the 
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price subsidy method more and more inefficient. Price subsidies are, however, 
an efficient method of income transfer if the deadweight loss is small and they 
are then well worth considering in conjunction with other methods of income 
transfer. In fact, the entire subsidy goes to the producers where the supply curve 
has zero elasticity and to the consumers where the demand curve has zero elasti-
city, and no deadweight losses occur then at all. In practice, this means that if the 
curves are relatively inelastic - which they often are for goods produced or 
consumed by the poor - the price subsidies for very reasonable T/P ratios incur 
only very small deadweight losses, say of the order of one or two percent of the 
transferred amounts. For all practical purposes this makes such subsidies 
comparable to direct transfer payments. 
A problem with many price subsidies is that other groups than the target 
groups benefit. The challenge is, therefore, to ensure that the subsidies will 
raise solely the incomes of the target group. In the case of subsidies on goods 
consumed by the poor, an extensive system of discriminatory rationing would 
be necessary to ensure that only the poor benefit, something which most Govern-
ments are unwilling to do. Regarding goods produced by the poor, a system of 
production quotas and differential payments based on, for instance, size of 
landholdings, seems theoretically possible but, again, such a system would 
seldom be acceptable. With regard to inputs used by the poor, however, a 
scheme of price subsidies and input rationing may well be feasible. In this con-
nection, we have noted already that a relatively efficient way of increasing in-
comes is to subsidize the price of a project output used as an input by the poor, 
e.g., irrigation water. The same applies to other inputs not specifically produced 
in the context of a project for the poor. In the rural sector, the inputs that come 
immediately to mind are such things as extension services, agricultural credit 
and fertilizers; in the urban sector probably the only input of significance in this 
respect is training programs to improve the skills of the poor. In all these cases 
some form of rationing would be necessary, but its cost in many cases may be 
small and such schemes are then well justified. 
Before turning to the discussion of investment policies, a few words about the 
use of tariffs to raise the incomes of target groups. In this connection, it needs 
no elaboration that export duties are not very useful. Import duties, however, 
are a highly efficient method of raising the price level of selected commodities. 
There will, of course, be a loss in consumer surplus but this is offset, except for 
the deadweight losses, by the increase in Government revenues and the increase 
in producers' incomes. Let us review an example. In Figure 9.6, SS' is the do-
mestic supply curve, DD' is the domestic demand curve and IF is the import 
curve. An increase in the tariff on imported goods from GJ to EJ will result in a 
decrease of consumer surplus equal to ABCD. This is, however, compensated 
by the increase in producer income of ABEF, so that the additional loss is equal 
to FECD. However, as the Government receives GECH in the form of tariffs, the 
net result is an increase in the deadweight loss equal to the areas FEG and HCD. 
Assuming that the additional producer income receives a weight and applying 
our familiar formula, we get vp-dYp = dYp (ABEF) + dX (FEG + CHD). 
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Since the horizontal difference between the SS' curve and the DD' curve is the 
import demand curve, AX is equal to AMm- A P where Mm is volume of 
imports. Import elasticities are in general not higher than 5, and a 10 percent 
increase in the import price amounts thus, at the must, to a deadweight loss of 
2.5 percent of the import bil l 4 8 and a yet smaller percentage of national income. 
Most Governments use tariffs to increase their revenues and to limit foreign 
exchange expenditures and we may, therefore, consider the deadweight loss an 
inevitable cost of these objectives. Tariffs are thus well worth considering to 
increase the incomes of the poor, provided, of course, that commodities can be 
identified which are mainly produced and not consumed by the poor 4 9 . 
Finally, let us examine Government policies that intervene at the investment 
level. It is useful here to distinguish among the ownership of capital assets. 
Government policies to help the poor may be directed towards: (a) capital assets 
held by the poor (mainly land); (b) other private capital - mainly industrial; or 
(c) Government capital. Since the bulk of the poor are often nonviable farmers 
and landless rural laborers, the ownership of land is an important factor. In 
many countries the ratio of land to population is such that land reform or land 
settlement can solve the problem by providing land to smallholders and landless 
workers. In others, however, there is just not enough land available to provide 
the landless and submarginal farmers with viable units, and other strategies 
must be devised. The determination of viable farm size is vital because too many 
mistakes have been made in the past by assuming that smallholdings can be 
made viable merely by increasing farm inputs. On the other hand, in land 
settlement projects, oversized holdings are often provided, creating a rural 
elite. In principle, we maintain that the holding should provide an income suffi-
cient to provide a reasonable return on invested capital as well as to farm labor. 
Let us turn now to Government policies concerning private industrial in-
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vestment. The problem of poverty is to a large extent the problem of unem-
ployment and underemployment, and many Governments have, therefore, 
followed a policy of employment generation by promoting modern private 
manufacturing. Such policies are important but cannot alone solve the problem 
because the elasticity of modern industrial output with respect to employment -
the Verdoorn elasticity - is high, often between 1.5 and 2.5. To give an example: 
Assume that the output of the industrial sector grows at the rate of 10 percent 
per annum, surely a high rate. Then industrial employment would grow by 
5 percent per annum if the Verdoorn elasticity is 2. Assume further that employ-
ment in manufacturing accounts for 10 percent of total employment, a figure 
typical for a developing country at the first stage of industrialization, and that 
the total labor force grows at the conservative rate of 2.5 percent per annum. 
Then industrial employment would absorb only 20 percent of the increase in 
the labor force. In other words, some 80 percent of the increase in the labor force 
must be absorbed by sectors other than modern manufacturing. Services, for 
which the Verdoorn elasticity would certainly be lower than for manufacturing, 
can perhaps reduce this target by half, but this would still leave a substantial 
amount of unemployment. It is, therefore, not surprising that many Govern-
ments have tried to promote labor-intensive techniques of production. Un-
fortunately, in the modern manufacturing sector there are few opportunities to 
increase labor intensity because, in any one production process, the pace of the 
machine determines the employment of labor, and the elasticity of subsitution 
between capital and labor is low. More promising is the promotion of labor-
intensive small-scale manufacturing, and cottage and handicraft industries, 
and to the extent that such industries have an adequate economic rate of return, 
such a strategy is well justified, even if some subsidy is necessary to ensure finan-
cial viability. 
As regards Government investments, we have noted already that such in-
vestments may be a highly efficient method of raising the poor's income insofar 
as inputs or services are produced which will be used by the poor. Many possi-
bilities exist in such fields as irrigation, land drainage and consolidation, agri-
cultural processing, marketing, transportation, education, water supply and 
electrification, and after our discussion in the preceding sections there is no 
need to discuss this category further. It is also possible, however, that Govern-
ments embark on a program of investments to provide the poor with subsidized 
consumption goods and services, such as housing. According to the traditional 
analysis, such programs are often not justified because the willingness of the 
poor to pay may be so low - due to their limited incomes - that the program may 
not have an acceptable rate of return. This is not correct. To give an example: 
Assume that housing can be built - either by private enterprise or the Govern-
ment - at a cost of $ 1,000 per house, the house being of the type used by those 
with incomes equal to that of an unskilled laborer. Assume further that the rent 
normally charged for such a house is $ 100 per annum, this rent amounting to 
one-sixth of the income of an unskilled laborer (a reasonable charge), which 
would provide a satisfactory economic rate of return of about 9 percent. 
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Assume now that Government wishes to make such houses available to the 
poor at a rental fee of $ 40 per annum, the maximum they can pay. 5 0 Then the 
program would not be acceptable according to the traditional benefit-cost 
analysis, since the rate of return is only 1.2 percent. What this analysis over-
looks is that the program includes an investment component as well as an 
income transfer component, and that the latter is well justified because the 
incomes of the poor are below base-level income. The subsidy of $ 60 on the 
rental fee is an acceptable income transfer, and the annual benefit stream of the 
housing program should, therefore, be considered to consist of $ 40 paid 
directly by the poor and $ 60 paid by the distribution branch of the Government. 
The economic rate of return of the program remains 9 percent, whether the 
houses will be used by unskilled laborers or the poor. 
To end our review, a few words about public works projects such as roads, 
bridges, and dams. Quite a controversy exists in Government circles and the 
economic literature as to whether such projects should be undertaken with 
labor-intensive or capital-intensive techniques. The proponents of the labor-
intensive method point out that it would create employment and raise the in-
comes of the poor, while opponents claim that such methods are extremely 
costly. The controversy is in reality a non-controversy. A public works project 
is, of course, open to the same type of scrutiny as any other project. Its optimum 
size should be determined by comparing at the margin investment costs and 
returns, and its acceptability should be based on its economic and social rates 
of return. Its investment costs are the costs of the most efficient production 
technique determined on the basis of the appropriate opportunity costs and 
whether a public works program should be labor-intensive or capital-intensive 
depends, therefore, on the actual circumstances. Labor-intensive techniques 
are often justified, especially if unemployment exists and the opportunity cost 
of foreign exchange is high. Since we have discussed such situations in Chapter 6, 
Section 4, we need not spend further time on them. As a last remark, it may be 
noted that a problem can arise if the works are to be undertaken by private 
contractors. Because they prepare their work programs and bids on the basis of 
the financially least costly technique, which may well be the economically 
inferior capital-intensive production method, it is advisable in cases where labor-
intensive methods are justified to specify in the invitation to tender that labor-
intensive techniques should be followed and to grant the contracts on a cost 
plus basis. 
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 9 
T H E S T . P E T E R S B U R G P A R A D O X 
The paradox - a problem which arises in connection with a simple gamble -
is important because it can only be solved by postulating - as DANIEL BER-
NOULLI and GABRIEL CRAMER saw independently of each other - the existence 
of a downward sloping marginal utility of income function. It may therefore be 
useful to discuss it in some detail. 
The paradox is as follows. A person is tossing a coin and continues to do so 
until 'heads' appears. He is paid one ducat if 'heads' appears on the first toss of 
the coin, two ducats if it appears for the first time on the second toss and so on, 
so that 2"~ 1 ducats will be paid if 'heads' appears for the first time on the «th 
toss. The probabilities of seeing 'heads' appear for the first time on the first, 
second, or third toss are 1/2, 1/22 and 1/23 respectively, so that, in general, the 
probability of 'heads' on the nth toss is 1/2". Since the sum of the probabilities 
multiplied by the corresponding money gain is the maximum amount of money 
a person should be willing to pay for the privilege of playing the game, the 
value of the game is 
£ L _ = I + I + I + = oo 
„=i 2" 2 2 2 
Clearly, no sane person would be willing to pay an infinite amount for the 
privilege of playing such a game. 
BERNOUILLI understood that the expected utility gains count rather than the 
expected money gains. In his 1738 paper 1 he states: 'It is highly probable that 
that any increase in wealth, no matter how insignificant, will always result in 
an increase in utility which is inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods 
already possessed.' If we denote total utility by U and wealth by R, BERNOULLI'S 
proposition is: dU/dR = b/R, where b is a constant. This condition is fulfilled 
when total utility is a natural logarithmic function of wealth, of the form U = 
b In R/R* where b and R* are constants. 
The figure below presents such a curve. The constant b is the projection on 
the U axis of that segment of the tanget to the U curve that lies between the 
tangent's point of intersection with the U axis and its tangency point and equals 
HJ in Figure 9.7. The constant R* is the value of R when U assumes the value 
of zero and equals OA in Figure 9.7. 
It is easy to show that any logarithmic curve of the form presented in Figure 
9.7 fulfills BERNOULLI'S proposition regarding the marginal utility of a gain. 
Suppose that a person's initial wealth is OB, and that he expects to gain a sum 
of BC. Then the total utility before and after the gain is BD and CE, respectively, 
and the increase in utility is FE. Since triangle DFE is congruent to triangle 
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HGE, it must hold that F E / B C = A U/AR = GE/OC. Suppose that the gain 
B C is infinitesimally small, so that GE is almost equal to HJ and O C almost 
equal to O B . Then we obtain dU/dR = b/R which is what BERNOULLI proposed. 
The paradox can now easily be solved by calculating not the expected value 
of the money gain, but the expected value of the utility gain. The utility value 
of any gain is, of course, the difference between total utility after and before the 
gain. Hence, if the fortune of the person playing the game is initially A, then the 
utility value of a gain of 2"~1 ducats is : 
b In b In — = b In 
R* R* A 
Since the probability of a money gain of 2"~1 ducats in the St. Petersburg game 
is 1/2", the mathematical value of the utility gain is (b/2n) In (A + 2n~1)/A. 
Hence, the mathematical expectation of the utility gain of the game is: 
AU= E ^ l n - 4 + 2 " ' 1 
»=! 2" A 
If A - the value of the fortune with which a person is starting the game - is 
known, this expression can be solved. This can be done by writing it out so that 
we obtain: 
A t / = * l n ^ + * l n ^ + . . . * l n ^ + - 2 ^ + . . . 2 A 4 A 2" A 
= bin [(A + \y'2-{A + 2 ) 1 / 4 ...{A + 2 " - 1 ) 1 / 2 " . . . ] - bin A 
Since the utility of an additional sum of sure money D is presented by A U = 
b In {A + D) - b In A, the bracketed expression in the written out formula is 
equal to A + D. If A = 0, it is easy to see that D = ^ 1 • */2- $4- ^ 8 ..., which 
amounts to exactly two ducats. Hence, if a person had no money to start the 
game, he would be happy to receive two ducats rather than to play the game. The 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 77-5 (1977) 233 
utility represented by these two ducats would be the same as the mathematical 
expectation of the utility he could gain by playing the game. 
BERNOULLI mentions in his paper also that GABRIEL CRAMER - at about the 
same time and independently of BERNOULLI - solved the problem. CRAMER, 
however, assumed that the utility of a sum of money would be directly pro-
portionate to the square root of the sum, i.e., U = b^jR. Hence, the mathema-
tical expectation of the utility gain of the game is A U = b *J(A + D)- b y/A. 
If we assume that A = 0, then 
,=i 2" [ 2 4 ^ 8 V 1 6 V J 
b 
Hence, the value of the game is presented by y/D = — j - . Solving for D, 
2 — yj2 
we find that the value of the game amounts to about three ducats. 
The difference between BERNOULLI'S and CRAMER'S solution is, of course, 
due to the difference in assumption as to the shape of the marginal utility of 
money curve. BERNOULLI assumes dU/dR = b i ? _ 1 , whereas CRAMER assumes 
dU/dR = b i ? " 0 5 . Therefore, as can be seen in Table 9.1 in the main text, a 
small money gain represents less utility for BERNOULLI than for CRAMER, and 
the game is thus worth less to BERNOULLI than to CRAMER. BERNOULLI finds 
CRAMER'S solution very plausible. In his words: 'Indeed, I have found his theory 
so similar to mine that it seems miraculous that we independently reached so 
close agreement on this sort of subject.' Neither BERNOULLI nor CRAMER gave 
any other reasons for their choice of function than that it was plausible that the 
marginal utility of money curve is downward sloping. To them the matter arose 
in connection with risk and, having solved the problem, they saw no need to 
investigate further the slope of the function. Their work has been, however, of 
fundamental importance for risk analysis and they may be considered the fore-
runners of modern subjective probability theory which uses essentially the 
same method. 
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10. S O C I A L B E N E F I T - C O S T A N A L Y S I S I N P R A C T I C E 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
The social rate of return approach to investment decisions is fairly straight-
forward: the parties who benefit and lose because of the project should be 
identified, and appropriate income distribution weights should be attached to 
the gains and losses. To illustrate the methodology we will review a hypothetical 
example, namely, a land settlement project in the hypothetical country Xalan-
dia. The analysis is unfolded in the form of a parable. 
Hypothetical Example of the Analyses of the Financial, Economic 
and Social Return of the Xalandia Oil Palm Project 
The proposed project was identified by the Planning Department and would 
be the first of its kind in Xalandia. It would consist of the settling of 5,000 
families on about 65,000 acres of land, 60,000 acres of which would be planted 
with oil palm. The settlers would be recruited from among the rural poor and 
would each be provided with 12 acres of planted oil palm, for which they would 
pay an appropriate rent. The Government would undertake all the investments 
except housing (clearing of land, planting of oil palm, and construction of a 
palm oil mill and feeder roads) and would operate the mill and provide the 
extension services; settlers would take care of their housing. All of the products 
produced under the proposed project, some 105,000 tons of palm oil and 
20,000 tons of kernels per annum, would be exported. 
The Prime Minister had asked the Treasury's opinion as to the feasibility of 
the project and Treasury officials had calculated that the financial return on the 
Government's funds would be only 6 percent (see Table 10.1). They, therefore, 
stated that the project should not be undertaken because at least 8 percent 
could be earned in the international capital markets. However, the Planning 
Department was not convinced by this reasoning and stated that the project 
should be evaluated from a national point of view. Consultants were, therefore, 
hired to do a detailed feasibility study. 
The consultants started by measuring the rates of return on capital in the 
country and, with their usual precision, estimated the opportunity cost of 
capital at 12 percent. The foreign exchange situation of the country was also 
examined. The merchandise and services accounts were found to be in equili-
brium and there was only an insignificant outflow of domestic capital. As the 
price level of tradeables in the country appeared to be about 40 percent above 
world market prices, the consultants recommended using a shadow price for 
foreign exchange of 1.4. Further, the consultants found that the average annual 
income of the prospective settlers in their old occupations amounted to about 
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X$ 680 and they recommended using this as the opportunity cost of labor. The 
economic rate of return of the proposed project was calculated and found to be 
about 13 percent. Since the opportunity cost of capital in the country was esti-
mated at 12 percent, the consultants considered the proposed project marginal. 
The Planning Department remained unconvinced and pointed out that the 
settlers all belonged to the bottom 5 percent of the income groups in Xalandia 
and that, if something was not done, disturbances could surely be expected. 
Furthermore, the country's investment program was much too low and, al-
though there were other investment opportunities for the Government, the 
Planning Department was not aware of any other project that could raise in-
comes so much as the proposed project. Settlers' incomes were expected to 
increase to four times the original income level of the settlers (about X$ 2,720). 
The Planning Department proposed hiring a new consultant who could, it had 
heard, quantify these considerations. The Prime Minister agreed. 
The new consultant reviewed the economic rate of return calculation, the 
parameters of which he accepted, and undertook to make a social benefit-
cost calculation. He pointed out that the wage rate of an unskilled worker in 
the rural area was about X$ 4,500 and interviewed the Cabinet as to whether 
this was considered excessive. It appeared that all the Ministers considered 
X$ 4,500 the minimum income level. The consultant explained that several 
functions could be used to measure the utility of an additional Xalandia dollar 
at various income levels and after much discussion the Cabinet felt that the 
Bernouilli-Weber-Fechner function presented the best estimate of their value 
judgment as to how much more a Xalandia dollar accruing to the settlers should 
be worth than a Xalandia dollar accruing to a person at the X$ 4,500 income 
level. 
The consultant made the necessary calculations and arrived at the result that 
a premium of 200 percent should be placed on the income increase of the 
settlers.1 Incorporating this premium in the benefit-cost calculation, the con-
sultant found that from a social point of view the project was highly valuable. 
Whereas the economic rate of return was only 13 percent, the social rate of 
return appeared to be about 19 percent. Sensitivity tests confirmed the plausi-
bility of these values. On the basis of the Planning Department's advice, the 
Prime Minister accepted the consultant's recommendations and approached 
one of the international institutions for a loan. 
The staff of that institution visited the country shortly thereafter to appraise 
the project. They found the technical, financial, managerial and economic 
aspects of the project well presented and acceptable, but expressed no opinion 
as to the validity of the social benefit-cost analysis. The Government of Xalan-
dia understands that the appraisal report is being prepared and hopes to hear 
soon whether the request for a loan will be granted. 
So far the discussion of our hypothetical example, and the reader may wish 
to guess what position the international lending institution is likely to take. 
The calculations are summarized in Table 10.1 and should not present a pro-
blem. All values are corrected for inflation. For ease of exposition, it is assumed 
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TABLE 10.1. Hypothetical example: Analyses of the financial, economic, and social return of 
the Xalandia oil palm project. 
Financial Return Economic Social 
Return Return 
Years 1-6 (Total): 
Domestic value of investments 
Premium on foreign exchange 
component of 102.4 
Economic value of investments 
Years 7-30 (Annual): 
Sales (125,000 tons at X$ 257 
f .o .b . -FE100%) 
Export duties 
Transport, mill operating, and 
additional extension costs (FE 80 %) 
Revenues accruing to settlers 
Settler operating costs (materials -
FE65%) 
Land rent 
Income taxes 
Net cash income settlers 
Settler labor cost (opportunity cost of 
labor X$ 680) 
Financial benefits 
128.0 
40.0% 
169.0 
32.1 
0.5 
5.0 
26.6 
2.0 
10.5 
0.5 
13.6 
3.4 
21.7 
Govt. Settlers 
XS Million 
128.0 
0.5 
10.5 
0.5 
11.5 
13.6 
3.4 
10.2 
128.0 
41.0 
169.0 
45.0 
6.6 
2.5 
3.4 
169.0 
Economic benefits 
Premium on income increase of 
settlers 
Social benefits 
2.0 x 10.2 
52.9 
32.5 32.5 
20.4 
52.9 
Internal rates of return: 6% 13% 19% 
that the investments are evenly distributed over the six-year investment period, 
while the benefits remain constant during years 7 to 30. Since we are interested 
in highlighting the social issues, only the internal rates of return of the project 
have been calculated and we have not bothered to calculate present values and 
probability distributions. The example is, of course, simplified and in real life 
the calculations would be more bothersome, but we hope to have shown that, 
with a minimum of investigation, fairly accurate financial, economic and social 
rates of return analyses can be made. 
As a last remark, it may be underlined that the example is entirely hypotheti-
cal. The values of the variables have been chosen such that the social rate of 
return is significantly higher than the economic rate of return. As we will see 
in the next Section, in which a real land settlement project will be discussed, this 
is not necessarily always the case. 
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10.2. MALAYSIA - LAND SETTLEMENT 
The example of the previous Section is not as hypothetical as it might at 
first sight seem to be. Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea 
and many African countries have land settlement programs quite similar to the 
example discussed. Of these, the Malaysia program is probably the largest and 
the best planned and organized, and it will be well worthwhile to review it in 
some detail. 
Malaysia, a country with a population of about 12 million, is generally 
regarded a successful case in development.2 During the 1960s, its GNP growth 
rate was between 6 and 7 percent, and its per capita income in 1974 was more 
than US$ 700. Nevertheless, it has a severe social problem. According to a 
1970 survey, in Peninsular Malaysia3 the incomes of the Malays (55 percent of 
the population) is only half that of the Chinese (34 percent of the population), 
while the Indians (accounting almost entirely for the remaining 11 percent) 
occupy a middle position. Furthermore, Malays and Indians own only 2.4 and 
1.1 percent, respectively, of the share capital of limited companies, while the 
Chinese own 27.2 percent. In the non-corporate sectors, Malays own 2.3 
percent of the fixed assets in manufacturing, construction and mining, and 
47.1 percent of the acreage under cultivation. On the other hand, the Chinese 
ownership is 92.2 percent in manufacturing, construction and mining, and 32.8 
percent in agriculture. The survey also indicated that, out of a total of 1.6 
million households in Peninsular Malaysia, some 590,000 had incomes below 
the poverty line and that 79 percent of these were Malay households. 
The increasing concern with this structural problem led the Government of 
Malaysia to formulate the New Economic Policy, which is well described in the 
Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975.4 The two-pronged 
strategy of development is the 'eradication of poverty' and 'the restructuring 
of Malaysian society to correct imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function.' The strategy is to 
be accomplished through 'the modernization of rural life, the rapid and ba-
lanced development of urban activities, and the creation of a Malay commercial, 
industrial community in all categories and at all levels of operation.' The 
modernization of rural life is a very important element of the New Economic 
Policy. Of the 590,000 poor households, some 520,000 were in the rural areas. 
The largest number was found among rubber smallholders (176,000), followed 
by padi cultivators (104,000), mixed agriculture farmers (102,000), and a 
residual group (138,000), in which non-estate laborers, fishermen and coconut 
smallholders formed the more important occupational groups. 
Malaysia is in the fortunate position of being endowed with ample land re-
sources. Some 34 million acres of land are suitable for agricultural development 
but, so far, only about half have been developed, leaving about 17 million acres 
to be opened up (6 million acres in Peninsular Malaysia and 11 million acres in 
Sabah and Sarawak). Land development is, therefore, an eminently feasible 
method of reducing the pressure of population on existing farming areas and 
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providing the poverty fanners new opportunities to raise their standard of 
living. From 1956, the year when land development as a program really started 
(the Federal Land Development Authority - FELDA - the most successful and 
most important of the land development agencies, was established in that year), 
through 1974, public agencies developed a total of some 1.6 million acres of 
land and settled some 150,000 families. At present, some 200,000 acres are 
annually being developed, some 80,000 acres of this by FELDA. The pace of 
development has accelerated in the past. Public sector allocations for land 
development increased from 4.5 percent of total public expenditures in the 
First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) to 8.3 percent in the Second Malaysia Plan 
(1971-1975). 
Are these land settlement projects good or bad? To analyze this, we will 
review a typical land settlement project as undertaken by FELDA during 1974. 
FELDA develops oil palm as well as rubber holdings but we will limit our ana-
lysis to the oil palm schemes, the more profitable of the two types. The invest-
ment costs per settler over the six-year investment period, the period during 
which no palm oil is produced, are of the order of USS 14,000 (1974 US dollars), 
surely not a negligible amount. About 56 percent of this amount is for land 
clearing, nurseries and planting of seedlings; about 24 percent for the oil mill; 
about 13 percent for management costs (supervision) of FELDA, and about 
7 percent for settler housing. 
The full bearing of the trees begins in the seventh year of the scheme; yields 
increase until the tree is about 13 years old, decrease somewhat thereafter but 
are still very substantial until the tree is about 30 years old, which is considered 
the end of the fruit-bearing period. Rather than calculating benefits and costs 
for each individual year, we will not be far off the mark if we show the calcula-
tions for an average year. Table 10.2 summarizes the basic data. 
A problem with such calculations, of course, is the price projection. The f.o.b. 
prices of palm oil and kernels shown in the table are in 1974 dollars and are 
based on an extrapolation of historical trends, adjusted for expected changes in 
demand and supply. In 1974, they were generally accepted as reasonable in 
price-forecasting circles. As the table shows, the settlers - they all have a holding 
of 14 acres - can expect to receive an average gross cash income during the 
years that the trees are bearing fruit (years 7 to 30) of about M$ 4,540 (about 
US$ 2,000). Under the FELDA schemes, the settlers move in during the fourth 
year after planting and, during the next two years when no income is being 
produced, receive a subsistence allowance of about MS 1,080 (US$ 470) per 
annum, which they are obliged to repay. In addition, they have to repay part of 
the agricultural development costs of the holding and the cost of the house they 
receive. All in all, the repayable amount at the end of the six-year investment 
period amounts to about M$ 19,400 (US$ 8,435) and the annual debt amortiza-
tion (loan to be repaid over 15 years at 6V2 percent) to about M$ 2,000 (USS 900). 
The spendable cash income of the settlers during the greater part of the produc-
tive lifetime of the trees is thus about MS 2,500 (US$ 1,100). 
The economic rate of return calculation for this type of project is rather 
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TABLE 10 .2 . Basic data on the Malaysian oil palm projects ( 1 9 7 4 Malaysian Dollars). 
I. Yields and Prices at Full Bearing 
Date of full bearing (years after 
clearing) 7 years 
Yield (average quantity of fresh fruit 
bunches - ffb - per acre) 7 .7 tons 
( 2 1 % oil; 4 . 2 % kernels) 
Per ton Palm oil Kernels 
F.o.b. price M$ 4 0 7 MS 2 5 0 
Export tax 3 2 -
Marketing/distr. charges 18 1 4 
Ex-mill value 3 5 7 2 3 6 
Per acre 
Production 1.6 tons 0 .3 tons 
Ex-mill value MS 571 MS 7 0 
Ex-mill value per acre of production M$ 6 4 0 
Processing costs M$ 1 0 0 
Price to settlers per acre of production MS 5 4 0 
II. Average Annual Revenues at Full Bearing per \A-acre Holding 
1. F.o.b. value of production per holding MS 1 0 , 1 4 0 
2 . Export tax 7 1 5 
3 . Marketing/distr. charges 4 6 5 
4 . Ex-mill value MS 8 , 9 6 0 
5. Processing costs 1 ,400 
6. Revenues settlers ( 1 4 ac. x MS 5 4 0 ) M$ 7 , 5 6 0 
7. Transport costs (holding to mill) 5 4 0 
8. Replanting fund charge 5 4 0 
9 . Fertilizers, pesticides 1 ,740 
10. State land tax 1 5 0 
11. Settler Devt. Fund charge 5 0 
12 . Gross cash income, settler MS 4 , 5 4 0 
1 3 . Debt amortization (principal and interest) 2 , 0 0 0 
14. Net cash income settler MS 2 , 5 4 0 (yrs. 7 - 2 1 ) 
15 . Net cash income settler 4 , 5 0 0 (yrs. 2 2 - 3 0 ) 
tedious because the values of benefits and costs are different for every year. We 
will not repeat the calculation here and it may, therefore, suffice to state that 
the numerous calculations which have been made for these schemes all arrive 
at economic rates of return between about 14 and 18 percent, say, an average of 
about 15 percent.3 
A few comments, however, are in order. Normally, no foreign exchange 
shadow rate is used in the calculations. In Malaysia, import duties are, on 
average, 13 percent; export duties about 5 percent. If we assume that import 
and export elasticities are equal, the shadow rate would be 104 percent of the 
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official rate. 6 If it is assumed that an additional dollar of foreign exchange would 
be used entirely for increasing imports, the shadow rate would be about 113 
percent of the official rate. This is certainly not negligible. On the other hand, 
the foreign exchange component of the investments is low (about 25 percent) 
while the foreign exchange component of the net benefit stream is high (the 
products are exported). The use of a foreign exchange shadow rate thus tends 
to increase the economic rate of return. There is, further, the point that the price 
projections are subject to a wide margin of error and that these errors may be 
larger than the foreign exchange adjustment. All in all, on practical grounds, 
we believe that it does not make much difference whether the official exchange 
rate or a shadow rate is used for this type of project in Malaysia. 
In the rate of return calculation, the f.o.b. value of the exports should, of 
course, be taken gross of the export duty, since this accrues to the Government 
and is therefore a benefit; similarly, the various taxes paid by the settlers should 
not be considered costs - they are transfer payments from the settlers to the 
Government. Also, the settlers' labor cost must be evaluated. FELD A surveyed 
the settlers carefully before they joined the schemes and found that settlers' 
average income was about MS 870 per annum. This may thus be taken to 
represent the opportunity cost of the settlers' labor. 
A short-cut method may be used to show that the economic rate of return 
will indeed be about 15 percent. As shown in Table 10.2, the f.o.b. value of the 
annual production of a holding is about MS 10,140. The costs consist of the 
real costs of items 3, 5, 7 and 9 in Table 10.2 and the opportunity cost of the 
settlers' labor (MS 870). Taking the figures of Table 10.2 we obtain a total cost 
of MS 5,015. However, about M$ 1,000 of depreciation, interest charges and 
taxes are included in the figures for processing, transporting and distributing, 
and the real total cost is therefore about MS 4,000. The value of the net benefit 
stream during years 7 to 30 is thus about MS 6,000 (US$ 2,600). The investments 
of MS 32,000 (USS 14,000) per holding take place about evenly during years 1 
to 6. Adjusting for taxes and compounding the yearly investments at an interest 
rate of 15 percent, we obtain, as the real value of the investments at the end of 
year 6, about MS 39,000. Comparison of the benefit stream of MS 6,000 per 
annum during years 7 to 30 with the tenninal investment in year 6 of MS 39,000 
shows that the economic internal rate of return is indeed about 15 percent. 
We are now in a position to analyze the social rate of return of this type of 
project, and the first question which arises is: which income level should be 
taken as the base income level? We have two pieces of evidence to determine 
this base level. First, in 1974, the wage paid by the Government for unskilled 
workers in the rural areas was about MS 2,500 per annum. Second, the bulk of 
the unskilled workers on private estates received a cash income of about 
MS 1,800 in 1974, to which must be added payments in kind such as housing 
and food. One would not be far off the mark if one evaluated the total income of 
an estate worker at about MS 2,500. Taking all these points into account, it 
seems to us that a base level of MS 2,500 represents a fairly accurate estimate of 
what in Malaysia was considered a reasonable income in 1974 for an unskilled 
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worker in the rural areas. 
For the social rate of return calculation, we should write out, year by year, the 
social value of the benefits, because these are a function of base level income, 
which may change over time. To simplify the exposition, we assume that there 
are no general productivity increases which would increase benefits and base 
level income. This may well be justified because, in the last decade, productivity 
increases have not been significant and this may well be so in the future. In any 
case, our assumption will not lead to large errors. Under our assumption then, 
an income distribution weight is to be attached to the increase in settlers' 
annual income from about M$ 900 without the project to the base income level 
of MS 2,500 with the project. Using our usual formula, we may set the weight 
on the additional annual income of M$ 1,600 at 1.67 or, in other words, we may 
attach to settlers' additional income of MS 1,600 a social premium of about 
60 percent (about MS 1,000). The net economic benefit of the project of MS 6,000 
per annum becomes thus a social net benefit stream of about MS 7,000. While 
the economic rate of return of this type of project is about 15 percent, the social 
rate of return appears to be slightly less than 17 percent. 
Why is it that the social analysis for this type of project results in a social rate 
of return only marginally different from the economic rate of return? The 
principal reason is that, whereas the relatively high investments (USS 14,000 
per settler) take place in the early years, the benefits of the schemes appear late 
in time: it takes six years after clearing before the settlers' income will increase. 
It would be of much interest to compare the land settlement type of project 
with projects also geared towards raising the incomes of the rural poor but 
with more immediate benefits. Malaysia has concentrated its efforts so far 
almost entirely on land settlement, and it is, therefore, difficult to find other 
types of projects. There are, however, two rural projects - the Muda and Ke-
mubu Irrigation Projects - where the objective was to increase the incomes of 
padi farmers. In the next section we will analyze the Muda project - the larger 
of the two. 
10.3. MALAYSIA - IRRIGATION 
One of the most spectacular projects in Malaysia is the Muda Irrigation 
project. It is located in the States of Kedah and Perlis in the northwest of 
Peninsular Malaysia and covers some 245,000 acres of land, on which some 
51,000 farmers cultivate padi. The objective of the project is to make double-
cropping of padi possible. The major works include the Muda and Pedu Dams 
of concrete and rockfill, respectively, with a tunnel connecting them; a head-
works and main canal system; improvement of existing and construction of new 
distributory canals; and drainage construction and ancillary works. Construc-
tion began in 1966 and was completed in 1970. In current Malaysian dollars, the 
total cost was M S 245 million (USS 106 million). In 1974 Malaysian dollars, 
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TABLE 10.3. Basic data: Malaysia-Muda irrigation project. 
Without With Change 
Project Project 
Farm Data, 1980 
Number of farmers 51,000 51,000 
Area 245,000 ac 245,000 ac 
Annual cropped area 237,000 ac 490,000 ac 253,000 ac 
Cropping intensity 96% 196% 
Yield per acre 1.5 tons 1.5 tons 
Padi output (tons) 347,000 710,000 363,000 
Annual Benefits and Costs by 1980 M$ Million 1 
Gross value of production 122.8 251.3 128.5 
Operating costs farmers 30.0 51.7 21.7 
Value added 92.8 199.6 106.8 
Labor cost farmers (hired labor and farmers' 
own labor) 19.8 55.3 35.5 
Net economic benefits, farmers 73.0 144.3 71.3 
Operating and maintenance costs, project works - 8.9 8.9 
Net economic benefit of project 73.0 135.4 62.4 
Investment Costs 313.0 
Economic Rate of Return 18 % 
Net Social Benefit of Project 83.6 
Social Rate of Return 24 % 313.0 
1 In 1974 Malaysian dollars. 
the total cost is M$ 313 million (US$ 136 million) or about US$ 2,650 per 
farmer. 
Although there are some leakages at the Muda Dam which are presently 
being sealed, and water control needs improvement, the project must be con-
sidered a great success. In 1965, the year before construction started, padi 
production was about 277,000 tons, and in 1971, the first full year when off-
season irrigation water was available, about 452,000 tons. It is expected that by 
1980 the full potential of off-season irrigation will be realized and that padi 
production then will be about 710,000 tons, accounting for about 60 percent of 
total padi production in Malaysia. A second-phase project, scheduled to start 
within the next few years, is expected to increase yields and lower production 
costs through improvements in water flows and agricultural supporting services. 
The economic rate of return analysis of the project is straightforward and the 
benefits and costs of the project for 1980, the year of full production, are re-
capitulated in Table 10.3. The area is analyzed without and with the project, 
and the incremental net benefit stream compared with the investments. The 
economic rate of return appears to be 18 percent. 
The social rate of return analysis is more difficult since we need to differen-
tiate between the various income classes. The income distribution pattern in the 
area is presently being studied but it will be several years before the results will 
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be available and the best we can do at present is to make some educated guesses. 
It is known that about 40 percent of the farmers are tenants and 60 percent 
owner-farmers. Furthermore, based on a sample survey of 4-acre holdings, it 
has been estimated that the incomes of the farmers operating this size of farm 
with and without the project would be as follows by 1980: 
TABLE 10.4. Net cash incomes 4-acre farmers by 1980 (1974 Malaysian dollars). 
Without With Change 
Project Project 
Tenant-farmers M$ 1,800 3,500 1,700 
Owner-farmers 2,000 4,000 2,000 
While the owner-farmers have in general larger holdings than four acres, the 
tenants in general have smaller farms. Since the base income level is MS 2,500 
(as discussed in the previous section), we assume that no income distribution 
weight is to be placed on the income increase of the 30,000 owner-farmers. As 
regards the tenants, we may calculate a conservative income distribution weight 
by assuming that the income of all tenants without and with the project are 
MS 1,800 and MS 3,500, respectively. Applying the usual formula8 we find that 
the increase from MS 1,800 to MS 2,500 should receive a weight of 1.17. The 
total social premium is then 20,000 x MS 700 x 0.17 = MS 2.4 million, which 
is a marginal addition to the economic benefits of about MS 62.4 million. This 
is, however, not surprising since the farmers have a relatively high annual in-
come without the project of MS 1,800. As discussed in the previous section, the 
settlers under the land settlement project have incomes without the project of 
about MS 900 only. 
There is, however, another very important social benefit. Detailed investi-
gations have shown that, because of the double-cropping, the labor requirement 
of the farmers has increased significantly. Again, only very rough estimates can 
be made, but the following labor situation for 1980 without and with the project 
may well be considered a realistic estimate. 
TABLE 10.5. Farm labor requirements and costs (in 1974 Malaysian dollars) by 1980. 
Without With Change 
Project Project 
Total farm labor, including 
farmers' own labor (in 
manyears) 36.350 73.700 37.350 
Total labor cost (M$ million) 19.8 55.3 35.5 
Labor cost per manyear M$ 570 MS 750 M$ 950 
Cost of hired labor (MS million) 12.0 28.0 16.0 
Total hired labor in manyears 21.000 37.350 16.350 
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It appears thus that some 16,350 additional manyears of hired labor may be 
necessary by 1980 and it has been estimated that the cost of this additional 
labor would be the equivalent of M S 950 per manyear, as compared to a normal 
cost equivalent to M S 570 per manyear. As a result, the average cost per man-
year would rise from M S 570 to M S 750. If we assume conservatively that the 
37,350 laborers equivalent in 1980 will experience this rise in income of M S 180, 
the social weight to be attached to this increase is 3.89 and the social premium 
is thus 37,350 x 180 x 2.8 = M S 18.8 million. 
A rough estimate of the total social value of the annual net benefits of the 
project is thus M S 84 million, compared with an annual net economic benefit of 
M S 62 million, and the social rate of return of the project is therefore approxi-
mately 24 percent, compared to the economic rate of return of 18 percent. 
More will be said about the land settlement projects vis-a-vis irrigation pro-
jects in Section 6 where we wish to draw some further conclusions, but first it 
will be useful to study two other cases. 
10.4. WEST AFRICA - MECHANICAL CLEARING VERSUS H A N D CLEARING 
OF JUNGLE FORESTS 
During one of our visits to a West African country in the late 1960s, we be-
came aware of a very controversial problem that arose in connection with a 
planned oil palm project, namely, whether the area for the project that consisted 
of jungle forest should be cleared mechanically or by hand. The mechanical 
method of clearing consists of the mechanical felling of forests with specialized 
equipment, windrowing of the felled woods with bulldozers, and light burning 
of the area between the windrows. Furthermore, no stumps are left in the field 
and the area between the windrows can be traveled by car. On the other hand, 
the manual method consists of the cutting of undergrowth, smaller trees and 
larger trees by successive worker teams. The trees are felled in only one direc-
tion and later on burned, leaving only the largest stumps standing. A path of 
2.40 m width is opened after every row of oil palm trees, but this is only a foot-
path which cannot be traveled by car. 
The dispute was fierce. The proponents of mechanical clearing claimed that 
complete burning in the case of hand clearing would affect the humus content 
of the soil, possibly leading to a reduction of yields, and that motorized in-
spection of the trees would not be possible. The proponents of hand clearing 
claimed that burning had a favorable effect on yields and auto transport 
between blocks of trees was possible, and that, as regards the trees in the blocks, 
a good manager should do his inspection on foot and not by car, and so on. 
In the end, after considerable discussion, both parties agreed that there was no 
evidence that the two methods of clearing would produce different yields. 
Furthermore, the inspection issue appeared not to be relevant at all, both 
parties eventually agreeing that neither of the clearing methods really had any 
advantage over the other. 
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The dispute thereafter centered on the financial rates of return of both 
methods. Projects with mechanical clearing appeared to have a rate of return of 
about 11 percent, while projects with hand clearing had a rate of return of 
about 9 percent. Further analysis showed that the higher financial rate of return 
of mechanical clearing was based on the fact that a larger area could be cleared 
per annum than under hand clearing so that the benefits of the project would 
materialize sooner. The higher cost per hectare of mechanical clearing appeared 
thus to be more than compensated by the earlier sales. It was pointed out, of 
course, that the economic rate of return rather than the financial rate of return 
was relevant for the decision, and it was finally agreed to undertake such a 
calculation. 
Much time was spent on estimating the relevant shadow prices. This does not 
concern us here, except that it should be noted that the costs of mechanical 
clearing were entirely foreign exchange costs and the output of the project 
would be exported. All the foreign exchange elements were, therefore, evaluated 
at the opportunity cost of foreign exchange, which differed markedly from the 
official exchange rate because the national currency was overvalued. As regards 
labor, it was found after detailed investigation that the wages which would be 
paid under the hand clearing method were about twice as high as the laborers' 
normal earnings. The opportunity cost of labor was therefore set at 0.5 of the 
wage rate. In order to compare the two methods of land clearing, a differential 
analysis was made using different values for the most significant variables 
(sensitivity tests). The base values of this analysis are presented in Table 10.6. 
As the calculations show, it was found that the base estimate of the economic 
rate of return on the incremental cost of mechanical clearing was only about 
3 percent, and it was, therefore, concluded by several of the participants in the 
debate that mechanical clearing was not justified. Nevertheless, this conclusion 
was challenged by others because the calculations appeared to be very sensitive 
to the chosen values. 
There is not much sense in reviewing all the different calculations. The point 
we wish to make is that the debate could easily have been settled if one had 
calculated the social rates of return of the two methods. It has already been 
pointed out that the workers under the land clearing method would be paid 
about twice what they would earn in their next best alternative. As the normal 
unskilled labor income was about 50 percent higher than the earnings of the 
workers, the social weight that should be attached to an increase in their income 
would be about 2.0. 1 0 This means thus that land clearing would have an addi-
tional benefit stream equal to the opportunity cost of land clearing (the stream 
14, 32, 33 and so on, in Table 10.6) and, as shown at the bottom of Table 10.6, 
the incremental cost of mechanical clearing would then have a negative rate 
of return, making hand clearing definitely the more preferable method of 
clearing the forests. 
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TABLE 10.6. West Africa- Oil palm development project. 
Differential Cost - Benefit Analysis Mechanical Clearing versus Manual Clearing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
69/70 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Mechanical clearing of 9,000 ha-annually 1,200 1,800 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Hand clearing of 9,000 ha-annually 600 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 
Differential Cost/Benefit Analysis (X$ million) 
Investments, mechanical clearing 109 164 182 182 182 
Investments, manual clearing 14 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Higher economic investment costs, 
mechanical (95) (132) (150) (150) (150) 32 32 
Higher economic revenue, mechanical 
clearing - - - 16 34 66 99 150 150 126 100 54 18 
Differential stream (95) (132) (150) (150) (134) 66 98 99 150 150 126 100 54 18 
Economic Return on Incremental Costs, Mechanical Clearing - 3 % 
Differential stream adjusted with income 
distribution weights (109) (164) (182) (182) (166) 34 66 99 150 150 126 100 54 18 
Social Return on Incremental Costs, Mechanical Clearing - negative 
10.5. PAKISTAN - FARM TRACTORS 
Beginning in the latter part of the 1960s, the International Development 
Association (the sister organization of the World Bank) made three credits on 
soft terms available to the Government of Pakistan for the procurement of 
tractors by farmers. These credits resulted in the introduction into Pakistan of 
some 18,000 tractors between 1966 and 1973. Although the appraisal reports 
indicated that the projects had high financial and economic rates of return, the 
Government of Pakistan and the Association became seriously concerned about 
possible adverse social effects of farm mechanization and, therefore, initiated a 
study 1 1 following approval of the third credit in 1970. 
The study consisted of two parts, the first being a field survey. From the 
3,868 farms which received tractors from the first credit in 1967-1968,202 farms 
were randomly selected and field survey data collected on farm situation, 
resource use, production processes and output in both the 'before' and 'after' 
tractor situations. 1 2 The second part consisted of an analysis of the financial 
and economic returns on investment in tractors. 
One of the principal findings of the study was that farm mechanization leads 
to a substantial increase in farm size. The 202 survey farms encompassed an 
area of 9,083 cultivated acres before acquiring tractors, compared to 22,025 
acres at the end of the period, thereby increasing the mean size of farms from 
some 45 acres to some 109 acres. The bulk of the increase in farm size came 
about because the mechanizing farmers took over the land formerly leased out 
to their tenants, thereby displacing some 879 tenant farmers. 
To make a meaningful calculation of the economic rate of return of farm 
mechanization, the authors of the study took as their base the final area of land 
(22,025 acres), and calculated inputs and outputs of this area before and after 
mechanization began. Appropriate shadow prices were introduced (for in-
stance, the opportunity cost of foreign exchange was set at Rs. 9,50 to the US 
dollar, while the official rate was Rs. 4.50 to the US dollar) and the surprising 
result is that the authors found an economic rate of return for the program of 
about 24 percent even though some 1,707 full-time employment opportunities 
were lost as a result of the mechanization - well over eight jobs per tractor. 
The authors are at a loss as to what conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis. On the one hand, they state that farm mechanization has been a very 
mixed blessing to the Pakistan economy because of this employment displace-
ment. On the other hand, there is this rather satisfactory economic rate of 
return. The authors conclude that 'no definitive judgment is possible as to 
whether tractor mechanization in Pakistan (or similar) agriculture is good or 
bad.' 
To make this judgment, a social rate of return analysis should, of course, be 
undertaken. But let us start with a review of the methodology the authors 
followed for the calculation of the economic rate of return. Table 10.7 presents 
in summary form all the relevant data. We do not wish to quarrel with the 
evaluation of benefits and costs other than labor, and assume that these have 
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TABLE 10.7. Calculation of the economic rate of return of farm mechanization in Pakistan. 
Valuation using Shadow Prices. 
Before After Change 
Rs. Million 
I. Annual Benefit and Cost Flows 
Benefits (value of output) 13.8 19.1 5.3 
Costs other than Labor 1.6 3.9 2.3 
Financial Costs of Labor 3.7 2.3 - 1 . 4 
Total Unadjusted Costs 5.3 6.2 0.9 
Net Benefits before Labor Cost 
Adjustment 8.5 12.9 4.4 
Adjustment to price Labor at 
Opportunity Cost +3 .7 +2 .3 - 1 . 4 
Net Economic Benefit 12.2 15.2 3.0 
Capital Costs 
Investment year 0 in tractors, 
tube wells, etc. Rs. 10.5 million 
Bullock sales: Year 1 Rs. 0.4 million 
2 Rs. 0.4 million 
3 Rs. 0.04 million 
Cost-Benefit Stream 
YearO -10 .5 Year 4 3.0 
1 3.4 5 3.0 
2 3.4 6 3.0 
3 3.0 7 3.0 
Economic Rate of Return: 24 percent. 
been correctly calculated. As regards labor, the implicit assumption of the 
authors was that the annual wage rate of Rs 844, which a casual worker makes, 
represents the opportunity cost of labor for hired labor as well as for farmers 
and tenants. As shown in Table 10.8, before the program, the labor require-
ments were 4,379 manyears and the total labor cost Rs 3.7 million, whereas, 
after the program, the labor requirements are 2,672 manyears and the total 
labor cost Rs 2.3 million. The authors state that the labor displaced from the 
area has no significant employment opportunities elsewhere and they propose 
to treat the displaced labor as representing neither costs nor benefits to the 
economy. They continue, therefore, to evaluate labor costs after the program at 
Rs 3.7 million. We prefer a different presentation and show, therefore, in Table 
10.7 the financial cost of labor as well as the adjustment which must be made to 
arrive at the opportunity cost of labor which, if there are really no employment 
opportunities, must be set at zero. 1 3 Both methods arrive at the same net eco-
nomic benefit stream of Rs 3.0 million per annum. As Table 10.7 shows, the 
economic rate of return of the program is then about 24 percent. 
It is very unfortunate that the authors of the study were not able to collect 
separate data on the incomes of the mechanizing farmers and the tenant farmers 
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TABLE 10.8. Labor use on 22,025 acres of farm land before and after farm mechanization 
program. 
Labor Use - manyears Total 
— Labor 
Acres Owners/ Hired Total Cost Rs 
Tenants Labor Labor million 
Before 
202 mechanizing farmers 9,083 
879 tenant farmers 10,095 
New land acquired 2,847 
22,025 
After 
202 tractor farms 22,025 
Change 
714 1,029 1,743 
2,197 439 2,636 
2,911 1,468 4,379 3.7 
853 1,819 2,672 2.3 
-2,058 +351 -1 ,707 - 1 . 4 
before and after the program. For the social evaluation it would have been of 
great help if we knew what the loss in income was of the displaced farmers, how 
long they remained unemployed, whether they migrated to the city and found 
another job, and so on. In the absence of these data, we can only accept the 
statement of the authors that there was no significant employment opportunity 
for the displaced 1,707 manyears of labor. Evaluating this at the rate of Rs 844 
per annum, we find that there was annually a loss in income of about Rs 1.4 
million which, socially, should be valued at the appropriate income distribution 
weight. We have no data for Pakistan to calculate these weights but can show 
the effect of the weights as follows. Let us assume that a socially acceptable 
project should have a rate of return of 10 percent, surely a low return for 
Pakistan. Then the social net benefit should be about Rs 2 million per annum, 1 4 
which will be the case if the displaced labor of Rs 1.4 million has socially a cost 
of Rs 2.4 million. Or, in other words, the loss of income should be valued at a 
weight of 1.7 only to make the entire mechanization program unacceptable. 
Since the weights in case of a decrease in income of the indicated order of mag-
nitude will be substantially higher than that (see Chapter 9), it may definitely be 
concluded that, if the data of the study are correct and displaced labor indeed 
has no alternative employment opportunities, the program should not have 
been undertaken. 
Another matter that should have been investigated is whether the tenant 
farmers had viable units. Unfortunately, the study does not provide any data 
on this point and the only observation we can make is that we would not be 
surprised if indeed the holdings of the tenants were submarginal. If additional 
employment opportunities were in fact as scarce as the authors believe, land 
reform would probably provide the best measure to remedy the situation. 
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10.6. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
The examples studied in the previous sections are all isolated case studies. 
However, as this study has tried to emphasize, projects should not be considered 
in isolation; they should be ranked against each other to determine what the 
composition of a country's investment program should be. To make such a 
comparative analysis, a larger project data base is needed than the few analyzed 
examples provide. Many more examples could have been taken from the files 
of consultants and international lending agencies; they would, however, 
have even greater-shortcomings than the previous examples in that they would 
have even less information. In fact, it is extremely rare to find a feasibility study 
that addresses itself to the question of who benefits and who loses, and that 
provides any detail on income levels. Because of this scarce data base, only a 
sketch of the implications of the social benefit cost approach with respect to a 
country's development strategy can be given. As two of the cases studied above 
refer to Malaysia, we will take this country as an example and comment briefly 
on its agricultural development strategy. 
For the last 15 years, the Malaysian Government has tried to reduce the 
pressure of the population on existing land by developing new land for agri-
cultural settlement. Increasing concern for rural poverty and income distri-
bution, and a recognition that the land settlement programs have not made as 
much of a dent in poverty as was hoped, have led recently to a re-evaluation of 
the costs of land settlement schemes and a questioning as to whether it would 
not be better to develop smallholder agriculture in situ or to take other measures 
of combating rural poverty. What can social benefit-cost analysis tell us in this 
regard? 
The analysis of the FELDA schemes in Section 2 showed clearly that the 
social rate of return of the land settlement projects (17 percent) is not signifi-
cantly higher than their economic rate of return (about 15 percent). An example 
of a project in situ is the Muda Scheme discussed in Section 3; its economic rate 
of return is about 18 percent. Surprisingly enough, it appeared that this project 
dealt to a large extent with relatively well-to-do farmers, so that for these bene-
ficiaries the additional social benefit is not large. However, the double cropping 
made possible by the project is leading to a significant additional demand for 
hired labor and very possibly to an increase in the incomes of the hired laborers. 
Applying some conservative weights, the overall social rate of return of the 
project was estimated to be about 24 percent. Nevertheless, this project also has 
its drawbacks. Incomes of hired labor are only half those of the smaller farmers 
and are far below what should be considered a reasonable minimum income. 
Are there any other possible schemes that can alleviate poverty in the rural 
areas? In Section 10.2 it was mentioned that a substantial part of the poverty 
groups consisted of smallholder farmers. The problem with these farmers is not 
only that their productivity is low but also that, unless they receive additional 
land, it cannot be expected that they will be able to rise above the poverty line. 
But additional land is hard to find in the populated areas where these farmers 
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live. Furthermore, alienation of existing land is probably not the solution since 
Malaysia does not have the extreme variation in landholdings that exists, for 
instance, in several Latin American countries. We believe, therefore, that a 
combination of measures is necessary. 
The non-viable farmers should be transferred to the settlement schemes and 
should surrender their existing holdings - the value of which should, of course, 
be deducted from their loan repayment obligation - so that the freed land can 
be used to increase the farm size of those staying behind. At the same time, mea-
sures should be taken to increase the productivity of those staying behind. 
Hence, to provide non-viable farmers with a livelihood and also to absorb 
the growth in the labor force, the development of new land should continue. 
However, Government should try to develop low-cost schemes, based on the 
principle of more farmer self-help and less Government assistance. Also, it 
should not be necessary to provide at the start the sometimes luxurious infra-
structure which the Government presently provides. If, for instance, the invest-
ment cost per settler could be reduced from about USS 14,000 to about US$ 
10,000, the social rate of return of this type of project would be about 24 percent. 
As regards measures to raise the productivity of smallholders in situ, nume-
rous possibilities exist. For instance, the existing replanting program with im-
proved planting material for rubber smallholders can be substantially expanded; 
whereas it was formerly believed that the potential for irrigation was limited, it 
now appears that there is considerable scope for constructing small-scale irri-
gation works for existing padi smallholders; the technique of interplanting with 
cocoa for coconut growers is only now becoming known and can be greatly 
expanded; and so on. In general, there is ample room for further developing 
the agricultural production potential of the existing smallholders, not only with 
specific technical measures but also by providing agricultural credit, and access 
to fertilizers and other farm inputs. 
The social rate of return of in situ farm development is high. Although we 
have no specific data on all the different possibilities, an example regarding padi 
farming may be useful. Some pilot schemes have shown that small-scale irri-
gation works can be constructed at less than M$ 4,500 (US$ 2,000) per farmer. 
A padi farmer with two acres of land may be expected to produce some six tons 
of padi when his land is irrigated, which gives him gross revenues of about 
MS 2,100 and a net income of about MS 1,600, as compared to a maximum pro-
duction of three tons of padi under dryland conditions, which gives him gross 
revenues of MS 1,050 and a net income of about MS 800. Such a scheme would 
have an economic rate of return of about 15 to 16 percent, but a social rate of 
return of at least 35 percent. 1 5 
We, therefore, definitely believe that, in order to combat rural poverty, much 
more should be done for existing smallholders. The social benefits of small-
holder schemes are so much higher than those of the land settlement projects 
that a change in strategy appears well justified. This does not mean that land 
settlement projects should not be undertaken at all. Rather, we believe that the 
Government should try to identify and prepare more in situ projects, and that 
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at least part of the additional resources otherwise used for land settlement 
should be used for the in situ projects. 1 6 The right strategy would in principle 
be attained when investments for existing smallholders would have been so 
much expanded and would have become so costly that their social rates of 
return would have become equal to the social rates of return of the land settle-
ment projects. 
We have tried to show in this Chapter that the social benefit-cost approach 
to investment decisions is a powerful tool. Even though, in all the cases dis-
cussed, the data base was scarce and educated guesses had to be made, it was 
possible to analyze the social impact of such programs as farm mechanization; 
mechanical and hand clearing of forests; rural development-type projects, 
varying from the rather costly land settlement project to a simple irrigation 
project; and, most importantly, how a sensible social development strategy 
should be drawn up. We hope that this study has shown that the social analysis 
should be as much a part of the instruments of those responsible for determining 
investment programs as the economic analysis. 
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 1 0 
S E N S I T I V I T Y T E S T I N G O F T H E SOCIAL R A T E S O F 
R E T U R N O F T H E D I S C U S S E D E X A M P L E S 
As mentioned in Chapter 9, the income distribuf on weights which we have 
used for the social rate of return analysis of the disuussed examples are some-
what speculative because of our lack of empirical data. It is, therefore, of interest 
to know to what extent our conclusions should be modified if we use CRAMER'S 
rather than BERNOUILLI'S function for the derivation of the weights. To norma-
lize CRAMER'S function so that the weight on base level income equals unity, we 
write for his marginal utility of income function u = yjbj Y, so that total utility 
U = 2 yjbY. The weights on the income changes of the poor can then be cal-
culated from vp x A Y = 2^b (yJY2 - V y i)-
Table 10.9 tabulates for each discussed project its economic rate of return, 
the social weight on the benefits or losses of the poverty groups if the weight is 
based on BERNOUILLI'S function, and its corresponding social rate of return, 
as well as the social weight and corresponding social rate of return if the CRAMER 
function is applied. The social weights and the social rates of return are, of 
course, lower in the latter case. Nevertheless, our conclusions remain the same. 
For instance, as regards Malaysia, even the use of CRAMER'S function gives a 
social rate of return of in situ development (25 %) which is much higher than 
that of land settlement ( 1 6 % ) . Our recommendation of a strategy change thus 
remains well justified. As extensively discussed before, we nevertheless believe 
that the BERNOULLI function is, on social grounds, more acceptable and we 
would recommend this function for the social rate of return analysis. 
TABLE 10.9. Economic rates of return as well as social weights and social rates of return of 
the discussed examples according to Bernouilli and Cramer. 
Economic Social Weights on Social Rates of 
Rates of Benefits (Losses) of Return According 
Return Poverty Groups According to: 
to: 
Bernouilli Cramer Bernouilli Cramer 
Xalandia Land Settlement 13% 3.00 1.72 19% 15.5% 
Malaysia Land Settlement 15% 1.60 1.25 17% 16% 
Malaysia Irrigation 18% 3.80 1.95 24% 20% 
W. Africa Land Clearing 3% 2.07 1.44 neg. 1-5% 
Pakistan Farm Tractors 24% >1.70 >1.70 < 1 0 % < 1 0 % 
Malaysia Padifarming 16% 2.15 1.46 35% 25% 
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N O T E S C H A P T E R 10 
1 This was calculated from v„ x A Y = A U, where A U = 2.3 b log Y2IY1. Since A Y = 
$ 2,720 - $ 680 = $ 2,040, while b = $ 4,500 and A C7 = 2.3 x 4,500 log 2,720/680 = 6,230 
utils, it was found that vp = 6,230/2,040 = 3.0. 
2 See, for instance, KASPER, W., 'Malaysia: A Study in Successful Economic Development,' 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Studies, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1974. 
3 Malaysia consists of Peninsular Malaysia and the States of Sabah and Sarawak. 
4 GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA, 'Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75,' 
Kuala Lumpur, 1973. 
5 For instance, during the period 1966-1973, the World Bank made four loans to FELDA 
for this type of project; the economic rates of return were estimated at 16 percent, 13.8 per-
cent, 17.5 percent, and 14.8 percent, respectively. 
6 As discussed in Chapter 3, the simplified formula for the shadow foreign exchange rate is 
(M + T) + (X - D) 
M + X 
Government statistics show the following values of M, X, T and D : 
M$ Million 1971 1972 1973 1971-1973 
Value imports (M) 4,422 
Value exports (X) 5,017 
Value taxes on imports (T) 582 
Value taxes on exports ( D ) 231 
The shadow rate is thus ^ ffi^ = 104 
7 The formula is vp x A Y = A U., where A U = 2.3 b log Y2/Y1. Since b = M $ 2,500, 
Y2 = M $ 2,500, Yi = M $ 900, and A Y = M S 1,600, we obtain: vp x 1,600 = 2.3 x 2,500 
log 2,500/900, from which follows that v p = 1 . 6 . 
8 v p x AY — AU, where A U = 2.3 b log Y2/Y1. Substituting b = M S 2,500, Y2 = 
M S 2,500, Ki = M S 1,800, and AY = M S 700, we get v„ x 700 = 2.3 x 2,500 log 2,500/ 
1,800, so that vp = 1 . 1 7 . 
9 Vp x AY = 23 b log Yi/Yi where b = M S 2,500, Y2 = M $ 750, Yi = M S 570 and 
A Y = M S 180. Hence, v p x 180 = 2.3 x 2,500 log 750/570, from which follows that v p = 
3.8. 
1 0 Our formula is v p x A Y = 2.3 b log Y2/Yi, where Yi = 100, Y2 = 200, and b = 300. 
Hence: vp x 100 = 2.3 x 300 log 200/100, from which follows v p = 2.07. 
1 1 MCINERNEY, J. P. (Consultant) and DONALDSON, G. F., 'The Consequences of Farm 
Tractors in Pakistan,' World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 210, February 1975. 
1 2 We will not quibble with the words 'before' and 'after.' As discussed in Chapter I, we 
prefer the terms 'without' and 'with' the project. 
1 3 We may also express this as follows. If labor can be fully employed throughout the 
economy, then the cost saving of Rs 1.4 million worth of labor represents a real saving in 
resources because this labor can be employed elsewhere. If this labor has, however, no em-
ployment elsewhere, then there is from an economic point of view no saving at all. 
1 4 The cost and benefit stream would then be: - 10.5 (Year 0), 2.4 (Year 1), 2.4 (Year 2), 
and 2.0 (Years 3-7), representing a rate of return of 10 percent. 
1 5 Since v p x A Y = 2.3 b log Y2/Y1, we get v p x 800 = 2.3 x 2,500 log 1600/800, so 
that v p = 2.15. Hence, the differential social net benefit stream is 800 x 2.15 = M S 1,720. 
Since the investment costs are less than M S 4,500, the social rate of return will be at least 35 
percent. 
4,543 5,899 14,864 
4,884 7,342 17,243 
589 720 1,891 (13%) 
232 371 834(5%) 
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1 6 It should be mentioned here that the Third Malaysia Plan (TMP) was published at the 
time this study was being finalized. The TMP sets the target for land settlement during the 
period 1976-1980 at 1 million acres, i.e., the same target as under the Second Malaysia Plan 
(SMP), and fixes the target for in situ development at 1.7 million acres or double that under 
the SMP. The new strategy of the Malaysian Government is thus well in line with the strategy 
outlined above (Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, p. 170). 
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C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S 
The gap between the rich countries and the poor countries has been widening 
for at least the last hundred years. ZTMMERMAN calculated that the 2 5 percent of 
the world population that lived in the lowest income areas of the world earned 
12.5 percent of the world income in 1860, against 3.2 percent in I 9 6 0 . 1 Annual 
per capita income of the industrialized countries was about US$ 4 , 5 5 0 in 1974 
whereas per capita income of the poorest developing countries (mostly in 
Africa and Asia where more than one billion persons live) was only US$ 1 1 6 . 2 
This gap between rich and poor has caused the developing countries to demand 
a larger share of the world's production. H A Q , 3 who must be considered one of 
the most eloquent spokesmen for the group, sees this as part of an historical 
process and feels that a new economic order is in the making. A larger share of 
the liquidity created by the International Monetary Fund should be made 
available to the developing countries, taxes on nonrenewable resources (oil, 
minerals, and the like) and on multinational corporation activities should be 
collected for the benefit of the developing countries, and more international 
assistance should be given to the poorest countries in the form of grants. Further-
more, according to HAQ , the slate must be wiped clean: a major settlement 
should be reached between creditors and debtors to ease past debt burdens, 
particularly for the poorest countries, and the contracts and concessions that 
multinational corporations obtained in the past through strength should be 
renegotiated. 
It is, however, becoming increasingly clear from the present discussions on 
the new economic order that the expectations of the developing countries will 
not be fulfilled. The most important of the developed countries are quite willing 
to enter into new arrangements where this is mutually beneficial, but far from 
agreeable to increase their transfers to the developing world. Although dis-
appointing, this is not a reason for despair on the part of the developing coun-
tries because, as K A H N has pointed out, they are now entering a stage of higher 
income and lower population growth rates. While it took the United States 
about 2 0 0 years to go from about US$ 2 5 0 to about US$ 7 ,000 in per capita 
GNP, there is every reason to believe that today the process will take place 
much more rapidly in many of the developing countries since the gap that now 
exists between the developed and the developing countries acts as a powerful 
force to pull the latter forward. The industrialized world needs the raw mate-
rials, other products and labor of the developing countries, and it can, therefore, 
be expected that the latter will gradually obtain better bargaining positions to 
secure the capital, technology and institutions necessary to help develop these 
resources. Furthermore, population growth rates are expected to go down in the 
developing world because rearing children is becoming costlier while increasing 
incomes are making parents less dependent for their old age livelihood on their 
children, thereby reducing the need for children.4 
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Although we thus expect that substantial economic growth will take place 
in the developing world, it has been stated that such growth will not benefit the 
lower income groups. KUZNETS 5 advanced the hypothesis that a U-shaped 
relationship exists between income distribution and income, or, in other words, 
that if we plot the shares of total income for the lowest 30 or 40 percent of in-
come earners over time, we should find that for subsistence societies at a low 
level of income the shares are high; that when overall income increases, the 
shares decrease; and that, in the last stages of development, the shares start to 
rise. AHLUWALIA 6 found indeed such a secular relationship but found also that, 
although the relative shares of the poorer groups may decline during the early 
structural stages of development, there is no cross-country evidence that the 
incomes of the poorer groups decline in absolute terms in this phase. Further-
more, there did not appear to be any evidence that faster growing countries 
show higher inequality at the same level of development than slower growing 
countries. As AHLUWALIA states, ' . . . policy makers are perhaps best advised 
to think of the rate of growth as determining essentially the speed of transition 
through the different phases of development and inequality; higher growth 
rates accelerate the transition without necessarily generating greater inequality 
than can be structurally expected in each phase.' AHLUWALIA'S findings con-
firm that high levels of growth can have a positive effect on the share of total 
income for the poorest income groups. 
What instruments should be used to achieve an improvement in income 
distribution without trading off growth for equity? We discussed the several 
possible transfer mechanisms in Chapter 9 and found that the investment 
method of transferring income proved to be a highly efficient method of raising 
the incomes of the poor. The same conclusion was reached by AHLUWALIA and 
CHENERY 7 but their analysis gives the impression that a mere increase of capital 
stock in the areas where the poor live would be sufficient to increase their in-
comes. Such investments may be for the improvement of water supply, electri-
fication, health, nutrition, education, roads, marketing and grain storage facili-
ties, irrigation, drainage, and the like. In our opinion, however, extreme caution 
is in order if the above policy prescription is to be followed for rural areas. For 
instance, some 80 percent of the land usually belongs to the top 20 percent of 
the farmers, and it must, therefore, be expected that the benefits of general 
infrastructure investments will accrue mainly to the richest groups. 
Another criticism we might direct at the CHENERY et al. study is that they are 
willing to accept low productivity investments where the objective is to raise 
the incomes of the poor. For instance, their income growth model assumes that, 
initially, the investments undertaken by the Government for the poor have an 
output-capital ratio of 0.22, with output being produced after 5 years, while the 
investments undertaken by the richest groups of the population have an output-
capital ratio of 0.33 to 0.35, with output being produced after one year.8 It is 
stated in so many words that this trade-off between growth and equity is per-
fectly acceptable as long as the relative weight on the incomes of the project 
beneficiaries justifies it. 9 This means in practice that CHENERY et al. are willing 
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to accept any project with a satisfactory social rate of return so that the econo-
mic rate of return appears to have lost its significance. In the same study, 
DULOY writes: 'For large investments which are at the core of a poverty pro-
gram - those which are designed to increase the access to income earning assets 
of the poor - we suggest that the appropriate procedure should include, first, 
the setting of aggregate levels of investment funds to be allocated for this pur-
pose and, second, the evaluation of projects utilizing a weighting system for 
benefits according to the income level of the recipients.' 1 0 Hence, DULOY also 
negates the function of the economic rate of return in project evaluation. Al-
though SQUIRE and VAN DER TAK mention that the economic rate of return of a 
project should be calculated, a careful reading of their study leads us to con-
clude that, in their opinion, the social rate of return is the only one that counts. 1 1 
We believe that the approach of all these writers to the poverty problem is un-
fortunate. Because sound investment possibilities almost always exist in reality, 
public investments should usually have satisfactory economic as well as social 
rates of return. If the economic criterion is overlooked, the result is not only that 
the international lending agencies will be open to the criticism of L I N D E R 1 2 that 
they exacerbate the balance of payments problems of the developing countries, 
but also to the criticism that this lending will lead to a serious waste of resources. 
There is, in our opinion, no short-cut method to social development. A 
poverty-focussed strategy is necessarily a micro-economic strategy and must 
rely on project analysis to help determine which projects and which programs 
will indeed raise the incomes of the poor and which must be rejected. This study 
has tried to show that in the drawing up of a poverty eradication strategy, 
efficiency as well as equity counts, and that the calculation of economic and 
social rates of return makes it possible to choose investment programs geared 
towards raising the incomes of the poor without neglecting efficiency. 
Looking at the actual development experience of the last decade, there have 
indeed been several countries which have followed development strategies 
based on efficiency as well as equity criteria. These countries have done well in 
economic terms while their income distribution has also become much more 
equitable. Others have paid attention mainly to distributive considerations, 
putting emphasis on extensive subsidy programs to help the poor, while neglect-
ing the investment method of raising incomes. Although income distribution 
has perhaps improved, the economic performance of these countries has been 
poor. Other developing countries focussed principally on the economic justifi-
cation of their investment programs. Their economic performance has been 
good but progress towards a more equitable income distribution has lagged 
behind. 
In our opinion, the choice between the different strategies is clear. The essence 
of the development process is the achievement of growth, not only of national 
income but also of the incomes of the lowest income groups. It is only in this 
way that social stability can be ensured. By basing investment decisions on both 
an economic and a social rate of return analysis, this objective can be attained. 
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with Growth,' Chapter X, p. 207. 
1 1 SQUIRE and VAN DER TAK, 'Economic Analysis of Projects.' This study is further subject 
to the criticism that it is operationally not very useful. The project evaluators are supposed to 
estimate the elasticity of the marginal utility of income schedule in a particular country and 
project evaluation becomes therewith a rather subjective matter. 
1 2 See Chapter VI, Section 3. 
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S U M M A R Y 
This study concerns project planning or, as it may also be called, project 
evaluation or benefit-cost analysis. It is a study of criteria for the design, 
selection and implementation of projects, with the basic objective of maximizing 
national welfare. Chapter 1 discusses that national welfare is not synonymous 
with national income and that the maximization of national income should not 
be accepted as a strategy for development since it excludes a number of impor-
tant welfare dimensions. Specifically, consumer surpluses, disutilities of effort, 
scarcity values of goods and services, externalities, and the distribution of in-
come between persons and over time are aspects of welfare which are not in-
corporated in the concept of national income. There is, therefore, a fundamental 
difference between a normal profitability analysis which uses basically the price 
data entering the national income accounts, and benefit-cost analysis. While 
profitability analysis uses market prices for inputs and outputs, benefit-cost 
analysis uses imputed values - the real values of benefits and costs - to deter-
mine whether an investment is worth undertaking. Traditional benefit-cost 
analysis - the economic evaluation of projects which considers all the above 
mentioned aspects of welfare except income distribution - is discussed in Part I 
of the study. Income distribution considerations are taken into account in 
Part II, and the analysis there is referred to as the social evaluation of projects. 
Chapter 1 also discusses some of the broader principles of project planning; 
for example, the fundamental efficiency principle: any expansion of a project's 
production is justified as long as incremental units of production have higher 
benefits than costs. But what are benefits and costs? Benefits may be defined as 
willingness to pay and thus are identical to the gross consumer surplus. In an 
economy without distortions, costs can be measured at market prices, but such 
economies do not exist and the use of shadow prices, therefore, becomes man-
datory to measure the real scarcity values of goods and services. It has been 
suggested that programming models could generate these shadow prices but 
such models are as yet insufficiently developed to be of practical use. The 
opportunity cost doctrine is, therefore, accepted as the starting point for the 
measurement of costs of production. The cost of a factor of production is de-
fined as the maximum return which would be earned by that factor in its next 
best alternative use. 
It is important for a project evaluator to know which variables are under his 
control. Suboptimal situations often exist and the project evaluator may find, 
for instance, that it would be more economical to import a certain product than 
to produce it domestically. However, it may be that the Government intends the 
country to be self-sufficient in a certain product. Although this may not be 
optimal in a strict economic sense, it may well be sensible from a national point 
of view, and the project evaluator should then base his analysis on actual poli-
cies rather than on imaginary optimal policies. 
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The last subject which is discussed in Chapter 1 concerns the relationship 
between national planning and project planning. Benefit-cost analysis is an 
important tool for determining the priority of projects and national planning 
cannot do without project planning since the project data are essential for the 
derivation of national parameters. At the same time, project planning cannot 
proceed without a knowledge of the national parameters. In a well run admi-
nistration, this circularity will strengthen the drawing up of national plans as 
well as plans for regions and income groups. The central planning unit would 
make tentative projections of national parameters and submit these to depart-
ments responsible for project planning; the latter would formulate their tenta-
tive investment program and submit these to the center, which would in turn 
correct the national plan and submit new parameters to the departments, and 
so on. As a result of this interaction, the likelihood of success for the nation's 
total investment program will be greatly increased. 
The valuation of benefits is reviewed in Chapter 2. After a discussion of the 
criticisms directed at the consumer surplus concept, it is concluded that changes 
in consumer welfare due to a price change cannot be measured if the consumer's 
marginal utility of income is not known. Anticipating the discussion in Part II, 
it is postulated that a social marginal utility of income function can be derived 
from the prevailing value concepts in the community. Welfare changes can then 
be found by evaluating the change in consumer surplus at the appropriate 
marginal utilities of income. If income distribution considerations are not im-
portant, then the social marginal utilities of income can be assumed to be con-
stant and an additional dollar at a low income level will have socially the same 
value as an additional dollar at a high income level. This is the justification for 
using, in such cases, the traditional benefit-cost analysis, even if goods have 
substantial income effects. Hence, when income distribution does not count, 
willingness to pay is the relevant concept and a consumer's welfare change can 
then be measured by the change in consumer surplus under the Marshallian 
demand curve. It is further discussed that the value of an intermediate product 
should be derived from the consumer's willingness to pay for the final product 
that the intermediate product helps to produce. 
The concept of willingness to pay, which is a concept of domestic prices, 
appears at first sight to have been challenged by LITTLE and MIRRLEES in their 
Manual on Industrial Project Analysis, where they suggest that all goods should 
be valued at border prices. Further review reveals, however, that the difference 
in approach is merely one of choosing different numeraires. Both methods have 
the same information requirements and will lead theoretically to the same result. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the LITTLE-MIRRLEES method can easily lead to in-
appropriate pricing. Moreover, due to the use of aggregated conversion factors, 
it will not be as precise as the normal method which undertakes to evaluate for 
each individual project its impact on the balance of payments. 
HARBERGER'S methodology is adopted in the first two sections of Chapter 3 
for the determination of the opportunity costs of inputs and foreign exchange. 
The opportunity cost of an input is shown to be the weighted average of the 
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demand and supply prices, the weights being the fractions of demand displaced 
and supply induced. The opportunity cost of foreign exchange appears to be the 
weighted average of the domestic values of the country's import and export 
prices, the weights being the fractions in which an additional dollar of foreign 
exchange will be used to increase imports and reduce exports. 
Labor as a production factor is unique in that the laborer's services are tied 
to the laborer, so that earnings as well as disutility of effort determine the welfare 
position of the laborer. With the help of the indifference curve analysis it is 
shown in section 3.3 that the opportunity cost of labor generally cannot be said 
to equal the foregone marginal product of labor, since this does not acknow-
ledge that labor may incur an extra disutility of effort. Three institutional 
frameworks are analyzed. The first is that of over-populated developing coun-
tries, and the doctrine that in such countries the marginal productivity of labor 
in the agricultural sector is zero (the LEWIS labor surplus model) is challenged 
on the basis of production principles and on the ground that it cannot be assum-
ed that farmers have no disutility from work. SEN'S hypothesis that the marginal 
utility of income schedule and the marginal disutility of labor schedule are flat 
in the relevant region is also rejected as unrealistic and in contradiction with 
empirical observation. HANSEN'S supply and demand model provides a clari-
fying analysis as to how wages are determined in the agricultural sector, and the 
opportunity cost of labor in the agricultural sector can be assumed to be a 
weighted average of observed actual rural wage rates and a reservation wage 
which may be set at the subsistence level. The second case concerns the cities. 
When calculating the opportunity cost of hiring a laborer in the city, it must be 
taken into account that the institutionally-determined high urban wage rates 
will result in an inflow of rural workers, not all of whom can find employment. 
An equilibrium situation is reached when the increase in urban unemployment 
reduces the expected earnings of the rural workers to such a level that migration 
is no longer attractive. Several migration functions proposed in the economic 
literature are discussed and, although sufficient empirical data are not available 
to determine the precise migration function, it is clear that the opportunity cost 
of labor in the urban areas must be set at a substantially higher level than the 
supply price of the rural migrants. The hiring of one migrant induces other rural 
workers to migrate to the urban area. The total opportunity cost must, there-
fore, include not only the direct opportunity cost of the worker hired but also 
the loss in welfare of those who become unemployed. The last institutional 
framework studied is that of the so-called 'primitive affluence' societies, where 
the subsistence farmer is able to produce as much as he can consume of the 
normal staple foods with a minimum of work - 19 to 25 hours per week in 
Papua New Guinea according to MOULIK - and is not willing to work, even at 
relatively high wages, in the modern sector. Following NAKAJIMA, FISK and 
others, this last phenomenon is explained by introducing the concept of a 
demand ceiling. As soon as this level of consumption has been reached, the 
labor-supply curve will start to slope backward. The opportunity cost of labor 
in such a society is high; furthermore, to make a modern man out of the sub-
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sistence farmer, the demand ceiling must be raised by bringing the farmer into 
contact with the modern world and inducing greater demand for goods and 
services. 
As regards the opportunity cost of the factor capital (section 3.4), the eco-
nomic literature is divided in its approach. On the one hand, there are those 
writers who feel that the relevant concept is the subjective time preference rate 
of lenders; on the other hand, there are those who feel that it should be the rates 
of return on private investment (gross of corporate taxes). It is pointed out that 
the individual time preferences do not necessarily reflect the social time pre-
ference rate of society as a whole and that the latter is the relevant concept. In 
Part I of the study it is assumed that the country in question has an optimal 
investment program and if resources are then transferred from the private 
sector to the public sector, the value of the goods produced in the public sector 
with these resources must at least be equal to the value of the goods that would 
be produced with these resources in the private sector. Hence, the social time 
preference rate is then the weighted average of the private rates of return fore-
gone, the weights being the amounts of investments which would have been 
necessary to produce the private sector products. The production function 
approach of estimating the rates of return on investment in an economy is 
discussed, and it is concluded that this approach must be rejected on practical 
as well as on theoretical grounds. The only correct method is the direct analysis 
of the rates of return on private investment. A complication arises in that 
industrial surveys publish nominal data whereas capital, labor, other inputs and 
outputs should be measured in real terms, or, in other words, at their appropriate 
shadow prices. Theoretically, the approach is clear, but lack of empirical data 
will often result in rather rough estimates of the opportunity cost of capital, and 
sensitivity tests should, therefore, generally be applied. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the analytics of project planning. The first two 
sections review the optimal scale and the optimal timing of a project; the third 
section reviews more complicated cases such as competing projects, joint pro-
duction, peak-load demand problems, decreasing average cost projects and 
projects which earn or save foreign exchange. Great emphasis is placed in the 
fourth section on the analysis of non-optimal situations. This section is an 
elaboration of what was briefly discussed in Chapter 1, namely, that in all cases 
where the Government is not willing to eliminate distortions, the project 
evaluator should base his analysis on actual policies rather than on hypothetical 
optimal policies. 
Chapter 5 reviews the various project ranking criteria which have been pro-
posed by the economic literature, specifically the internal rate of return, the 
present value and the benefit-cost ratio methods. It is shown that in the absence 
of budget constraints, the present value method is the only correct way to 
evaluate a project. In the event of a single period budget constraint, projects 
should be ranked on the basis of their ratios of present value of net benefits to 
present value of investment, priority being given to the project with the highest 
ratio and so proceeding down the line until the budget is exhausted. The same 
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result can be obtained by ranking projects on the basis of what the study calls 
their modified internal rates of return. While the unmodified internal rate of 
return is calculated by valuing the cash flow generated by a project at the inter-
nal rate of return, the modified internal rate of return is calculated by valuing 
the cash flow at the opportunity cost of capital rate. When the budget constraint 
prevails over multiple periods, the opportunity cost of capital can no longer be 
used for discounting the benefits and costs of projects and the discount rate 
should then be the rate at which the number of projects accepted just exhausts 
the investment funds available. In other words, it is the rate which equilibrates 
total investments with available funds. In many cases the values of a project's 
inputs and outputs cannot be projected with precision but are subject to a 
margin of uncertainty. Probability distributions of each of the significant varia-
bles about which uncertainty exists should then be drawn up, and the probability 
distribution of the net present value of the project calculated. The value of the 
project is then its expected value, i.e., the aggregate of each net present value 
multiplied by its probability. There is a substantial theoretical literature about 
decision rules to be followed in the case of complete uncertainty. The author 
believes, however, that in reality decisions are always based on subjective 
judgments and it is then difficult to imagine, as decision theory does, that no 
opinion can be formed about the probable value of a certain variable. 
How linkage effects, externalities, and foreign labor and capital are to be 
handled in benefit-cost analysis is discussed in the first three sections of Chapter 
6 ; none of these present a theoretical problem although, in practice, of course, 
estimation problems arise. The last section of Chapter 6 reviews how the op-
portunity costs of the factors of production differ from their normal values when 
the economy is not in a situation of internal and external balance. It is shown 
that the micro-economic project decision rules proposed in the study are con-
sistent with the macro-economic policies that Governments should follow to 
attain overall balance. 
Part II of the study starts with a review in Chapter 7 of the so-called com-
pensation tests and it becomes clear immediately that they are worse than use-
less if income distribution counts. If a group of poor persons is worse off by 
$ 100,000 while a group of rich persons is better off by $ 250 ,000 , the fact that 
the poor could have been compensated for their loss is completely irrelevant if 
they are not, and one cannot say, therefore, that there is a net gain in welfare of 
$ 150,000. If compensation does not take place - and it is difficult to find a pro-
ject where it takes place - the loss of the poor as well as the gain of the rich should 
be valued at the appropriate social marginal utilities of income to determine 
whether there is a net gain in welfare. Furthermore, even if compensation would 
take place, the same procedure should be followed since, otherwise, projects 
cannot be compared on the basis of their social values. In other words, the 
determination of whether a project will result in a welfare gain should always 
be based on a country's social welfare function. ARROW'S objection to the con-
cept, namely that the function cannot be derived from individual preferences, 
is discussed but it appears that his conditions for constructing the function are 
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much too restrictive. There are in every community prevailing general values 
and they can be found by experiments, interviews and analyses of the actions of 
thought leaders and the public at large. Income distribution is an important 
aspect of social welfare, and there can be no doubt that it is taken into considera-
tion by Governments when making investment decisions. It is, therefore, 
accepted that social income distribution weights do exist, and the task at hand is 
to determine these and to incorporate them in the project planning framework. 
In the opinion of several writers, income distribution has an intertemporal 
as well as an interpersonal aspect. Chapter 8 reviews the so-called social dis-
count literature which argues that when investments and therewith income and 
consumption growth are not considered optimal, a special investment algo-
rithm should be used for the evaluation of investment projects to ensure that a 
quick deepening of the capital structure of the economy takes place. Under 
normal circumstances it may be assumed that the Government will apply 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies to promote investments if expansion 
of investment is considered necessary, in which case the projected opportunity 
costs of capital determine the discount rate for evaluating public investment 
projects. The social discount rate literature, however, maintains that political 
and institutional constraints make such a policy not feasible, especially in the 
developing countries, so that then investment is socially worth more than con-
sumption, and proceeds to analyze the situation as follows. 
First of all, it is contended that the objective of development is the maximi-
zation of aggregate consumption - present as well as future consumption - and 
the problem is, therefore, to determine how aggregate consumption should 
grow over time. Dividing aggregate consumption by population and taking 
present per capita consumption as the numeraire, the literature shows that the 
rate of fall over time of the marginal utility of per capita consumption is equal 
to the product of the growth rate of per capita consumption g and the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to consumption a. For in-
stance, if the growth rate of per capita consumption is 3 percent per annum 
while for every one percent increase in per capita consumption the marginal 
utility of per capita consumption decreases by one percent, the rate of fall of 
the marginal utility of per capita consumption will be 3 percent per annum. If 
there is a pure time preference rate p - and there are good reasons to believe that 
there is - future consumption must increase at the rate p + ccg if it is to be on the 
optimal growth path. This means, of course, that future consumption should be 
discounted at the ratep + ccg to find its present value. This rate, which is denoted 
by d, is known as the social discount rate or sometimes also as the consumption 
rate of interest. Although it is assumed in the literature that the values of p vary 
from 1 to 5 percent, of a from x\% to 2 V2 percent, and of g from 2 to 3 percent, so 
that the value of the social discount rate d may be set at anywhere between 2 and 
1272 percent, the literature seems to feel that generally d is of the order of 5 
percent or less. 
The second point made in the social discount literature is that, because there 
exists the constraint on expanding investments to the optimal level, private 
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investments will generate consumption streams much larger than the rate of 
return d. Suppose that the rate of return of the private sector is q percent and 
that this rate of return is entirely consumed. Then it follows immediately that 
the present value of this consumption stream is q/d. Assumrng that the oppor-
tunity cost of private capital q is 12.5 percent and that d is 5 percent, the litera-
ture concludes that in this case investments have a shadow price Pmv of 2.5 times 
their nominal value. However, this example is not entirely correct because the 
rate of return in the private sector is never entirely consumed. Part of it, sq, 
will be reinvested, where s is the savings coefficient. Since this reinvested part 
should be valued at the shadow price of investment, the return on private in-
vestment is socially worth (q - sq) + SC[ JTinv* 
The present value of this stream 
discounted at the rate d is equal to Ptm, and it thus follows that Pi„v = (q - sq)/ 
(d - sq). Assuming that the marginal savings coefficient of the private sector 5 
equals 20 percent and using the values for q and d assumed above, the shadow 
price of investment in this example would be 4.0 and any investment should 
thus, according to the literature, be valued at a premium of 300 percent. 
It is now clear how the proponents of the social discount rate method evaluate 
public investment projects. Since benefits and costs should be measured in 
terms of consumption, the benefit-cost stream of a particular project should be 
divided into its consumption and investment parts and, while the consumption 
part should be valued at its face value, the investment part should be valued at 
the shadow price of investment. Assuming, as the literature does, that the public 
investment displaces for the full hundred percent private investments, the social 
discount rate cum shadow price of investment algorithm of evaluating public 
investment projects may be written as: 
A 7Vt(l - S*) + NtS*Pinv . v p 
«-I (1 + d)' 
where N is net benefits of the project under scrutiny, s* is the invested part of 
the net benefits, K is the investment costs of the project and, as before, Pi„v is 
the shadow price of investment, and d is the social discount rate. 
The above discussion of the social discount rate sets out the approach taken 
in the UNIDO Guidelines. The OECD Manual takes savings as the numeraire 
instead of consumption, but it is shown that the two approaches are theoretical-
ly identical. There are, however, serious difficulties with both procedures for 
evaluating public investments. Section 8.4 compares the algorithm with the 
traditional criterion and concludes that with very reasonable values of s*, q, d 
and Pinv, short life projects (10 years) should have very high internal rates of 
return (26 percent to more than 50 percent) before they are acceptable under the 
algorithm. Section 8.5 analyzes the algorithm in more detail. It is pointed out 
that public investment generally displaces not only private investment but also 
consumption and that the source of finance of a particular public project deter-
mines, therefore, to a large extent whether the project is acceptable. This means 
also that the algorithm cannot be diverged from interpersonal income distri-
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bution considerations since it is of course of the utmost importance to know 
whose consumption and whose investment will be foregone. In their sequel 
volume to the OECD Manual, LITTLE and MIRRLEES have indeed introduced 
interpersonal weights but, as Section 8.5 discusses, it appears that these are 
highly discriminatory. The weights are greater than unity for incomes below 
the level at which the Government makes subsidy payments, decrease rapidly 
to zero above this level and rise to unity for the rich groups who save almost all 
of their incomes. Section 8.5 also points out that the concept of one single social 
discount rate is unrealistic. The intertemporal income distribution problem is 
a special aspect of the interpersonal income distribution problem since the 
intertemporal weights as well as the interpersonal weights are derived from 
the same marginal utility of consumption function. There are, therefore, as 
many social discount rates as there are income classes with different income 
growth rates. It is also pointed out that it is unrealistic to draw up a social mar-
ginal utility schedule as a function of the economy's aggregate consumption or 
income; the fallacy of the pursuit of growth for its own sake, without taking 
into account whose incomes should grow, has been amply demonstrated in the 
last decade. 
If the UNIDO and OECD approaches of evaluating public investments have 
drawbacks, the question arises, what then? It is discussed that usually Govern-
ments do promote private investments by appropriate fiscal and monetary 
policies and that if they are allowed to transfer funds from the private sector, 
the weighted projected rates of return of the private sector represent the discount 
rate for public projects. If such transfers are not possible, there will be a budget 
constraint and, as discussed in Chapter 5 a budget constraint discount rate is 
then the relevant cut-off rate. There may be some use for the capital deepening 
algorithm if the body politic prohibits the use of fiscal and monetary policies 
and is willing to accept the discriminatory nature of the system. However, the 
writer believes that such cases are rare indeed. 
Chapter 9 addresses itself to the question of whether income distribution 
between persons should be considered relevant for project planning. On the 
one hand, there are those who without further ado postulate that income distri-
bution weights should be used; on the other hand, there are those who feel that 
only the traditional benefit-cost analysis leads to correct results. A detailed 
discussion of why this controversy exists is deferred to Sections 9.4 and 9.5 and 
the first problem which is analyzed is whether meaningful income distribution 
weights can be determined. Section 9.2 reviews the rather scarce literature which 
has postulated that individual marginal utility of income functions do exist. 
There is the BERNOUILLI function, subsequently defended by WEBER and 
FECHNER and recently adopted by CHENERY et al. and TINBERGEN, which states 
that constant percentage increases in income produce constant arithmetic 
increases in welfare; there is also the function of CRAMER, recently defended 
by STEVENS, which states that constant percentage increases in income produce 
constant percentage increases in welfare. The marginal utility of income under 
the BERNOUILLI function falls much faster than under the CRAMER function; 
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the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income is minus 
unity according to BERNOULLI and minus one-half according to CRAMER. 
While the functions were postulated by these writers to solve the so-called St. 
Petersburg Paradox - discussed in the Annex to Chapter 9 - they were pre-
sumably not based on empirical observations. The pathbreaking work of 
FISHER, FRISCH, FELLNER, THEIL and BROOKS, and VAN PRAAG on the measure-
ment of the marginal utility of income from observable consumer behavior is 
discussed, but unfortunately it appears that the various findings are still quite 
speculative. It appears, however, very probable that the elasticity of the margi-
nal utility of income with respect to income is larger than unity (in absolute 
terms) for the lower income groups. 
Section 9.3 discusses whether the income distribution weights derived from 
the individual marginal utility of income schedule can be taken to represent the 
social weights which the Government should use for project planning purposes. 
It is shown that the individual marginal utility of income schedule cannot be 
relevant because the use of this schedule implies that every person in the com-
munity should have the same income. In reality, of course, for a wide range of 
incomes society is indifferent as to how incomes are actually distributed. Edu-
cation and own efforts will cause differences in incomes and even in the most 
centrally planned economies such differences are accepted. Society, however, 
does attach weights to the incomes of the ultra-poor and the ultra-rich. Since 
unskilled labor income appears normally to be valued at unity, this may be 
taken as the base income for the calculation of the income distribution weights 
on the poor's income. Applying the BERNOULLI-WEBER-FECHNER law, these 
weights are inversely proportionate to income level. At the higher income levels, 
the incomes of professionals such as engineers, physicians and Cabinet members 
appear to be generally accepted socially as reasonable, and taking that level 
as a base, the weights on higher incomes can then again be calculated with the 
help of the BERNOULLI-WEBER-FECHNER function. For instance, in a typical 
middle-level developing country with a modal family income of about US$ 1,200 
per annum, subsistence income is about US$ 250 per annum, unskilled labor 
income is about USS 600 per annum, and professionals employed in the 
Government receive about USS 4,800 per annum. Following the procedures 
discussed above, the range of incomes of US$ 600 to USS 4,800 would receive 
a weight of unity; the incomes of the poor, i.e., incomes below USS 600, would 
receive weights varying from 2.4 to 1; and the incomes of the rich, i.e., incomes 
above USS 4,800, would receive weights varying from 1.0 to zero. In the opinion 
of the writer, the proposed procedure of estimating socially acceptable weights 
is reasonable. However, the found weights should not be considered precise 
and absolute, and sensitivity tests should be undertaken. 
While the objective function for a project under the traditional benefit-cost 
criterion is written as A W = Yp + Ya where Yp is the gain in real income of the 
different consumers of the product produced by the project and Ya the gain in 
real income of the producer, the objective function in the case of welfare maxi-
mization is of the form A W = vpYp + vaYa, where vp is the income distribution 
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weight on the additions to income of the consumers, and va the income distri-
bution weight on the income of the producer. In the case of a public project, 
the weight va has the value of unity, while the weight vp is derived as discussed 
in the previous paragraph. What are the implications of the use of the welfare 
maximization function for project size? Since Yp = B - R, and Ya = R - C, 
where B is benefits, R is revenues and C is costs, the first order condition for the 
maximization of the objective function is vp = (dC - dR)/(dB - dR) or, in 
words, project size should be expanded until the marginal loss in income of the 
producer equals the marginal redistribution gain of the consumers weighted 
with the distribution weight vp. If no repayments are levied, this condition 
becomes vp = dC/dB. In case of constancy of project benefits, this may be 
written as vp = dBA- amr/dBA-a^r, where dBA-amr is the annual benefit stream 
of the invested marginal dollar discounted at the marginal dollar's rate of return, 
and dBA- amq the same benefit stream but discounted at the opportunity cost 
of capital rate q. It follows that amr = vp- amq and it is thus possible to calculate 
the internal rate of return r of the invested marginal dollar under varying as-
sumptions as to the values of vp, n and q. Suppose, for instance, that the incomes 
of a certain group of subsistence level farmers can be raised by providing them 
with irrigation water. Then, when the income distribution weight vp on addi-
tions to this group's income equals 2.0, the lifetime of the irrigation works is 
about 25 years and the opportunity cost of capital is 10 percent, the irrigation 
works should be built oversized to the point that the rate of return on the margi-
nal invested dollar is about 2 percent only. 
The use of an income distribution weighted objective function thus leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that projects should be oversized to the point that 
in many cases the rate of return on the marginal invested dollar is negligible or 
even negative. It is, therefore, not surprising that many writers believe that 
income distribution considerations should not play a role in determining the 
optimum size of a project. The author tends to agree. There are almost always 
other projects possible to increase the incomes of the target groups so that 
usually there is no need to build oversized projects. 
Should income distribution weights also be ignored in the selection of pro-
jects? Or, in other words, are only the economic rates of return relevant for 
project selection and not the social rates of return? When the possibility to 
transfer incomes is limited - which is usually the case - the only way of increas-
ing incomes is by means of projects. The consequence of this is that all possible 
projects should be socially weighed against each other. As in practice almost 
always projects with satisfactory economic rates of return can be found, it 
is suggested as a basic principle that only projects with economic rates of 
return higher than the opportunity cost of capital should be accepted. All the 
economically acceptable projects should then be scrutinized as to their social 
priority, and those with unsatisfactory social rates of return should be rejected. 
Since under this procedure each project will have a satisfactory economic rate of 
return, a minimum efficiency is ensured for the overall program; by choosing 
projects with satisfactory social rates of return, the program will also be socially 
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justified. To determine the overall investment program, it is thus necessary to 
calculate the economic as well as the social rates of return of the individual 
projects. This procedure has important consequences with respect to a coun-
try's development strategy. For instance, while according to the traditional 
analysis, the more efficient plantation development should be preferred to 
smallholder development, under the proposed methodology the latter should 
be preferred if it has the highest social rate of return. The methodology thus 
leads to some trade-off between growth and equity but not to the extent that 
projects earn less than the opportunity cost of capital, or the budget constraint 
rate if the assumption of absence of budget constraints is relaxed. 
The final section of Chapter 9 reviews the different income transfer mecha-
nisms that are available to a Government to increase the incomes of the poor. 
A useful classification is to distinguish among Government policies that inter-
vene at the income level, the price level and the investment level. The policies 
that intervene directly at the income level are fairly straightforward: they may 
consist of direct money transfers or transfers in kind. As regards the policies 
that intervene at the price level, it is shown that price subsidies may be an effi-
cient way of transferring income if the subsidy level is not too high. There is also 
the possibility of using tariffs to fix the price of a domestically produced good 
at a certain level. Although in such a case, a small deadweight loss exists, this 
can be considered to be the inherent cost of raising Government revenues by 
means of a tariff and this method of increasing the incomes of the poor is, 
therefore, well worth considering, provided that commodities can be identified 
which are mainly produced and not consumed by the poor. At the investment 
level, Government policies may be directed at: (a) capital held by the poor; (b) 
other private capital; and (c) Government capital. Since the bulk of the poor 
are often non-viable farmers, land reform or the opening up of new land may 
solve the problem of rural poverty to a large extent (where sufficient land is 
available). In many countries, however, the land to population ratio is so low 
that other strategies must be devised. Promotion of private manufacturing and 
services creates employment and thereby increases incomes but, in general, does 
not solve the entire problem. It is, therefore, not surprising that many Govern-
ments are promoting labor-intensive techniques of production. As regards 
Government investments, many Governments embark on programs of invest-
ments to provide the poor with inputs or other services. Many investment 
possibilities exist in such fields as irrigation, land drainage, agricultural pro-
cessing, marketing, transportation, education, water supply and electrification, 
and this project method of increasing incomes has been amply demonstrated 
to be a highly efficient method of income transfer. 
Chapter 10 applies the developed social methodology to several practical 
cases and the study ends with some concluding remarks. Any attack on poverty 
- and this is essential if social stability is to be ensured - should consist of a 
conglomerate of the various possible income transfer mechanisms, the actual 
mix to be determined on the basis of efficiency considerations. What this study 
is all about is that by calculating economic as well as social rates of return, it is 
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possible to devise investment programs geared towards raising the incomes of 
the poor without neglecting efficiency, thus ensuring both growth and social 
stability. 
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S A M E N V A T T I N G 
Dit boek is geschreven voor hen die op enigerlei wijze betrokken zijn bij de 
voorbereiding, evaluatie en uitvoering van projecten. Aangezien deze groep 
vele personen telt die niet economisch gevormd zijn, worden de meeste onder-
werpen van de projectbeoordelingstheorie tamelijk uitvoerig in dit boek be-
handeld. Tevens is geprobeerd de théorie tot een afgerond geheel op te bouwen. 
De reden voor het schrijven van dit boek is dat de behandeling van inkomens-
effecten in de projectevaluatie naar de mening van de schrijver nog veel te 
wensen over laat. Na een discussie in het eerste deel van de traditionele baten-
kosten analyse, welke als de economische evaluatie van projecten wordt geken-
schetst, wordt daarom in het tweede deel uitvoerig stil gestaan bij de sociale 
beoordeling van projecten, d.w.z. de evaluatie die ook de inkomensverdelings-
effecten van projecten in aanmerking neemt. 
De Engelse samenvatting volgt het schema van het boek op de voet. Voor de 
Nederlandse samenvatting is het daarom meer interessant in het kort aan te 
duiden welke aspecten deze Studie een eigen karakter geven. Wat betreft het 
eerste deel is dit allereerst de aandacht die wordt besteed aan niet-optimale 
situaties. Zij, die voor de baten-kosten analyse van projecten aansluiting zoeken 
bij de welvaartseconomie en het leerschema der volledige mededinging zullen 
deze niet behandeld vinden ; zij, die aannemen dat de wereld gekenmerkt is door 
distorsies en door zulk een veelheid van structurele relaties, dat gedetailleerde 
programmering veelal niet mogelijk is, zijn nader tot de gedachtenwereld van 
de schrijver. Deze zienswijze leidt ertoe dat, indien mkomensverdelingsaspecten 
niet belangrijk zijn, het 'wat heeft men er voor over' ofwel het zogenaamde 
'willingness to pay' principe wordt aanvaard voor de bepaling van de baten en 
het alternatieve kosten beginsel voor de bepaling van de kosten van een project. 
Verder heeft dit grondmotief als gevolg, dat wordt gekozen voor het gebruik 
van binnenlandse prijzen in plaats van, zoals tegenwoordig vaak wordt voor-
gestaan, wereldprijzen. Een tweede leiddraad is dat projecten niet in isolatie 
mögen worden bekeken ; de beperkte middelen maken een keuze uit de veelheid 
van mogelijke projecten noodzakelijk. Veel aandacht wordt daarom besteed 
aan het rangschikken van projecten. Een derde punt is dat, ofschoon het eerste 
deel theoretisch van aard is, steeds wordt getracht de problemen op een prac-
tische manier te benaderen. Voor de berekening van de schaduwprijzen van 
inputs, vreemde valuta, arbeid en kapitaal worden daarom vereenvoudigende 
benaderingsformules voorgesteld. Ook komt deze practische aanpak tot uit-
drukking in de behandeling van situaties van kapitaalschaarste, externe effecten, 
en de evaluatie van projecten in tijden van depressie. Tenslotte möge worden 
vermeld, dat in het eerste deel uitvoerig wordt ingegaan op het gebruik van 
buitenlandse arbeid en kapitaal, waarbij ook de kapitaaloverdracht door inter-
nationale organisaties zoals de Wereldbank ter sprake komt. 
Het tweede deel wijkt in belangrijke mate af van de bestaande literatuur. 
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Allereerst wordt uiteengezet, dat het compensatiebeginsel - en daarmede de 
traditionele analyse - moet worden verworpen, indien de inkomensverdeling 
wordt beïnvloed door een project. De enige méthode om de sociale prioriteit 
van een project in zulk een geval te beoordelen, is door te meten in hoeverre een 
meer optimale inkomensverdeling bereikt wordt en daarmede een toeneming 
van de collectieve welvaart. In dit opzicht wordt vaak een onderscheid gemaakt 
tussen de inkomensverdeling tussen generaties en de inkomensverdeling tussen 
personen in de bestaande generatie. Uitvoerig wordt in de Studie ingegaan op de 
nieuwe literatuur betreffende de sociale disconteringsvoet, welke postuleert 
dat indien het niveau van de investeringen in een land niet optimaal is een spe-
ciaal investeringsalgorithme moet worden gevolgd om het inkomen van de 
volgende generaties te vergroten. De analyse in de Studie maakt het echter dui-
delijk dat het hechten van gewichten aan investeringen, waardoor onder deze 
berekeningswijze investeringen waardevoller worden gemaakt dan consumptie, 
in wezen zeer discriminatoir is en tot een sterke benadeling van de midden in-
komensgroep kan leiden. Aangezien de overheid in de praktijk gewoonlijk 
verschillende andere meer efficiente Instrumenten, b.v. de invoer-, fiscale- en 
monétaire politiek, tot haar beschikking heeft, moet dit systeem van project-
evaluatie meestal worden verworpen. Verder wordt besproken dat het doel van 
het Overheidsingrijpen niet moet worden gezien als het streven naar groei van 
het nationale inkomen, maar als het streven naar een billijke groei van de in-
komens van de verschillende inkomensgroepen in de volkshuishouding. In 
wezen is daarom de intertemporale analyse dezelfde als de interpersonele 
analyse. 
Wat betreft de interpersonele kant van de baten-kosten analyse gaat de 
nieuwe literatuur er in het algemeen van uit dat investeringsprojecten moeten 
helpen de bestaande inkomensverdeling te verbeteren. Het is echter niet juist 
om, zoals deze nieuwe literatuur voorstelt, de sociale waarden van inkomens-
veranderingen tengevolge van een project af te leiden van een afnemende grens-
nut functie van het inkomen. Zoals wordt uiteengezet houdt zulk een procedure 
in dat een ieder in de maatschappij hetzelfde inkomen zou moeten hebben, en 
dat is iets dat door geen enkel land, hetzij op politieke dan wel op practische 
gronden, wordt aanvaard. Het is echter wel algemeen aanvaard dat een in-
komensvermeerdering van de allerarmsten of allerrijksten respectievelijk 
zwaarder en lichter moet wegen dan een verandering in de inkomens van de 
middengroep. Voor de sociale evaluatie van projecten stelt deze Studie daarom 
voor dat gebruik wordt gemaakt van een sociale welvaartsfunctie welke aan-
neemt dat voor de midden inkomensgroep de inkomensverdeling als optimaal 
mag worden beschouwd en dat wat betreft de uiteinden van de inkomensschaal 
de onlangs ook door Tinbergen en Chenery aanbevolen Bernouilli functie kan 
worden aanvaard. 
De op deze manier te bepalen sociale rentabiliteit van een project mag echter 
niet als de enige maatstaf voor het wel of niet accepteren van het project dienen. 
Efficiency overwegingen speien immers altijd een roi en dit betekent dat te allen 
tijde de verschillende methoden waarop de inkomensverdeling kan worden ver-
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beterd tegen elkaar moeten worden afgewogen. In principe is net daarom on-
juist een project met een läge economische rentabiliteit maar met een hoge sociale 
rentabiliteit zonder meer te accepteren. Met andere woorden, het geld mag 
niet over de balk worden gegooid. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt aan de hand van een aantal voorbeelden uit-
eengezet hoe de sociale evaluatie van projecten in de practijk moet worden uit-
gevoerd. Deze voorbeelden betreffen een hypothetisch project en een aantal 
actuele projecten gericht op landontwikkeling, irrigatie, mechanische ontgin-
ning en het gebruik van landbouwtractoren. Bovendien wordt voor een bepaald 
land (Maleisie) besproken hoe de sociale ontwikkelingsstrategie moet worden 
ontworpen voor een bepaalde sector (de landbouwsector). Het blijkt dat indien 
sociale overwegingen in aanmerking worden genomen belangrijke Verände-
rungen in de traditionele Strategie moeten worden aangebracht. 
Het ene na het andere land ondergaat tegenwoordig politieke en sociale on-
rust en het lijdt geen twijfel dat ter verkrijging van sociale stabiliteit niet alleen 
de groei van het nationale inkomen van een land moet worden nagestreefd, 
maar ook de groei van het inkomen van de laagste inkomensklassen. In de 
opinie van de schrijver kan de sociale evaluatie van projecten een belangrijke 
bijdrage leveren tot het bevorderen van de sociale stabiliteit van een land. 
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